{ "id": 3473724, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RENE SOTO, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Soto", "decision_date": "2003-09-02", "docket_number": "No. 2-01-0119", "first_page": "1005", "last_page": "1019", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "342 Ill. App. 3d 1005" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "323 Ill. App. 3d 988", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 171772 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "999" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/323/0988-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 Ill. App. 3d 471", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5080872 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476-77" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/172/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 Ill. 2d 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 778576 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "445-46" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/157/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550081 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 Ill. 2d 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 476988 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "295" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/164/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 Ill. 2d 436", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1224772 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488" }, { "page": "488" }, { "page": "488" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/189/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 Ill. 2d 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3278448 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "232" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/147/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 Ill. 2d 548", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 453255 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "573" }, { "page": "573" }, { "page": "573" }, { "page": "573" }, { "page": "573" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/192/0548-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 544", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442061 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "561" }, { "page": "562" }, { "page": "562" }, { "page": "562" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0544-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 Ill. App. 3d 1017", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1209165 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1027" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/331/1017-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 Ill. App. 3d 914", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1281424 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "924" }, { "page": "924-25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/326/0914-01" ] }, { "cite": "3 Ill. 2d 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2696705 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "361" }, { "page": "361" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/3/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 Ill. App. 3d 574", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3526112 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "584" }, { "page": "584" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/128/0574-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ill. App. 3d 38", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2490893 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "53" }, { "page": "53" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/196/0038-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 Ill. App. 3d 532", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5162729 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "536" }, { "page": "536" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/237/0532-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 679", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609698 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358-62" }, { "page": "346-51" }, { "page": "358" }, { "page": "358" }, { "page": "357" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 Ill. App. 3d 238", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1599198 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/336/0238-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1189, "char_count": 32138, "ocr_confidence": 0.755, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1013486635619577e-07, "percentile": 0.5684507089023337 }, "sha256": "c2cc75e323432d5e6a01c76c538803c1fc23424a96623621bdc8867874c3bd19", "simhash": "1:4ffc543ae20135d9", "word_count": 5314 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:14:05.196224+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "HUTCHINSON, EJ., and BOWMAN, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RENE SOTO, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KAPALA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Rene Soto, was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 1 (West 1996)) and was sentenced to natural life imprisonment without parole on each count. This court reversed defendant\u2019s conviction and remanded the cause for a new trial on both counts. See People v. Soto, 336 Ill. App. 3d 238 (2002). Our supreme court denied the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal but, under its supervisory authority, directed this court to vacate our opinion and reconsider our judgment in light of People v. Ceja, 204 Ill. 2d 332 (2003). See People v. Soto, 204 Ill. 2d 679 (2003). We now vacate our prior opinion pursuant to that order and file this opinion in its stead.