{ "id": 5575773, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LARRY YOUNG, Respondent-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Young", "decision_date": "2003-06-30", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201401\u20140627", "first_page": "379", "last_page": "390", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "341 Ill. App. 3d 379" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "592 N.E.2d 997", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1011", "parenthetical": "finding evidence not closely balanced, despite lack of physical evidence linking defendant to crime scene, where two witnesses testified to witnessing defendant commit the crime" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 Ill. 2d 196", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3283395 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "229-30", "parenthetical": "finding evidence not closely balanced, despite lack of physical evidence linking defendant to crime scene, where two witnesses testified to witnessing defendant commit the crime" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/148/0196-01" ] }, { "cite": "660 N.E.2d 901", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "910", "parenthetical": "\"A procedural default may be excused either because the error affected 'substantial rights' or, independent of the nature of the right affected, simply because the evidence in the case was closely balanced\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 909174 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "18", "parenthetical": "\"A procedural default may be excused either because the error affected 'substantial rights' or, independent of the nature of the right affected, simply because the evidence in the case was closely balanced\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/169/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "630 N.E.2d 1231", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1239" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "259 Ill. App. 3d 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2870428 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/259/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "596 N.E.2d 749", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "753", "parenthetical": "finding the trial court complied with Rule 401(a) by admonishing defendant who was convicted but not yet sentenced of the crime for which he had just been convicted, the minimum and maximum sentences, and the right to counsel" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "232 Ill. App. 3d 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8498320 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62-63", "parenthetical": "finding the trial court complied with Rule 401(a) by admonishing defendant who was convicted but not yet sentenced of the crime for which he had just been convicted, the minimum and maximum sentences, and the right to counsel" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/232/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 N.E.2d 769", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "771", "parenthetical": "trial court must admonish defendant pursuant to Rule 401(a) in revocation of probation proceeding" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ill. 2d 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3106647 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133", "parenthetical": "trial court must admonish defendant pursuant to Rule 401(a) in revocation of probation proceeding" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/94/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 N.E.2d 856", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "858" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 Ill. 2d 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3098736 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/92/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "733 N.E.2d 705", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "712" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 Ill. App. 3d 86", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 980689 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "95" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/315/0086-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.E.2d 303", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "305" }, { "page": "305" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5464950 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "265" }, { "page": "265-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "713 N.E.2d 532", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "536-37" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "186 Ill. 2d 450", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 243932 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "459" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/186/0450-01" ] }, { "cite": "550 N.E.2d 284", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "301", "parenthetical": "Steigmann, J., specially concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "193 Ill. App. 3d 708", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2496987 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "733", "parenthetical": "Steigmann, J., specially concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/193/0708-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 N.E.2d 695", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "698" }, { "page": "698" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 Ill. 2d 510", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2903225 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "516" }, { "page": "516" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/47/0510-01" ] }, { "cite": "648 