{ "id": 3473385, "name": "LAURI BUCHNA, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION et al., Respondents-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Buchna v. Illinois State Board of Education", "decision_date": "2003-08-27", "docket_number": "No. 3-02-0404", "first_page": "934", "last_page": "939", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "342 Ill. App. 3d 934" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "13 Ill. App. 3d 1056", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5341457 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1058" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/13/1056-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 Ill. 2d 96", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 725349 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/195/0096-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58911 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0198-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 645, "char_count": 13148, "ocr_confidence": 0.753, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.09679830754611563 }, "sha256": "ea64cea2ae68c14afc73a55bf4d838fd810fac566991af9f1f51317b7a4883aa", "simhash": "1:a0062c5e549673f3", "word_count": 1997 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:14:05.196224+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "SLATER and BARRY, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "LAURI BUCHNA, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION et al., Respondents-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nLauri Buchna, a third-grade teacher for the Illinois Valley Central Unit School District No. 321 (District), was terminated for failing to successfully remediate under Article 24A of the School Code (Code) (105 ILCS 5/24A \u2014 1 et seq. (West 1996)). She sought administrative review before a hearing officer appointed by the Illinois State Board of Education. The hearing officer affirmed the District\u2019s termination decision. Buchna then appealed to the Peoria County circuit court, which confirmed the hearing officer\u2019s decision. She now brings this appeal, claiming: (1) the hearing officer applied an incorrect legal standard in upholding her termination, (2) the evidence does not support the hearing officer\u2019s decision, and (3) the circuit court\u2019s order is against the manifest weight of the evidence and contrary to law. We reverse.\nBACKGROUND\nSection 24A \u2014 1 of the Code \u201crequir[es] that all certified school district employees be evaluated on a periodic basis and that the evaluations result in remedial action being taken when deemed necessary.\u201d 105 ILCS 5/24A \u2014 1 (West 1996). Buchna was evaluated during the 1997-98 school year and received a rating of \u201cDoes not Meet District Expectations.\u201d The only other rating available in the District\u2019s evaluation scheme was \u201cMeets or Exceeds District Expectations.\u201d Because of her rating, Buchna was placed on a one-year remediation plan.\nThe plan called for remediation in 10 areas where Buchna had been found deficient during her evaluation. The District issued four quarterly reports during the remediation period. In its first two reports, the District gave Buchna an overall rating of \u201cDoes not Meet District Expectations.\u201d In its third report, the District failed to give an overall rating; but the fourth report again specified an overall rating of \u201cDoes not Meet District Expectations.\u201d The District thus terminated Buchna\u2019s employment, and she sought administrative review of the decision.\nDuring the proceedings before the hearing officer, Buchna moved for a directed verdict on several grounds. One of her claims was based on subsection 24A \u2014 5(c) of the Code, which required the District to conduct its pre-remediation evaluation using three ratings: excellent, satisfactory, and unsatisfactory. 105 ILCS 5/24A \u2014 5(c) (West 1996). Since the District\u2019s evaluation scheme only used two ratings (\u201cMeets or Exceeds District Expectations\u201d and \u201cDoes not Meet District Expectations\u201d), and since the ratings did not follow the statutory terminology, Buchna argued that her termination was improper because the District failed to comply with the mandatory language of subsection 24A \u2014 5(c). The hearing officer denied the motion for a directed verdict, stating that the District had substantially complied with subsection 24A \u2014 5(c). The circuit court confirmed the hearing officer\u2019s decision in its entirety, finding that the decision was neither against the manifest weight of the evidence nor contrary to law.\nANALYSIS\nIn her first claim, Buchna argues that the hearing officer erroneously applied a substantial compliance standard. She contends that the officer was required to \u201cstrictly construe,\u201d inter alia, \u201c[the District\u2019s] statutory obligation to prove *** the legality of [its] evaluation plan.\u201d Of course, this claim involves a question of statutory construction. When construing a statute, our primary objective is to effectuate the legislature\u2019s intent. In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d 198 (2002). We first turn to the statute\u2019s language \u2014 the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. Yang v. City of Chicago, 195 Ill. 2d 96 (2001). Where that language is clear and unambiguous, we apply the statute as written without resorting to other aids of construction. C.W., 199 Ill. 2d 198. Our review is de novo. C.W., 199 Ill. 2d 198.