{
  "id": 2469556,
  "name": "RONALD Z. RICHEY, Plaintiff-Appellant v. ERIE INSURANCE GROUP et al., Defendants-Appellees",
  "name_abbreviation": "Richey v. Erie Insurance Group",
  "decision_date": "2003-06-25",
  "docket_number": "No. 3-02-0688",
  "first_page": "1002",
  "last_page": "1005",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "339 Ill. App. 3d 1002"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "785 N.E.2d 951",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "year": 2003,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "337 Ill. App. 3d 420",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        894509
      ],
      "year": 2003,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/337/0420-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 142",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        609692
      ],
      "year": 2003,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-2d/204/0142-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 385,
    "char_count": 6583,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.762,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08,
      "percentile": 0.0811636122414859
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    "sha256": "87045ff10d6a952848599ee7a7d181b15fd569e9171367b6d1dca47739ba1513",
    "simhash": "1:f8eaf7541fce4fce",
    "word_count": 1097
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:12:32.579911+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "RONALD Z. RICHEY, Plaintiff-Appellant v. ERIE INSURANCE GROUP et al., Defendants-Appellees"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE LYTTON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe plaintiff, Ronald Z. Richey, filed a complaint against the defendants, Erie Insurance Group, Erie Insurance Exchange, and Erie Insurance Company (collectively, Erie), after Erie refused to pay Richey\u2019s insurance claim for damage to his boat and its motor. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to Erie. On appeal, Richey argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law by granting partial summary judgment to Erie. We affirm.\nFACTS\nRichey\u2019s boat and its motor were insured by Erie. Richey\u2019s complaint stated that \u201c[o]n or about July 24, 1999,\u201d he was boating on the Illinois River when the boat\u2019s \u201cskeg, propeller and assembly holding the propeller\u201d came into contact with \u201cmud and other debris\u201d under the surface of the water. Richey claimed that \u201c[a]s a result of this collision, *** the underside of the housing for the propeller and attached assembly to the propeller was [sic] damaged and wrecked.\u201d\nDuring Richey\u2019s deposition, he said that at the time of the collision, the boat was traveling \u201c[mjaybe 15 miles an hour, if that.\u201d The boat then came to a stop in \u201c[m]aybe 15-18 inches\u201d of water. Richey turned the boat\u2019s motor off and got out of the boat to assess the damage. He determined that the boat\u2019s \u201coutdrive\u201d was imbedded in mud. Richey got back in the boat, started the motor, and attempted to free it from the mud by rocking it back and forth. He stated that in less than five minutes \u201call the warning buzzers were going off\u201d on the motor. He could not recall whether the motor \u201cshut itself down or if [he] shut it down.\u201d\nIn his complaint, Richey alleged that \u201cmud and other debris blocked the water pick-up of the lower unit of the motor\u201d as a result of the collision. He submitted after he restarted the motor, \u201c[t]he water pump disintegrated and no longer provided coolant to the motor, thus damaging the motor irreparably.\u201d In his affidavit, Erie\u2019s \u201cMaterial Damage Adjuster,\u201d Skip Rhea, \u201cconcluded the motor was pushed passed [sic] its limit when Mr. Richey attempted to dislodge [his boat] from the mud.\u201d\nRichey then freed the boat from the mud by digging around it with an oar. Another boat that was passing Richey\u2019s location towed Richey and his boat back to the boat launch. At the boat launch, Richey could not restart the motor.\nRichey paid for repairs to the propeller and gears and for replacement of the motor. Richey submitted an insurance claim to Erie, but Erie rejected the claim.\nErie\u2019s insurance policy states that Erie \u201cwill pay for direct and accidental loss of or damage to your insured property.\u201d The policy \u201capplies to losses that occur during the policy period anywhere within the continental United States.\u201d An \u201coccurrence\u201d is defined as \u201can accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to the same general harmful conditions.\u201d An \u201caccident\u201d is defined as \u201ca sudden, unforeseen, unintended event which causes *** damage.\u201d The policy excludes coverage for damage \u201cconfined to *** mechanical breakdown.\u201d\nRichey filed his complaint against Erie, which moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to Erie. The court\u2019s order stated that \u201c[t]he damage to the boat was caused by two separate occurrences.\u201d The court ruled that the occurrence that damaged the propeller was covered by Erie\u2019s policy, but it disallowed Richey\u2019s claim for the occurrence that damaged the motor. Richey appealed.\nANALYSIS\nRichey argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law by granting partial summary judgment to Erie.\nSummary judgment is appropriate where \u201cthe pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2\u20141005(c) (West 2000). We review a trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment de novo. Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142 (2003).\nThe construction of an insurance policy and its coverage are questions of law, which are appropriate subjects for summary judgment. In construing an insurance policy, a court is to ascertain and enforce the intent of the parties as expressed by the words in the policy. To determine the intent of the parties and the meaning of the words used in the insurance policy, a court must construe the policy as a whole. If the words of the policy are plain and unambiguous, a court will give them their plain, ordinary meaning and will apply them as written. Mutlu v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 337 Ill. App. 3d 420, 785 N.E.2d 951 (2003).\nIn this case, the wording of Erie\u2019s policy showed that Erie only covered occurrences that were accidents. In turn, accidents must be unforeseen events that cause damage. Furthermore, Erie\u2019s policy excludes damage caused by mechanical breakdown. The words of Erie\u2019s policy are plain and unambiguous. Therefore, we will give the words of Erie\u2019s policy their plain, ordinary meaning and apply them as written.\nRichey\u2019s boat collided with \u201cmud and debris\u201d under the surface of the water. The collision was an occurrence under Erie\u2019s policy because it was an accident, meaning that it was an unforeseen event that caused damage to the propeller and its assembly. When Richey stopped the boat\u2019s motor, got out of the boat, and restarted the motor, the ensuing damage to the motor was not part of the same occurrence that damaged the propeller and its assembly. It was foreseeable that irreparable damage to the motor would result when, after restarting the motor, Richey continued to use it until the water pump was destroyed and he heard the motor\u2019s \u201cwarning buzzers.\u201d Thus, the damage was foreseeable because of Richey\u2019s own actions, not the accident, and was not covered under the policy. Furthermore, under a plain reading of the insurance policy, coverage was also excluded as a \u201cmechanical breakdown.\u201d There was no genuine issue of material fact that damage to Richey\u2019s boat motor was not covered under the plain and unambiguous terms of Erie\u2019s insurance policy. The trial court did not err as a matter of law by granting partial summary judgment to Erie.\nCONCLUSION\nThe judgment of the Peoria County circuit court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nBARRY and SLATER, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE LYTTON"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Daniel G. O\u2019Day, of Cusack, Fleming, Gilfillan & O\u2019Day, EC., of Feoria, for appellant.",
      "Katherine S. Gorman Hubler, of Prusak & Winne, Ltd., of Peoria, for appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "RONALD Z. RICHEY, Plaintiff-Appellant v. ERIE INSURANCE GROUP et al., Defendants-Appellees\nThird District\nNo. 3-02-0688\nOpinion filed June 25, 2003.\nDaniel G. O\u2019Day, of Cusack, Fleming, Gilfillan & O\u2019Day, EC., of Feoria, for appellant.\nKatherine S. Gorman Hubler, of Prusak & Winne, Ltd., of Peoria, for appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "1002-01",
  "first_page_order": 1018,
  "last_page_order": 1021
}