{ "id": 3473472, "name": "SURESH CHAND, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANN PATLA, Director of Public Aid, et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Chand v. Patla", "decision_date": "2003-08-06", "docket_number": "No. 5-02-0063", "first_page": "655", "last_page": "665", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "342 Ill. App. 3d 655" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "48 Ill. App. 3d 815", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3370326 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "819" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/48/0815-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821407 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205" }, { "page": "205" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "518 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1729911 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10" }, { "page": "345" }, { "page": "1928" }, { "page": "10" }, { "page": "345" }, { "page": "1928" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/518/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 60", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259028 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "72" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 Ill. App. 3d 982", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3525547 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "983" }, { "page": "984" }, { "page": "984", "parenthetical": "the argument that an attorney fee award was barred by sovereign immunity was devoid of merit" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/128/0982-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 Ill. App. 3d 1084", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 79433 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1088" }, { "page": "1088" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/327/1084-01" ] }, { "cite": "3 Ill. 2d 375", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2695151 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/3/0375-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 Ill. 2d 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2972054 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "442" }, { "page": "441" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/62/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 527", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 797, "char_count": 23438, "ocr_confidence": 0.724, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.548627546539126e-08, "percentile": 0.28501391393861186 }, "sha256": "d0a06c38701988bdf50f8af472cf5d37cd53ac71b768e49b46ca0202eed3277e", "simhash": "1:ccf2ce8fe719a69a", "word_count": 3662 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:14:05.196224+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "GOLDENHERSH and DONOVAN, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "SURESH CHAND, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANN PATLA, Director of Public Aid, et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE HOPKINS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe plaintiff, Suresh Chand, M.D., filed a complaint in the circuit court of Madison County for judicial review of the administrative action of the Illinois Department of Public Aid (the Department) terminating his eligibility as a vendor of medical services. The circuit court reversed the Department\u2019s decision to terminate the plaintiff from eligibility to participate in the State\u2019s medical assistance program and ordered the Department to pay the plaintiff $42,650 in attorney fees.\nOn appeal, the Department asserts that the case is moot, that the circuit court improperly awarded attorney fees, and that the plaintiffs failure to answer a questionnaire or provide copies of his professional licenses was a sufficient, alternative basis upon which to affirm the Department\u2019s determination. We affirm in part and reverse in part.\nFACTS\nIn a letter dated February 9, 1998, and again in a letter dated March 16, 1998, the Department, through the Bureau of Medical Quality Assurance (the Bureau), indicated that the plaintiff had \u201cbeen selected for peer review *** to determine [the plaintiffs] compliance with Department policies.\u201d The Bureau requested that the plaintiff produce the medical charts of 15 patients and attached a list of the 15 patients with their recipient identification numbers. The Bureau requested the patient records \u201cin their entirety[,] including the initial visit, all progress notes, operative reports, consultation reports, hospitalization records[,] *** and diagnostic services.\u201d The Bureau also enclosed a physician\u2019s information questionnaire and requested that the plaintiff return the questionnaire within two weeks, along with copies of his current license, Illinois controlled substance license, Drug Enforcement Agency certificate, and continuing education certificates for the previous three years.\nOn February 23 and March 30, 1998, the plaintiff\u2019s attorney responded to the Department\u2019s request, stating that because the Department had failed to comply with the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act (the Confidentiality Act) (740 ILCS 110/1 et seq. (West 2000)), the plaintiff would not honor the Department\u2019s request.