{ "id": 3474333, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DOMINGO MENDOZA, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Mendoza", "decision_date": "2003-07-11", "docket_number": "No. 2-01-1309", "first_page": "195", "last_page": "203", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "342 Ill. App. 3d 195" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "248 Ill. App. 3d 706", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2943523 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "715" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/248/0706-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 Ill. App. 3d 292", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 351017 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298" }, { "page": "298" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/289/0292-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 Ill. App. 3d 145", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1599262 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "151" }, { "page": "151" }, { "page": "151" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/336/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "203 Ill. App. 3d 992", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2582357 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "997" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/203/0992-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 Ill. 2d 542", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 243867 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549-50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/186/0542-01" ] }, { "cite": "20 P.3d 329", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "case_ids": [ 11112113 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "331" }, { "page": "330" }, { "page": "331" }, { "page": "331" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p3d/20/0329-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 W. Va. 257", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "W. Va.", "case_ids": [ 2387737 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260", "parenthetical": "\"eleven years old or less\"" }, { "page": "260", "parenthetical": "\"eleven years old or less\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/w-va/195/0257-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 Neb. 874", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Neb.", "case_ids": [ 2909397 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "880", "parenthetical": "\"fourteen years of age or younger\"" }, { "page": "673", "parenthetical": "\"fourteen years of age or younger\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/neb/223/0874-01" ] }, { "cite": "421 So. 2d 504", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9536394 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504", "parenthetical": "\"eleven years of age or younger\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/421/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 Ark. 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1902396 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "82-83", "parenthetical": "\"twelve years of age or younger\"" }, { "page": "251", "parenthetical": "\"twelve years of age or younger\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/307/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 Md. 335", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Md.", "case_ids": [ 2071700 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "337" }, { "page": "1338" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/md/311/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "258 A.2d 276", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 8079008 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277", "parenthetical": "same; rejecting argument that statute should be strictly construed in favor of accused" }, { "page": "277" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/258/0276-01" ] }, { "cite": "363 P.2d 361", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10493119 ], "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "363-64", "parenthetical": "minor who turned 16 three months before committing offense was \"over 16 years of age\" under statute allowing minor to be tried as an adult" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/363/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "351 P.2d 1076", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10498222 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1078", "parenthetical": "person who reaches the age of 18 is \"over the age of 18\" under statute defining first-degree rape" }, { "page": "1078" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/351/1076-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 Ill. App. 3d 1017", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 980699 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1029", "parenthetical": "applying section 5 - 5-3(c)(8) to defendant who was 21 when convicted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/315/1017-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 Ill. App. 3d 139", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2979928 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "142" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/254/0139-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259041 