{ "id": 3474383, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHRISTOPHER GOLDEN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Golden", "decision_date": "2003-08-20", "docket_number": "No. 1-00-3181", "first_page": "820", "last_page": "827", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "342 Ill. App. 3d 820" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "342 Ill. App. 3d 37", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3473176 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defendant beat victim with bat, put a pillow over her face, then stabbed her multiple times as she lay helpless" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/342/0037-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 Ill. App. 3d 58", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3472964 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defendant punched and choked victim into unconsciousness, then used a 30-inch-long tree limb to sexually assault her" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/342/0058-01" ] }, { "cite": "535 U.S. 625", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 353467 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "633" }, { "page": "869" }, { "page": "1786" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/535/0625-01" ] }, { "cite": "786 N.E.2d 1019", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "203 Ill. 2d 352", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 799391 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364-65" }, { "page": "363" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/203/0352-01" ] }, { "cite": "788 N.E.2d 1117", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "203 Ill. 2d 335", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 799372 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "347" }, { "page": "347-48" }, { "page": "348" }, { "page": "348" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/203/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 U.S. 466", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9413911 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490" }, { "page": "455" }, { "page": "2362-63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/530/0466-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 Ill. App. 3d 696", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1156802 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "699-700" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/278/0696-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 Ill. App. 3d 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2493911 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "85" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/195/0078-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 Ill. App. 3d 1086", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3559238 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1090-91" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/121/1086-01" ] }, { "cite": "382 Ill. 168", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2479164 ], "year": 1943, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/382/0168-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 Ill. App. 3d 99", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3266361 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "103" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/73/0099-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 Ill. 2d 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3082585 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "501" }, { "page": "501" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/88/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "203 Ill. 2d 335", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 799372 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "347" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/203/0335-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 781, "char_count": 14954, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.09684078106484201 }, "sha256": "e946c1fd0579bc74672781ccca3d397f1b3973593d439e6e8cbe702fe423cca8", "simhash": "1:3e27bb6ac74c9671", "word_count": 2494 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:14:05.196224+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "HOFFMAN, J., concurs." ], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHRISTOPHER GOLDEN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WOLFSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nChristopher Golden was convicted by a jury of attempted first degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm. The trial court, after vacating the aggravated battery conviction, sentenced Golden to an extended term of 36 years for the attempted first degree murder. There is no question that the procedure followed by the trial court violated Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). But Golden must overcome two substantial hurdles before he can cash in on the trial court\u2019s error. While this is a close case, we conclude Golden\u2019s extended-term sentence should be vacated and we remand this cause for resentencing.\nFACTS\nOn January 26, 1997, around midnight, defendant entered Marsha\u2019s Jam Cocktail Lounge along with five or six other men. Marsha Banks worked at the lounge. The men moved to the dance floor in an attempt to have their picture taken by a photographer. The men bumped into people during the process of having their picture taken, and Marsha asked them to have their picture taken outside. They refused and began arguing with her. She had the disc jockey turn off the music and again asked them to have their pictures taken outside.\nThe victim, Jerome Banks, who was Marsha\u2019s brother, approached defendant regarding the disturbance. Defendant cursed at him and then shot at him, missing. The victim tried to grab the gun, but it continued to fire during the struggle, striking the victim several times. Defendant then struck the victim on the top of his head with the gun. The victim fell to the floor, and defendant stood over him and tried to fire the gun at his head, but the gun jammed. The victim was taken to the hospital where he was treated for numerous and severe injuries to his spleen, colon, pancreas, lung, and broken vertebrae.\nOn August 6, 1997, both Jerome and Marsha identified defendant in a police lineup as the man who shot Jerome at the lounge.\nDECISION\nThe defendant does not challenge his conviction. He challenges his extended-term sentence.\nWhen sentencing the defendant, who had no prior convictions, the trial court said it considered the presentence investigation, statements of the lawyers, statutory factors in aggravation and mitigation, and \u201cI\u2019ve considered the seriousness of the injury or the permanency and the effect \u2014 long range effect on the part of the victim, Jerome Banks.