\nOn May 22, 1998, the Department commenced an administrative proceeding seeking to terminate the plaintiffs eligibility to participate in the State\u2019s medical assistance program, which provides medical care to the State\u2019s public aid recipients. The administrative law judge (ALJ) heard evidence and argument on October 27 and 28, 1998; February 5 and 22, 1999; and March 8 and March 22, 1999.\nMarilyn Harvatin, a health facilities surveillance nurse with the Bureau\u2019s peer review unit, testified that she participated in the Bureau\u2019s request for the recipient records, the physician questionnaire, and copies of professional licenses for the peer review committee. Harvatin asserted that the purpose of the peer review was to determine whether the plaintiff was in compliance with the Department\u2019s policies and whether recipients of the medical assistance program were receiving quality care. Harvatin testified that she did not contact or attempt to acquire authorizations from the 15 recipients whose medical records the Bureau requested. Harvatin explained that when a recipient signs up with the program, the recipient understands that the recipient\u2019s records might be reviewed.\nHarvatin stated that the physician\u2019s questionnaire was essential to the peer review process. The questionnaire requested information regarding the provider\u2019s age, education, certification, licensing, and practice, i.e., how many offices and employees the provider has; whether the provider has an interest in a pharmacy, transportation company, or long-term care company; how many patients the provider treats; and whether the provider has a laboratory.\nOn April 23, 1999, the ALJ recommended that the plaintiff\u2019s eligibility to participate in the medical assistance program be terminated. The ALJ held that the plaintiff wrongfully refused to produce copies of the medical records. The ALJ determined that the plaintiff was permitted under the Confidentiality Act to supply the records to the Department because doing so was pursuant to a peer review of his work, a specific exception to the disclosure requirements under the Confidentiality Act (740 ILCS 110/9 (West 2000)). The ALJ further determined that the Confidentiality Act required the plaintiff, as the medical provider, to inform his patients that he was disclosing their records to the Bureau.\nThe ALJ held that the plaintiff also wrongfully refused to produce his professional documents and the physician\u2019s information questionnaire. The ALJ held that the information sought in the questionnaire was current and updated information to ensure an accurate basis on which to conduct a peer review. The ALJ rejected the plaintiffs claims that no specific rules or handbook policies required him to provide such information, that the Department already had the information, or that the plaintiff was being harassed by the Bureau. The ALJ determined that the plaintiff violated sections 140.12(f) and 140.16(a)(1) and (a)(4) of the Department\u2019s regulations, as well as paragraph four of the plaintiffs provider agreement.\nOn June 9, 1999, the Director adopted the ALJ\u2019s recommended decision and terminated the plaintiffs eligibility to participate in the medical assistance program.\nOn June 17, 1999, the plaintiff sought administrative review in the circuit court. He alleged that the Department\u2019s decision was incorrect because the files that he refused to provide the Department were protected under the Confidentiality Act and that the Department failed to follow the procedures outlined in the Confidentiality Act.\nOn April 7, 2000, the circuit court continued the proceedings for three months, noting that a separate appeal was pending in the appellate court between the Department and the plaintiff and that it concerned issues raised in the present case. In the separate appeal, this court, on April 26, 2000, affirmed the Department\u2019s termination of the plaintiffs eligibility to participate as a vendor in the medical assistance program because the plaintiff had provided medical goods and services to public aid patients that placed them at risk of harm and that were of a grossly inferior quality. Chand v. Wright, No. 5 \u2014 98\u2014 0691 (2000) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23 (166 Ill. 2d R. 23)). On October 4, 2000, the Illinois Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs petition for leave to appeal. Chand v. Wright, 191 Ill. 2d 527 (2000).\nIn its November 20, 2000, order, the circuit court held that, despite the separate appeal terminating the plaintiffs eligibility, the present cause was not moot and that the Department\u2019s decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence but that the Department\u2019s regulatory requirement to provide psychiatric records of patients without their consent violates the Confidentiality Act. The circuit court also held that the plaintiffs failure to complete the questionnaire did not constitute a sufficient basis for termination because the plaintiff did not refuse to supply the questionnaire and supporting documents.\nOn December 27, 2000, the plaintiff filed a motion for costs and attorney fees, pursuant to the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act (5 ILCS 100/10 \u2014 55(c) (West 2000)) and pursuant to the Confidentiality Act (740 ILCS 110/15 (West 2000)), seeking a total fee of $42,650. On December 23, 2001, the circuit court awarded the plaintiff his attorney fees and costs. The Department filed its timely appeal.\nANALYSIS\nMootness\nThe Department argues that because the plaintiffs eligibility to participate in the program had already been terminated, this case was moot prior to the circuit court\u2019s order, and therefore, the Department requests that we vacate the circuit court\u2019s order. We decline to do so.