{ "id": 3474283, "name": "MARGARET SZCZEBLEWSKI et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. JEFFREY GOSSETT, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Szczeblewski v. Gossett", "decision_date": "2003-07-31", "docket_number": "No. 5-02-0422", "first_page": "344", "last_page": "349", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "342 Ill. App. 3d 344" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "407 N.E.2d 193", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 Ill. App. 3d 645", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3192172 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "647" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/85/0645-01" ] }, { "cite": "495 N.E.2d 1264", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1268" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 Ill. App. 3d 585", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3535472 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "592" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/145/0585-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 F.R.D. 655", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "F.R.D.", "case_ids": [ 7854572 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "657" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/frd/120/0655-01" ] }, { "cite": "692 N.E.2d 1150", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1155" }, { "page": "1155" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 395", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821394 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "404-05" }, { "page": "404-05" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0395-01" ] }, { "cite": "713 N.E.2d 222", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "225-26" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1725039 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "963" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/292/0956-01" ] }, { "cite": "703 N.E.2d 71", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "75" }, { "page": "77" }, { "page": "77" }, { "page": "77" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "184 Ill. 2d 224", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 926969 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233" }, { "page": "236" }, { "page": "236" }, { "page": "237" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/184/0224-01" ] }, { "cite": "536 N.E.2d 831", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "832" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "180 Ill. App. 3d 1076", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2615512 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1078" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/180/1076-01" ] }, { "cite": "519 N.E.2d 1056", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1063" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "166 Ill. App. 3d 442", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5069255 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "452" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/166/0442-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 N.E.2d 483", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "485" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 Ill. 2d 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3031543 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/87/0167-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 624, "char_count": 11495, "ocr_confidence": 0.743, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1965999332911203e-07, "percentile": 0.5925702618183532 }, "sha256": "34150c93cecf2c72f8cc0592e3d02fbc9f249c1f709ee6d5becd2633cc1f002e", "simhash": "1:b113f5d4f5e414ae", "word_count": 1898 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:14:05.196224+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "CHAPMAN and KUEHN, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "MARGARET SZCZEBLEWSKI et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. JEFFREY GOSSETT, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE DONOVAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis interlocutory appeal, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308), involves three certified questions regarding the proper interpretation and application of Supreme Court Rule 216 (134 Ill. 2d R. 216). In particular, we are asked to determine:\n1. Whether the causal connection to the occurrence, the reasonableness and necessity of the medical services, and the reasonableness of the cost of medical services are facts susceptible to admission or denial within the meaning of Supreme Court Rule 216.\n2. Whether the knowledge of defendants\u2019 attorneys and insurers regarding the causal connection to the occurrence, the reasonableness and necessity of the medical services, and the reasonableness of the cost of medical services are facts imputable to defendants for purposes of Supreme Court Rule 216.\n3. Whether a defendant responding to requests for the admission of facts as set forth above is required to seek to avail himself of the knowledge of his attorneys and/or insurers before making a claim of insufficient knowledge to admit or deny.\nWe answer question 1 in the affirmative and combine questions 2 and 3 into one inquiry and answer it in the affirmative.