\nDefendant raises the following issues in this appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in ruling that he consented to have his conversation with a codefendant at a detention facility electronically monitored; (2) whether he was denied his confrontation rights under the state and federal constitutions by the admission of his codefendant\u2019s statement made at the detention facility; (3) whether the trial court erred in admitting defendant\u2019s refusal to provide handprinting exemplars; (4) whether the prosecutor made unfairly prejudicial misrepresentations and improper comments during closing argument; and (5) whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the offense of conspiracy to commit murder as a lesser included offense of murder by accountability.\nAfter reconsidering our judgment in light of Ceja, we now conclude that it was not reversible error for the trial court to have refused to instruct the jury on the offense of conspiracy to commit murder as a lesser included offense of murder by accountability. We also consider the other errors identified in our earlier opinion to be harmless. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County.\nFACTS\nDefendant and a codefendant, Raul Ceja, who was tried separately, were indicted for the shooting deaths of Richard Sanchez and Alfredo Garcia. The charges were based on a July 26, 1998, incident in which the victims, who were in a Lincoln Continental, were fatally shot by occupants of a Chevrolet Tahoe at the intersection of Oak Lawn and Grand Avenues in Elmhurst. The indictment against defendant contained five counts as to each victim. All 10 counts were premised on the same factual allegation that defendant \u201cshot [the victim] with a handgun\u201d combined with the operative language from the first-degree murder statute.\nThe evidence at trial established the following. On July 26, 1998, at about 9:25 p.m., Kevin Oldaker and his wife were stopped for a red light at the corner of Grand and Oak Lawn Avenues in Elmhurst. There are four westbound lanes at that point of Grand Avenue with two lanes going straight and an inside left-turn lane and an outside right-turn lane. Oldaker\u2019s vehicle was in the right lane of the two through lanes. As they were waiting for the light to turn green, there was a Lincoln Continental sitting in the left lane of the through lanes next to the Oldaker vehicle. There were two male occupants in the front seat of the Lincoln.\nAs the light turned green, a Chevrolet Tahoe pulled into the westbound left-turn lane next to the Lincoln. At that point, Oldaker heard glass breaking and gunshots. He observed the front passenger halfway out the front door of the Tahoe shooting a handgun at the Lincoln. There was also a passenger in the rear seat of the Tahoe with his hand sticking out of the rear passenger window shooting a handgun at the Lincoln. Stephanie Alfano, Oldaker\u2019s wife, also testified that the passenger in the back of the Tahoe shot several times at the Lincoln.\nAfter the two occupants of the Tahoe shot several times at the Lincoln, the Tahoe made a U-turn so it was facing eastbound on Grand Avenue. After stopping, the driver fired several shots at the Lincoln. The Tahoe then sped off eastbound on Grand Avenue. The Lincoln made a U-turn in an apparent attempt to follow the Tahoe, but it went only a short distance before veering off the road and coming to a stop on the grass in front of a car dealership.\nKevin Lafin, an Elmhurst police officer, responding to a radio dispatch regarding the shooting, saw a Tahoe matching the suspects\u2019 vehicle on the Eisenhower Expressway. He observed three occupants in the Tahoe and followed it. He followed the Tahoe into an alley in Bellwood, where it stopped in the 600 block of Marshall Avenue. Thereafter, three occupants exited and ran away. A nearby resident also saw three occupants exit the vehicle.\nOfficer Ackerman of the Broadview police department, along with his police dog, arrived at the scene where the Tahoe stopped. In the 600 block of Frederick Avenue in Bellwood, the dog began barking at a heavy clump of bushes. When he shined his flashlight into the bushes, Officer Ackerman observed two individuals hiding. Officer Ackerman described both as \u201cprofusely sweating, very nervous, and [looking] like they just finished running a marathon.\u201d The two individuals were defendant and Raul Ceja, both of whom were arrested.\nA search of the area between where the Tahoe stopped and defendant and Ceja were found revealed a Ruger 9-millimeter handgun in some bushes. After finding the Ruger, the police questioned defendant about the location of the second gun, and he directed them to a Smith & Wesson handgun, which was hidden in hushes near where the police found the Ruger. The police also found two discarded hooded sweatshirts in the same area they found the guns.