N.E.2d 218", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "221" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 Ill. App. 3d 97", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 249227 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "100" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/271/0097-01" ] }, { "cite": "660 N.E.2d 9", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16" }, { "page": "16" }, { "page": "16" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 Ill. App. 3d 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1172363 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "138" }, { "page": "138" }, { "page": "138" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/277/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "566 N.E.2d 259", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 Ill. 2d 323", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3238398 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "388" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/141/0323-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687, 694" }, { "page": "693, 698" }, { "page": "2064, 2068" }, { "page": "694" }, { "page": "698" }, { "page": "2068" }, { "page": "694" }, { "page": "698" }, { "page": "2068" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "771 N.E.2d 643", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "645" }, { "page": "645" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 Ill. App. 3d 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1209125 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484" }, { "page": "484" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/331/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "416 N.E.2d 688", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "692", "parenthetical": "defendant's waiver of counsel was ineffective without strict compliance with Rule 401" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "92 Ill. App. 3d 1106", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5533145 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1112", "parenthetical": "defendant's waiver of counsel was ineffective without strict compliance with Rule 401" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/92/1106-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 N.E.2d 652", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "653" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "8 Ill. App. 3d 660", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2758575 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "662" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/8/0660-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 N.E.2d 930", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "932" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "123 Ill. App. 3d 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5676486 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "131" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/123/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "589 N.E.2d 824", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "825" }, { "page": "831" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "226 Ill. App. 3d 742", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5238394 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "743" }, { "page": "751" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/226/0742-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1030, "char_count": 23650, "ocr_confidence": 0.77, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.585354465181334e-07, "percentile": 0.6811375875581935 }, "sha256": "6cb347c55ef2d28ee5ea266d723e461f82c29865f49099e8af0912cbbda396fd", "simhash": "1:bb24e1a6ef449d64", "word_count": 3886 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:38:13.673521+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LARRY YOUNG, Respondent-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE COOK\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Larry Young, appeals his jury conviction for aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 4(b)(6) (West 1998)) and the trial court\u2019s denial of his posttrial motion for appointment of new counsel. We affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nThe indictment stated that on December 14, 1999, in Livingston County, Young committed aggravated battery by \u201cknowingly [making] physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with Kara Cumberland, in that he spit upon [her], knowing [her] to be a correctional institution employee engaged in the execution of her official duties.\u201d\nAt the first appearance on April 28, 2000, the trial court asked Young how old he was. Young answered he was 44. After reading the charge to him, the trial court explained to him that aggravated battery was a Class 3 felony, for which he could be sentenced to imprisonment for 2 to 3 years or, depending on his criminal history, 5 to 10 years, and, if convicted, he would serve the sentence consecutively to whatever term he was presently serving. The court further told him: \u201cYou are entitled to a lawyer. You can hire your own. Or, if you can\u2019t afford one, I would appoint the public defender to represent you.\u201d At Young\u2019s request, the trial court appointed the public defender, David Ahlemeyer, to represent him. Ahlemeyer entered a plea of not guilty on Young\u2019s behalf.\nOn June 22, 2000, a jury found Young guilty of aggravated battery. Correctional officer Cumberland had testified that Young spit on her. This testimony was corroborated by another correctional officer who heard a spitting noise come from Young\u2019s cell followed by Cumberland wiping off her face and rushing away. Young denied spitting on anyone. On July 26, 2000, the trial court sentenced Young to three years in prison to run consecutively to the sentence he was already serving.