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58928 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "135" }, { "page": "135" }, { "page": "135" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 108", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58937 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0108-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 Ill. App. 3d 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1599231 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "72", "parenthetical": "sentence not authorized by statute is void and may be attacked at any time" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/336/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 U.S. 466", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9413911 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/530/0466-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 902, "char_count": 18832, "ocr_confidence": 0.742, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.52709332932132e-08, "percentile": 0.4473581278290742 }, "sha256": "f70ff42fd4b20ef0da15d9a457669f8a6f9b1aa95e6efd90b2a17dbbc8ed1ed2", "simhash": "1:ab3b30e261c6dea6", "word_count": 3193 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:14:05.196224+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "BOWMAN and O\u2019MALLEY, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DOMINGO MENDOZA, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CALLUM\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Domingo Mendoza, entered a blind guilty plea to burglary (720 ILCS 5/19 \u2014 1(a) (West 1998)), and the trial court sentenced him to three years\u2019 probation with the condition that he comply with the Treatment Alternatives for Safe Communities (TASC) program (see 20 ILCS 301/40 \u2014 5 et seq. (West 1998)). The State petitioned to revoke defendant\u2019s probation, and defendant admitted the allegations of the petition. The trial court sentenced defendant to 10 years\u2019 imprisonment after finding he was subject to a mandatory Class X sentence under section 5 \u2014 5\u20143(c)(8) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20143(c)(8) (West 1998)). On appeal, defendant argues that (1) because he was not \u201cover the age of 21 years\u201d when he was convicted, the trial court improperly enhanced his sentence under section 5 \u2014 5\u20143(c)(8) of the Code and (2) even if section 5 \u2014 5\u20143(c)(8) applies here, when defendant pleaded guilty, the trial court failed to admonish him that he could be sentenced as a Class X offender. We affirm.\nDefendant was born on February 10, 1978. The State charged defendant with burglary and theft (720 ILCS 5/16 \u2014 1(a)(1)(A) (West 1998)). The indictment alleged that the offenses occurred on March 24, 1999. On July 23, 1999, the parties presented a plea agreement to the trial court. Defendant would plead guilty to burglary, and the State would nol-pros the theft charge. While admonishing defendant, Judge Burke advised him that burglary was a Class 2 felony punishable by 3 to 7 years\u2019 imprisonment or, if defendant was eligible for an extended term, 7 to 14 years\u2019 imprisonment. While arguing the aggravating sentencing factors, the assistant State\u2019s Attorney stated, \u201c[t]he only reason he\u2019s not Class X eligible, Judge, is the fact that he is 21. I believe the statute requires an individual to be over the age of 21.\u201d The State asked the court to impose an extended term of eight years\u2019 imprisonment based on defendant\u2019s criminal history. See 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20143.2(b)(1) (West 1998). The trial court sentenced defendant to 3 years\u2019 TASC probation and 364 days of periodic imprisonment with credit for 122 days served.\nOn February 2, 2000, the State petitioned to revoke defendant\u2019s probation on the ground that TASC terminated him from its treatment program. The hearing on the petition commenced on April 6, 2000. The trial court heard testimony from one witness and continued the hearing. On April 13, 2000, pursuant to the parties\u2019 agreement, the trial court continued the cause until June 15, 2000, \u201cfor status on TASC compliance.\u201d The court ordered defendant to comply with all of the conditions of the TASC program. During the June 15 hearing, a TASC representative reported that defendant was complying with the treatment program and was \u201cdoing extremely well.\u201d\nOn November 15, 2000, the State filed a second petition to revoke, again on the ground that TASC terminated defendant from its program. The State alleged additionally that, on August 10, 2000, he tested positive for drugs and missed several treatment appointments in July and August 2000.\nDefendant admitted the allegations of the petition. During the hearing, the State informed Judge Creswell that defendant was eligible to be sentenced as a Class X offender, and Judge Creswell admonished defendant accordingly.\nThe trial court continued the cause for sentencing. Defendant again petitioned for TASC treatment, and TASC accepted him. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court found that it was unlikely that defendant would comply with a treatment program and that TASC probation would deprecate the seriousness of defendant\u2019s conduct. Accordingly, the court sentenced defendant to 10 years\u2019 imprisonment.