\nFollowing their arrest, defendant and Ceja were transported to the detention facility at the Elmhurst police department. Michael Lullo, a detective with the Elmhurst police department, met with defendant and advised him of his Miranda rights. Lullo spoke to defendant in English, defendant spoke to him in English, and he believed defendant understood English. Defendant admitted to Lullo he was a member of the Maywood Latin Kings street gang.\nDefendant also made several statements to Detective Raymond Bradford of the Elmhurst police department while in the detention facility. Also present was an assistant State\u2019s Attorney from Du Page County, Jeffrey Kendall. Defendant admitted that he had been in the Tahoe and had run from it after it stopped. He also admitted that he was the occupant in the rear seat during the shooting and that he had accidently shot out the rear passenger window. Defendant also told Detective Bradford there were only two guns, not three, used in the shooting. When Detective Bradford suggested to defendant they were driving around looking to steal another vehicle, defendant responded, \u201cWe had guns with us. We don\u2019t take guns when we go out to steal cars.\u201d Defendant also said he knew one of the victims was the owner of the Lincoln and a member of a rival gang, the Imperial Gangsters. Defendant described the Lincoln as one involved in previous drive-by shootings in Maywood. Defendant also admitted that all three occupants of the Tahoe, including himself, fired shots at the Lincoln\u2019s occupants. When Detective Bradford described a drive-by shooting at Ceja\u2019s residence on July 24, 1998, defendant agreed that Ceja was upset and that may have been what motivated Ceja to shoot at the Lincoln\u2019s occupants.\nThe physical evidence included 9-millimeter shell casings and fired bullets recovered from the scene, the Tahoe, and the victims\u2019 bodies. The police also recovered a 9-millimeter ammunition box from the Tahoe with defendant\u2019s fingerprint on it. The bullets removed from the bodies of the victims were fired from the Smith & Wesson handgun found in the bushes near where defendant and Ceja were hiding. Defendant\u2019s prints were also found in several places on the Tahoe. The fingerprint expert testified that \u201cno two individuals have the same fingerprints.\u201d\nAlso pertinent to this appeal are several statements made by defendant and Ceja while they were in the detention facility at the Elmhurst police department that were overheard via an electronic monitoring system. Each of the cells in the detention area has a two-way sound system. That system includes a speaker in each cell that is visible to the occupant. There is a panel in the control area that has toggle switches that allow the operator to activate the system in any given cell. When the system is activated it emits a loud beep, or alert tone, every 9 or 10 seconds, which is audible in each cell. Aside from the visible speaker and audible tone, there are no notices posted anywhere regarding the presence of the system or its capability for transmitting voices from the cell to the control room. The system is not operational at all times and is used when there is a concern for the detainee, an officer, or when the crime involved is serious.\nOfficer Jodi Beilis testified that on July 27, 1998, Ceja and defendant were held in two separate cells in the detention area. At about 9:30 a.m., Beilis went into the detention area to tell defendant and Ceja to be quiet. She told defendant that she could hear what they were saying even when she was not in the room and that their conversations were being \u201cmonitored\u201d at the front desk. She spoke in English but did not explain to defendant what she meant by the word \u201cmonitor.\u201d\nDefendant and Ceja made several statements to each other while in the detention facility that were heard via the monitoring system. Because some of these statements were in Spanish, Officer Gonzalo Gomez, who understands both English and Spanish, was brought in to listen to and translate the conversations of defendant and Ceja. Gomez took notes, but no electronic recording was made.\nDetective Bradford testified that while he was in the control room he heard Ceja say, \u201cMy parents sent my brother away,\u201d and defendant answered, \u201cYeah.\u201d Ceja further stated, \u201cThey\u2019re afraid they\u2019ll come after him. I hope the brothers don\u2019t get popped. They don\u2019t have any guns anymore,\u201d to which defendant said, \u201cYeah.\u201d Ceja also said, \u201cThe fat one, he was my sister\u2019s boyfriend. Boxer, he was from the jungle. He wasn\u2019t even banging anymore.\u201d Then both defendant and Ceja laughed.\nAccording to Kendall, while he was listening he heard Ceja say, \u201cThey found the guns,\u201d to which defendant responded, \u201cYeah. Two. They showed me one.\u201d Ceja also said, \u201cThey found a lot of fingerprints in the truck. They got my prints. They got your prints. They got Capone\u2019s prints. They had a bunch they haven\u2019t told us about,\u201d to which defendant responded, \u201cYeah.\u201d Ceja also stated, \u201cThey say that guy is the guy that shot up our town.\u201d\nGomez testified that he heard one of the two say in Spanish, \u201cHey, they can hear what we say.\u201d Both Bradford and Kendall heard defendant say in English, \u201cHey, we\u2019re innocent.\u201d Defendant moved to suppress the statements made by himself and Ceja. The trial court denied the motion.\nOn November 20, 1998, while defendant was being held in the Du Page County jail, a search of his cell revealed two sheets of paper and one envelope with gang markings and hand-printed words on them. The hand-printed statements included, \u201cWhen did our fingerprints get in the truck?