{ "id": 3473451, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BRISCOE WATSON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Watson", "decision_date": "2003-08-29", "docket_number": "No. 1-01-1988", "first_page": "1089", "last_page": "1100", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "342 Ill. App. 3d 1089" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "658 N.E.2d 445", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "448" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307263 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "669 N.E.2d 114", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 Ill. App. 3d 887", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 159575 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "893" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/282/0887-01" ] }, { "cite": "662 N.E.2d 161", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "167" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 Ill. App. 3d 65", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1156775 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/278/0065-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 N.E.2d 1117", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defendants forced themselves into victim's car and drove victim around in his car before robbing him; aggravated kidnaping conviction reversed" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 Ill. App. 3d 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3150808 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defendants forced themselves into victim's car and drove victim around in his car before robbing him; aggravated kidnaping conviction reversed" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/91/0523-01" ] }, { "cite": "450 N.E.2d 947", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defendant grabbed victim and threw her against a wall before sexually assaulting her; kidnaping conviction reversed" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 Ill. App. 3d 455", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3558064 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defendant grabbed victim and threw her against a wall before sexually assaulting her; kidnaping conviction reversed" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/115/0455-01" ] }, { "cite": "751 N.E.2d 81", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "88" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 Ill. App. 3d 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 171716 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/323/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "771 N.E.2d 982", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "995", "parenthetical": "noting cases in which asportation of less than one block and detention of a few minutes have been sufficient to support a kidnaping conviction" }, { "page": "996" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 Ill. App. 3d 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1209138 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294", "parenthetical": "noting cases in which asportation of less than one block and detention of a few minutes have been sufficient to support a kidnaping conviction" }, { "page": "295" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/331/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "772 N.E.2d 833", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "842" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 Ill. App. 3d 96", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1034060 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "104" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/332/0096-01" ] }, { "cite": "718 N.E.2d 117", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "129" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "187 Ill. 2d 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1131028 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "265" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/187/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "544 N.E.2d 797", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 Ill. 2d 91", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5569470 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/131/0091-01" ] }, { "cite": "658 N.E.2d 450", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "458" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 83", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307264 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "100" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "739 N.E.2d 584", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "589" }, { "page": "589" }, { "page": "589" }, { "page": "589" }, { "page": "589" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 Ill. App. 3d 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1025888 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "317-18" }, { "page": "318" }, { "page": "318" }, { "page": "319" }, { "page": "318" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/317/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "780 N.E.2d 669", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "681" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 189", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442057 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "210" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 N.E.2d 532", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "533-34" }, { "page": "533" }, { "page": "533-34" }, { "page": "534-35" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 Ill. 2d 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5454543 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "64-65" }, { "page": "64" }, { "page": "65" }, { "page": "67" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/69/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "777 N.E.2d 626", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "632" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 Ill. App. 3d 962", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 487109 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "968" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/333/0962-01" ] }, { "cite": "591 N.E.2d 431", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 Ill. 2d 510", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3278412 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/147/0510-01" ] }, { "cite": "552 N.E.2d 726", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 Ill. 2d 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3256443 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/135/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "689 N.E.2d 669", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "674" }, { "page": "674" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 Ill. App. 3d 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 35417 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340-41" }, { "page": "340" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/294/0334-01" ] }, { "cite": "710 N.E.2d 445", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 Ill. App. 3d 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 564639 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "71-72" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/304/0069-01" ] }, { "cite": "730 N.E.2d 561", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "573" }, { "page": "573" }, { "page": "573" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 Ill. App. 3d 849", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 186549 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "863" }, { "page": "863" }, { "page": "863" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/313/0849-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 N.E.2d 1124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1130" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550081 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0176-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1003, "char_count": 26122, "ocr_confidence": 0.727, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.173544365164621e-08, "percentile": 0.42957678227572343 }, "sha256": "b0cea62cebc4de8cd4f6939dc850344ab1c280f0c28ce7980bac2f4f12577236", "simhash": "1:20ad345803e62d50", "word_count": 4188 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:14:05.196224+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "O\u2019BRIEN, EJ., and O\u2019MARA FROSSARD, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BRISCOE WATSON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GALLAGHER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial, defendant Briscoe Watson was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault and aggravated kidnaping and was sentenced to 10 years in prison for each offense, with those terms to be served concurrently. On appeal, defendant contends that in closing argument, the prosecution made several prejudicial statements that denied him the right to a fair trial. Defendant also asserts that an omission in the jury instruction that listed the elements of aggravated criminal sexual assault constituted reversible error. For all of the reasons that follow, we affirm defendant\u2019s convictions. In addition, we vacate defendant\u2019s concurrent sentences and remand this case to the trial court for the imposition of consecutive sentences.\nDefendant was convicted on an accountability theory of the aggravated criminal sexual assault of L.E. The State presented testimony that on December 2, 1998, defendant and Lawrence McIntosh threatened L.E. with a gun and forcibly took her to defendant\u2019s apartment. There, McIntosh sexually assaulted L.E. while defendant watched.\nAt trial, the jury heard the following relevant testimony. L.E. testified that on the date of the offense, she was 14 years old and had known defendant and McIntosh for a couple of months but was not dating either of them. Defendant called her and asked if she wanted to get something to eat. Defendant sent McIntosh to pick up L.E. at her mother\u2019s house.\nMcIntosh bought food for L.E. and took her to defendant\u2019s apartment building. L.E. said she then asked to be taken home, but McIntosh tried to pull her out of the car and \u201casked [her] to go upstairs.\u201d As McIntosh pulled L.E. out of the car, defendant arrived in his car. Defendant approached L.E. and McIntosh and was holding a gun. Defendant told L.E. that if she did not get out of the car, he would shoot her. McIntosh told L.E. to \u201cget the f\u2014 out of the car\u201d and pulled her up the stairs and into defendant\u2019s apartment. Defendant held the apartment door open as they entered and locked the door behind them.\nMcIntosh pulled L.E. into a bedroom, pushed her onto a bed, forced her to undress and raped her. During this time, L.E. heard defendant laughing. L.E. testified that defendant was standing near the bedroom door and that McIntosh had thrown her pants on the bedroom floor about two feet from the door. Forensic testimony established that a semen stain on L.E.\u2019s pants matched defendant\u2019s DNA profile and that her underwear contained a semen stain that did not match defendant\u2019s or McIntosh\u2019s DNA profile.\nOn appeal, defendant first contends that the prosecution made several remarks in closing argument that prejudiced his right to a fair trial: (1) stating that defendant was \u201cpleasuring himself\u2019 during the assault; (2) mentioning a third DNA profile as to the semen stains on L.E.\u2019s underwear; and (3) suggesting that defendant tried to \u201ccamouflage\u201d the proceedings.\nInitially, we note that although defendant made contemporaneous objections to those comments, he failed to raise- the issues in his post-trial motion, thus forfeiting the issues for purposes of our review. See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186, 522 N.E.2d 1124, 1130 (1988); People v. Williams, 313 Ill. App. 3d 849, 863, 730 N.E.2d 561, 573 (2000). This court can consider forfeited issues under the plain error doctrine when the evidence is closely balanced and the remarks are so prejudicial as to deny the defendant a fair trial. Williams, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 863, 730 N.E.2d at 573. However, we do not find either circumstance applies here. The comments in this case were not improper and do not constitute reversible error.