\nIt is well settled that the existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction. Meyer v. Marshall, 62 Ill. 2d 435 (1976); La Salle National Bank v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill. 2d 375 (1954). In Meyer, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the appellate court had erred in reviewing the merits of the case to determine whether the plaintiffs were entitled to costs or attorney fees, because the substantive questions had become moot. Meyer, 62 Ill. 2d at 442. The Illinois Supreme Court stated:\n\u201cWe have repeatedly held that where it is no longer possible to render effective relief on the ultimate merits of a controversy, a reviewing court should not undertake a review of the controversy simply because liability for costs may be at stake.\u201d Meyer, 62 Ill. 2d at 441.\nSee also La Salle National Bank, 3 Ill. 2d at 378-79 (where issues involved in the trial court no longer exist, the appellate court will not review a case merely to decide moot or abstract questions, to establish a precedent, to determine the right to or the liability for costs, or, in effect, to render a judgment to guide potential future litigation).\nThe record reveals that on April 26, 2000, this court affirmed the Department\u2019s separate and previous termination of the plaintiff\u2019s eligibility to participate as a vendor in its medical assistance program (Chand v. Wright, No. 5 \u2014 98\u20140691 (2000) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23)), and on October 4, 2000, the Illinois Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs petition for leave to appeal) (Chand v. Wright, 191 Ill. 2d 527 (2000)). Because the plaintiff has been previously terminated, on alternative grounds, from eligibility to participate as a vendor in the medical assistance program, it is no longer possible to render the plaintiff effective relief on the ultimate merits of the instant controversy.\nAlthough we would therefore be precluded from reviewing the controversy simply because liability for attorney fees is at stake, an exception to the mootness doctrine exists where collateral legal consequences survive the expiration of the order under review. In re Jessie B., 327 Ill. App. 3d 1084, 1088 (2002). In In re Jessie B., 327 Ill. App. 3d at 1088, the court held that collateral legal consequences survived an order of delinquency because in the future a history of prior delinquency might be considered in aggravation against a defendant convicted of a crime as an adult. Similarly, in the present case, collateral legal consequences survive the expiration of the order terminating the plaintiff from eligibility to participate in the medical assistance program, because the order may be used against the plaintiff in the future when he applies for reinstatement to the program after one year, pursuant to the Illinois Public Aid Code (305 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 4.25(D) (West 2000)). Thus, because collateral legal consequences survive the expiration of the order under review, we agree with the trial court that the case sub judice is not moot, and we address the merits.\nAttorney Fees\nThe Department asserts that the Bureau\u2019s request for medical records was made pursuant to a peer review and was consistent with the Confidentiality Act (740 ILCS 110/9 (West 2000)). The Department asserts that the plaintiff must disclose to the recipients that he might release their medical records and that the Department therefore did not act improperly. Although we agree that the Bureau\u2019s request was made pursuant to the peer review exception to the disclosure requirements under the Confidentiality Act, we disagree with the Department\u2019s contention that the plaintiff must disclose to the recipients that he might release their psychiatric medical records.\nSection 10 \u2014 55(c) of the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act provides, in pertinent part:\n\u201cIn any case in which a party has any administrative rule invalidated by a court for any reason, including but not limited to the agency\u2019s exceeding its statutory authority or the agency\u2019s failure to follow statutory procedures in the adoption of the rule, the court shall award the party bringing the action the reasonable expenses of the litigation, including reasonable attorney\u2019s fees.\u201d 5 ILCS 100/10 \u2014 55(c) (West 2000).\n\u201cA rule is defined as a principle, procedure[,] or regulation governing conduct or action. (See The Random House Dictionary (unabr. ed. 1966).)\u201d Ackerman v. Department of Public Aid, 128 Ill. App. 3d 982, 983 (1984).\nThe Confidentiality Act provides that \u201cany record kept by a therapist or by an agency in the course of providing mental health or developmental disabilities service to a recipient\u201d and \u201cany communication made by a recipient or other person to a therapist or to or in the presence of other persons during or in connection with providing mental health or developmental disability services to a recipient\u201d \u201cshall be confidential and shall not be disclosed except as provided in this Act.\u201d 740 ILCS 110/2, 3(a) (West 2000).