{ "id": 2469299, "name": "In re MARRIAGE OF LINDA S. WALLER, n/k/a Linda S. Sachs, Petitioner, and DENNIS B. WALLER, Respondent-Appellant (The Department of Public Aid ex rel. Linda S. Waller, n/k/a Linda S. Sachs, Intervening Petitioner-Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "In re Marriage of Waller", "decision_date": "2003-04-23", "docket_number": "No. 4-02-0713", "first_page": "743", "last_page": "751", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "339 Ill. App. 3d 743" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "753 N.E.2d 1259", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 Ill. App. 3d 206", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 256279 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/324/0206-01" ] }, { "cite": "490 N.E.2d 1274", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1277" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 Ill. 2d 545", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3166520 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "552" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/111/0545-01" ] }, { "cite": "770 N.E.2d 177", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "185" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 325", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58932 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "709 N.E.2d 994", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "996" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 Ill. App. 3d 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 564655 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "328" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/304/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "613 N.E.2d 1381", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1389" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "245 Ill. App. 3d 797", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5386348 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "806" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/245/0797-01" ] }, { "cite": "751 N.E.2d 23", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "26" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 Ill. App. 3d 815", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 126414 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "819" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/322/0815-01" ] }, { "cite": "769 N.E.2d 924", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "928" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58930 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "390-91" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "781 N.E.2d 430", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "442", "parenthetical": "section 510(a) \"does not distinguish between 'procedural' and 'substantive' changes\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 Ill. App. 3d 297", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 637126 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "310", "parenthetical": "section 510(a) \"does not distinguish between 'procedural' and 'substantive' changes\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/335/0297-01" ] }, { "cite": "479 N.E.2d 1152", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1159" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Ill. App. 3d 963", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3530086 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "973" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/133/0963-01" ] }, { "cite": "657 N.E.2d 694", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "697" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 Ill. App. 3d 986", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 906787 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "990" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/275/0986-01" ] }, { "cite": "695 N.E.2d 1376", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1378-79" }, { "page": "1379" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 Ill. App. 3d 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 222652 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449" }, { "page": "450" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/296/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "583 N.E.2d 716", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "719-20" }, { "page": "719-20" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "222 Ill. App. 3d 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5262585 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "361-62" }, { "page": "362" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/222/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "570 N.E.2d 636", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "638" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "211 Ill. App. 3d 797", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2528998 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "799-800" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/211/0797-01" ] }, { "cite": "732 N.E.2d 1094", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1096" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 Ill. App. 3d 1080", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 140166 