\nDefendant timely moved to reconsider the sentence. The motion argued that a sentence of six years\u2019 imprisonment would better recognize the gains defendant made while undergoing treatment and help him to progress by continuing treatment. Defendant filed a second motion arguing that section 5 \u2014 5\u20143(c)(8) of the Code violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 11) and the due process guarantees recognized in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). The trial court denied the motions, and defendant timely appealed.\nOn appeal, defendant argues first that, because he was only 21 years old when he was convicted and not \u201cover 21,\u201d the Class X recidivist provision could not be applied to him. That provision states in pertinent part:\n\u201cWhen a defendant, over the age of 21 years, is convicted of a Class 1 or Class 2 felony, after having twice been convicted of any Class 2 or greater Class felonies in Illinois, and such charges are separately brought and tried and arise out of different series of acts, such defendant shall be sentenced as a Class X offender.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20143(c)(8) (West 1998).\nDefendant never raised this argument in the trial court. If, as defendant argues, however, section 5 \u2014 \u20225\u20143(c)(8) cannot be applied to him because of his age when convicted, then the Class X sentence is void and may be challenged on this basis for the first time on appeal. See People v. Bradley, 336 Ill. App. 3d 62, 72 (2002) (sentence not authorized by statute is void and may be attacked at any time).\nWhen interpreting a statute, the court\u2019s primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent. People v. Jurisec, 199 Ill. 2d 108, 118 (2002). The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute which, if unambiguous, must be read without exception, limitation, or other condition. People v. Davis, 199 Ill. 2d 130, 135 (2002). The court must give the language of the statute its plain and ordinary meaning. People v. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d 404, 451 (2001). The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo. Davis, 199 Ill. 2d at 135.\nDefendant urges us to interpret \u201cover 21\u201d as referring to someone who is at least 22 years old. We are mindful that criminal or penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused and that we should not imply anything beyond the obvious or literal meaning of the statute. Davis, 199 Ill. 2d at 135. We believe, however, that defendant\u2019s interpretation of section 5 \u2014 5\u20143(c)(8) is contrary to what \u201cover 21\u201d is commonly understood to mean.\nBecoming 21 years old is a significant milestone in our society, and Illinois\u2019s legislative scheme reflects this. For example, persons \u201cunder 21\u201d years old generally may not consume alcohol. 235 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 20 (West 2002). The Juvenile Court Act of 1987 defines a \u201cminor\u201d as \u201ca person under the age of 21 years\u201d (705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 3(10), 5 \u2014 105(10) (West 2002)) and an \u201cadult\u201d as \u201ca person 21 years of age or older\u201d (705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 3(2) (West 2002)). See also 720 ILCS 570/312(c)(2) (West 2002) (providing that a pharmacist may dispense certain controlled substances for medical purposes but only to \u201ca person over 21 years of age\u201d).\nIn discussing section 5 \u2014 5\u20143(c)(8), this court has adopted the commonly understood meaning of \u201cover 21.\u201d We stated:\n\u201c[The statute] presumes that persons under the age of 21 have great rehabilitative potential since a sentence will not be increased until after a defendant reaches age 21. Our interpretation is consistent with the goal of prescribing a sentence that is proportionate to the seriousness of the offense with regard to the presumption that minors should be rehabilitated.\u201d People v. Storms, 254 Ill. App. 3d 139, 142 (1993).\nSee also People v. Dunlap, 315 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1029 (2000) (applying section 5 \u2014 5\u20143(c)(8) to defendant who was 21 when convicted).\nTo adopt defendant\u2019s reasoning would \u201crepeal long standing custom and usage.\u201d In re Application of Smith, 351 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Okla. Crim. App. 1960) (person who reaches the age of 18 is \u201cover the age of 18\u201d under statute defining first-degree rape); see also State v. Linn, 363 P.2d 361, 363-64 (Alaska 1961) (minor who turned 16 three months before committing offense was \u201cover 16 years of age\u201d under statute allowing minor to be tried as an adult); Farrow v. State, 258 A.2d 276, 277 (Del. 1969) (same; rejecting argument that statute should be strictly construed in favor of accused). Accordingly, we conclude that someone like defendant who is convicted of an offense anytime after turning 21 is \u201cover the age of 21 years\u201d pursuant to section 5 \u2014 5\u20143(c)(8).\nDefendant cites several decisions which are distinguishable. Most of the decisions addressed statutory language such as \u201c21 years old or younger.