\nOn August 4, 2000, the circuit clerk filed a notice of appeal on Young\u2019s behalf. On August 21, 2000, Young filed a motion to reduce his sentence. On June 21, 2001, pursuant to Rule 606(b) (188 Ill. 2d R. 606(b)), we dismissed the appeal as premature and remanded the case for proceedings on the posttrial motion (the motion to reduce the sentence). People v. Young, No. 4 \u2014 00\u20140691 (June 21, 2001) (dismissed on appellant\u2019s motion as premature).\nOn July 3 and 5, 2001, Young filed, pro se, two motions for the appointment of new counsel. In these motions, he alleged that Ahlemeyer had been ineffective.\nOn July 16, 2001, the trial court held a hearing on Young\u2019s post-trial motions. Young appeared without counsel. The court concluded that the allegations in Young\u2019s motions for the appointment of new counsel did not entitle him to different counsel. The court therefore declined to appoint new counsel, giving Young a choice between the continued services of the public defender or self-representation. Young chose the latter. Finding the sentence of three years\u2019 imprisonment to be \u201can appropriate sentence for what *** [Young] did,\u201d the court denied his motion to reduce the sentence.\nThis appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nYoung appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court failed to make an adequate inquiry into his allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel before denying his request for new counsel, (2) the public defender rendered ineffective assistance at trial, (3) the trial court failed to admonish him pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 401(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 401(a)) before holding that he had waived his right to counsel, and (4) improper comments by the prosecutor during closing arguments deprived Young of a fair trial. We address each issue in turn.\nA. Adequate Inquiry\nWhen a defendant presents a pro se posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the operative concern for the reviewing court is whether the trial court conducted an adequate inquiry into the pro se defendant\u2019s allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Haynes, 331 Ill. App. 3d 482, 484, 771 N.E.2d 643, 645 (2002). A trial court\u2019s finding that it is unnecessary to appoint new counsel will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is manifestly erroneous. Haynes, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 484, 771 N.E.2d at 645.\nIn this case, Young\u2019s claims of ineffective assistance all related to matters that happened at trial. The judge hearing Young\u2019s posttrial motion, having been the judge presiding over the trial, already knew all the facts he needed to rule on Young\u2019s motion. Further inquiry into the factual basis for Young\u2019s claims was therefore unnecessary. The judge did examine Young\u2019s motion, and he decided that the arguments were without merit. Under the circumstances, the trial court conducted an adequate inquiry into Young\u2019s allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.\nHaving conducted an adequate inquiry, the question still arises whether the trial court\u2019s decision that Young\u2019s arguments were without merit was manifestly erroneous. To answer that question, we next address whether Young\u2019s trial counsel\u2019s performance was ineffective.\nB. Trial Counsel\u2019s Performance\nTo prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Young must prove (1) his lawyer\u2019s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for the defense lawyer\u2019s errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 698, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 (1984). A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. People v. House, 141 Ill. 2d 323, 388, 566 N.E.2d 259, 288 (1990). \u201c[N]either mistakes in strategy nor the fact that another attorney with the benefit of hindsight would have handled the case differently indicates the trial lawyer was incompetent.\u201d People v. Vera, 277 Ill. App. 3d 130, 138, 660 N.E.2d 9, 16 (1995). \u201cThe defendant must overcome a \u2018strong presumption that counsel\u2019s complained-of action or inaction was merely trial strategy.\u2019 \u201d Vera, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 138, 660 N.E.2d at 16, quoting People v. Medrano, 271 Ill. App. 3d 97, 100, 648 N.E.2d 218, 221 (1995).\nYoung argues that his counsel\u2019s performance was objectively unreasonable because counsel did not object to the admission of Young\u2019s prior convictions, Young being shackled during the trial, testimony that Cumberland was pregnant, and references that Young was housed in a segregation unit. Young also argues that it was objectively unreasonable to use the so-called \u201cmere-fact\u201d method of impeachment and that it was objectively unreasonable to fail to explain to the jury that Young wore dark glasses for medical reasons.\nWe first address the issue of Young\u2019s prior convictions.\nDuring direct examination, Young\u2019s counsel asked the following question: \u201cAnd I take it that you have been convicted of one or more felonies that resulted in your incarceration; is that correct?\u201d Young answered yes.\nYoung argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to move in limine to exclude evidence of his prior convictions. We find this argument to be without merit for the simple fact that the jury was going to know Young had a prior conviction because Young was in prison. Young\u2019s current imprisonment was not something the trial court could exclude.