{ "id": 3472384, "name": "In re J.R., Alleged to be an Abused and Neglected Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Lona Griffin, Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Griffin", "decision_date": "2003-07-30", "docket_number": "No. 4-02-0973", "first_page": "310", "last_page": "323", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "342 Ill. App. 3d 310" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "745 N.E.2d 1233", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1241" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "195 Ill. 2d 291", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 725379 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "301-02" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/195/0291-01" ] }, { "cite": "740 N.E.2d 404", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417", "parenthetical": "affirming the trial court's judgment terminating the respondent's parental rights despite evidence that there were no prospective adoptive parents" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 Ill. App. 3d 650", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1026064 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "665", "parenthetical": "affirming the trial court's judgment terminating the respondent's parental rights despite evidence that there were no prospective adoptive parents" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/317/0650-01" ] }, { "cite": "762 N.E.2d 701", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "706" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 Ill. App. 3d 1110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1281488 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1115-16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/326/1110-01" ] }, { "cite": "1996 Ill. Laws 1458", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1997 Ill. Laws 1498", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1996 Ill. Laws 3963", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "weight": 5, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "789 N.E.2d 1211", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1214" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 392", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609696 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397-98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0392-01" ] }, { "cite": "752 N.E.2d 1112", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1119-20" }, { "page": "1120" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 405", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351263 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418-19" }, { "page": "419" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0405-01" ] }, { "cite": "614 N.E.2d 102", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "107" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "243 Ill. App. 3d 968", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5108262 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "974" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/243/0968-01" ] }, { "cite": "783 N.E.2d 115", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "122" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 Ill. App. 3d 83", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1599256 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "91" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/336/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "782 N.E.2d 937", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "940" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 Ill. App. 3d 1095", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 637128 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1099" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/335/1095-01" ] }, { "cite": "621 N.E.2d 977", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "979" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "251 Ill. App. 3d 127", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2958442 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "131" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/251/0127-01" ] }, { "cite": "657 N.E.2d 680", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 Ill. App. 3d 950", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 906770 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "959" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/275/0950-01" ] }, { "cite": "723 N.E.2d 1238", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1243" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 Ill. App. 3d 388", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 415288 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "394-95" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/311/0388-01" ] }, { "cite": "786 N.E.2d 1121", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1124" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 Ill. App. 3d 819", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 894558 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "823" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/337/0819-01" ] }, { "cite": "584 N.E.2d 89", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "91" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 Ill. 2d 