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1083" }, { "page": "1083" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/314/1080-01" ] }, { "cite": "732 N.E.2d 667", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "671" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 Ill. App. 3d 756", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 140089 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "760" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/314/0756-01" ] }, { "cite": "775 N.E.2d 217", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "221" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 Ill. App. 3d 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 487196 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "146" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/333/0141-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 838, "char_count": 18847, "ocr_confidence": 0.78, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.6513379256976782e-07, "percentile": 0.6928083451969593 }, "sha256": "136e6852b645e38f8fb780c2dc3fa3b63f7b641d424d66d5f116f88168d7caee", "simhash": "1:aba5f56c7f69bdc5", "word_count": 3090 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:12:32.579911+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re MARRIAGE OF LINDA S. WALLER, n/k/a Linda S. Sachs, Petitioner, and DENNIS B. WALLER, Respondent-Appellant (The Department of Public Aid ex rel. Linda S. Waller, n/k/a Linda S. Sachs, Intervening Petitioner-Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE APPLETON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe trial court dissolved the marriage of petitioner, Linda S. Waller (n/k/a Sachs), and respondent, Dennis B. Waller, and awarded custody of their son, Joshua Waller, to petitioner. A modified order of support required respondent to pay child support until Joshua\u2019s eighteenth birthday, September 10, 2001. Joshua was not expected to graduate from high school, however, until May 31, 2002. On behalf of petitioner, the Illinois Department of Public Aid (Department) filed a motion to require respondent to continue paying child support until Joshua\u2019s expected date of graduation. Over respondent\u2019s objection, the trial court granted the motion. Respondent appeals, arguing that the trial court should have held an evidentiary hearing to consider the parties\u2019 current financial circumstances. We agree.\nWe hold that before extending the termination date of a support order to provide support for an 18-year-old until his or her graduation from high school, the trial court must comply with sections 510(a) and 513 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Dissolution Act) (750 ILCS 5/510(a), 513 (West 2000)). By refusing to apply those statutory sections to the facts of the case, the trial court abused its discretion. Therefore, we reverse the judgment. Because it is clear, from the undisputed evidence, that respondent lacked the ability to pay child support after Joshua turned 18, an order requiring him to do so could never stand; we remand, however, for entry of an order fixing the amount of the arrearage.\nI. BACKGROUND\nThe modified order of support, entered on March 19, 1997, required respondent to pay $320 per month in child support \u201cuntil September 10, 2001,\u201d as well as become current on the then-existing arrearage. On August 6, 2001, the Department filed its motion to extend child support. The Department alleged that although Joshua would attain the age of majority on September 10, 2001, his senior year in high school would not end until May 31, 2002. Attached to the motion was a letter, from the high school principal, confirming Joshua\u2019s expected date of graduation. The Department prayed \u201c[t]hat the [sjupport order continue through May[ ] 2002\u201d and the trial court \u201center a judgment\u201d against respondent \u201cfor arrears.\u201d\nOn October 16, 2001, respondent filed a response to the motion to extend child support, admitting the allegations in the motion but adding that \u201che [was] unemployed at this time and unable to make extended payments.\u201d He prayed that the trial court deny the motion for that reason. On the same day, he filed a financial affidavit averring that he was 45 years old, unemployed, and without any source of income. Other than a car, which he valued at $500, he had no assets. His monthly living expenses totaled $1,074.\nAt respondent\u2019s request, or with his agreement, the trial court continued the hearing on the motion several times, until June 4, 2002. In the hearing and in a memorandum he filed before the hearing, respondent made a twofold argument: (1) under section 510(d) of the Dissolution Act (750 ILCS 5/510(d) (West 2000)), child support ended when the child turned 18; and (2) a trial court could award postmajority support only under section 513 of the Dissolution Act (750 ILCS 5/513 (West 2000)), which required a new proceeding in which the trial court considered the parties\u2019 current financial circumstances.