\u201d and \u201cWhat story did you give your lawyer so I could give my lawyer the same one ***[?]\u201d One side of the envelope also contained the words \u201cBoxer Rots.\u201d When confronted with these items, defendant admitted to the jailer they were his and that he had drawn on them. Defendant was later ordered by the trial court to give a handprinting exemplar, which defendant refused to do. The trial court ruled that defendant\u2019s refusal to do so could be introduced at trial to show consciousness of guilt.\nAt trial, although the State did not refer to accountability in the indictment, it sought and received instructions on accountability. One instruction stated, \u201cA person is legally responsible for the conduct of another person, when, either before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense, he knowingly solicits, aids, abets, agrees to aid, or attempts to aid the other person in the planning or commission of the offense.\u201d Further, the murder instruction for each victim provided, in pertinent part, that \u201cthe defendant or one for whom he is legally responsible performed the acts that caused the death.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nDefendant sought an instruction on conspiracy to commit murder, arguing that because of the evidence and the State\u2019s use of an accountability theory the jury could find him not guilty of first-degree murder but guilty of conspiracy to commit murder. The trial court refused to give defendant\u2019s proposed instruction. The jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder as to both victims and sentenced defendant to natural life without parole on each count.\nDISCUSSION\nDefendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error when it refused to give his proposed instruction on conspiracy to commit murder. This precise issue was raised by the defendant in Ceja and rejected by our supreme court. Ceja, 204 Ill. 2d at 358-62. For the reasons set forth in Ceja, we reject defendant\u2019s contention and hold it was not error for the trial court to refuse to give the lesser included offense instruction on conspiracy.\nWe turn next to the remaining issues in this case. Defendant raised two issues in his appeal pertaining to statements he and Ceja made while in the detention facility. As to the issue of whether those statements were recorded in violation of the eavesdropping statutes (720 ILCS 5/14 \u2014 1 through 14 \u2014 9 (West 1998)), we follow the holding in Ceja that Ceja and defendant were aware their conversations were being monitored and, therefore, consented for purposes of the statutes. See Ceja, 204 Ill. 2d at 346-51.\nNext, we address whether the statements by Ceja while in the detention facility should be inadmissible as hearsay of a nontestifying codefendant. The State responds that the statements are an admissible exception because they are tacit admissions, or admissions by the silence of defendant.\nWe initially note that admission of Ceja\u2019s statements and evidence of defendant\u2019s lack of denials is not a violation of defendant\u2019s right to confrontation if the evidence in question meets the requirements of the tacit-admission rule. See People v. Goswami, 237 Ill. App. 3d 532, 536 (1992). When a statement that is incriminating in nature is made in the presence and hearing of an accused and such statement is not denied, contradicted, or objected to by him, both the statement and the fact of his failure to deny it are admissible in a criminal trial as evidence of the defendant\u2019s agreement in its truth. People v. Childrous, 196 Ill. App. 3d 38, 53 (1990). Assent to the statement may be manifested by silence or by an evasive, equivocal, or unresponsive reply. Childrous, 196 Ill. App. 3d at 53. The necessary elements for admissibility are: (1) the defendant heard the incriminating statement; (2) the defendant had an opportunity to reply and remained silent; and (3) the incriminating statement was such that the natural reaction of an innocent person would be to deny it. Goswami, 237 Ill. App. 3d at 536. Such statements need not be accusatory, however, so long as it is evident that the defendant is \u201cbeing painted or portrayed as a participant in illegal and prohibited activity.\u201d People v. Miller, 128 Ill. App. 3d 574, 584 (1984). Under such circumstances, an innocent person would normally and naturally deny or correct such an impression. Miller, 128 Ill. App. 3d at 584.\nIn this case, defendant\u2019s reactions to Ceja\u2019s statements do not qualify as tacit admissions. First, defendant did not have an unencumbered choice to speak up and deny the statements. He was under arrest and in police custody. He had already been warned that anything he said could be used against him at trial. It can also be inferred that he believed the police could hear his conversation with Ceja because he and Ceja were shouting across the cell area, because one of the two stated \u201cthey\u201d could hear what the two were saying, and Officer Beilis testified she had told the two to be quiet because they could be heard in the control room. Knowing that anything he said could be used against him and that the police could hear his conversation with Ceja, it cannot reasonably be expected that defendant would feel free to respond to Ceja\u2019s comments. The situation in which the statements were made in the presence of defendant in this case is so unique as to remove it from the ordinary tacit-admission case.