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5596379 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "448" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/145/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "704 N.E.2d 937", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "941" }, { "page": "941" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 Ill. App. 3d 1017", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 257192 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1022" }, { "page": "1022-23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/301/1017-01" ] }, { "cite": "729 N.E.2d 86", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "94-95" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 Ill. App. 3d 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 186479 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "214-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/313/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "737 N.E.2d 364", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "368-69" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 Ill. App. 3d 652", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1096568 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "658" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/316/0652-01" ] }, { "cite": "563 N.E.2d 999", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1002", "parenthetical": "declining to review the respondent's claim that the State's termination petition was deficient when the respondent (1) had not raised the claim in the trial court, and (2) did not claim that the petition failed to state a cause of action" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "205 Ill. App. 3d 497", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2567223 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "502-03", "parenthetical": "declining to review the respondent's claim that the State's termination petition was deficient when the respondent (1) had not raised the claim in the trial court, and (2) did not claim that the petition failed to state a cause of action" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/205/0497-01" ] }, { "cite": "556 N.E.2d 268", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "269-70", "parenthetical": "reviewing the respondent's claim, raised for the first time on appeal, that the State's supplemental termination petition failed to state a cause of action" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "198 Ill. App. 3d 633", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2474836 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "634", "parenthetical": "reviewing the respondent's claim, raised for the first time on appeal, that the State's supplemental termination petition failed to state a cause of action" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/198/0633-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.E.2d 894", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "896-97", "parenthetical": "relaxing the forfeiture rule to consider the respondent's claim that the State's termination petition failed to state a cause of action when it failed to (1) allege that the respondent was an unfit parent, and (2) set forth an alleged ground for unfitness" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 Ill. App. 3d 784", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2893339 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "787-89", "parenthetical": "relaxing the forfeiture rule to consider the respondent's claim that the State's termination petition failed to state a cause of action when it failed to (1) allege that the respondent was an unfit parent, and (2) set forth an alleged ground for unfitness" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/45/0784-01" ] }, { "cite": "615 N.E.2d 1346", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1349-50" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "246 Ill. App. 3d 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5388037 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/246/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "783 N.E.2d 681", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "683" }, { "page": "683-85" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 Ill. App. 3d 335", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1599242 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "337" }, { "page": "337-39" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/336/0335-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1084, "char_count": 29700, "ocr_confidence": 0.755, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.392147806818433e-08, "percentile": 0.3960667204921986 }, "sha256": "f6a01aeb9bcdbf70d59403ead3ae8f18b5b7d1c80bb54e9155909b7b33dfd337", "simhash": "1:8b2c5446bf2dd563", "word_count": 4964 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:14:05.196224+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "APPLETON, J., concurs." ], "parties": [ "In re J.R., Alleged to be an Abused and Neglected Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Lona Griffin, Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court;\nIn April 2002, the State filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of respondent, Lona Griffin, as to her son, J.R. (born July 1, 1999). Following a November 2002 hearing, the trial court found respondent unfit, and following a separate hearing that same day, the court found that it would he in J.R.