\nAfter hearing the arguments, the trial court disagreed with respondent. It explained, in a dialogue with his attorney:\n\u201cI respectfully disagree with the proposition that you can\u2019t order [s]ection 505 child support after a child turns 18.1 think I have the authority to modify the order, and I think that when the legislature says[,] [in section 505(g),] the termination date shall not be earlier than age 18[,] *** they could have said the termination date shall be no later than 18. They didn\u2019t say that. ***\nThe problem that I\u2019ve got here is, being fair to [respondent], I just don\u2019t understand why this wasn\u2019t heard sooner. If[,] back in September or October of 2001[,] I would have said the [m]otion is allowed, then [respondent] knows *** he can file a motion to modify. [He could have said:] [\u2018]Hey, Judge, *** I don\u2019t like your ruling, but I hear you ordered me to pay child support. Now let me tell you about this change of circumstances since that order was entered. I\u2019ve lost my job[\u2019 \u2014 ]or whatever. That\u2019s the problem that I [have].\n^ ^ ^\nI think I can continue^] under [s]ection 505[,] a child[-]support [obligation] past the [eighteenth] birthday without requiring a [hearing on a possible] change of circumstances *** or without implicating [s]ection 513.\n^ ^ $\n*** [I]t is not a [section] 510 modification to extend the termination date [rather than change the monthly amount of child support] ***. ***\n:Jc \u00edj\u00ed\n[Section 505(g) says:] [\u2018]Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prevent the court from modifying the order. [\u2019] ***\n^ ^ ^\n[Section] 513 doesn\u2019t apply because we haven\u2019t terminated [respondent\u2019s] child[-]support obligation under [sjection 505.\n^ ^\nI\u2019m ruling that since [petitioner] filed a motion before the [eighteenth] birthday of this child and asked me to modify the termination date[,] *** under [sjection 505 I have the authority to do that, and I\u2019m doing it.\u201d\nNotwithstanding its ruling, the trial court allowed respondent to make an offer of proof as to his current financial situation. Respondent testified, essentially, to the facts in his financial affidavit: his lack of income and assets. He testified that after \u201ca long time and a lot of resumes,\u201d he finally landed a job on March 11, 2002, only to be fired seven weeks later for failing to comply with his employer\u2019s unethical demands. Respondent insisted he lacked the means to pay child support.\nIn an amended judgment order entered on August 1, 2002, the trial court granted petitioner\u2019s motion to extend child support until May 31, 2002. The court held that \u201cit [had] the authority through [s]ection 505 to do so and that no modification under [s]ection 510 [was] implicated[,] nor [was] [sjection 513 implicated.\u201d The court found that under the modified order of support, respondent owed $8,611.14 plus statutory interest, whereas under the modified order of support as extended, he owed $11,171.14 plus statutory interest. The court entered a judgment against respondent for the latter figure.\nIn a motion to reconsider, respondent argued that \u201c[wjhile [sjection 505(g) does provide the [cjourt with authority to modify a support order, this clause is not independent of [sjection 510.\u201d The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration.\nThis appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nThis appeal turns on the meaning of sections 505, 510, and 513 of the Dissolution Act. We interpret statutes de novo. See Hogan v. Adams, 333 Ill. App. 3d 141, 146, 775 N.E.2d 217, 221 (2002). When a party appeals an order modifying an award of child support, we ask whether the trial court abused its discretion. In re Marriage of Mulry, 314 Ill. App. 3d 756, 760, 732 N.E.2d 667, 671 (2000). The trial court abused its discretion only if its decision was \u201cclearly against logic.\u201d State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Leverton, 314 Ill. App. 3d 1080, 1083, 732 N.E.2d 1094, 1096 (2000). The question here is whether the trial court had the statutory authority to extend respondent\u2019s child-support obligation in the fashion it did.\nThe Department argues that a trial court has the power, in certain circumstances, to order the payment of support beyond the child\u2019s eighteenth birthday. We agree with that truism. Attaining the age of majority, 18 years, is an emancipating event. In re Marriage of Ferraro, 211 Ill. App. 3d 797, 799-800, 570 N.E.2d 636, 638 (1991). Normally, child support ceases at emancipation, but the parties can agree otherwise or the judgment can provide otherwise. 750 ILCS 5/510(d) (West 2000). Section 513(a) describes the instances when a trial court \u201cmay award sums of money *** for the support of *** children of the parties who have attained majority.\u201d 750 ILCS 5/513(a) (West 2000). One of those instances is when \u201cthe child of the parties is still attending high school, even though he or she attained the age of 18.\u201d 750 ILCS 57513(a)(2) (West 2000).\nWe disagree with the Department that \u201c[i]t is child support under section 505, and not educational expenses pursuant to section 513, that is at issue in cases where a child needs support while finishing high school.\u201d Section 513(a)(2) describes \u201ceducational expenses\u201d as a type of \u201csupport [for] *** children *** who have attained majority,\u201d including those in high school. 