{ "id": 5575458, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PATRICK A. PURSLEY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Pursley", "decision_date": "2003-06-24", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201402\u20140236", "first_page": "230", "last_page": "237", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "341 Ill. App. 3d 230" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "324 Ill. App. 3d 909", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 256323 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "916" }, { "page": "915" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/324/0909-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 Ill. 2d 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5603208 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "500" }, { "page": "500" }, { "page": "500" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/152/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 Ill. 2d 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477908 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "237" }, { "page": "237" }, { "page": "237" }, { "page": "237" }, { "page": "242" }, { "page": "242" }, { "page": "238" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/163/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 Ill. App. 3d 307", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1096664 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "310" }, { "page": "310" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/316/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259094 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212" }, { "page": "213" }, { "page": "213" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 Ill. App. 3d 752", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1096556 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "755" }, { "page": "755" }, { "page": "755-56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/316/0752-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 Ill. App. 3d 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1260372 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/284/0597-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 737, "char_count": 15869, "ocr_confidence": 0.752, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2337080937954649e-07, "percentile": 0.606256967105032 }, "sha256": "18154fb65edf230159a032a405469302928678134169218d977261c86f13a970", "simhash": "1:f2cc5d1e321494fc", "word_count": 2553 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:38:13.673521+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PATRICK A. PURSLEY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BOWMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter a jury trial, defendant, Patrick Pursley, was found guilty of first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(a)(3) (West 1992)). Defendant was sentenced to natural life in prison. On direct appeal, this court affirmed defendant\u2019s conviction and sentence. See People v. Pursley, 284 Ill. App. 3d 597 (1996). In July 1997, defendant filed a petition for postconviction relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 1996)). The trial court dismissed defendant\u2019s petition as frivolous and without merit and this court affirmed the trial court\u2019s dismissal. See People v. Pursley, No. 2 \u2014 97\u20140984 (1999) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Thereafter, in March 1999, defendant filed a second postconviction petition, which was also dismissed. This court affirmed the trial court\u2019s dismissal of defendant\u2019s second petition for postconviction relief. See People v. Pursley, No. 2 \u2014 00\u20140551 (2001) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).\nDefendant now appeals from a judgment by the circuit court denying his motion for ballistics testing pursuant to section 116 \u2014 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/116 \u2014 3 (West 2000)). Specifically, defendant argues that section 116 \u2014 3 permits ballistics testing under the Integrated Ballistics Identification System (IBIS). We affirm.\nThe facts relevant to this appeal are as follows. Becky George testified that she had been Andy Ascher\u2019s girlfriend. On April 2, 1993, at around 10 p.m., she and Ascher were parked in front of her brother\u2019s condominium when a man opened the driver\u2019s door where Ascher was sitting. The man pointed a gun at them and asked for money. Becky then heard two \u201cnoises that were like pops\u201d and Ascher slouched down.\nThe police found two cartridge casings outside the vehicle in which Ascher was shot. Also recovered were two bullets, one from the dashboard of the vehicle and the other from beneath Ascher\u2019s shoulder. After an anonymous tip, the police searched the apartment shared by defendant and his girlfriend and seized a 9-millimeter Taurus semiautomatic handgun. Defendant was charged with shooting and killing Ascher while committing an armed robbery.\nAt trial, Daniel Gunnell, a specialist in firearm and tool mark identification for the Illinois State Police, testified for the State. Using the same type of cartridges found at the scene of the crime, Gunnell test-fired two shots with defendant\u2019s Taurus handgun. Gunnell then compared his test firings to the recovered cartridges and bullets. Gunnell concluded that the two recovered cartridges had been fired by the Taurus handgun \u201cto the exclusion of all others.\u201d With respect to the bullets, Gunnell also concluded that they had been fired by the Taurus gun \u201cto the exclusion of all others.\u201d\nMark Boese, an expert in patterned impression evidence employed by Bri-Mar International Laboratories, testified for the defense. After examining the cartridges and bullets from the crime scene, as well as Gunnell\u2019s test firings, he test-fired the Taurus gun. Boese concluded that the bullets had probably been fired by a 9-millimeter Taurus gun, but did not conclude that it was the one in evidence. Although Boese could not exclude the recovered Taurus gun as having fired the bullets, he did not feel he had sufficient correspondence of impressions to declare a match.\nThe jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder and he was sentenced to natural life in prison. After exhausting all other forms of remedy, defendant filed a pro se motion for forensic testing pursuant to section 116 \u2014 3 of the Code. Defendant requested, inter alia, that the Taurus handgun, as well as the recovered cartridges and bullets, be subjected to ballistics testing under IBIS.