{ "id": 5573088, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TRAMAINE JONES, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Jones", "decision_date": "2003-05-22", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201401\u20142259", "first_page": "103", "last_page": "108", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "341 Ill. App. 3d 103" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "174 Ill. 2d 320", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 223611 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/174/0320-01" ] }, { "cite": "332 Ill. App. 3d 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1034066 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/332/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "332 Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 132374 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "428", "parenthetical": "The Act does not permit a defendant to raise an issue on appeal from the dismissal of a postconviction petition that he never raised in the petition" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/321/0425-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 Ill. 2d 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1578278 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339" }, { "page": "338" }, { "page": "338" }, { "page": "339" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/206/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259103 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244" }, { "page": "240-41" }, { "page": "253, 257-58" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209962 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "379" }, { "page": "388-89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 Ill. 2d 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 223616 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418" }, { "page": "418" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/174/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 Ill. 2d 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1131041 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "527-28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/187/0500-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 520, "char_count": 11322, "ocr_confidence": 0.76, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.37279561855524e-08, "percentile": 0.48176901433249586 }, "sha256": "d53f8f3fbd18b1634bca1747965878dbeff99a658c1a311ad3c0ba2e1d5564f7", "simhash": "1:f3b2151512fcd2f7", "word_count": 1824 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:38:13.673521+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TRAMAINE JONES, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KARNEZIS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Tramaine Jones entered into a negotiated guilty plea to the charge of attempted first-degree murder and was sentenced to 20 years in prison. Subsequently, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 2000)), which the circuit court dismissed as frivolous and patently without merit. The sole issue presented on appeal is whether defendant\u2019s pro se postconviction petition was properly dismissed. We affirm the dismissal of defendant\u2019s petition because it failed to state the gist of a constitutional claim. Although we limit our analysis to the determination of whether defendant\u2019s petition was properly dismissed, we include a brief recitation of the procedural history of the case.\nOn August 12, 1999, after finding a sufficient factual basis for defendant\u2019s plea existed and defendant\u2019s plea was knowing and voluntary, the circuit court sentenced defendant to 20 years in prison, pursuant to the plea agreement. At sentencing, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 605(b)(2) (145 Ill. 2d R. 605(b)(2)), the circuit court admonished defendant that if he wanted to appeal he first had to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea or a motion to reconsider his sentence within 30 days.\nWithin 30 days of the court\u2019s judgment, defendant filed a pro se motion to reduce his sentence. In the motion, he alleged his sentence was excessive. The circuit court denied defendant\u2019s motion, finding that 20 years was an appropriate sentence and defendant had agreed to the sentence when he entered into the negotiated guilty plea. The court informed defendant he had 30 days to appeal the denial of his motion.\nInstead of filing an appeal, defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate the judgment on January 14, 2000. He alleged in the motion:\n\u201cI feel I wasn\u2019t represented to the fullest by my counsel, he didn\u2019t pay attention to the whole case. He was just looking at the crime instead of the facts.\u201d\nThe circuit court denied the motion as untimely because it was filed more than 30 days after the August 12, 1999, sentencing date.\nSubsequently, defendant filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief in March 2001. The petition consisted of a preprinted form with blank spaces that defendant filled in with handwritten text. Paragraph four of the petition, which purported to establish the basis for the petition, read:\n\u201cThat petitioner contends, as supported by the attached affidavits, that he was denied his right to_guaranteed by the __and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.\u201d\nDefendant wrote \u201ceffective assistance of counsel\u201d and \u201cSixth,\u201d respectively, in the blank spaces. The preprinted form also provided blank spaces for defendant to describe how his constitutional rights were violated; however, he did not fill in those blank spaces. The petition was verified by defendant\u2019s affidavit, which contained nothing more than defendant\u2019s notarized signature attesting that the allegations in the petition were true. The petition provided no other information or allegations and no supporting documentation was attached. The circuit court summarily dismissed defendant\u2019s petition as frivolous and patently without merit, finding the petition \u201ccompletely failed to assert any claim at all, much less even the gist of a constitutional claim.\u201d\nOn appeal, defendant contends for the first time the circuit court erroneously admonished him pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 605. On this basis, defendant seeks to have his case remanded for proper admonishments and an opportunity to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea.\nThe Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides an opportunity for a defendant to assert that his conviction was the result of a substantial deprivation of his constitutional rights. People v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500, 527-28 (1999). To succeed in receiving postconviction relief, the defendant must clearly state the ways in which his constitutional rights were violated and must provide affidavits, records, or other evidence to support the allegations or explain why none could be obtained. 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 2 (West 2000). In non-death-penalty post-conviction proceedings, the adjudication of a postconviction petition follows a three-stage process. People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410, 418 (1996). At the first stage, the circuit court must review the petition within 90 days and summarily dismiss the petition if it is frivolous or patently without merit. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 379 (1998); 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 2.1(a) (West 2000). To survive summary dismissal, a pro se petitioner need only raise the \u201cgist\u201d of a constitutional claim. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 380 n.2. The \u201cgist\u201d standard is a \u201clow threshold,\u201d and to meet this standard, the petition need only set forth \u201ca limited amount of detail,\u201d and need not include \u201clegal arguments\u201d or \u201clegal authority.\u201d People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 244 (2001), quoting Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d at 418. The standard of review at this stage of the proceeding is de novo. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 388-89.\nThe supreme court\u2019s holding in Edwards, that the defendant\u2019s pro se postconviction petition stated the gist of a constitutional claim, is illustrative. In Edwards, the defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition \u201cin which he alleged that, following the entry of his guilty plea, his court-appointed attorney refused his request to \u2018file an appeal\u2019 and became \u2018totally unavailable in regard to the case.\u2019 \u201d Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 240-41. The supreme court held that the defendant\u2019s petition met this low threshold and presented the gist of a constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. In rejecting the appellate court\u2019s conclusion that defendant\u2019s petition had been properly dismissed as frivolous and patently without merit, the supreme court concluded the defendant\u2019s allegations were sufficient and, at the first stage, the defendant was not required to allege how his appeal would have been successful in order to establish how he was prejudiced by his attorney\u2019s failure to pursue a requested appeal. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 253, 257-58.\nBefore addressing whether defendant\u2019s petition stated the gist of a constitutional claim, we must note that the scope of our review on appeal from the dismissal of defendant\u2019s petition is limited to consideration of only those claims actually raised in defendant\u2019s petition. People v. Britt-El, 206 Ill. 2d 331, 339 (2002). The supreme court\u2019s holding in Britt-El is based on section 122 \u2014 3 of the Act, which provides that \u201c[a]ny claim of substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or an amended petition is waived.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 3 (West 2000). In Britt-El, the supreme court held that only those claims the defendant raised in his first pro se petition could be considered on appeal. Britt-El, 206 Ill. 2d at 338. The defendant in Britt-El filed a second pro se petition in which he raised some of the same allegations he raised in his first petition as well as numerous additional allegations. The court found that because the claims in his second petition had not been raised in his first petition, they could not be addressed on appeal. Britt-El, 206 Ill. 2d at 338. The court reasoned:\n\u201c[T]hose claims in defendant\u2019s second petition which were not included in his first petition are waived. That being the case, the scope of our review is limited to consideration of those claims *** which were presented in both defendant\u2019s first post-conviction petition and his second.\u201d Britt-El, 206 Ill. 2d at 339.\nTherefore, our review is limited to examining the allegation raised in defendant\u2019s petition to determine whether it stated the gist of a constitutional claim. In making this determination we cannot consider defendant\u2019s contention, which he raised for the first time on appeal, that he was improperly admonished pursuant to Rule 605. See People v. Griffin, 321 Ill. App. 3d 425, 428 (2001) (The Act does not permit a defendant to raise an issue on appeal from the dismissal of a postconviction petition that he never raised in the petition).\nWe conclude defendant\u2019s petition was properly dismissed as frivolous and patently without merit because it failed to state the gist of a constitutional claim. Defendant\u2019s petition merely stated he was denied his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. To meet the low threshold of the \u201cgist of a constitutional claim,\u201d defendant was only required to present \u201ca limited amount of detail\u201d in his petition. Because defendant failed to present any detail whatsoever, he did not meet this threshold. Merely alleging he was denied his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, with nothing more, is insufficient. To invoke the Act, defendant merely needed to allege, in limited detail and without citation to legal authority, why he believed his counsel was ineffective. If we were to hold that defendant\u2019s meager allegation constituted the gist of a constitutional claim, we would effectively eviscerate the requirements and purpose of the Act.\nWe acknowledge this court\u2019s recent decisions in People v. Bates, 323 Ill. App. 3d 77 (2001), People v. Johnson, 332 Ill. App. 3d 81 (2002), and People v. Green, 332 Ill. App. 3d 481 (2002); however, we decline to follow them. In each of these cases, the court addresses the issue of improper guilty plea admonishments, when the issue was not raised in the defendants\u2019 pro se postconviction petitions, but was raised for the first time on appeal from the dismissal of their petitions. The cases upon which the court relies are not appeals from the denial of post-conviction petitions; rather, they are direct appeals. We reject the reasoning of the decisions in Bates, Johnson and Green and follow the clear language of the Act, which specifically limits our review on appeal to only those issues raised in defendant\u2019s postconviction petition.\nAccordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court dismissing defendant\u2019s pro se postconviction petition as frivolous and patently without merit.\nAffirmed.\nTHEIS, EJ., and GREIMAN, J., concur.\nAthough the court\u2019s admonishment adhered to the text of Rule 605(b)(2), the rule was legally inaccurate. Pursuant to People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320 (1996), a defendant can only challenge his sentence following the entry of judgment on a negotiated guilty plea by filing a motion to withdraw the guilty plea, not by filing a motion to reconsider the sentence. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 332. Subsequently, Supreme Court Rule 605 was amended, effective November 1, 2000, to add subsection (c), which complied with the holding of Evans. See 188 Ill. 2d R. 605(c).\nThe petition is not date stamped, but was signed by defendant and notorized on March 5, 2001.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KARNEZIS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Letty S. DiGiulio, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Alan J. Spellberg, and Bette Plass, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TRAMAINE JONES, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 01\u20142259\nOpinion filed May 22, 2003.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Letty S. DiGiulio, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Alan J. Spellberg, and Bette Plass, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0103-01", "first_page_order": 121, "last_page_order": 126 }