{ "id": 5572880, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARTARIUS JETT, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Jett", "decision_date": "2003-07-03", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201401\u20141382", "first_page": "200", "last_page": "204", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "341 Ill. App. 3d 200" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3147214 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "525" }, { "page": "525" }, { "page": "527" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687" }, { "page": "693" }, { "page": "2064" }, { "page": "694" }, { "page": "698" }, { "page": "2068" }, { "page": "697" }, { "page": "699" }, { "page": "2069" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 U.S. 466", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9413911 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490" }, { "page": "455" }, { "page": "2362-63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/530/0466-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 568, "char_count": 10508, "ocr_confidence": 0.75, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.948112308623226e-08, "percentile": 0.31227882397776857 }, "sha256": "5910e6685c301d4aaa31f59646cacddbd1dbda15dd27a9cf7a302c362854412f", "simhash": "1:941f1812e364fff6", "word_count": 1710 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:38:13.673521+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARTARIUS JETT, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BOWMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nA jury convicted defendant, Artarius Jett, of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(a) (West 2000)). Defendant received a sentence of natural life in prison. On appeal, defendant challenges the charging instrument and the jury instructions, arguing that they improperly included, as an element of first degree murder, \u201cthat the offense was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.\u201d Defendant further contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.\nOn October 4, 1999, Michelle Monachello, defendant\u2019s former girlfriend and the mother of his child, was stabbed, doused with gasoline, and set on fire while she was still alive. She died later that day. On October 27, 1999, defendant was charged by indictment with seven counts of first degree murder, two counts of armed robbery, and one count of arson, all arising from Monachello\u2019s death. In an effort to comply with the United States Supreme Court\u2019s opinion in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), the State filed additional indictments on September 28, 2000, alleging that the aforementioned offenses were accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictments on speedy trial grounds, and the trial court denied his motion. Defendant\u2019s trial ensued. As the evidence presented at trial is well known to the parties and defendant raises no evidentiary issues on appeal, we will dispense with a detailed recitation of the trial testimony and refer to relevant evidence as our discussion demands.\nAt the instructions conference, the State proposed to provide the jury with an issues instruction for first degree murder and a separate instruction asking the jury to decide whether defendant\u2019s actions constituted exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. The court disagreed and expressed its belief that the instructions would be clearer to the jury if the \u201cbrutal and heinous\u201d instruction were included in the issues instruction. Defense counsel agreed with the court. Consequently, the jury received an instruction directing it, if it found that the State had proved the elements of first degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt, to \u201ccontinue [its] deliberations to determine whether or not the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.\u201d The jury was provided with three verdict forms: \u201cnot guilty,\u201d \u201cguilty of first degree murder which was not accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty,\u201d and \u201cguilty of first degree murder which was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.\u201d The verdict form signed by the jury stated as follows:\n\u201cWe, the jury, find the defendant, Artarius Jett, guilty of First Degree Murder and that the murder was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.\u201d\nDefendant argues on appeal that including the \u201cbrutal and heinous\u201d factor in the indictments and the jury instructions effectively added an element to the first degree murder offense, thereby creating a new offense. To facilitate our analysis of this issue, a brief synopsis of the relevant statutes and case law is in order.\nSection 9 \u2014 1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 defines first degree murder as follows:\n\u201cA person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits first degree murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death:\n(1) he either intends to kill or do great bodily harm to that individual or another, or knows that such acts will cause death to that individual or another; or\n(2) he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another; or\n(3) he is attempting or committing a forcible felony other than second degree murder.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(a) (West 2000).\nThe sentence for first degree murder shall be not less than 20 years and not more than 60 years (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(1)(a) (West 2000)), but a defendant may be eligible for an enhanced sentence if certain factors apply. In June 2000, the United States Supreme Court, in Apprendi, held that \u201c[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63. Consequently, the legislature amended section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(1)(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections to provide that a defendant convicted of first degree murder may receive an enhanced sentence of natural life in prison \u201cif a trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(1)(b) (West 2000).