\u2019s best interest to terminate respondent\u2019s parental rights. (The court also terminated the parental rights of J.R.\u2019s father, Frederick Robb, subject to the terms of a final and irrevocable consent to adoption by specified persons \u2014 namely, Robb\u2019s parents, Joyce and Larry Hyatt. However, he is not a party to this appeal.)\nRespondent appeals, arguing that the trial court\u2019s order terminating her parental rights should be reversed because (1) the State\u2019s termination petition failed to state that she could \u201cpermanently\u201d lose her parental rights, as is required under section 2 \u2014 13(4) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 13(4) (West 2000)); and (2) the court\u2019s finding that it was in J.R.\u2019s best interest to terminate her parental rights was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nIn January 2001, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship regarding J.R. and his younger brother, Joseph R. (born December 22, 2000), alleging that (1) they were abused minors in that a person responsible for or residing in the same household as J.R. and Joseph R. caused physical injury to Joseph, by other than accidental means, such that he was brain dead with bruises in the folds of his neck and on his scalp; and (2) information provided by respondent was not consistent with Joseph R.\u2019s injuries (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 3(2)(i) (West 2000)). Later in January 2001, the State filed an amended petition, alleging that J.R. and Joseph R. were neglected minors in that (1) they were residing in an environment injurious to their welfare when in the care of respondent and Robb, in that respondent and Robb had unresolved issues of domestic violence (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 3(l)(b) (West 2000)); and (2) they were residing in an environment injurious to their welfare when in the care of Robb, in that Robb had unresolved issues of anger management (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 3(l)(b) (West 2000)). In April 2001, the State filed a second amendment to its adjudication petition, alleging that the children were neglected due to Robb\u2019s unresolved issues of substance abuse (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 3(l)(b) (West 2000)). At an April 2001 hearing, Robb admitted the allegation in the State\u2019s second-amended petition, and the court adjudicated J.R. and Joseph R. neglected minors.\nFinally, in September 2001, the State filed a third-amended adjudication petition, alleging that (1) J.R. and Joseph R. were abused in that respondent had inflicted injuries, by other than accidental means, which caused Joseph\u2019s death (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 3(2)(i) (West 2000)); and (2) respondent had been convicted of the first degree murder of Joseph R. (McLean County case No. 01 \u2014 CF\u201490).\nAt a September 2001 adjudicatory hearing, respondent stipulated to the allegations contained in the State\u2019s third-amended petition, and the trial court accepted her stipulation and adjudicated J.R. and Joseph R. abused minors. The court then conducted a dispositional hearing and adjudicated J.R. a ward of the court and placed him in the guardianship of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS).\nIn April 2002, the State filed its petition to terminate respondent\u2019s parental rights, alleging that respondent was unfit under section l(D)(q) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/l(D)(q) (West 2000)), in that she had been criminally convicted of murdering a child.\nAt the November 2002 hearing on the State\u2019s termination petition, the trial court took judicial notice that (1) in case No. 01 \u2014 CF\u2014 90, respondent was charged with the first degree murder of Joseph R.; (2) in June 2001, a jury convicted respondent of that crime; and (3) in September 2001, respondent was sentenced to 25 years in prison. The State presented no other evidence of respondent\u2019s unfitness. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found respondent unfit based on the ground alleged in the State\u2019s petition.\nAt the best-interest hearing, DCFS caseworker Glenda Bassett testified that she was assigned to the case for a few weeks in January 2001, was reassigned to the case in April 2002, and had been the caseworker ever since. At the time of the hearing, J.R. had been living with his paternal grandparents, the Hyatts, for one year. J.R. was doing well in the Hyatts\u2019 home and appeared \u201cvery bonded\u201d to them. Joyce was at home with J.R. during the day, J.R. had many toys to play with, and the Hyatts made sure he received his asthma medication. DCFS recommended that terminating respondent\u2019s parental rights would be in J.R.\u2019s best interest. The Hyatts had expressed a desire to adopt J.R., and DCFS believed that they would meet the applicable standards regarding financial means and the ability to meet J.R.\u2019s emotional needs. Bassett opined that the Hyatts should adopt J.R.