\nThe State filed a motion to dismiss arguing, inter alia, that section 116 \u2014 3 does not pertain to ballistics testing. The trial court granted the State\u2019s motion to dismiss, finding that (1) defendant\u2019s claim was barred by res judicata-, (2) section 116 \u2014 3 pertains to fingerprints and DNA testing but not to ballistics; (3) IBIS is not a new test but a new system for cataloging ballistics information; (4) Gunnell was definite in his ballistics comparison whereas Boese\u2019s expert opinion was inconclusive; and (5) application of the IBIS would not produce new, noncumulative evidence. Defendant\u2019s appeal timely followed.\nOn appeal, defendant argues that the court erred in denying his motion for forensic testing pursuant to section 116 \u2014 3 of the Code. It is defendant\u2019s position that section 116 \u2014 3 applies to ballistics testing and that he has fulfilled the prerequisites of the statute. Defendant contends that, if the two cartridges and bullets from both the crime scene and the Taurus handgun are analyzed under IBIS, the results may demonstrate that his Taurus gun was not the weapon used in the shooting. According to defendant, the computer may not find a match with his gun, or may indicate a match with another Taurus gun.\nThe State responds that defendant\u2019s section 116 \u2014 3 motion is barred by res judicata or, in the alternative, that defendant has failed to present a prima facie case that IBIS testing should be allowed. The State also moves to strike two IBIS articles appended to defendant\u2019s brief. Arguing that they were not considered by the trial court and are not part of the record, the State objects to defendant\u2019s citation to these articles in his brief.\nThis case hinges upon the proper scope of section 116 \u2014 3, which provides:\n\u201cMotion for fingerprint or forensic testing not available at trial regarding actual innocence.\n(a) A defendant may make a motion before the trial court that entered the judgment of conviction in his or her case for the performance of fingerprint or forensic DNA testing on evidence that was secured in relation to the trial which resulted in his or her conviction, but which was not subject to the testing which is now requested because the technology for the testing was not available at the time of trial. Reasonable notice of the motion shall be served upon the State.\n(b) The defendant must present a prima facie case that:\n(1) identity was the issue in the trial which resulted in his or her conviction; and\n(2) the evidence to be tested has been subject to a chain of custody sufficient to establish that it has not been substituted, tampered with, replaced, or altered in any material aspect.\n(c) The trial court shall allow the testing under reasonable conditions designed to protect the State\u2019s interests in the integrity of the evidence and the testing process upon a determination that:\n(1) the result of the testing has the scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence materially relevant to the defendant\u2019s assertion of actual innocence;\n(2) the testing requested employs a scientific method generally accepted within the relevant scientific community.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/116 \u2014 3 (West 2000).\nWe review de novo a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion under section 116 \u2014 3 of the Code. People v. Hockenberry, 316 Ill. App. 3d 752, 755 (2000). This standard is appropriate because the trial court\u2019s decision is based upon its assessment of the pleadings and the trial transcripts rather than the credibility of the witnesses. Hockenberry, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 755. Thus, the trial court is in no better position than the reviewing court to decide the merits of such a motion. Hockenberry, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 755-56.\nAs stated previously, the trial court found that section 116 \u2014 3 applies to fingerprints and DNA testing but not to ballistics testing. Thus, the dispositive issue in this case is whether section 116 \u2014 3 pertains to ballistics testing under IBIS. Upon reviewing the plain language of section 116 \u2014 3, we hold that it is not applicable here.\nWe believe the language in section 116 \u2014 3 is clear and unambiguous. While the section is entitled \u201cMotion for fingerprint or forensic testing not available at trial regarding actual innocence,\u201d subsection (a) then states that a defendant may make a motion \u201cfor the performance of fingerprint or forensic DNA testing.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/116 \u2014 3 (West 2000). Defendant argues that the single reference to \u201cfingerprint or forensic DNA testing\u201d should not limit the application of the statute to those two forms of testing. We disagree.\nThe cardinal principle of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. People v. Savory, 197 Ill. 2d 203, 212 (2001). The language used by the legislature is the best indicator of legislative intent, and it must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Savory, 197 Ill. 2d at 213. When the terms used by the legislature are clear and unambiguous, it is not necessary to resort to other aids of construction. Savory, 197 Ill. 2d at 213.\nOur review of the statute reveals an intent by the legislature to restrict the scope of section 116 \u2014 3 to tests based on \u201cgenetic material\u201d such as fingerprints and DNA.\n\u201cWhen our legislators enacted section 116 \u2014 3, they intended to provide an avenue for convicted defendants who maintained their innocence to test available genetic material capable of producing new and dramatic evidence materially relevant to the question of innocence. The legislature recognized that advances in scientific technology harbored the potential to correct injustice through the highly reliable use of genetics.\u201d (Emphasis added.) People v. Urioste, 316 Ill. App. 3d 307, 310 (2000).\nWhile it is clear that the legislature has provided for fingerprint and forensic DNA testing, we find nothing in the language of the statute to support defendant\u2019s assertion that it is intended to encompass all advances in forensic technology and testing. We note that, had the legislature intended to broaden the scope of section 116 \u2014 3 to include different forms of forensic testing beyond fingerprint and DNA testing, it could have expressly done so. Thus, we hold that section 116 \u2014 3 pertains only to fingerprint and forensic DNA testing, exactly as it states.