\nThis conclusion is supported by People v. Bennett, 3 Ill. 2d 357 (1954). The supreme court in Bennett stated that admissions by silence should be received with great caution and only under the proper conditions. Bennett, 3 Ill. 2d at 361. When statements are made in the presence of a defendant who is in no position to deny them, or if his silence is of such character that it does not justify the inference that he should have spoken, or if in any way he is restrained from speaking by either fear, doubt of his rights, instructions given by his attorney, or a reasonable belief it would be better or safer to keep silent, then standing silent does not amount to an admission. Bennett, 3 Ill. 2d at 361. We believe the circumstances surrounding defendant\u2019s reaction to Ceja\u2019s statements are controlled by Bennett and that defendant should not be held to an admission.\nSecond, some of the statements Ceja made were not the type that an innocent person would normally and naturally deny or correct. The statements, \u201cMy parents sent my brother away,\u201d and \u201cThe fat one, he was my sister\u2019s boy friend. Boxer, he was from the jungle. He wasn\u2019t even banging anymore,\u201d were not statements that painted or portrayed defendant as a participant in an illegal or prohibited activity. Rather, they were comments about the case. They were not the type of statements about which a defendant\u2019s lack of denial should be considered as an admission of guilt. Thus, the statements and defendant\u2019s reactions thereto do not qualify as tacit admissions.\nBecause all of the statements are inadmissible hearsay of a codefendant and do not meet the requirements of the tacit-admission rule, we hold that they should not have been admitted. We do not, however, consider this error to be reversible. Errors in the admission of hearsay evidence are harmless when properly admitted evidence is so overwhelming that no fair-minded jury could reasonably have voted to acquit the defendant. People v. Sample, 326 Ill. App. 3d 914, 924 (2001). Admission of hearsay is harmless if there is no reasonable probability the verdict would have been different had the hearsay been excluded. Sample, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 924-25.\nIn this case, the other evidence independent of Ceja\u2019s statements precludes any reasonable possibility of a different verdict. Defendant was found hiding near where the vehicle used in the shooting had been abandoned. He also directed the police to where the Smith & Wesson handgun, one of the weapons used in the shooting, was located. Defendant also made several incriminating statements to the police. He told Detective Bradford that he had been in the Tahoe at the time of the shooting and had run from it after it stopped. He also admitted he was the occupant in the rear of the Tahoe at the time of the shooting and that he had accidently shot out the rear passenger window. He further admitted that all three occupants nf the Tahoe, including himself, fired shots at the victims\u2019 vehicle. There was also physical evidence implicating defendant. The bullets removed from the victims\u2019 bodies were fired from the Smith & Wesson handgun to which defendant had directed the police. Defendant\u2019s fingerprints were also found in several places on the Tahoe. In light of this overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt, we hold the error in admitting Ceja\u2019s statements was harmless.\nThe next issue to be addressed is defendant\u2019s contention that the trial court erred in admitting his refusal to provide handprinting exemplars as evidence of consciousness of guilt. Defendant admits he waived this issue by failing to raise it at trial but contends that we should consider the issue under the plain error rule. Alternatively, he argues his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the State\u2019s request for handprinting exemplars which would have precluded his refusal to provide the exemplars.\nSupreme Court Rule 615(a) provides a limited exception to the waiver rule and allows a reviewing court to consider plain errors affecting substantial rights that were not properly preserved in the trial court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a). A court will consider a trial error under the plain error exception where the evidence in the case is closely balanced or where the error is so fundamental and of such a magnitude as to deny the defendant a fair trial. People v. Hunter, 331 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1027 (2002).\nAs we have already explained, the evidence in this case is not closely balanced. Nor can we say any error in admitting defendant\u2019s refusal to submit handprinting exemplars was the type that denied him a fair trial. This was a small part of the case on a minor point which was not mentioned during closing argument. It cannot be said that any error would be fundamental or of significant magnitude. No plain error occurred in this regard; thus, the issue is waived.\nAs for the ineffective assistance of counsel issue, defendant must show that his attorney\u2019s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the attorney\u2019s deficient performance prejudiced defendant. See Ceja, 204 Ill. 2d at 358. A defendant must satisfy both prongs of this test, and failure to establish either is fatal to his claim. Ceja, 204 Ill. 2d at 358. Here, defendant failed to satisfy either prong.