\nThe trial court took judicial notice of all the proceedings in the case and admitted into evidence the November 12, 2002, dispositional report prepared by the Court Appointed Special Advocates (CASA). The CASA report indicated that J.R. was doing well with the Hyatts. He was receiving appropriate medical care, and his asthma and sleep patterns were improving. He was in a safe, stable, and nurturing environment. CASA recommended termination of respondent\u2019s parental rights based on (1) her conviction for murdering Joseph R.; and (2) the fact that her long-term incarceration would make it impossible for her to play a meaningful role in J.R.\u2019s life.\nJ.R.\u2019s guardian ad litem also recommended termination of respondent\u2019s parental rights.\nAt the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found it in J.R.\u2019s best interest to terminate respondent\u2019s parental rights.\nThis appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. The State\u2019s Termination Petition\nRespondent first argues that the State\u2019s petition to terminate her parental rights was defective in that it did not state that she could \u201cpermanently\u201d lose her parental rights, as is required under section 2 \u2014 13(4) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 13(4) (West 2000)). The State responds that its failure to use the word \u201cpermanently\u201d in its termination petition does not warrant reversal in this case. We agree with the State.\n1. Section 2 \u2014 13(4) of the Act\nSection 2 \u2014 13(4) of the Act provides as follows:\n\u201cIf termination of parental rights and appointment of a guardian of the person with power to consent to adoption of the minor under [s]ection 2 \u2014 29 is sought, the petition shall so state. If the petition includes this request, the prayer for relief shall clearly and obviously state that the parents could permanently lose their rights as a parent at this hearing.\nIn addition to the foregoing, the petitioner, by motion, may request the termination of parental rights and appointment of a guardian of the person with power to consent to adoption of the minor under [selection 2 \u2014 29 at any time after the entry of a dispositional order under [s]ection 2 \u2014 22.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 13(4) (West 2000).\n2. Forfeiture\nIn support of her argument, respondent cites one case, In re Andrea D., 336 Ill. App. 3d 335, 783 N.E.2d 681 (2003). In that case, the respondent argued that the State\u2019s petition to terminate his parental rights was defective on its face because it \u201cfailed to apprise [him] that his parental rights could be \u2018permanently\u2019 terminated,\u201d citing section 2 \u2014 13(4) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 13(4) (West 2000)). In that case, as here, the respondent failed to raise any objection to the State\u2019s petition in the trial court. Andrea D., 336 Ill. App. 3d at 337, 783 N.E.2d at 683. On review, the Second District Appellate Court (1) opted to review the issue under the plain-error exception to the forfeiture rule, (2) concluded that due to the omission of the word \u201cpermanently,\u201d the State\u2019s petition was defective on its face, and (3) based on that conclusion, reversed the trial court\u2019s order terminating the respondent\u2019s parental rights. Andrea D., 336 Ill. App. 3d at 337-39, 783 N.E.2d at 683-85. We decline to follow Andrea D. because we disagree with the Second District\u2019s holding and the analysis upon which it is based.\nInitially, we note that termination-of-parental-rights proceedings are civil in nature (750 ILCS 50/20 (West 2000)); In re E.S., 246 Ill. App. 3d 330, 335, 615 N.E.2d 1346, 1349-50 (1993)), and under section 2 \u2014 612(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure, \u201c[a]ll defects in pleadings, either in form or substance, not objected to in the trial court are waived\u201d (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 612(c) (West 2000)). In some circumstances, however, justice requires relaxation of this forfeiture rule. Therefore, courts have relaxed the rule when the State\u2019s termination petition fails to state a cause of action. See In re Rauch, 45 Ill. App. 3d 784, 787-89, 359 N.E.2d 894, 896-97 (1977) (relaxing the forfeiture rule to consider the respondent\u2019s claim that the State\u2019s termination petition failed to state a cause of action when it failed to (1) allege that the respondent was an unfit parent, and (2) set forth an alleged ground for unfitness); In re J.RS., 198 Ill. App. 3d 633, 634, 556 N.E.2d 268, 269-70 (1990) (reviewing the respondent\u2019s claim, raised for the first time on appeal, that the State\u2019s supplemental termination petition failed to state a cause of action); cf. In re L.M., 205 Ill. App. 3d 497, 502-03, 563 N.E.2d 999, 1002 (1990) (declining to review the respondent\u2019s claim that the State\u2019s termination petition was deficient when the respondent (1) had not raised the claim in the trial court, and (2) did not claim that the petition failed to state a cause of action). Thus, the threshold question before us in this case is whether the alleged defect in the State\u2019s petition resulted in its failure to state a cause of action. We conclude that it did not.