\nYoung also argues that his counsel was ineffective for disclosing the \u201cmere fact\u201d of the prior convictions on direct examination, without requiring the court to engage in the requisite balancing test set forth in People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510, 516, 268 N.E.2d 695, 698 (1971). The Montgomery balancing test requires a trial court to exclude evidence of a prior conviction if the danger of unfair prejudice outweighs the probative value. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d at 516, 268 N.E.2d at 698. The mere-fact method of impeachment informs the jury only of the \u201cmere fact\u201d of a witness\u2019s prior conviction. People v. Kunze, 193 Ill. App. 3d 708, 733, 550 N.E.2d 284, 301 (1990) (Steigmann, J., specially concurring).\nThe Illinois Supreme Court has since rejected the use of the mere-fact approach, stating:\n\u201cThis bare announcement unavoidably invites jury speculation about the nature of the prior crime. There is a potential danger that the jury would speculate that the defendant was previously convicted of a more serious crime. Consequently, the mere-fact approach may result in unfair prejudice to the defendant arising from jury speculation as to the nature of the prior unnamed crime.\u201d People v. Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d 450, 459, 713 N.E.2d 532, 536-37 (1999).\nReturning to Young\u2019s arguments, we find no error in not asking the court to conduct a balancing test on whether evidence of Young\u2019s prior convictions should be admitted. Again, the jury was going to know Young had a prior conviction because Young was in prison. Young\u2019s current imprisonment was not something the trial court could exclude.\nRegarding the mere-fact argument, Young is effectively arguing that defense counsel should have brought out the details of Young\u2019s prior convictions to the jury. This argument has some merit. It may have been better for defense counsel to elicit the nature of Young\u2019s prior convictions rather than let the jury speculate about them.\nOn the other hand, defense counsel may have thought it better to acknowledge the obvious, that Young was in prison for a felony conviction, and move on without dwelling on Young\u2019s past crimes. This appears to be a matter of trial strategy. That this may not have been the best strategy, or that Young\u2019s appellate counsel may have acted differently, does not overcome the strong presumption that counsel\u2019s complained-of action or inaction was merely trial strategy. Vera, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 138, 660 N.E.2d at 16. Trial counsel was not ineffective on this basis.\nYoung also argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Young being shackled during the trial. Young points out that shackling is disfavored because it prejudices a jury against the accused, restricts the defendant\u2019s ability to assist his attorney, and offends the dignity of the judicial process. People v. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d 261, 265, 362 N.E.2d 303, 305 (1977). An accused, therefore, should never be shackled in front of the jury unless there is a manifest need for the restraint. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 265-66, 362 N.E.2d at 305.\nThe trial court stated that Young was to be shackled based upon Young\u2019s record of committing assaults while in prison. The presentence report indicates that since Young\u2019s imprisonment in 1998, he had received 11 citations for assault and 7 for intimidation and threats. Young does not suggest that this information is incorrect or that it does not support the court\u2019s decision to shackle Young. Nor does Young suggest that an objection to the shackles would have likely been granted. Even if Young\u2019s counsel\u2019s failure to object was objectively unreasonable, since Young has not demonstrated that the outcome would have been any different, no ineffective assistance of counsel is shown. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.\nYoung next argues that his trial counsel should have asked the court to inform the jury that Young wore dark glasses for medical reasons. Young suggests that by not doing so the jury was left to speculate that Young wore dark glasses as a whim or in disrespect. This is based on some comments by the trial court before trial that people generally do not wear dark glasses in courtrooms and that it might be better if Young took the glasses off to testify so the jury could see his eyes. The record does not indicate whether Young took the glasses off to testify.\nThe record does indicate that Young had other nontinted glasses and that he did not have to wear glasses all the time. It was apparently Young\u2019s choice, rather than an absolute medical necessity, to wear the tinted glasses at trial. Trial counsel was therefore not ineffective for not asking the court to tell the jury that Young wore the glasses out of medical necessity.\nFinally, Young argues that his counsel was ineffective for fading to object to testimony that correctional officer Cumberland was five months pregnant when Young spat in her face and that Young was housed in the segregation unit. Young argues that this testimony was irrelevant and prejudicial and should not have been allowed. We disagree.\nThe testimony about Young being in segregation and correctional officer Cumberland being five months pregnant was relevant. Young\u2019s presence in segregation explained why he was behind a steel door with a small hole rather than behind bars in a regular cell. Young\u2019s trial counsel actually used Young\u2019s presence in a segregation cell to argue Young\u2019s innocence. In closing arguments, defense counsel suggested that if Young had really spit through the narrow grate in the small hole in the door, then some spit should have been observed stuck on that grate, yet there was none. Regarding correctional officer Cumberland being pregnant, an element of battery which the State had to prove was that the contact was \u201cof an insulting or provoking nature.