\u201d The court then sentenced the defendant to 36 years in prison, 6 years more than the maximum for attempted first degree murder, a Class X felony. See 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(3) (West 2000).\nThe trial court did not specifically say it found \u201cexceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5-\u20143.2(b)(2) (West 1994). It appears from the record the reason for the extended-term sentence was the seriousness of the current and future injuries to Jerome Banks. We will assume the trial judge intended to apply the enhanced-sentence provision of section 5 \u2014 5\u2014 3.2(b)(2).\nThe penalty-increasing finding was not alleged in the information, was not submitted to the jury, and was not tested by the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.\nThe trial court\u2019s sentencing procedure violated Apprendi: \u201c[ojther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63.\nIn our original unpublished order, without going beyond Apprendi, we vacated the extended-term sentence and remanded for resentencing. Then, on June 4, 2003, the Illinois Supreme Court directed us to reconsider the remand in light of its supplemental opinion upon denial of rehearing in People v. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d 335, 788 N.E.2d 1117 (2001), and its opinion in People v. Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d 352, 786 N.E.2d 1019 (2003). We withdrew our order on July 15, 2003, and went back to the drawing board, to conduct the analysis required by Crespo and Thurow. That is, we now inquire into whether the trial court\u2019s Apprendi violation constituted plain error, and, if so, whether the error was harmless.\nI. Plain Error\nWe must consider whether there was plain error because the defendant did not object to his sentence on constitutional grounds at the time he was sentenced. That is the \u201cproper inquiry,\u201d even though Apprendi had not been decided until some time after the defendant was sentenced. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d at 347. If we find there was no plain error, we must hold the issue was forfeited by inaction. End of case.\nUnder the plain-error analysis, the defendant\u2019s sentence will stand unless he shows the error was prejudicial. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d at 347-48. The Illinois Supreme Court erected a formidable barrier in Crespo. Not only must the Apprendi error be plain and affect substantial rights, but it also must \u201c \u2018seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d at 348.\nThe plain-error approach to Apprendi cases was inspired by the United States Supreme Court\u2019s decision in United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 152 L. Ed. 2d 860, 122 S. Ct. 1781 (2002). There, the defendant was charged with being part of a drug conspiracy. The indictment made no mention of the specific drug quantities that could lead to enhanced penalties. After the jury returned a guilty verdict, the trial judge determined the relevant drug quantities when imposing a sentence that exceeded the statutory maximum reflected by the jury\u2019s verdict. Holding the error was forfeited, the Court concluded the jury \u201csurely\u201d would have found the required drug amounts since the evidence of drug quantity was overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 633, 152 L. Ed. 2d at 869, 122 S. Ct. at 1786.\nIn Crespo, the defendant attacked his victim with a kitchen knife that had an eight-inch-long blade. He stabbed her 24 times in the head, neck, and body, bending the blade, and he ripped out a large clump of her hair with the scalp still attached. The court, finding the defendant did not show the Apprendi error was prejudicial, said:\n\u201cWe have no doubt that a jury, presented with these facts, would have found that the crime was committed in a brutal and heinous manner, indicative of wanton cruelty.\u201d Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d at 348.\nWe do not believe the facts of this case are anywhere near the brutal and relentless stabbing attack that took place in Crespo. Nor do the facts of this case approach the vicious sexual attack we saw in People v. Lucas, 342 Ill. App. 3d 58 (2003) (defendant punched and choked victim into unconsciousness, then used a 30-inch-long tree limb to sexually assault her), or the murder we reviewed in People v. Lee, 342 Ill. App. 3d 37 (2003) (defendant beat victim with bat, put a pillow over her face, then stabbed her multiple times as she lay helpless).\nIn this case, the victim grabbed the defendant. The victim was shot twice as they struggled, then fell to the ground when the defendant hit him on the head with the gun. All the victim\u2019s injuries were caused before he fell to the ground, although the defendant tried, but failed, to shoot the victim some more while the victim was lying on the ground.\nThis, like many other cases of attempted first degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm, was a violent crime and it caused serious injuries. But we cannot say, as the court said in Crespo, \u201cwe have no doubt\u201d it was caused in a brutal and heinous manner indicative of wanton cruelty. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d at 348. In fact, we have substantial doubt. Nor do we believe a jury, had it considered the issue, would necessarily have found the victim\u2019s injuries were caused in a brutal and heinous manner, indicative of wanton cruelty. (Again, we note the trial court made no such finding.)\nWe conclude the defendant has sustained his burden of showing the Apprendi error was prejudicial, and for that reason we will consider the issue as a plain error.\nII. Harmless Error\nOur supreme court has held Apprendi violations are not\nstructural errors, requiring automatic reversal, but rather are susceptible to harmless-error analysis. Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d at 364-65.\nThe harmless-error analysis differs from plain error in terms of which party carries the burden of persuasion. To establish an error was harmless, \u201cthe State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error.\u201d Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d at 363. Applied to this case, the question becomes whether the State has persuaded us beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found the defendant\u2019s conduct was brutal and heinous, indicative of wanton cruelty.