\nFor a defendant to prevail on the first prong, he must show his counsel\u2019s performance was \u201cso seriously deficient\u201d that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. People v. Metcalfe, 202 Ill. 2d 544, 561 (2002). In order to show prejudice, a defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel\u2019s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Metcalfe, 202 Ill. 2d at 562.\nHere, in view of defendant\u2019s willingness to admit that the writings were his, we cannot say that his trial counsel\u2019s failure to object to a request for handprinting exemplars was so seriously deficient as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. Further, defendant cannot satisfy the prejudice prong of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Any error in not objecting to a request for handprinting exemplars would not have affected the outcome of the case in light of the overwhelming evidence. Defendant has failed to show ineffective assistance of counsel.\nThe final issue raised by defendant concerns comments by the prosecutor during closing argument. Defendant claims the following comments by the prosecutor during closing argument denied him a fair trial: (1) the prosecutor made a statement based on facts not in the record when he mistakenly told the jury that Kevin Oldaker said \u201cthat\u2019s the defendant\u201d when shown a picture of the Tahoe; (2) the prosecutor, when referring to defendant\u2019s fingerprints being on the ammunition box, stated that \u201cwith fingerprints *** you can say to the exclusion of everyone else on earth it was that person,\u201d when no one testified as such at trial; (3) the prosecutor improperly bolstered the credibility of Detective Bradford and commented on a fact not in evidence when he referred to Bradford as a \u201cveteran detective with a sterling record,\u201d when there was no evidence regarding Bradford\u2019s record, and said of Bradford \u201cthey don\u2019t make [them] any better than Ray Bradford, they truly don\u2019t,\u201d and improperly bolstered the credibility of Kendall when he said he was a \u201ccareer prosecutor\u201d who is \u201cout here protecting our rights, protecting the rights of people like Ricky Sanchez *** and Alfredo Garcia\u201d; (4) the prosecutor improperly commented that defendant knew the name of one of the victims when the evidence did not show that; and (5) the prosecutor argued that the State\u2019s witnesses who testified defendant made certain statements should be believed because the court had previously ruled the statements admissible.\nProsecutors are afforded wide latitude in closing argument and may argue facts and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence. People v. Williams, 192 Ill. 2d 548, 573 (2000). Prosecutorial comments that are invited and not prejudicial do not constitute error. People v. Williams, 147 Ill. 2d 173, 232 (1991). In reviewing a challenge to remarks made by the State during closing argument, the comments must be considered in the context of the entire closing argument of the parties. Williams, 192 Ill. 2d at 573. Even if prosecutorial comment exceeds the bounds of proper argument, the verdict must not be disturbed unless the remark caused substantial prejudice to the defendant, taking into account the content and context of the comment, its relationship to the evidence, and its effect on the defendant\u2019s right to a fair and impartial trial. Williams, 192 Ill. 2d at 573. To warrant relief, errors in closing argument must result in substantial prejudice such that the result would have been different absent the complained-of remark. Williams, 192 Ill. 2d at 573. Further, reversal and remand are generally unnecessary where the trial court sustains a defense objection, thereby curing the potential for improper influences from the comment, especially where the jury is instructed that closing arguments are not to be considered evidence. People v. Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d 436, 488 (2000). Finally, the regulation of the substance and style of the closing argument is within the trial court\u2019s discretion, and the trial court\u2019s determination of the propriety of the remarks will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. People v. Byron, 164 Ill. 2d 279, 295 (1995).\nDefendant here failed to object at trial or raise in a posttrial motion any objection to the first four allegedly improper comments; thus they are waived. See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). He argues, however, that he should be excused from the waiver rule because these allegedly improper comments constitute plain error. As we have already discussed, the evidence was overwhelming. Therefore, the closely-balanced-evidence prong of plain error does not apply.\nNor are the alleged errors of such magnitude as to have denied defendant a fair trial. Comments in closing argument must be considered in the context of the entire closing argument of both the State and the defendant. Ceja, 204 Ill. 2d at 357. Here, the objected-to comments are isolated remarks, only a brief portion of a rather extensive closing argument, and, in view of the extensive evidence in this case, they pertained to minor points. The claimed errors are not fundamental or of great magnitude; thus, defendant was not denied a fair trial. As plain error is inapplicable here, defendant has waived any challenge to the propriety of these comments.