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 3(a)(2) (West 1998). In this case, the fact that correctional officer Cumberland was five months pregnant heightened her concern about possibly contracting a disease from Young\u2019s saliva. This exemplified the insulting or provoking nature of the contact, an element the State had to prove.\nSince the evidence was relevant, an objection would not likely have been granted and there would have been no difference in the outcome. Young\u2019s counsel was therefore not ineffective on this basis. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.\nC. Rule 401(a) Admonishments\nSupreme Court Rule 401(a) provides:\n\u201cAny waiver of counsel shall be in open court. The court shall not permit a waiver of counsel by a person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open court, informing him of and determining that he understands the following:\n(1) the nature of the charge;\n(2) the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by law, including, when applicable, the penalty to which the defendant may be subjected because of prior convictions or consecutive sentences; and\n(3) that he has a right to counsel and, if he is indigent, to have counsel appointed for him by the court.\u201d 134 Ill. 2d R. 401(a).\nYoung had a right to counsel in the hearing on his posttrial motions. See People v. Hughes, 315 Ill. App. 3d 86, 95, 733 N.E.2d 705, 712 (2000), citing U.S. Const., amends. VI, XTV; People v. Baker, 92 Ill. 2d 85, 90, 440 N.E.2d 856, 858 (1982). By telling the trial court he did not want the public defender to represent him any longer, Young in effeet waived his right to appointed counsel and chose self-representation. The trial court made it clear to Young that it would not appoint a different attorney. Young argues that before accepting the waiver of counsel, the trial court had to admonish him under Rule 401(a). See People v. Baker, 94 Ill. 2d 129, 133, 445 N.E.2d 769, 771 (1983) (trial court must admonish defendant pursuant to Rule 401(a) in revocation of probation proceeding). We disagree.\nYoung clearly understood that he had the right to continued representation by the public defender. The question is whether it is mandatory that a court comply with the technical requirements of Rule 401(a) when a defendant discharges his attorney late in the proceedings, here, after trial. Rule 401(a) expresses no such intent. A defendant who has been represented by an attorney for a period of time is more likely to understand the workings of the system than a defendant who first appears in court. The language of Rule 401(a) manifests only the intent to deal with defendants who are considering a waiver of counsel at the initial-appointment stage of the proceedings. The plain language of Rule 401(a) says that the admonishments are to be given to a defendant \u201caccused\u201d of an offense \u201cpunishable\u201d by imprisonment. 134 Ill. 2d R. 401(a). In this case, Young had already been convicted of the offense and sentenced, while being represented by counsel. Young already knew everything a Rule 401(a) admonishment would have told him.\nYoung complains that \u201c[t]he court did not explain the nature of the charge, the maximum sentence, [or] [Young\u2019s] mandatory consecutive sentence.\u201d It would have been useless for the trial court to inform Young of the nature of a charge and the possible sentencing because Young was not facing any charge or possible sentence. As stated above, he had already been convicted and sentenced. The plain language and logic of Rule 401(a) do not require admonishing a defendant who has been convicted and sentenced of the nature of the charge for which he was just convicted and the sentence he just received. Cf People v. Hovenec, 232 Ill. App. 3d 57, 62-63, 596 N.E.2d 749, 753 (1992) (finding the trial court complied with Rule 401(a) by admonishing defendant who was convicted but not yet sentenced of the crime for which he had just been convicted, the minimum and maximum sentences, and the right to counsel).\nD. The Prosecutor\u2019s Closing Argument\nYoung argues that he is entitled to a new trial because various comments made by the prosecutor in rebuttal argument amounted to reversible error. Young did not object to these comments at trial or in a posttrial motion. To preserve an issue for review, a defendant must make both a contemporaneous objection and a specific objection in his posttrial motion; failure to do so results in forfeiture of the issue. People v. Norfleet, 259 Ill. App. 3d 381, 389, 630 N.E.2d 1231, 1239 (1994) . Young argues that we may still address this issue as a matter of \u201cplain error.\u201d See 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a) (\u201cPlain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court\u201d). Specifically, Young argues that plain error may be invoked because the evidence was closely balanced. See People v. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d 1, 18, 660 N.E.2d 901, 910 (1995) (\u201cA procedural default may be excused either because the error affected \u2018substantial rights\u2019 or, independent of the nature of the right affected, simply because the evidence in the case was closely balanced\u201d).