\nFollowing Apprendi, the legislature also amended section 111 \u2014 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 to allow the State to amend the charge at any time before trial to include those facts that would increase a defendant\u2019s sentence beyond the statutory maximum term. 725 ILCS 5/111 \u2014 3(e\u20145), (d) (West 2000). This statute was not yet in effect at the time the additional indictments against defendant were filed.\nDefendant contends that principles of separation of powers, due process, and ex post facto application of laws require us to reverse his conviction. Defendant bases all of these arguments on the premise that he was charged with and convicted of an offense other than first degree murder, namely, first degree murder accompanied by brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. Defendant\u2019s argument does not withstand scrutiny.\nUnder defendant\u2019s reasoning, the mere inclusion of the \u201cbrutal and heinous\u201d factor in the indictments violated his constitutional rights. We disagree. The inclusion of this factor did not alter the elements of first degree murder. It simply put defendant on notice that the State would be seeking to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant acted brutally or heinously and, therefore, was eligible for an enhanced sentence. The indictments set forth the elements of first degree murder and then separately alleged that defendant acted in an exceptionally brutal or heinous manner indicative of wanton cruelty. The plain language of the indictments simply does not support defendant\u2019s contention that the State improperly added an element to the offense of first degree murder.\nLikewise, the record is clear that defendant was convicted of first degree murder, and the jury made the additional finding that the murder was accompanied by brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. The jury was instructed to first determine whether the State had proved the elements of first degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The issues instruction directed the jury to decide whether the murder was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior only after it had determined that the State met its burden of proving defendant guilty of first degree murder. The \u201cbrutal and heinous\u201d factor was not included as one of the elements of the offense.\nPursuant to section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(1)(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections, the State was entitled to seek an enhanced sentence based on the brutal or heinous nature of the offense. In submitting the determination of this factor to the jury, the State followed the Supreme Court\u2019s directive in Apprendi. There was no prejudice whatsoever to defendant\u2019s constitutional rights.\nMoreover, defendant made no objection in the trial court to the additional indictments on the grounds he asserts here, nor did he object to the jury instructions at issue. In fact, defense counsel advocated using the instructions as given. Defendant now asserts ineffectiveness of counsel.\nThe standard for determining whether defense counsel was ineffective is well established. A defendant must show both that his counsel\u2019s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that he suffered prejudice as a result of counsel\u2019s errors. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 525 (1984). To establish prejudice, a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel\u2019s unprofessional errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068; Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d at 525. A court need not examine the reasonableness of counsel\u2019s performance if it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on lack of prejudice grounds. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 699, 104 S. Ct. at 2069; Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d at 527.\nIn the case at bar, the evidence overwhelmingly showed that defendant murdered Monachello and did so in an exceptionally brutal or heinous manner. As the facts are well known to the parties, it is not necessary to set forth in detail all of the evidence presented against defendant. Suffice it to say that, despite suffering third and fourth degree burns over approximately 75% of her body and losing 40% of her blood from the stab wound to her abdomen, Monachello identified defendant as her attacker to a police officer, a paramedic, and a physician on duty at Glen Oaks Hospital before she died. Defendant did not present any evidence on his own behalf. The trial court stated at defendant\u2019s sentencing hearing that the evidence of his guilt was \u201cabsolutely overwhelming\u201d and that \u201cwords were insufficient to describe the horrific nature of this crime.\u201d We agree and hold that a reasonable jury could not have come to any other conclusion.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County.\nAffirmed.\nGROMETER and CALLUM, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BOWMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller and Kim M. DeWitt, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Joseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Martin E Moltz and Diane L. Campbell, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARTARIUS JETT, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2 \u2014 01\u20141382\nOpinion filed July 3, 2003.\nG. Joseph Weller and Kim M. DeWitt, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nJoseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Martin E Moltz and Diane L. Campbell, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0200-01", "first_page_order": 218, "last_page_order": 222 }