\nThe State\u2019s petition alleged, in pertinent part, that respondent was an unfit person under section l(D)(q) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1 (D)(q) (West 2000)) for the reason that she had been criminally convicted of murdering a child. The petition clearly stated that the State sought the termination of her parental rights based on that ground. Given that the State\u2019s petition clearly stated what action it sought the trial court to take, and the legal grounds that justify that action, the defect respondent complains of did not constitute a failure to state a cause of action. Accordingly, we hold that it is not a defect that may be raised for the first time on appeal. By failing to object to the State\u2019s petition in the trial court, respondent has forfeited the right to raise this issue on appeal.\nWe acknowledge that this result might appear harsh in light of the special nature of termination proceedings. We recognize that although termination-of-parental-rights proceedings are civil in nature, termination proceedings involve fundamental liberty interests and invoke some constitutional concerns akin to those implicated in criminal cases. In re J.P., 316 Ill. App. 3d 652, 658, 737 N.E.2d 364, 368-69 (2000); In re M.H., 313 Ill. App. 3d 205, 214-15, 729 N.E.2d 86, 94-95 (2000). However, even if we were to afford respondent the greatest procedural protections available \u2014 that is, those afforded to criminal defendants alleging defects in a charging instrument \u2014 her claim would fail if brought for the first time on appeal.\nUnder Illinois criminal law, the existence of certain defects in a charging instrument may be raised at any time, including for the first time on appeal. For example, a charging instrument that fails to state an offense contains a defect implicating due process concerns and thus may be attacked at any time. People v. Alvarado, 301 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1022, 704 N.E.2d 937, 941 (1998). However, when a criminal defendant challenges the charging instrument for the first time on appeal, the reviewing court considers the claim under a lower standard than that which the trial court would have applied had the objection been raised below. People v. Thingvold, 145 Ill. 2d 441, 448, 584 N.E.2d 89, 91 (1991). If an indictment is attacked either before or during trial, the instrument must strictly comply with statutory pleading requirements. Alvarado, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 1022-23, 704 N.E.2d at 941. When a charging instrument is attacked for the first time on appeal, however, the reviewing court considers only whether the indictment apprised the accused of the precise offense charged with enough specificity to (1) allow preparation of a defense, and (2) allow pleading a resulting conviction as a bar to future prosecution arising out of the same conduct. People v. Smith, 337 Ill. App. 3d 819, 823, 786 N.E.2d 1121, 1124 (2003). Thus, a criminal defendant\u2019s conviction will not be reversed based on a technical defect in the charging instrument raised for the first time on appeal unless the defendant shows that the defect prejudiced him in preparing his defense. People v. Maggette, 311 Ill. App. 3d 388, 394-95, 723 N.E.2d 1238, 1243 (2000).\nIn this case, respondent does not contend that the State\u2019s failure to state that it sought to \u201cpermanently\u201d terminate her parental rights in its termination petition misled her or that she was in any way prejudiced by the omission. She does not claim that she did not know that the termination of her parental rights would be permanent. The record contains no indication that respondent or her counsel failed to grasp the import of the proceedings. In light of respondent\u2019s failure to allege, and our inability to ascertain from the record, any way in which the alleged defect affected respondent\u2019s rights or interests, her claim would fail even under the most generous analytical framework.\nWe are perplexed by the Second District\u2019s reliance on the plain-error doctrine. As previously discussed, a framework for reviewing pleading-defect claims raised for the first time on appeal already exists, and application of the plain-error doctrine to civil cases is \u201c \u2018exceedingly rare and limited to circumstances amounting to an affront to the judicial process.\u2019 \u201d Holder v. Caselton, 275 Ill. App. 3d 950, 959, 657 N.E.2d 680, 687 (1995), quoting Allison v. Stalter, 251 Ill. App. 3d 127, 131, 621 N.E.2d 977, 979 (1993). Moreover, even under the criminal law, plain error is not implicated when a defendant challenges a charging instrument; rather, courts apply the analysis set forth above.\nAlthough we have determined that the forfeiture rule bars respondent\u2019s claim, we acknowledge that this rule is an admonition to the parties and does not impose a limitation on the reviewing court. In re K.A., 335 Ill. App. 3d 1095, 1099, 782 N.E.2d 937, 940 (2003). This court may overlook considerations of forfeiture in the interest of developing a sound body of law (In re Marriage of King, 336 Ill. App. 3d 83, 91, 783 N.E.2d 115, 122 (2002)), and may review any issue so long as the record contains facts sufficient for its resolution (Ward v. Community Unit School District No. 220, 243 Ill. App. 3d 968, 974, 614 N.E.2d 102, 107 (1993)). In light of these principles, we will address on the merits respondent\u2019s claim regarding the pleading requirement of section 2 \u2014 13(4) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 13(4) (West 2000)).