\u201d Carolina Freight Carriers Corp. v. Keane, 311 Md. 335, 337, 534 A.2d 1337, 1338 (1988); see also State v. Joshua, 307 Ark. 79, 82-83, 818 S.W.2d 249, 251 (1991) (\u201ctwelve years of age or younger\u201d); Hansen v. State, 421 So. 2d 504, 504 (Fla. 1982) (\u201celeven years of age or younger\u201d); State v. Carlson, 223 Neb. 874, 880, 394 N.W.2d 669, 673 (1986) (\u201cfourteen years of age or younger\u201d); State ex rel. Morgan v. Trent, 195 W. Va. 257, 260, 465 S.E.2d 257, 260 (1995) (\u201celeven years old or less\u201d). This is entirely different language that has no bearing on the analysis here. Under the type of statutory language at issue in the decisions just cited, defendant here could be considered \u201c21 years old or younger,\u201d but that is not the question before us. Our decision is based on the common understanding of what it means to be \u201cover 21.\u201d It would not be inconsistent to conclude that defendant was \u201c21 years old or younger\u201d under a statute like the ones in the cases cited above and \u201cover 21\u201d under the statute at issue here.\nIn State v. Christensen, 20 P.3d 329 (Utah 2001), the State charged the defendant with rape against a victim \u201cnot older than 17.\u201d The court held that the victim, who had passed her seventeenth birthday, would not be older than 17 until she reached her eighteenth birthday. Christensen, 20 P.3d at 331. The court stated:\n\u201c[I]t is almost a universal practice in our society to state our age *** by the number of full years we have lived, without adding or recognizing that we have also lived some additional months beyond those full years. We do not ordinarily recognize increase in our age until we have lived another full year.\u201d Christensen, 20 P.3d at 330.\nThis language supports defendant\u2019s position, but the analysis does not end there. Although it is custom for people to state their ages in whole numbers, the fact remains that people are continually aging. A child who reaches his or her first birthday has lived one full year and, on passing that birthday, is more than one year old. Similarly, someone who has passed his or her twenty-first birthday has lived more than 21 years and therefore is over 21. Farrow, 258 A.2d at 277. In Smith, the court referred to a statute stating that people must be \u201cover the age of twenty-one years\u201d to be eligible to vote. The court observed:\n\u201cSurely no one would be so bold, in face of the long custom and usage, in that connection, to assert that before a person would become eligible to vote he would have to have reached his 22nd birthday. *** Such interpretation would amend the clear intent of the statute by unusual interpretation.\u201d Smith, 351 P.2d at 1078.\nAdditionally, we note that Christensen actually is not on point. The court there recognized the force of the defendant\u2019s interpretation and ultimately was swayed against him because the statute was part of a legislative scheme designed to protect children under 18. Christensen, 20 P.3d at 331. The court noted several examples \u201cwhere the legislature has determined that a person is not capable of making adult decisions until he or she has attained the age of eighteen. A person\u2019s eighteenth birthday has specific significance in terms of personal autonomy.\u201d Christensen, 20 P.3d at 331. Like the Christensen court, we base our decision on the legal and societal significance of reaching a certain age.\nWe are aware that the legislature has used more specific language to describe a class of people who have reached a certain age. For example, to be eligible for the death penalty, a defendant must have \u201cattained the age of 18 or more.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(b) (West 2002). In the same section containing the Class X recidivist provision, the legislature has mandated, under certain circumstances, educational courses for prison inmates who are \u201cat least 17 years of age.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20143(j\u20145) (West 2002).\nOf course, by employing certain language in one instance and wholly different language in another, the legislature indicates that it intended different results. In re K.C., 186 Ill. 2d 542, 549-50 (1999). This rule is not universal, however. Buss v. Edwards, 203 Ill. App. 3d 992, 997 (1990). Here, there is no strong indication that the legislature intended a different result by using \u201cover 21\u201d instead of \u201cat least 21\u201d or other similar language. In fact, the legislature has used the different phrases interchangeably within a single statutory provision. Section 6 \u2014 16(a) of the Liquor Control Act of 1934 (235 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 16(a) (West 2002)) prohibits a common carrier, e^qpress company, or contract carrier from delivering to anyone under 21 years old a shipping container labeled as containing alcoholic beverages and requires the signature of an \u201cadult of at least 21 years of age.\u201d The section states further that, to prevent violations, the shipper or carrier shall refuse to deliver to anyone unable to produce adequate written evidence of identity and \u201cof the fact that he or she is over the age of 21 years.\u201d 235 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 16(a) (West 2002). Here, there is no evidence that the legislature intended the phrase \u201cover 21\u201d to have a meaning inconsistent with its plain and ordinary meaning. Therefore, we reject defendant\u2019s claim that section 5 \u2014 5\u20143(c)(8) does not apply to him.