750 ILCS 5/513(a)(2) (West 2000). \u201cSupport\u201d is simply a general term that can include \u201ceducational expenses\u201d for a child who has turned 18 but is still in high school. \u201cEducational expenses\u201d may include \u201croom\u201d and \u201cboard,\u201d just as the more generic term, \u201csupport,\u201d may include shelter and food. A court can award \u201csupport\u201d to disabled unemancipated children, minor or nonminor (750 ILCS 57513(a)(1) (West 2000)), and a particular kind of support, \u201ceducational expenses,\u201d to \u201cnonminor children\u201d in school (750 ILCS 57513(a)(2) (West 2000)). In short, if the child has attained majority, the trial court must turn to section 513 when deciding whether to award support for that \u201cnonminor child.\u201d\nThe modified order of support stated that respondent\u2019s obligation to pay support would cease when Joshua ceased being a minor. To require respondent to continue paying support after Joshua turned 18, the trial court had to change, or \u201cmodify,\u201d the modified order of support. Therefore, section 510, entitled \u201cModification *** of provisions for *** support,\u201d had obvious relevance. 750 ILCS 5/510 (West 2000). Section 510(a) provides that \u201c[a]n order for child support may be modified\u201d in two circumstances, only one of which (the parties agree) has any possible applicability to this case: \u201cupon a showing of a substantial change in circumstances.\u201d 750 ILCS 5/510(a)(1) (West 2000).\nThe Department contends that modifying the date the parent may cease paying child support is not truly a modification within the meaning of section 510. It cites two cases holding that a parent\u2019s obligation to pay child support ends, by operation of law, when the child abandons the parental home (Meyer v. Meyer, 222 Ill. App. 3d 357, 361-62, 583 N.E.2d 716, 719-20 (1991)) or gets married (In re Marriage of Daniels, 296 Ill. App. 3d 446, 449, 695 N.E.2d 1376, 1378-79 (1998)). The Department reasons, by analogy, that the period during which a parent must pay support extends, by operation of law (without a showing of a substantial change of circumstances), to the date the 18-year-old beneficiary of the support is scheduled to graduate from high school.\nWe disagree with the Department\u2019s reasoning. Meyer and Daniels relied on section 510(d) of the Dissolution Act (750 ILCS 5/510(d) (West 1998)), which provided: \u201cUnless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in a judgment, provisions for the support of a child are terminated by emancipation of the child ***.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Meyer, 222 Ill. App. 3d at 362, 583 N.E.2d at 719-20; Daniels, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 450, 695 N.E.2d at 1379. No statute says: \u201cAbsent an order or agreement, provisions for the support of a child are extended to the date he or she graduates from high school, regardless of emancipation.\u201d\nIn In re Marriage of Offer, 275 Ill. App. 3d 986, 990, 657 N.E.2d 694, 697 (1995), we held that section 510(a) applied to a petition to extend maintenance. We see no principled reason to distinguish between an extension of child support and an extension of maintenance; both are a \u201cmodification\u201d of an order of child support or maintenance within the meaning of section 510. In In re Marriage of Stanley, 133 Ill. App. 3d 963, 973, 479 N.E.2d 1152, 1159 (1985), we held that the \u201cduration\u201d of maintenance and child support was \u201cmodifiable upon a showing of substantially changed circumstances\u201d\u2014 the showing section 510(a) required. We have declined to read into section 510(a) an exception for certain types of modifications. In re Marriage of Turrell, 335 Ill. App. 3d 297, 310, 781 N.E.2d 430, 442 (2002) (section 510(a) \u201cdoes not distinguish between \u2018procedural\u2019 and \u2018substantive\u2019 changes\u201d).\nTo require continued support until graduation day, the trial court had to change the modified order of support by effectively drawing a line through the words \u201cuntil September 10, 2001,\u201d and substituting the words \u201cuntil May 31, 2002.\u201d A modification is a modification. Section 510(a) imposes conditions for modifying an order of support and, on its face, makes no exception for extending the period during which the parent must pay support. We will not interpret an unambiguous statute as having subtle exceptions or limitations that are absent from the text. Lauer v. American Family Life Insurance Co., 199 Ill. 2d 384, 390-91, 769 N.E.2d 924, 928 (2002). If the legislature intended to make an exception for modifying the duration of support, it surely would have considered the exception important enough to s\u00e1y so in section 510. Increasing the period during which the parent must pay monthly support means more money out of the parent\u2019s pocket, just as surely as increasing the monthly amount.\nIn section 505(g), the trial court purported to find authority, separate and distinct from section 510, to change the modified order of support. Specifically, the trial court relied on the language in section 505(g) that \u201c[t]he termination date shall be no earlier than the date on which the child covered by the order will attain the age of majority or is otherwise emancipated\u201d and \u201c[njothing in this subsection shall be construed to prevent the court from modifying the order.