\n3. The Pleading Requirement of Section 2 \u2014 13(4) of the Act\nAs stated above, respondent contends that section 2 \u2014 13(4) of the Act required the State to include the word \u201cpermanently\u201d in its termination petition. The State responds that the section 2 \u2014 13(4) requirement that petitions \u201cclearly and obviously state that the parents could permanently lose their rights as a parent at this hearing\u201d (1) applies only when the State seeks to terminate parental rights in the same proceeding in which it seeks an adjudication of neglect, abuse, or dependency; and (2) does not apply when, as here, the State files a termination petition under section 2 \u2014 29 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 29 (West 2000)) after there has been an adjudication of abuse and a dispositional order has been entered. We agree with the State.\nWe review de novo questions of statutory construction. \u201cThe cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent of the legislature [citations], while presuming the legislature did not intend to create absurdity, inconvenience, or injustice.\u201d In re D.D., 196 Ill. 2d 405, 418-19, 752 N.E.2d 1112, 1119-20 (2001). The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute itself; thus, our analysis of any statute begins with its language. When the language is plain and unambiguous, courts may not read in exceptions, limitations, or other conditions. D.D., 196 Ill. 2d at 419, 752 N.E.2d at 1120. However, when the meaning of a statute ' cannot be ascertained from its language, courts may resort to aids for statutory construction, including a statute\u2019s legislative history and transcripts of legislative debates. Krohe v. City of Bloomington, 204 Ill. 2d 392, 397-98, 789 N.E.2d 1211, 1214 (2003).\nWithout question, section 2 \u2014 13 of the Act, in its entirety, pertains to petitions seeking an adjudication of neglect, abuse, or dependency. Subsection (2) of section 2 \u2014 13 provides, \u201c[the petition] shall allege that the minor is abused, neglected, or dependent, with citations to the appropriate provisions of this Act, and set forth (a) facts sufficient to bring the minor under [s]ection 2 \u2014 3 or 2 \u2014 4.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/2\u2014 13(2) (West 2000). (Section 2 \u2014 3 of the Act defines \u201cneglected and abused minors\u201d (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 3 (West 2000)), and section 2 \u2014 4 of the Act defines \u201cdependent minor\u201d (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 4 (West 2000)).) Subsection (3) of section 2 \u2014 13 states that \u201c[t]he petition must allege that it is in the best interests of the minor and of the public that he be adjudged a ward of the court.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 13(3) (West 2000).\nThe next subsection of section 2 \u2014 13 is subsection (4), which, as previously stated, provides as follows:\n\u201cIf termination of parental rights and appointment of a guardian of the person with power to consent to adoption of the minor under [s]ection 2 \u2014 29 is sought, the petition shall so state. If the petition includes this request, the prayer for relief shall clearly and obviously state that the parents could permanently lose their rights as a parent at this hearing.\nIn addition to the foregoing, the petitioner, by motion, may request the termination of parental rights and appointment of a guardian of the person with power to consent to adoption of the minor under [sjection 2 \u2014 29 at any time after the entry of a dispositional order under [s]ection 2 \u2014 22.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 13(4) (West 2000).\nConsistent with our interpretation of preceding subsections (2) and (3), we conclude that where subsection (4) refers to \u201cthe petition,\u201d it is referring to the aforementioned petition for adjudication of neglect, abuse, or dependency, and where it refers to \u201cthis hearing,\u201d it is referring to the adjudicatory hearing on that petition. Any other interpretation would render superfluous the second paragraph of section 2 \u2014 13(4), which states that \u201cin addition\u201d to \u201cthe foregoing\u201d \u2014 that is, seeking termination of parental rights \u201cat this hearing\u201d \u2014 a petitioner may seek termination of parental rights \u201cat any time after the entry of a dispositional order under [sjection 2 \u2014 22.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 13(4) (West 2000). Thus, \u201cthis hearing\u201d must refer to the adjudicatory hearing, which necessarily takes place before a dispositional order under section 2 \u2014 22 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 22 (West 2000)) has been entered.