\nInitially, we note that discovery orders are not appealable under Rule 308. People ex rel. Scott v. Silverstein, 87 Ill. 2d 167, 171, 429 N.E.2d 483, 485 (1981); Voss v. Lincoln Mall Management Co., 166 Ill. App. 3d 442, 452, 519 N.E.2d 1056, 1063 (1988). Nevertheless, a distinction exists between questions of law regarding the scope of discovery and questions regarding particular discovery. Questions of law are reviewable under Rule 308, whereas discovery orders are not. Bass v. Cincinnati, Inc., 180 Ill. App. 3d 1076, 1078, 536 N.E.2d 831, 832 (1989). The questions that have been certified for our review are questions of law regarding the scope of discovery We turn then to the questions certified for review.\nBackground\nThis case arises out of the claims of Margaret Szczeblewski and Joseph Myers against Jeffrey Gossett as a result of a rear-end collision on October 26, 2000. Plaintiffs\u2019 complaint was filed March 26, 2001. Defendant\u2019s answer, denying the existence of a collision, negligence on the part of the defendant, or injury to either plaintiff, was filed April 5, 2001. After discovery depositions of the parties, defendant\u2019s admission of liability was filed June 12, 2001. Medical records and bills pertaining to both plaintiffs were provided to the defense June 1, 2001, and thereafter, plaintiffs voluntarily provided to the defense authorizations for medical records. Plaintiffs\u2019 first and second requests for the admission of facts pertaining to medical services and bills were filed August 29, 2001.\nEach plaintiffs request for the admission of facts had attached the medical providers\u2019 bills involved, and with the exception of differences in the date, amount, and identity of the service provider, each paragraph of the requests for the admission of facts was in the following form:\n\u201ca. That the attached bill dated October 26, 2000, in the amount of $501, from Marshall Browning Hospital, 900 North Washington, DuQuoin, Illinois, represents charges for services which were reasonable and necessary treatment for conditions occurring as a result of the occurrence which is the subject of the instant suit.\nb. That the charges on the attached bill dated October 26, 2000, in the amount of $501, from Marshall Browning Hospital, are fair and reasonable charges for the services performed.\u201d\nEach subparagraph (a) and (b) of defendant\u2019s responses uniformly stated as follows:\n\u201cThis defendant can neither admit or [sic] deny Request for Admission of Fact *** in that it requires him to give a medical opinion which he is not qualified to do. Defendant has insufficient knowledge to admit or deny.\u201d\nDefendant verified his responses to each of plaintiffs\u2019 requests for the admission of facts as \u201ctrue and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.\u201d\nPlaintiffs\u2019 motion to compel was filed November 21, 2001. A listing of the medical records, reports, statements, and receipts provided to the defense up to the date of the hearing was attached as an exhibit to plaintiffs\u2019 motion to compel.\nOn May 31, 2002, the trial court heard arguments on the motion to compel. On June 13, it entered its order, with findings pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308, denying plaintiffs\u2019 motion to compel. We granted plaintiffs\u2019 application for leave to appeal on July 25, 2002.\nQuestion 1\nQuestion 1 addresses whether a Rule 216 request to admit can be used to establish the causal connection between a defendant\u2019s conduct and a plaintiffs injuries, the necessity and reasonableness of the medical services received by that plaintiff, and the reasonableness of the cost of the medical services received by that plaintiff.\nThe Illinois Supreme Court\u2019s decision in P.R.S. International, Inc. v. Shred Pax Corp., 184 Ill. 2d 224, 703 N.E.2d 71 (1998), holds the key. According to the holding in PR.S. International, Inc., a party\u2019s failure to respond to a request for admissions may be deemed an admission if the request relates to \u201c \u2018disputed ultimate facts\u2019 \u201d or \u201c \u2018any contested facts needed to establish one\u2019s case or defense.\u2019 \u201d P.R.S. International, Inc., 184 Ill. 2d at 233, 703 N.E.2d at 75, quoting P.R.S. International, Inc. v. Shred Pax Corp., 292 Ill. App. 3d 956, 963, 686 N.E.2d 1214, 1219 (1997). The court explained the language of Rule 216 allowing requests for the admission \u201c \u2018of the truth of any specified relevant fact.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis omitted.) P.R.S. International, Inc., 184 Ill. 2d at 236, 703 N.E.2d at 77, quoting 134 Ill. 2d R. 216(a). The court then stated: \u201c[W]hether a fact is an \u2018ultimate\u2019 fact is irrelevant for purposes of this rule. The key question is whether a requested admission deals with a question of fact. Accordingly, requests for legal conclusions are improper; however, requests for admissions of factual questions which might give rise to legal conclusions are not improper.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) RR.S. International, Inc., 184 Ill. 2d at 236, 703 N.E.2d at 77. A defendant\u2019s conduct as the cause of the occurrence, the necessity and reasonableness of the medical services a plaintiff received to treat his or her injuries, and the reasonable cost of the medical services received are all facts that are proper subjects for a Rule 216 request to admit. See Hubeny v. Chairse, 305 Ill. App. 3d 1038, 1043-45, 713 N.E.2d 222, 225-26 (1999).