\nIn the instant case, the relevant statutory language appears in section 24A \u2014 5, which reads:\n\u201cEvaluation of teachers whose positions do not require administrative certification shall be conducted by an administrator qualified under Section 24A \u2014 3 *** and shall include at least the following components:\n(c) rating of the teacher\u2019s performance as \u2018excellent\u2019, \u2018satisfactory\u2019 or \u2018unsatisfactory\u2019.\n(f) within 30 days after completion of an evaluation rating a teacher as \u2018unsatisfactory\u2019, development and commencement by the district *** of a remediation plan designed to correct deficiencies cited, provided the deficiencies are deemed remediable. ***\n(g) participation in the remediation plan by the teacher rated \u2018unsatisfactory\u2019, a district administrator qualified under Section 24A \u2014 3 ***, and a consulting teacher *** of the teacher who was rated \u2018unsatisfactory\u2019, which consulting teacher is an educational employee ***, has at least 5 years\u2019 teaching experience and a reasonable familiarity with the assignment of the teacher being evaluated, and who received an \u2018excellent\u2019 rating on his or her most recent evaluation. ***\n(h) quarterly evaluations and ratings for one year immediately following receipt of an \u2018unsatisfactory\u2019 rating of a teacher for whom a remediation plan has been developed; ***\n(i) *** reinstatement to a schedule of biennial evaluation for any teacher who completes the 1-year remediation plan with a \u2018satisfactory\u2019 or better rating, unless the district\u2019s plan regularly requires more frequent evaluations; ***\n(j) dismissal *** of any teacher who fails to complete any applicable remediation plan with a \u2018satisfactory\u2019 or better rating.\u201d 105 ILCS 5/24A \u2014 5(c), (f) through (j) (West 1996).\nThis language clearly states that use of the three-tiered rating system from subsection 24A \u2014 5(c) is mandatory. Yet the District has gone to great lengths to convince us that the mandatory word \u201cshall\u201d really only means \u201cmay.\u201d We decline to adopt this position. As noted above, if a statute\u2019s language is clear and unambiguous, we will interpret the statute according to its plain meaning without resorting to other aids of construction.\nIn the fourth paragraph of section 24A \u2014 5, the legislature wrote:\n\u201cThe plan may provide for evaluation of personnel whose positions require administrative certification by independent evaluators not employed by or affiliated with the school district. The results of the school district administrators\u2019 evaluations shall be reported to the employing school board ***.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 105 ILCS 5/24A \u2014 5 (West 1996).\nBy using both the words \u201cmay\u201d and \u201cshall\u201d in adjoining sentences, the legislature demonstrated independent signification of permissive and mandatory scenarios. Then in the very next sentence the legislature applied the mandatory word \u201cshall\u201d to subsection 24A\u2014 5(c), which requires school districts to give teachers one of three ratings: excellent, satisfactory, or unsatisfactory. The directive is clear and unambiguous. The legislature even enclosed each rating in quotation marks to unmistakably articulate the required categories. Yet in the instant case, the District ignored the requirements and evaluated Buchna under a scheme using only two ratings \u2014 neither of which employed the statutory language.\nThe remediation and dismissal provisions of section 24A \u2014 5 only apply to teachers who have received an \u201cunsatisfactory\u201d rating. Since Buchna never received that rating, she was never rightfully subject to remediation, and her dismissal was improper.\nWe appreciate the District\u2019s argument that its two ratings essentially represent the legislature\u2019s three ratings (with \u201cMeets or Exceeds District Expectations\u201d being a combination of \u201cexcellent\u201d and \u201csatisfactory,\u201d and \u201cDoes not Meet District Expectations\u201d being \u201cunsatisfactory\u201d). We have also considered the District\u2019s various other arguments (e.g., that Buchna was not prejudiced by its two-tiered rating system). However, these arguments sidestep the threshold issue of noncompliance. We simply cannot sanction disregard for clear statutory directives.\nAside from the simple issue of compliance, such disregard threatens the legislature\u2019s intended application of section 24A \u2014 5. For instance, the requisite consulting teacher must have \u201creceived an \u2018excellent\u2019 rating on his or her most recent evaluation.\u201d 105 ILCS 5/24A \u2014 5(g) (West 1996). This provision signals the legislature\u2019s intent to exclude mere \u201csatisfactory\u201d teachers from being consulting teachers. Yet the District\u2019s rating scheme does not distinguish between \u201csatisfactory\u201d and \u201cexcellent\u201d teachers. Thus, when a consulting teacher is chosen from the District\u2019s highest rated teachers, there is still a question of whether that teacher meets the legislature\u2019s prescribed criteria.