\nSection 9 of the Confidentiality Act provides:\n\u201cIn the course of providing services and after the conclusion of the provision of services, a therapist may disclose a record or communications without consent to:\n(2) persons conducting a peer review of the services being provided;\nInformation may be disclosed under this Section only to the extent that knowledge of the record or communications is essential to the purpose for which disclosure is made and only after the recipient [the person receiving mental health or developmental disabilities services (740 ILCS 110/2 (West 2000))] is informed that such disclosure may be made.\u201d 740 ILCS 110/9 (West 2000).\n\u00a3\u00a3[A]nyone seeking the nonconsensual release of mental health information faces a formidable challenge and must show that disclosure is authorized by the Act.\u201d Norskog v. Pfiel, 197 Ill. 2d 60, 72 (2001). As the United States Supreme Court has noted:\n\u201cEffective psychotherapy *** depends upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient is willing to make a frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and fears. Because of the sensitive nature of the problems for which individuals consult psychotherapists, disclosure of confidential communications made during counseling sessions may cause embarrassment or disgrace. For this reason, the mere possibility of disclosure may impede development of the confidential relationship necessary for successful treatment.\u201d Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10, 135 L. Ed. 2d 337, 345, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1928 (1996).\nWe reject the plaintiffs contention that because Harvatin was a nurse who had never worked in the mental health field, she was not a peer and that, therefore, the Bureau\u2019s request was not made pursuant to a peer review. Considering Harvatin\u2019s testimony that the Bureau\u2019s request for information was contemplated for a peer review, along with the letters notifying the plaintiff of the peer review, the Department\u2019s determination that the Bureau\u2019s request was made pursuant to a peer review and pursuant to section 9 of the Confidentiality Act (740 ILCS 110/9 (West 2000)) was not clearly erroneous. See City of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 205 (1998).\nHowever, we disagree that section 9 requires the plaintiff, as the medical provider, to disclose to the recipients that he might release their medical records. Recognizing that the possibility of disclosure impedes the development of the confidential relationship between the medical provider and the psychiatric recipient (see Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 345, 116 S. Ct. at 1928), we hold that, when conducting a peer review of the services being provided, the Department, which is seeking the nonconsensual release of mental health information, is required to limit its request to records or communications essential for the purpose for which the disclosure is made and to inform the recipient that such disclosure might be made. See 740 ILCS 110/9 (West 2000).\nWe next consider whether the Department informed the recipients that such a disclosure might be made. See 740 ILCS 110/9 (West 2000). Harvatin testified that recipients understand that their records might be reviewed, but Harvatin admitted that she did not contact any of the 15 recipients before requesting their mental health medical records from the plaintiff. In the circuit court\u2019s November 20, 2000, order, the court directed the Department to provide consent forms or a showing of notice to the 15 recipients whose medical records the Department requested. However, the Department, in its brief, asserts that because the plaintiff was terminated for independent reasons, the Department \u201cdid not pursue the question of whether the fifteen patients had received sufficient disclosures\u201d because \u201cthe question was entirely academic.\u201d\nUnder Supreme Court Rule 323 (166 Ill. 2d R. 323), the appellant must provide an adequate record on appeal sufficient to establish reversible error, and any doubt arising from the incompleteness of the record will be resolved against the appellant. Reed v. Hoffman, 48 Ill. App. 3d 815, 819 (1977). The Department failed to supplement the record with evidence that the recipients had previously been informed that a disclosure of their mental health information might be made. As a result, we resolve the issue \u2014 whether the Department informed the recipients that a disclosure of their mental health information might be made \u2014 against the Department.\nThus, the Department\u2019s procedures for acquiring the recipients\u2019 mental health information, for the purposes of peer review, without first notifying the recipients that such a disclosure might be made, did not comply with the Confidentiality Act (see 740 ILCS 110/9 (West 2000)) and had the effect, force, and impact of a rule (see Ackerman, 128 Ill. App. 3d at 984). The plaintiff had the Department\u2019s rule invalidated, and the trial court correctly awarded attorney fees to the plaintiff pursuant to the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act (5 ILCS 100/10 \u2014 55 (West 2000)). See Ackerman, 128 Ill. App. 3d at 984 (the argument that an attorney fee award was barred by sovereign immunity was devoid of merit). We therefore affirm that part of the circuit court\u2019s judgment relating to the requested medical records.