\nThe logic and consistency of our interpretation of section 2 \u2014 13(4) is apparent when the Act is viewed as a whole. The language at issue in this case became part of the Act when the legislature enacted Public Acts 89 \u2014 704 and 90 \u2014 28 (Pub. Act 89 \u2014 704 \u00a7 5, eff. January 1, 1998 (1996 Ill. Laws 3963, 3964); Pub. Act 90 \u2014 28, \u00a7 10 \u2014 20, eff. January 1, 1998 (1997 Ill. Laws 1498, 1549)). These enactments amended the Act, in pertinent part, to allow the State to expedite termination-of-parental-rights proceedings in egregious cases of abuse or neglect. To that end, Public Act 89 \u2014 704 (1) amended section 1 \u2014 2 of the Act to provide that when a ground for unfitness under section 1(D) of the Adoption Act can be met, \u201cit may be appropriate to expedite termination of parental rights in abandonment cases; or in those extreme cases in which the parent\u2019s conduct toward the child or the child\u2019s sibling has been so egregious that the behavior justifies termination of parental rights\u201d (Pub. Act 89 \u2014 704, \u00a7 5, eff. January 1, 1998 (1996 Ill. Laws 3963, 3964), amending 705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 2 (West 1996)); (2) amended section 2 \u2014 18 of the Act to allow the trial court to consider, at the adjudicatory hearing, legally admissible evidence on grounds of unfitness under section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (Pub. Act 89 \u2014 704, \u00a7 5, eff. January 1, 1998 (1996 Ill. Laws 3963, 3966), amending 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 18 (West 1996)); (3) amended section 2 \u2014 21 of the Act to allow trial courts to terminate parental rights at the \u201cinitial dispositional hearing\u201d when certain conditions are met (Pub. Act 89\u2014 704, \u00a7 5, eff. January 1, 1998 (1996 Ill. Laws 3963, 3968-69), amending 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 21 (West 1996)); and (4) amended section 2 \u2014 13(4) of the Act to provide that if the State\u2019s petition seeks termination of parental rights, its \u201cprayer for relief shall clearly and obviously state that the parents could permanently lose their rights *** at this hearing\u201d (Pub. Act 89 \u2014 704, \u00a7 5, eff. January 1, 1998 (1996 Ill. Laws 3963, 3965), amending 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 13(4) (West 1996)).\nPublic Act 90 \u2014 28 added the second paragraph to section 2 \u2014 13(4) of the Act, clarifying the State\u2019s right to seek termination of parental rights at any point after the entry of a dispositional order (Pub. Act 90 \u2014 28, \u00a7 10 \u2014 20, eff. January 1, 1998 (1996 Ill. Laws 1458, 1549), amending 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 13(4) (West 1996)). Public Act 90 \u2014 28 also amended three sections of the Act to provide that when the trial court (1) adjudicates a minor abused, neglected, or dependent (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 21(1) (West 2000)), (2) awards guardianship to DCFS at a dispositional hearing (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 22(6) (West 2000)), and (3) enters a dispositional order granting guardianship to DCFS (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 23(l)(c) (West 2000)), the court shall admonish the parents that they must cooperate with DCFS, comply with the terms of the service plan, and correct the conditions that require the child to be in care, or risk termination of their parental rights. 705 ILCS 405/2\u2014 21(1), 2 \u2014 22(6), 2 \u2014 23(l)(c) (West 2000).\nThus, through the amendments to the Act provided in Public Acts 89 \u2014 704 and 90 \u2014 28, the legislature, in its wisdom, not only granted the State additional powers, but also granted respondent parents attendant protections. When the State seeks termination of parental rights in an expedited fashion \u2014 that is, contemporaneous with an adjudication of wardship \u2014 its petition must clearly and obviously state that the parents could permanently lose their rights at the hearing on that petition. This requirement (1) ensures that the parent is put on notice of what is immediately at stake, and (2) attempts to prevent parents from being blindsided by an adjudication petition that buries the request for termination of parental rights amid numerous other allegations and requests for relief. In light of the magnitude of the rights and issues at stake, such procedural protections are fair and reasonable.\nSimilarly, with the enactment of Public Act 90 \u2014 28, the legislature provided procedural protections to respondents who face termination proceedings at a later point. In those cases where the State does not seek an expedited termination of parental rights but files a termination petition at some point after a dispositional order has been entered, the respondent will have been admonished by the trial court (possibly as many as three times) that her parental rights will be at stake in the event she fails to cooperate with DCFS, comply with service plans, or otherwise follow the court\u2019s directives. Thus, when the State files a petition for termination of parental rights at this point, the concerns addressed by the pleading requirement of section 2 \u2014 13(4) do not arise. The respondent has been adequately forewarned that her parental rights are at stake. Moreover, the State\u2019s petition will be labeled as a petition for termination of parental rights, and no risk exists that the petition will appear to be anything other than a petition seeking termination of parental rights.