\nIn Thurow, the jury convicted the defendant of involuntary manslaughter. At sentencing, the trial court enhanced the defendant\u2019s sentence after finding the victim was a member of the defendant\u2019s household, a fact the jury was not instructed on and not specifically found by the jury. The evidence in support of the \u201chousehold member\u201d finding was \u201cuncontested and overwhelming.\u201d Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d at 369. We cannot say the same for the conclusion that the defendant\u2019s conduct in this case was brutal and heinous, indicative of wanton cruelty.\nOur plain-error analysis need not be repeated here. We conclude the State has not carried its burden of persuading us, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error made no difference.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the defendant\u2019s conviction, we vacate the extended-term sentence imposed on him, and remand this cause for resentencing within the confines of section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(3) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(3) (West 2000)).\nAffirmed in part and vacated in part; cause remanded.\nHOFFMAN, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WOLFSON" }, { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE SOUTH,\ndissenting\u2019:\nI would find that the crime was committed in a brutal and heinous manner, indicative of wanton cruelty. I therefore respectfully dissent.\nAs the majority correctly notes, the issue is whether the Apprendi violation constituted plain error because defendant did not object at the time of trial. See People v. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d 335, 347 (2001). I would find that the record supports a finding of brutal and heinous conduct.\nIn People v. La Pointe, 88 Ill. 2d 482, 501 (1981), our supreme court held that the phrase \u201c \u2018brutal or heinous behavior, indicative of wanton cruelty\u2019 [citation]\u201d did not require \u201c \u2018torture or unnecessary pain upon [a] victim\u2019 \u201d in order to find \u201cbrutal\u201d or \u201cheinous\u201d behavior. The court stated:\n\u201c \u2018Heinous\u2019 is identified by Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary (unabridged) as \u2018hatefully or shockingly evil: grossly bad: enormously and flagrantly criminal\u2019; \u2018brutal\u2019 includes \u2018grossly ruthless,\u2019 \u2018devoid of mercy or compassion: cruel and coldblooded.\u2019 \u201d La Pointe, 88 Ill. 2d at 501.\nThe words \u201cwanton\u201d and \u201ccruelty\u201d as used in section 5 \u2014 5\u20143.2 of the Unified Code of Corrections were defined in People v. Jones, 73 Ill. App. 3d 99, 103 (1979), in quotes from Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 546 (1976) (unabridged) and Bartolucci v. Failed, 382 Ill. 168, 174 (1943), as follows:\n\u201c \u2018[C]ruelty\u2019 [is] a \u2018disposition to inflict pain or suffering or to enjoy it being inflicted.\u2019 ***\n\u201c*** To constitute an act wanton, the party doing the act or failing to act must be conscious of his conduct, and, though having no intent to injure, must be conscious, from his knowledge of surrounding circumstances and existing conditions, that his conduct will naturally and probably result in injury.\u2019 \u201d\nMoreover, brutal or heinous behavior is not determined by the number of wounds sustained by a victim; a single act that causes death or injury may be sufficient to demonstrate brutal or heinous behavior considering the entire conduct of the defendant. People v. McGee, 121 Ill. App. 3d 1086, 1090-91 (1984). See also People v. Brown, 195 Ill. App. 3d 78, 85 (1990); People v. Taylor, 278 Ill. App. 3d 696, 699-700 (1996).\nIn the case at bar, I believe that defendant\u2019s conduct in the lounge that evening demonstrated brutal and heinous behavior. First, defendant\u2019s disposition to inflict pain and his flagrant disregard for others can be inferred from the fact that he was armed with a loaded gun during an evening out in a crowded lounge and did not hesitate to pull it out and begin shooting at the first sign of confrontation. After the victim had retreated from the initial confrontation regarding the disturbance with the lounge\u2019s owner, defendant pulled out a gun and began to fire at the unarmed victim. The victim and defendant then struggled for the gun, during which time defendant\u2019s finger remained on the trigger and he continued to fire the gun, injuring the victim. When defendant gained control of the gun, he struck the victim on the head with the gun, and as the victim lay wounded on the ground, defendant pointed the gun at his head and attempted to fire the gun again. The only thing that prevented this case from being a case of first degree murder was the fact that the gun jammed. Moreover, defendant\u2019s behavior showed a gross indifference to the safety and well-being of the other people in the lounge who could have been injured by the shooting. Finally, what is of most significance to me, is that the victim suffered substantial injuries as noted by the trial court: injury to his spleen which required its removal, injuries to his colon and pancreas that required their partial removal, injury to his lung, a broken vertebrae, and a bullet lodged in his back, three centimeters from his spine, the removal of which would cause permanent paralysis. The victim\u2019s total medical expenses exceeded $126,000, and the victim was unable to work for a substantial amount of time following the shooting.\nIn applying the plain-error analysis, I would find that defendant was not prejudiced by the Apprendi violation. Like the court in Crespo, I believe that on the basis of what I perceive to be overwhelming evidence that the crime was committed in a brutal and heinous manner, the Apprendi violation did not seriously affect the integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings because a jury, if confronted with these facts, would have found that the crime was committed in a brutal and heinous manner, indicative of wanton cruelty. For these reasons, I would affirm defendant\u2019s convictions and sentences.", "type": "dissent", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE SOUTH," } ], "attorneys": [ "Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Janet Stewart, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Alan J. Spellberg, and Susan M. Caraher, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHRISTOPHER GOLDEN, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 00\u20143181\nOpinion filed August 20, 2003.\nRita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Janet Stewart, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Alan J. Spellberg, and Susan M. Caraher, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0820-01", "first_page_order": 838, "last_page_order": 845 }