\nWe find that the evidence in this case was not closely balanced. Young\u2019s testimony contradicted Cumberland\u2019s testimony, and there was no physical evidence in this case. However, Cumberland\u2019s testimony was unimpeached and substantially corroborated by another correctional officer who was standing immediately behind Cumberland when the spitting occurred. The corroborating testimony gave the jury more evidence with which to convict than just one person\u2019s word over another. As such, the evidence against Young was not closely balanced. See, e.g., People v. Burrows, 148 Ill. 2d 196, 229-30, 592 N.E.2d 997, 1011 (1992) (finding evidence not closely balanced, despite lack of physical evidence linking defendant to crime scene, where two witnesses testified to witnessing defendant commit the crime). We therefore consider Young\u2019s argument regarding the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument forfeited.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nWe affirm.\nAffirmed.\nMYERSCOUGH, PJ., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE COOK" }, { "text": "JUSTICE APPLETON,\ndissenting:\nAlthough I otherwise agree with the majority\u2019s opinion, I respectfully dissent from the conclusion that the trial court need not have complied with Rule 401(a) during the hearing on Young\u2019s posttrial motions.\nThe majority holds that Rule 401 applies only to \u201cdefendants who are considering a waiver of counsel at the initial-appointment stage of the proceedings.\u201d 341 Ill. App. 3d at 387. That holding flies in the face of precedent.\nIn People v. Langley, 226 Ill. App. 3d 742, 743, 589 N.E.2d 824, 825 (1992), the defendant was represented by an attorney throughout the trial but represented himself during the sentencing hearing. We held that the trial court should have admonished the defendant under Rule 401(a) before accepting his waiver of counsel in the sentencing hearing. Langley, 226 Ill. App. 3d at 751, 589 N.E.2d at 831. Clearly, under our decision in Langley, Rule 401(a) remains applicable after arraignment and even after trial. The majority disposes of Langley by ignoring it.\nThe majority assumes that because Young had been convicted and sentenced, he \u201calready knew everything a Rule 401(a) admonishment would have told him.\u201d 341 Ill. App. 3d at 387. In an ideal world with ideally perceptive defendants, one could safely make that assumption. Unfortunately, the record suggests that we exist in a less-than-ideal world. At the pretrial hearing, the public defender informed the trial court that Young had \u201cbeen diagnosed as schizophrenic\u201d and was \u201creceiving SSI [(supplemental security income)] because of that condition.\u201d It appears, from Young\u2019s oral responses during the pretrial hearing, that he was incapable of remembering what the trial court told him only a month earlier, during the first appearance. The trial court had to explain to him again the nature of the charge. In the hearing on his posttrial motions, Young seemed to be laboring under the delusion that he was \u201c[t]here for a minor possession.\u201d\nThe very purpose of Rule 401 is to eliminate any reliance on the assumption that the defendant already knows the information in Rule 401(a) or that the defendant has \u201cpicked up\u201d the information along the way. In unambiguous, mandatory language, Rule 401(a) states: \u201cThe court shall not permit a waiver of counsel *** without first *** informing him of and determining that he understands the following ***.\u201d (Emphases added.) 134 Ill. 2d R. 401(a). Rule 401 does not contemplate a one-way conduit of communication. \u201cThe conclusion that defendant has knowingly waived his right to counsel is based upon the totality of [the defendant\u2019s] responses to the court\u2019s admonitions.\u201d People v. Johnson, 123 Ill. App. 3d 128, 131, 462 N.E.2d 930, 932 (1984).\nAs the majority states, Young had a constitutional right to counsel at the hearing on his posttrial motions. The purpose of Rule 401 is to prevent the defendant from \u201cwaiving the right to counsel without full knowledge and understanding.\u201d People v. Schrodt, 8 Ill. App. 3d 660, 662, 289 N.E.2d 652, 653 (1972). Obviously, by promulgating Rule 401(a), the supreme court has expressed its conclusion that defendants cannot intelligently waive counsel without understanding their right to counsel as well as some basic information about their case: the nature of the charge and the minimum and maximum potential punishment. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 401(a). Regardless of how far the criminal proceedings have progressed, a defendant cannot intelligently waive his or her right to counsel without a grasp of that essential information.\nI would reverse the trial court\u2019s judgment and remand this case for a new hearing on Young\u2019s posttrial motions, including strict compliance with Rule 401. See People v. Berra, 92 Ill. App. 3d 1106, 1112, 416 N.E.2d 688, 692 (1981) (defendant\u2019s waiver of counsel was ineffective without strict compliance with Rule 401).", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE APPLETON," } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and Keleigh L. Biggins, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Thomas J. Brown, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pontiac (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Denise M. Ambrose, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LARRY YOUNG, Respondent-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4 \u2014 01\u20140627\nOpinion filed June 30, 2003.\nRehearing denied July 28, 2003.\nAPPLETON, J., dissenting.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Keleigh L. Biggins, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nThomas J. Brown, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pontiac (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Denise M. Ambrose, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0379-01", "first_page_order": 397, "last_page_order": 408 }