\nIn light of the foregoing considerations, we hold that the language of section 2 \u2014 13(4) (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 13(4) (West 2000)) of the Act requiring that a petition \u201cclearly and obviously state that the parents could permanently lose their rights as a parent at this hearing\u201d does not apply to termination petitions brought under section 2 \u2014 29 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 29 (West 2000)) following the entry of a dispositional order under section 2 \u2014 22 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/ 2 \u2014 22 (West 2000)).\nB. J.R.\u2019s Best Interest\nLast, respondent argues that the trial court\u2019s best-interest finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, she contends that terminating her parental rights was not in J.R.\u2019s best interest because it did not \u201cfree him for adoption\u201d since Robb\u2019s parental rights were only terminated pursuant to a specific consent to adoption, which did not constitute a complete surrender of J.R. to DCFS. We disagree.\nFollowing a finding of parental unfitness, the trial court must give full and serious consideration to the child\u2019s best interest. We will not disturb a court\u2019s finding that termination is in a child\u2019s best interest unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re M.F., 326 Ill. App. 3d 1110, 1115-16, 762 N.E.2d 701, 706 (2002).\nAt the time of the November 2002 best-interest hearing, J.R. was three years old and had been living with the Hyatts for a full year. He had a bond with the Hyatts, their home provided him with a safe and stable environment, and his health was good. The Hyatts wanted to adopt J.R., and Robb had executed a final and irrevocable consent to such adoption. No chance existed that respondent would be able to take care of J.R. in the foreseeable future, in light of her 25-year prison sentence.\nIn termination-of-parental-rights cases, often the trial court is left without a perfect solution, and the court must choose what in its judgment is the best alternative. It may be in a child\u2019s best interest to have his parents\u2019 parental rights terminated, even if no adoptive candidate exists. See In re B.S., 317 Ill. App. 3d 650, 665, 740 N.E.2d 404, 417 (2000) (affirming the trial court\u2019s judgment terminating the respondent\u2019s parental rights despite evidence that there were no prospective adoptive parents), overruled in part on other grounds in In re R.C., 195 Ill. 2d 291, 301-02, 745 N.E.2d 1233, 1241 (2001). Here, the court determined that the best available alternative was to provide J.R. with a chance for permanency with the Hyatts. That determination was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nAffirmed.\nAPPLETON, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" }, { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH,\nspecially concurring:\nI agree with the majority\u2019s finding that respondent forfeited her right to raise her objection to the State\u2019s petition on appeal because she failed to object to the State\u2019s petition in the trial court. I would have ended the analysis there. However, I concur in the majority\u2019s result, but specially concur to attempt to reconcile the majority\u2019s holding with the section of the statute under which respondent was found unfit.\nThe trial court found respondent unfit under section 1(D) (q) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/l(D)(q) (West 2000)), which provides that a parent is unfit if:\n\u201c[t]he parent has been criminally convicted of aggravated battery, heinous battery, or attempted murder of any child.\u201d 750 ILCS 50/1 (D)(q) (West 2000).\nIn the present case, respondent was convicted of first degree murder of J.R. The legislature did not specifically list first degree murder in this section of the statute. It is logical to infer, however, that if a parent is criminally convicted of a greater offense \u2014 i.e., first degree murder \u2014 that offense would naturally encompass the lesser offenses enumerated.\nBlack\u2019s Law Dictionary defines \u201caggravated battery\u201d as \u201c[a] criminal battery accompanied by circumstances that make it more severe, such as the use of a deadly weapon or the fact that the battery resulted in serious bodily harm.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 146 (7th ed. 1999). Certainly first degree murder meets that definition and was intended by the legislature to fall within the purview of this section of the statute as a basis for a finding of unfitness.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH," } ], "attorneys": [ "Adele M. Saaf, of Bloomington, for appellant.", "William A. Yoder, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Linda Susan McClain, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Frosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the Eeople." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re J.R., Alleged to be an Abused and Neglected Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Lona Griffin, Respondent-Appellant).\nFourth District\nNo. 4 \u2014 02-\u20140973\nOpinion filed July 30, 2003.\nAdele M. Saaf, of Bloomington, for appellant.\nWilliam A. Yoder, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Linda Susan McClain, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Frosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the Eeople." }, "file_name": "0310-01", "first_page_order": 328, "last_page_order": 341 }