\nA prosecutor is allowed a great deal of latitude in closing argument, and he or she may speak unfavorably of the accused, comment on the evidence presented and make reasonable inferences arising therefrom, even if those inferences are unfavorable to the defendant. People v. Bennett, 304 Ill. App. 3d 69, 71-72, 710 N.E.2d 445, 447 (1999); People v. Rush, 294 Ill. App. 3d 334, 340-41, 689 N.E.2d 669, 674 (1998). Regarding the prosecutor\u2019s assertion that defendant was \u201cpleasuring himself\u2019 during McIntosh\u2019s assault of L.E., that statement was supported by testimony that a semen stain matching defendant\u2019s DNA profile was found on L.E.\u2019s pants. The prosecutor\u2019s remark is also consistent with L.E.\u2019s testimony that defendant was standing near the bedroom door laughing during the assault and that her pants were about two feet from the doorway. Given that testimony, we find that the prosecutor\u2019s comment was supported by the evidence. Moreover, despite defendant\u2019s assertion that the prosecutor\u2019s remark was \u201cmaterial to his conviction,\u201d whether or not defendant engaged in such activity would not have been a decisive factor in his conviction because he was charged with L.E.\u2019s sexual assault on an accountability theory based on the actions of McIntosh.\nTurning to the two other statements of which defendant complains, each of those remarks was made in the State\u2019s rebuttal to defense counsel\u2019s closing argument. In reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, the closing arguments of both parties must be examined in their entirety and the remarks made must be placed in their proper context. Rush, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 340, 689 N.E.2d at 674. In closing argument, defendant\u2019s counsel referred to testimony that L.E.\u2019s underwear contained a semen stain that did not match the DNA profile of defendant or McIntosh. Defendant\u2019s attorney called the jury\u2019s attention to the source of that semen, stating:\n\u201cWho put it there? How did it get there? Under what circumstances? Did it relate to this situation or event, which [L.E.] now complains of? Is there somebody whose identity she perhaps does not wish to disclose?\u201d\nIn addition, defendant\u2019s attorney referred to those queries as \u201cimportant, unanswered questions\u201d that the jury should consider and answer.\nDefendant now contends that the prosecutor misstated the evidence by remarking in rebuttal closing argument that the \u201cthird [DNA] profile, the semen in those panties, as the court instructed you, is not at issue.\u201d Where the complained-of comments are part of a prosecutor\u2019s rebuttal argument, the statements will not be deemed improper if they were invited by defense counsel\u2019s closing argument. Williams, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 863, 730 N.E.2d at 573. Considering the remarks in their entirety, we find that the prosecutor\u2019s comments were made in response to defense counsel\u2019s attempt to focus the jury\u2019s attention on a third party.\nDefendant also contends that the prior sexual conduct of L.E. and the presence of unidentified semen in her underwear are relevant issues that relate directly to his guilt or innocence. First, it is necessary to point out, as the prosecution did in its rebuttal closing argument, that L.E.\u2019s prior sexual activity is generally inadmissible and not relevant. See People v. Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d 159, 552 N.E.2d 726 (1990). Second, the fact that her underwear contained semen from a third party does not negate the evidence that McIntosh sexually assaulted her. Therefore, the State\u2019s comments were not in error.\nDefendant next asserts that the prosecutor improperly accused him of \u201ccamouflage.\u201d Defense counsel objected to the following remarks in the State\u2019s rebuttal closing argument:\n\u201cThe easiest thing in this type of case is to make the defendant\u2014 excuse me \u2014 make the victim defend her actions. That is a camouflage attempt, the same camouflage he has throughout this entire proceeding [sic].\u201d\nAt that point, defense counsel objected to the word \u201ccamouflage,\u201d and the trial court sustained the objection. The prosecutor went on to tell the jury that defense counsel \u201cwants to divert your attention from the physical evidence and the testimony that you have heard.\u201d\nAgain, the State\u2019s comments were made in rebuttal to defense counsel\u2019s closing argument in which counsel repeatedly questioned L.E.\u2019s version of the assault and her actions on that day. Unlike People v. Kidd, 147 Ill. 2d 510, 591 N.E.2d 431 (1992), on which defendant relies, the prosecutor in the instant case did not suggest that the defense was fabricated. Instead, the State pointed out, accurately we might add, that the defense\u2019s closing argument focused on the victim\u2019s role in the assault. The State\u2019s comments did not constitute error.\nDefendant next argues that an assistant State\u2019s Attorney made an improper and prejudicial remark during her testimony. Cook County Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Catherine Quinlan testified that she took a statement from defendant at the police station. On redirect examination, the State asked Quinlan why she approved felony charges against defendant. Following an objection by defense counsel, Quinlan answered, \u201cThe evidence in this case overwhelmingly supports the charge.\u201d\nDefendant contends that Quinlan improperly expressed her personal opinion as to his guilt and that her testimony was prejudicial because it characterized the evidence against him as \u201coverwhelming.