\nPhysician Questionnaire and Licenses\nThe Department asserts that the plaintiffs termination based on his failure to answer the questionnaire or provide copies of his professional documents was not clearly erroneous because the information concerned the plaintiff and his practice and should have been promptly provided as required by state regulations. The plaintiff counters that because he may have completed and updated similar informational requests, he should not be required to do so on the whim of the Department, that no regulation required the disclosure of such information, and that as a result the plaintiff was improperly terminated on this basis. We disagree with the plaintiff.\nSection 140.12(f) of the Illinois Administrative Code requires that the provider shall agree to \u201c[flurnish to the Department, in the form and manner requested by it, any information it requests regarding payments for providing goods or services[ ] or in connection with the rendering of goods or services or supplies to recipients by the provider [or] his agent, employer[,] or employee.\u201d 89 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 140.12(f) (2000).\nSection 140.16(a)(4) of the Illinois Administrative Code provides for the termination of a vendor\u2019s eligibility to participate in the medical assistance program when the Department determines that the vendor \u201chas failed to furnish any information requested by the Department regarding payments for providing goods or services [ ] or has failed to furnish all information required by the Department in connection with the rendering of services or supplies to recipients of public assistance by the vendor [or] his agent, employer[,] or employee.\u201d 89 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 140.16(a)(4) (2000).\nParagraph four of the plaintiffs provider agreement required the plaintiff \u201con a continuing basis to comply *** with all applicable Federal and State laws and regulations.\u201d\nSection 12 \u2014 4.25(A) (a) of the Illinois Public Aid Code and section 140.16(a)(1) of the Illinois Administrative Code provide that the Department may terminate a vendor\u2019s eligibility to participate in the medical assistance program when it determines that the vendor is not complying with the Department\u2019s policy or rules or regulations or with the terms and conditions prescribed by the Department in any vendor agreement. 305 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 4.25(A)(a) (West 2000); 89 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 140.16(a)(1) (2000).\nIn the letter dated February 9, 1998, the Bureau requested that the plaintiff complete and return, within two weeks, a physician\u2019s information questionnaire and provide copies of his current professional licenses. The questionnaire requested information regarding how many offices and employees the provider has; whether the provider has an interest in a pharmacy, transportation company, or long-term care company; how many patients the provider treats; and whether he has a laboratory. The requested information was information in connection with the rendering of services or supplies to recipients by the provider, pursuant to sections 140.12(f) and 140.16(a)(4) of the Illinois Administrative Code (89 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7\u00a7 140.12(f), 140.16(a)(4) (2000)).\nThe plaintiff failed to provide the information in the form and manner requested by the Department, and the information was in connection with the rendering of services or supplies to recipients by the plaintiff. See 89 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7\u00a7 140.12(f), 140.16(a)(4) (2000). The ALJ properly concluded that by not completing the questionnaire or providing copies of the professional documents, the plaintiff violated sections 140.12(f) and 140.16(a)(4) of title 89 of the Illinois Administrative Code and, therefore, violated section 12 \u2014 4.25(A)(a) of the Illinois Public Aid Code, section 140.16(a)(1) of title 89 of the Illinois Administrative Code, and paragraph four of the plaintiffs provider agreement by failing to comply with the Department\u2019s regulations. The ALJ\u2019s conclusions were not clearly erroneous. See City of Belvidere, 181 Ill. 2d at 205. The circuit court\u2019s decision \u2014 that the plaintiffs failure to respond was not sufficient to terminate him because he had not refused to provide the documents \u2014 was in error, and we therefore reverse that part of the circuit court\u2019s judgment finding that the plaintiff was improperly terminated on this basis.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the circuit court of Madison County. We remand the cause to the trial court to determine the appropriate attorney fees pertinent to the issue involving the medical records, which the plaintiff can properly recover under the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act (5 ILCS 100/10 \u2014 55 (West 2000)).\nAffirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.\nGOLDENHERSH and DONOVAN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE HOPKINS" } ], "attorneys": [ "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, and Carl J. Elitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellants.", "Gregory G. Fenlon, of St. Louis, Missouri, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SURESH CHAND, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANN PATLA, Director of Public Aid, et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nFifth District\nNo. 5-02-0063\nOpinion filed August 6, 2003.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, and Carl J. Elitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellants.\nGregory G. Fenlon, of St. Louis, Missouri, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0655-01", "first_page_order": 673, "last_page_order": 683 }