\nNevertheless, the District argues that it was only required to substantially comply with the procedures of section 24A \u2014 5. The District supports this argument by citing the following statement from the Appellate Court, Fifth District:\n\u201cWhen this court reviews any decision of a circuit court which has handed down an opinion under the Administrative Review Act it is confronted with twp questions: (1) Does the record show that the steps and procedures required by law were taken, and (2) If so, is or is not the decision of the board or administrative agency against the manifest weight of the evidence? If, upon examination of the record regarding the first question, the court concludes that there were failures or omissions which substantially affect the rights of the party against whom the proceedings are taken, it has no choice but to reverse.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Waller v. Board of Education of Century Community Unit School District No. 100, 13 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 1058 (1973).\nThe Waller court did not cite any authority for this proposition. Furthermore, the issue in Waller was different from the issue presently before us. The facts of the instant case invoke clear and unequivocal statutory language, and we are obligated to effectuate that language.\nSection 24A \u2014 5 only authorizes remediation if certain requirements are followed. The Board lost its remedial authority when it failed to comply with one of those requirements. The legislature meant what it said when it used the mandatory word \u201cshall.\u201d This conclusion is further supported by the last sentence of section 24A \u2014 5, which reads: \u201cFailure to strictly comply with the time requirements contained in [this section] shall not invalidate the results of the remediation plan.\u201d 105 ILCS 5/24A \u2014 5 (West 1996). The need to disavow a strict compliance standard in this specific instance signals that the standard is otherwise generally applicable.\nFinally, the District places much weight on the fact that its two-tiered rating system resulted from collective bargaining with the teachers\u2019 union. Since such bargaining is mandatory on procedural matters (see 105 ILCS 5/24A \u2014 4 (West 1996); 115 ILCS 5/10(a) (West 1996); see also Alton Education Ass\u2019n v. Alton Community Unit School District No. 11, 9 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 1085, No. 88 \u2014 C\u2014 0032 \u2014 S (IELRB May 25, 1993)), the District argues that the resulting agreement is valid despite the clear directive in subsection 24A \u2014 5(c) of the Code. We disagree.\nThe mere fact of mandatory bargaining does not authorize parties to contravene subsection 24A \u2014 5(c), or any other statute, in the process. See 115 ILCS 5/10(b) (West 1996) (stating that parties to collective bargaining shall not implement a provision that is inconsistent or conflicts with any statute). Parties wishing to engage in such action must first obtain a waiver under section 2 \u2014 3.25g of the Code. 105 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 3.25g (West 1996). However, when the District\u2019s agreement was formulated, section 2 \u2014 3.25g did not allow variance from legislative mandates prescribed in the Code. See 105 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 3.25g (West 1994) (applying the waiver provision only to administrative rules and regulations promulgated by the Illinois State Board of Education). An avenue for such variance did not arise until a subsequent amendment by the legislature.\nThe District\u2019s departure from subsection 24A \u2014 5(c) was unauthorized at its inception, and the departure remains unauthorized because the District has not since procured a legitimizing waiver.\nSince our holding on Buchna\u2019s first claim disposes of the case, there is no need to address her remaining claims. The hearing officer\u2019s decision affirming her termination is reversed.\nReversed.\nSLATER and BARRY, JJ., concur.\nIn 1998 the legislature changed the one-year period to 90 days (see 105 ILCS 5/24A \u2014 5(h) (West 1998)), but Buchna proceeded under the District\u2019s one-year plan.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Sandra J. Holman (argued) and Mitchell E. Roth, both of Illinois Education Association-NEA, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Scott A. Brunton (argued) and Dennis R. Triggs, both of Miller, Hall & Triggs, of Peoria, for appellee Board of Education of Illinois Valley Central Unit School District No. 321.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Jerald S. Post, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for other appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LAURI BUCHNA, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION et al., Respondents-Appellees.\nThird District\nNo. 3 \u2014 02\u20140404\nOpinion filed August 27, 2003.\nSandra J. Holman (argued) and Mitchell E. Roth, both of Illinois Education Association-NEA, of Springfield, for appellant.\nScott A. Brunton (argued) and Dennis R. Triggs, both of Miller, Hall & Triggs, of Peoria, for appellee Board of Education of Illinois Valley Central Unit School District No. 321.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Jerald S. Post, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for other appellees." }, "file_name": "0934-01", "first_page_order": 952, "last_page_order": 957 }