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 5/505(g) (West 2000). Just because a court can order postmajority support, it does not follow that it has unfettered discretion to do so. Further, just because nothing in section 505(g) prevents a court from modifying a support order, it does not follow that nothing in section 510(a) \u2014 or, for that matter, any other section of the Dissolution Act, such as section 513 \u2014 prevents the modification.\nThe Department argues that even if section 510 was applicable, the evidence showed a substantial change of circumstances in that Joshua would not graduate from high school until May 2002. We do not understand how Joshua\u2019s expected date of graduation was a change in circumstances. The Department offers no explanation and does not cite any pages of the record that shed light on that question. A \u201cchange in circumstances,\u201d within the meaning of section 510(a)(1), is a change that occurred sometime after the entry of the modified order of support. See In re Marriage of Hughes, 322 Ill. App. 3d 815, 819, 751 N.E.2d 23, 26 (2001). According to the petition for a judgment of dissolution, Joshua was born on September 10, 1983. Presumably, he would not have started kindergarten until 1989. By our count, he was right on schedule when he began his senior year of high school in 2001, the year he turned 18. The parties must have known, from the date of Joshua\u2019s birth, that he would reach the age of majority before graduating from high school.\n\u201cWhen determining whether there is sufficient cause to modify, courts consider both the circumstances of the parents and the circumstances of the child.\u201d In re Marriage of Lambdin, 245 Ill. App. 3d 797, 806, 613 N.E.2d 1381, 1389 (1993). The trial court erroneously concluded that respondent\u2019s financial circumstances were irrelevant. \u201cFor a modification to occur, there must be a change in the child\u2019s needs, an increase in the father\u2019s income, or a change in the financial condition of the mother.\u201d In re Marriage of Pettifer, 304 Ill. App. 3d 326, 328, 709 N.E.2d 994, 996 (1999). The record contains no evidence of any of those changed circumstances.\nEven if the evidence did show a substantial change in circumstances, we would nevertheless reverse the trial court\u2019s judgment because the trial court refused to consider the factors in section 513(b) and thereby caused substantial prejudice to respondent. Section 513(b) provides:\n\u201cIn making awards under paragraph *** (2) of subsection (a) [(which allows support for 18-year-olds who are still in high school)], *** the court shall consider all relevant factors that appear reasonable and necessary, including:\n(1) The financial resources of both parents.\n(2) The standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved.\n(3) The financial resources of the child.\n(4) The child\u2019s academic performance.\u201d 750 ILCS 5/513(b) (West 2000).\nLike section 510 of the Dissolution Act, section 513 was directly applicable to this case, and the trial court erred in sidestepping both of those sections. Section 510 was applicable because the trial court was modifying a support order. Section 513 was applicable because the trial court was \u201cawarding] sums of money *** for the support of [a] child *** who [had] attained majority.\u201d 750 ILCS 5/513(a) (West 2000).\nWe disagree with respondent that the trial court\u2019s failure to follow sections 510 and 513 deprived it of jurisdiction. Subject-matter jurisdiction flowed from the Illinois Constitution, not from the Dissolution Act. See Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 335, 770 N.E.2d 177, 185 (2002). Nevertheless, the trial court disregarded controlling statutory law, to the substantial prejudice of respondent, and thereby abused its discretion. See Leverton, 314 Ill. App. 3d at 1083, 732 N.E.2d at 1096. A court should not order a parent to pay a greater amount of support than the parent can reasonably afford. In re Support of Pearson, 111 Ill. 2d 545, 552, 490 N.E.2d 1274, 1277 (1986).\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court\u2019s amended judgment order. Respondent remains obligated, however, to pay the arrears in child support that accrued prior to September 10, 2001; we remand for entry of a judgment order stating the arrearage ($8,611.14) and statutory interest calculated consistent with Burwell v. Burwell, 324 Ill. App. 3d 206, 753 N.E.2d 1259 (2001).\nReversed; cause remanded with directions.\nKNECHT and McCULLOUGH, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE APPLETON" } ], "attorneys": [ "John T. Phipps (argued), of John T. Phipps Law Offices, PC., of Champaign, for appellant.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Diane M. Potts (argued), Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re MARRIAGE OF LINDA S. WALLER, n/k/a Linda S. Sachs, Petitioner, and DENNIS B. WALLER, Respondent-Appellant (The Department of Public Aid ex rel. Linda S. Waller, n/k/a Linda S. Sachs, Intervening Petitioner-Appellee).\nFourth District\nNo. 4-02-0713\nArgued April 23, 2003.\nOpinion filed June 17, 2003.\nJohn T. Phipps (argued), of John T. Phipps Law Offices, PC., of Champaign, for appellant.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Diane M. Potts (argued), Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0743-01", "first_page_order": 759, "last_page_order": 767 }