\nDefendant argues second that, even if section 5 \u2014 5\u20143(c)(8) applies here, his plea is void because, when defendant pleaded guilty, the trial court failed to admonish that he was eligible to be sentenced as a Class X offender. Defendant has waived this issue because he did not move to withdraw his plea but instead sought only reconsideration of his sentence. 188 Ill. 2d R. 604(d); People v. Hayes, 336 Ill. App. 3d 145, 151 (2002). The trial court\u2019s failure to admonish the defendant properly under Supreme Court Rule 402(a) (177 Ill. 2d R. 402(a)) may constitute plain error, however. Hayes, 336 Ill. App. 3d at 151.\nThe failure to admonish a defendant properly does not automatically require reversing the judgment or vacating the plea. Hayes, 136 Ill. App. 3d at 151. Whether we must reverse depends on whether real justice has been denied or whether the inadequate admonishment prejudiced the defendant. Hayes, 336 Ill. App. 3d at 151.\nWhen the trial court understates the maximum possible penalty but sentences the defendant within the limits as stated at the time of the plea, no prejudice results, and the defendant is not entitled to withdraw his plea. People v. Rhoades, 289 Ill. App. 3d 292, 298 (1997). Rhoades involved a very similar situation. The State charged the defendant with two counts of burglary. During the guilty plea hearing, the trial court advised the defendant of the Class 2 sentencing range, including the possibility of an extended term of 14 years\u2019 imprisonment. Later, during the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor pointed out that the defendant had to be sentenced as a Class X offender. Also, the trial court incorrectly advised the defendant that he was eligible for TASC probation. The trial court imposed concurrent eight- and nine-year prison terms. On appeal, the court concluded that, because \u201c[t]he defendant\u2019s request for TASC probation was considered by the trial judge, and the sentence issued was well within the range explained to the defendant at the guilty plea hearing,\u201d the inaccurate admonishments did not prejudice the defendant. Rhoades, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 298.\nHere, as in Rhoades, when defendant pleaded guilty, the trial court advised him that he could receive an extended term of 14 years\u2019 imprisonment. Although the trial court failed to advise defendant that he was required to be sentenced as a Class X offender, it ultimately imposed a 10-year term, which is within the limits the trial court originally stated. When defendant admitted the allegations of the petition to revoke, the trial court properly advised him of the Class X sentencing range.\nWe are aware that it has been stated that when a defendant has been advised that the minimum sentence is less than it actually is, he cannot be deemed to have made an intelligent decision because the range of possible penalties is greater than he believed. People v. Tripp, 248 Ill. App. 3d 706, 715 (1993). Tripp is distinguishable, and we conclude that the statement in Tripp does not apply here. In Tripp, the trial court advised a defendant charged with murder that the minimum sentence was 20 years\u2019 imprisonment and that the maximum sentence was life imprisonment. In fact, the defendant was subject to a mandatory life sentence. In Tripp, the prejudice to the defendant was manifest. The maximum sentence as stated during the admonishments turned out to be the mandatory minimum.\nHere, the record does not reveal any prejudice. Defendant has never alleged that he would not have pleaded guilty if he had known he was facing a minimum sentence of six years\u2019 imprisonment instead of three years\u2019 imprisonment. It is apparent that defendant pleaded guilty with the hope of receiving TASC probation, which he initially received. Relevant to our conclusion that real justice has not been denied here is that in his Rule 604(d) certificate, defense counsel stated that he was satisfied \u201cafter corresponding with [defendant] and talking with him on the phone, that [defendant] does not wish to withdraw his plea of guilty to the violations of probation but seeks only to proceed on a motion to reconsider the sentence.\u201d Accordingly, we follow Rhoades, which is on point. We conclude that the inaccurate guilty plea admonishments did not prejudice defendant and that he is not now entitled to withdraw his plea.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nBOWMAN and O\u2019MALLEY, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CALLUM" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller and Darren E. Miller, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Joseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Martin P Moltz, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), and Lynn Hirschfeld Brahin, of Chicago, for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DOMINGO MENDOZA, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2-01-1309\nOpinion filed July 11, 2003.\nModified on denial of rehearing August 6, 2003.\nG. Joseph Weller and Darren E. Miller, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nJoseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Martin P Moltz, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), and Lynn Hirschfeld Brahin, of Chicago, for the People." }, "file_name": "0195-01", "first_page_order": 213, "last_page_order": 221 }