\nWaiver aside, the challenged comments did not cause substantial prejudice to defendant and, thus, do not warrant a reversal. The first objected-to comment is characterized by the State as an obvious misstatement by the prosecutor. There is clearly no evidence to support the prosecutor\u2019s statement that Oldaker said \u201c[Tjhat\u2019s the defendant\u201d when shown a picture of the Tahoe. This comment by the prosecutor, while not proper, does not constitute reversible error because it did not affect the outcome of the trial. Such a statement was an isolated remark and would have made little sense to the jury considering the tenuous connection between a person and a photograph of a vehicle.\nThe second complained-of comment about the fingerprints was not improper, as the State\u2019s expert, Sergeant Robert Wojcik, testified that \u201cno two individuals have the same fingerprints.\u201d The State\u2019s characterization that a fingerprint match excludes all others but the matched person is a fair use of Sergeant Wojcik\u2019s testimony. At most, it was simple hyperbole and not inappropriate. Moreover, any error was not substantial enough to have affected defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial. See Williams, 192 Ill. 2d at 573.\nThe third point is the prosecutor\u2019s bolstering of Bradford\u2019s and Kendall\u2019s credibility and his reference to a fact not in evidence when he described Bradford as having a \u201csterling record.\u201d We note that defendant, in his closing, attacked the credibility of these two witnesses. While the State may reply to comments made by defense counsel (People v. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d 401, 445-46 (1993)), the prosecutor cannot interject his personal views and improperly bolster a witness\u2019s credibility (People v. Rogers, 172 Ill. App. 3d 471, 476-77 (1988)), nor can he make comments based on matters not in evidence (People v. Roman, 323 Ill. App. 3d 988, 999 (2001)).\nWhile it was not proper to state that Bradford had a sterling record because there was no evidence of that, it was an isolated remark on a minor point that did not substantially prejudice defendant. The same can be said for the prosecutor\u2019s unsubstantiated personal view that they do not make them like Bradford anymore.\nWe also do not find error in the prosecutor\u2019s remark that Kendall was a \u201ccareer prosecutor,\u201d as the evidence shows that Kendall had been an assistant State\u2019s Attorney for many years. The comment was a fair characterization of the evidence and a fair response to an attack on Kendall\u2019s credibility. The same is true for the comment about Kendall protecting the rights of the victims and the public, as that was a fair description of one of Kendall\u2019s duties as a prosecutor.\nDefendant\u2019s fourth complaint is that the State improperly argued that defendant knew the name of one of the victims. This was not error, as the conversation between defendant and Ceja in the detention facility supported such an inference.\nDefendant alternatively argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the alleged improper comments. As we have noted earlier, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim can be disposed of on the ground that the defendant suffered no prejudice from the alleged error. Metcalfe, 202 Ill. 2d at 562. In order to show prejudice, a defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel\u2019s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Metcalfe, 202 Ill. 2d at 562. We reject defendant\u2019s ineffective assistance of counsel claim in this regard because, in view of our discussion above, we cannot conclude that the outcome of the trial would have been different absent the challenged remarks.\nDefendant\u2019s final contention regarding closing argument is that the prosecutor improperly mentioned that the trial court had earlier ruled that certain statements of defendant were admissible. Defense counsel objected to this comment, and the trial court sustained the objection. Any error was harmless in light of the overall evidence in the case and the amelioration via the sustained objection. See Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d at 488. Further, the trial court instructed the jurors that they were not to consider closing argument as evidence. See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 1.03 (4th ed. 2000); Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d at 488.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant\u2019s convictions on counts I and II.\nAffirmed.\nHUTCHINSON, EJ., and BOWMAN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KAPALA" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller and Jack Hildebrand, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Joseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Martin E Moltz and David A. Bernhard, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RENE SOTO, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2-01-0119\nOpinion filed September 2, 2003.\nG. Joseph Weller and Jack Hildebrand, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nJoseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Martin E Moltz and David A. Bernhard, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1005-01", "first_page_order": 1023, "last_page_order": 1037 }