\u201d He asserts that the testimony \u201cmade it appear that the issue of Watson\u2019s guilt or innocence had already been determined and it took the decision out of the jury\u2019s hands.\u201d However, unlike the cases that defendant cites, Quinlan did not state her personal opinion of the charges against defendant. Although Quinlan testified that the evidence \u201coverwhelmingly\u201d supported the charges, that did not reflect on her opinion of defendant\u2019s guilt but instead her opinion as to the strength of the evidence that was presented to her. Furthermore, as defendant acknowledges, the trial judge admonished the jurors immediately after Quinlan\u2019s statement that the jury\u2019s function was to determine whether the State proved defendant guilty of the charges against him. The judge also told the jury that a prosecutor\u2019s role is to determine whether a crime was committed and whether the evidence supported charging defendant with that crime. Defense counsel did not object to those instructions. Given the nature of the prosecutor\u2019s statement and the trial court\u2019s admonitions to the jury, we conclude that Quinlan\u2019s remark did not prejudice defendant\u2019s case. Furthermore, because we have not found that any of the complained-of remarks were prejudicial, we necessarily conclude that their cumulative effect did not deprive defendant of a fair trial.\nDefendant\u2019s next contention involves the tendered jury instructions as to the offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault. Although the trial court correctly instructed the jury as to the elements of that crime and the definition of accountability, defendant argues that the absence of accountability language in a separate instruction constituted reversible error.\nThe jury received an instruction defining aggravated criminal sexual assault (which included the emphasized language defining the offense under an accountability theory):\n\u201cA person, or one for whose conduct he is legally responsible, commits the offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault when he commits criminal sexual assault and displays or threatens to use a dangerous weapon, or the criminal sexual assault is perpetrated during the course of the commission of the offense of aggravated kidnaping.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 11.57 (4th ed. 2000) (hereinafter IPI Criminal 4th).\nThe next instruction given to the jury, IPI Criminal 4th No. 11.58, is the subject of defendant\u2019s argument. The jury was instructed that to support a finding of aggravated criminal sexual assault against a defendant, the State must prove that: (1) the defendant committed an act of sexual penetration upon L.E.; (2) the act was committed by the use of force or threat of force and L.E. did not consent to the act of sexual penetration; and (3) the defendant (a) displayed a dangerous weapon; (b) caused bodily harm to L.E.; or (c) sexually penetrated L.E. during the course of an aggravated kidnaping and unlawful restraint by the defendant. The jury was instructed that if it found that each of those three propositions was proved beyond a reasonable doubt, it should return a guilty verdict. In the absence of proof of any one of those propositions, a not guilty verdict should result.\nDefendant correctly asserts that the accountability language present in IPI Criminal 4th No. 11.57 was not included in IPI Criminal 4th No. 11.58. He contends that pursuant to IPI Criminal 4th No. 5.03, because an accountability theory is raised, the phrase \u201cor one for whose conduct he is legally responsible\u201d should have followed the references to \u201cdefendant\u201d in IPI Criminal 4th No. 11.58. Defendant argues that in the absence of that language in IPI Criminal 4th No. II. 58, the jury received inconsistent and contradictory instructions.\nAs with his previous contentions, defendant forfeited these arguments by failing to object to the instructions at the time they were given and by failing to include his specific assertions from his posttrial motion. See People v. Jackson, 333 Ill. App. 3d 962, 968, 777 N.E.2d 626, 632 (2002). Indeed, the record indicates that when the trial judge re-read IPI Criminal 4th No. 11.58 to the jury to correct a different omission, defendant\u2019s counsel expressly agreed to that version of the instruction, which lacked the accountability language. Moreover, even had defendant properly preserved his argument, the tendered instructions did not constitute reversible error.\nDefendant argues that the omission of the language \u201cor one for whose conduct he is legally responsible\u201d from each portion of IPI Criminal 4th No. 11.58, which defines the elements of the offense, renders that instruction inconsistent with IPI Criminal 4th No. 11.57. In support of his position, defendant discusses People v. Jenkins, 69 Ill. 2d 61, 370 N.E.2d 532 (1977), in which the trial court gave the jury two contradictory instructions on the offense of attempted murder. In Jenkins, the State\u2019s instruction informed the jury as to the definition of attempted murder, and the defense\u2019s instruction correctly listed the elements that the State must prove, including whether the defendant was not justified in his use of force (the defendant\u2019s use of force was the central issue at trial). Jenkins, 69 Ill. 2d at 64-65, 370 N.E.2d at 533-34. However, the State\u2019s instruction defining attempted murder did not discuss the use of force, whether reasonable or unreasonable. Jenkins, 69 Ill. 2d at 64, 370 N.E.2d at 533. As a result, the supreme court noted that the State\u2019s instruction omitted \u201cany reference to an essential element of the case, namely, that defendant must not have been justified in using the force employed, although such was an issue.