\nFinally, commentary regarding section 116 \u2014 3 lends support to this conclusion by noting that additional forensic tests, such as ballistics testing, may eventually be added to the, statute.\n\u201cOther forensic tests might someday be added to the Illinois law as the courts and the legislature recognize their reliability. For instance, new computerized technology similar to [the Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS)] can compare a bullet\u2019s characteristics to a range of bullet profiles in a database, matching the gun used in one case to another case and possibly tying the crime for which a person was convicted to another crime committed by someone else.\u201d G. O\u2019Reilly, A Second Chance for Justice: Illinois\u2019 Post-Trial Forensic Testing Law, 81 Judicature 114, 116 (1997).\nDefendant argues in the alternative that, if section 116 \u2014 3 is found not to apply to other forms of forensic testing, it violates due process and equal protection of the law. Defendant concedes that this claim is subject to a rational basis test. According to defendant, there is no rational reason to treat those who may be exonerated by a new forensic test, such as ballistics testing under IBIS, differently from those who may be exonerated through new DNA or fingerprint tests. In other words, advances in fields such as ballistics should accrue to defendants who have been convicted in the same way as advances in fingerprint and DNA testing.\nStatutes carry a very strong presumption that they are constitutional as written, and the party challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears the burden of rebutting this presumption. People v. Kimbrough, 163 Ill. 2d 231, 237 (1994). In construing a statute, we have a duty to affirm the statute\u2019s validity and constitutionality if reasonably possible. Kimbrough, 163 Ill. 2d at 237. If the statute\u2019s construction is doubtful, we must resolve all doubts in favor of the statute\u2019s validity. Kimbrough, 163 Ill. 2d at 237.\nThe constitutional right to equal protection of the law guarantees that the State must treat similarly situated persons in a similar manner. Kimbrough, 163 Ill. 2d at 237. A law that does not implicate either a suspect classification or a fundamental right is subject to the rational basis test. People v. Shephard, 152 Ill. 2d 489, 500 (1992). Under this test, the statute need only be rationally related to a legitimate State goal. Shephard, 152 Ill. 2d at 500. Further, our review under the rational basis standard is limited and generally deferential. Shephard, 152 Ill. 2d at 500.\nThe standards used to determine the constitutionality of a statute under the due process and equal protection clauses are identical. Kimbrough, 163 Ill. 2d at 242. As in the case of equal protection, legislation challenged on due process grounds will be upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate statutory objective. Kimbrough, 163 Ill. 2d at 242. Under the rational basis test, the statute is constitutional if any state of facts can reasonably be conceived to justify the classification. Kimbrough, 163 Ill. 2d at 238.\nAs previously noted, the purpose of the statutory scheme we are considering is \u201cto provide an avenue for convicted defendants who maintained their innocence to test available genetic material capable of producing new and dramatic evidence materially relevant to the question of innocence.\u201d Urioste, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 310. Balanced with this interest in exonerating innocent persons wrongly convicted is the interest in promoting the finality of criminal judgments. See 81 Judicature 114. Conceivably, the legislature restricted forensic testing to genetic material because the reliability of such tests has been established. This limit ensures that a motion for forensic testing will not be filed alongside every scientific advancement in the years to come. Thus, it cannot be said that section 116 \u2014 3 is unreasonable or arbitrary simply because it does not provide for other types of forensic testing such as ballistics testing under IBIS.\nWithout presuming to know why the Illinois legislature chose to limit section 116 \u2014 3 to fingerprint and forensic DNA testing, we need only conceive of one potential basis for the legislation. People v. McLaughlin, 324 Ill. App. 3d 909, 916. Moreover, \u201c 1 \u201c[i]t is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether [our] conceived reason for the challenged distinction,\u201d \u2019 \u201d namely, promoting the finality of judgments, \u201c \u2018 \u201cactually motivated the legislature.\u201d [Citation.]\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d McLaughlin, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 915. Accordingly, defendant\u2019s argument that section 116 \u2014 3 violates equal protection and due process must fail.\nBecause we hold that section 116 \u2014 3 pertains only to fingerprint and forensic DNA testing, and not to ballistics testing under IBIS, we need not consider whether defendant\u2019s motion is barred by res judicata or whether defendant has satisfied all of the requirements of section 116 \u2014 3. For the same reason, we need not reach a determination regarding the State\u2019s motion to strike the IBIS articles appended to defendant\u2019s brief.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County dismissing defendant\u2019s motion for ballistics testing under IBIS pursuant to section 116 \u2014 3 of the Code.\nAffirmed.\nO\u2019MALLEY and CALLUM, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BOWMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller and Thomas A. Lilien, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Paul A. Logli, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (Martin P Moltz, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), and Kristine A. Karlin, of Mt. Prospect, for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PATRICK A. PURSLEY, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2 \u2014 02\u20140236\nOpinion filed June 24, 2003.\nG. Joseph Weller and Thomas A. Lilien, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nPaul A. Logli, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (Martin P Moltz, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), and Kristine A. Karlin, of Mt. Prospect, for the People." }, "file_name": "0230-01", "first_page_order": 248, "last_page_order": 255 }