\nQuestions 2 and 3\nThe remaining two questions deal with whether a party is required to avail himself of the knowledge of his attorneys or agents before admitting, denying, or making a claim of insufficient knowledge to admit or deny a request to admit.\nSupreme Court Rule 216 states in relevant part:\n\u201c(a) Request for Admission of Fact. A party may serve on any other party a written request for the admission by the latter of the truth of any specified relevant fact set forth in the request.\n(c) Admission in the Absence of Denial. Each of the matters of fact and the genuineness of each document of which admission is requested is admitted unless, within 28 days after service thereof, the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission either (1) a sworn statement denying specifically the matters of which admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully admit or deny those matters or (2) written objections on the ground that some or all of the requested admissions are privileged or irrelevant or that the request is otherwise improper in whole or in part. If written objections to a part of the request are made, the remainder of the request shall be answered within the period designated in the request. A denial shall fairly meet the substance of the requested admission. If good faith requires that a party deny only a part, or requires qualification, of a matter of which an admission is requested, he shall specify so much of it as is true and deny only the remainder. Any objection to a request or to an answer shall be heard by the court upon prompt notice and motion of the party making the request.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 216(a), (c).\nIn interpreting a supreme court rule, we are to apply the same principles of construction that apply to a statute. In re Estate of Rennick, 181 Ill. 2d 395, 404-05, 692 N.E.2d 1150, 1155 (1998). As the Illinois Supreme Court has stated:\n\u201cOur goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the drafters of the rule. [Citation.] The most reliable indicator of intent is the language used, which should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. [Citation.] Where the language is clear and unambiguous, we must apply the language used without further aids of construction. [Citation.]\u201d In re Estate of Rennick, 181 Ill. 2d at 404-05, 692 N.E.2d at 1155.\nThe purpose of a request to admit is not to discover facts but, rather, to establish some of the material facts in a case without the necessity of formal proof at trial. P.R.S. International, Inc., 184 Ill. 2d at 237, 703 N.E.2d at 77. The proper use of requests to admit results in a substantial savings of time and expense, both for the parties and the court. Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Deutz-Allis Corp., 120 F.R.D. 655, 657 (E.D.N.C. 1988).\nIn deciding a party\u2019s duty under Rule 216, we are guided by how Supreme Court Rule 213 (166 Ill. 2d R. 213) (\u201cWritten Interrogatories to Parties\u201d) has been construed. Rule 213 has been interpreted \u201cto require a party to answer fully and in good faith to the extent of his actual knowledge and the information available to him or to his attorney.\u201d Singer v. Treat, 145 Ill. App. 3d 585, 592, 495 N.E.2d 1264, 1268 (1986), citing Brandon v. DeBusk, 85 Ill. App. 3d 645, 647, 407 N.E.2d 193, 195 (1980). Comparably, Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)) (\u201cRequest for Admission\u201d) explicitly requires as follows: \u201cAn answering party may not give lack of information or knowledge as a reason for failure to admit or deny unless the party states that the party has made reasonable inquiry and that the information known or readily obtainable by the party is insufficient to enable the party to admit or deny.\u201d\nTo ensure that the laudable purpose of Rule 216 is accomplished, a party has a good-faith obligation to make a reasonable effort to secure answers to requests to admit from persons and documents within the responding party\u2019s reasonable control. In this case that would include the defendant\u2019s attorney and insurance company investigators or representatives. We believe that this finding reflects the long-accepted practice of trial attorneys in the courts of Illinois.\nOn remand, the trial court shall allow the defendant an additional 28 days to amend his answers to plaintiffs\u2019 requests to admit if, after considering this opinion, defendant believes that he is required to modify his previous answers. \u2022\nThis cause is remanded with directions for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nCertified questions answered; cause remanded with directions.\nCHAPMAN and KUEHN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE DONOVAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Bruce D. Irish, of Sam C. Mitchell & Associates, of West Frankfort, for appellants.", "Brad K. Bleyer, of Marion, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MARGARET SZCZEBLEWSKI et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. JEFFREY GOSSETT, Defendant-Appellee.\nFifth District\nNo. 5 \u2014 02\u20140422\nOpinion filed July 31, 2003.\nBruce D. Irish, of Sam C. Mitchell & Associates, of West Frankfort, for appellants.\nBrad K. Bleyer, of Marion, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0344-01", "first_page_order": 362, "last_page_order": 367 }