{
  "id": 2962500,
  "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ralph C. Nunnley, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Nunnley",
  "decision_date": "1975-11-04",
  "docket_number": "No. 61566",
  "first_page": "4",
  "last_page": "6",
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    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:50:26.295263+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ralph C. Nunnley, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "PER CURIAM\n(Before Downing, P. J., Stamos and Leighton, JJ.):\nDefendant was charged with criminal trespass to vehicles, in that on November 6, 1974, he knowingly entered a 1972 Oldsmobile without the consent of the owner, Robert Muhr. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 21 \u2014 2.) He was convicted following a bench trial and sentenced to the House of Correction. He now appeals, contending he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\nThe defendant and the owner of the vehicle worked together on November 5, 1974. They then cashed their checks and commenced a tour of bars where both men consumed a formidable number of beers. Starting at 5 P.M. on November 5, they toured either 4 or 5 (Muhr\u2019s testimony), or 10 to 12 (defendant\u2019s testimony) bars in all, arriving at 1 or 2 o\u2019clock in the morning at the apartment of Aliene Cole, a female friend of the victim. The men arrived with six cans of beer which they were drinking at the time. The victim testified he \u201cgot sleepy\u201d and \u201cpassed out.\u201d Upon awakening the next morning, he found the defendant gone, his car was gone, and the ignition key was missing from his set of keys. He immediately reported the car stolen and went to defendant\u2019s home to inquire regarding the car, but defendant was not home. A few days later, the victim again visited defendant\u2019s home and after not finding him home, left a note advising him to call or return the car. On November 11, 5 days after the car had been taken, the victim and a police officer went to defendant\u2019s home. Defendant produced a xerox copy of a document pm-porting to be a bill of sale for the car. The victim conceded at trial that the signature appeared to be his, but denied that in fact it was his signature since he did not remember signing it. This document was placed in evidence as People\u2019s Exhibit No. 1. At trial, defendant introduced into evidence the original bill of sale and the victim\u2019s note which had been placed in the defendant\u2019s mailbox.\nDefendant related that prior to going to Miss Cole\u2019s apartment, he bought the car from the victim for $400.25 cash, and the victim signed the bill of sale. Defendant testified that he then left the girl friend\u2019s house, went to a bar, showed the car to a stranger and sold it to him for $400. The stranger drove the car off after using the key that defendant told him was under the seat. Aliene Cole testified that prior to defendant\u2019s departure, she saw defendant in possession of the victim\u2019s keys and heard him tell the victim that he would not return the keys because he was afraid the victim would wreck the car. She heard defendant and the victim discussing the sale of the car and heard the victim say he did not want to sell because he owed payments on the vehicle. She testified that defendant had more to drink than the victim; they had about 6 to 12 cans of beer.\nThe police officer said that when defendant was arrested on November 11, he stated that he had taken the victim\u2019s key, received a bill of sale from the victim, and sold the car to a stranger for $400.\nWhere evidence is circumstantial, proof beyond a reasonable doubt requires the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis based upon the evidence which is consistent with innocence. (People v. Cortez, 26 Ill.App.3d 829, 326 N.E.2d 232.) Hie issue in this case is whether the proof showed that defendant knowingly entered Muhr\u2019s vehicle without his consent. There is no direct evidence that defendant in fact entered Muhr\u2019s automobile. In fact, defendant testified that he did not enter the automobile after he left Aliene Cole\u2019s apartment on the morning in question, although he did seH the vehicle to a third party. Generally speaking, the rule is that where a criminal act, such as a theft, is committed through the instrumentality of an innocent agent, the person who induced the act is a principal. (Aldrich v. People, 224 Ill. 622, 79 N.E. 964.) Therefore, if defendant, without Muhr\u2019s consent, sold the vehicle to an innocent third party who subsequently entered the vehicle without Muhr\u2019s permission, the defendant would be a principal.\nHowever, the evidence that Muhr did not give defendant permission to enter' the vehicle after defendant left the apartment at 1 or 2 o\u2019clock in the morning on November 6, 1974, is not persuasive. Muhr testified that he \u201cgot sleepy\u201d while drinking the six cans of beer at Cole\u2019s apartment/that he \u201cpassed out,\u201d and that defendant left at 2 A.M.. This would have been after 9 hours of drinking beer. He had given permission to defendant to enter the automobile earlier that day and in fact they had driven in the automobile to Cole\u2019s apartment. Even though the victim knew where defendant resided, he waited 5 days before taking a police officer there. At trial, defendant produced the original bill of sale. Although Muhr admitted that the signature appeared to be his, he could not remember signing it. Ultimately, the proof of guilt comes down to a question of whether Muhr did or did not give defendant permission to enter his vehicle that morning, and whether defendant reasonably understood this. The only sober witness heard the men discussing the sale of the car, but she was unable to testify that the victim had not given defendant permission to enter the car. Considering aH the circumstances, and with due deference to the opportunity of the trial judge to see the witnesses, we nevertheless have concluded that this evidence did not establish' beyond a reasonable do\u00fabt that defendant knowingly entered the victim\u2019s vehicle without the victim\u2019s consent as charged in the complaint.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is therefore reversed.\nReversed.\nThe State\u2019s Attorney informed the appellant that the exhibits had been \u201cdestroyed,\u201d and thus were not available.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "PER CURIAM"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "James R. Streicker and Allen L. Wiederer, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.",
      "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Laurence J. Bolon and Linda Ann Miller, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ralph C. Nunnley, Defendant-Appellant.\n(No. 61566;\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNovember 4, 1975.\nJames R. Streicker and Allen L. Wiederer, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Laurence J. Bolon and Linda Ann Miller, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0004-01",
  "first_page_order": 30,
  "last_page_order": 32
}