\u201d Jenkins, 69 Ill. 2d at 65, 370 N.E.2d at 533-34. The supreme court agreed with the defendant that the two instructions were conflicting and the use of those instructions constituted reversible error. Jenkins, 69 Ill. 2d at 67, 370 N.E.2d at 534-35. In attempting to liken this case to Jenkins, defendant argues that in omitting the accountability language from IPI Criminal 4th No. 11.58, the trial court omitted the \u201cessential element\u201d of accountability from the definition of the offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault. However, accountability is not a crime in and of itself but, rather, a mechanism through which a criminal conviction may result. People v. Pollock, 202 Ill. 2d 189, 210, 780 N.E.2d 669, 681 (2002).\nWe find that the instant case more closely resembles People v. Pena, 317 Ill. App. 3d 312, 739 N.E.2d 584 (2000). In Pena, the defendant was charged with armed robbery, among other offenses, and, as in this case, the defendant\u2019s accountability for the crimes was at issue. The jury was instructed as to the elements that must be proven to convict the defendant of armed robbery. Pena, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 317-18, 739 N.E.2d at 589. The instruction defining armed robbery did not include the accountability language of \u201c \u2018or one for whose conduct he is legally responsible.\u2019 \u201d Pena, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 318, 739 N.E.2d at 589, quoting IPI Criminal 4th No. 14.06, Committee Note at 206. However, the jury was given IPI Criminal 4th No. 5.03, which defined accountability. In considering all of the instructions given, the court stated that IPI Criminal 4th No. 5.03 \u201cunambiguously sets out a principle of accountability.\u201d Pena, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 318, 739 N.E.2d at 589. The court concluded that assuming that the armed robbery instruction was deficient for omitting the accountability language, \u201cthe instructions as a whole ameliorated any defect stemming from the omission of the accountability phrase.\u201d Pena, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 319, 739 N.E.2d at 589.\nIn determining the propriety of jury instructions, a court must determine whether the jury was fairly, fully and comprehensively informed as to the relevant principles, considering the instructions in their entirety. Leonardi v. Loyola University of Chicago, 168 Ill. 2d 83, 100, 658 N.E.2d 450, 458 (1995). Here, the jury was instructed as to the elements of the offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault. The jury also was given the definition of accountability. As the Pena court noted, the purpose of jury instructions is to guide the jury in its deliberations and assist it in reaching a proper verdict through the application of legal principles as they apply to the evidence and the law. Pena, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 318, 739 N.E.2d at 589, citing People v. Hester, 131 Ill. 2d 91, 544 N.E.2d 797 (1989). Jury instructions should not be read in isolation; they instead should be construed as a whole. People v. Ward, 187 Ill. 2d 249, 265, 718 N.E.2d 117, 129 (1999). Accordingly, as in Pena, the absence of accountability language from IPI Criminal 4th No. 11.58 is not fatal because the instructions, when read as a whole, informed the jury of the proof necessary to sustain a conviction on an accountability theory.\nAlthough defendant argues that the instructions given in this case were inconsistent and contradictory like those in Jenkins, we instead agree with the State\u2019s assessment that the jury instructions were complementary. Based on the evidence presented, defendant could not have been convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault as a principal because McIntosh, not defendant, assaulted L.E. Therefore, in order for the jury to reach the verdict that it did, the jury necessarily must have considered the accountability instruction, IPI Criminal 4th No. 5.03, and applied that instruction in conjunction with IPI Criminal 4th No. 11.58. For those reasons, we find that in construing the instructions as a whole, the jury was properly informed as to the proof necessary to convict defendant. The jury was properly apprised of the law as it should be applied. Defendant was not denied a fair trial.\nLastly, we address the State\u2019s contention that defendant\u2019s concurrent 10-year terms for aggravated criminal sexual assault and aggravated kidnaping instead should be served consecutively. The State argues that pursuant to section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections, consecutive sentences are required when a defendant commits offenses as part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective and one of the offenses is aggravated criminal sexual assault. 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) (West 1998); 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14 (West 1998). Defendant was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault and aggravated kidnaping. The State asks this court to vacate defendant\u2019s concurrent sentences and remand this case to the trial court for the imposition of consecutive sentences.\nDefendant responds that he should not receive consecutive sentences for several reasons. He first argues that his aggravated kidnaping conviction should be vacated because L.E.\u2019s kidnaping was incidental to her sexual assault and did not constitute a separate offense. We note that defendant never offered this argument at trial in an attempt to avoid one of his two convictions. Nevertheless, even if defendant had extended this theory previously, we find that, based on the circumstances of this case, the asportation and detention of L.E. were sufficiently removed from the sexual assault as to support defendant\u2019s conviction for aggravated kidnaping.\nIn determining whether the asportation or detention of an individual rises to the level of a kidnaping, the court considers: (1) the duration of the asportation or detention; (2) whether the asportation or detention occurred during the commission of a separate offense; (3) whether the asportation or detention is inherent in the separate offense; and (4) whether the asportation or detention created a significant danger to the victim independent of that posed by the separate offense. People v. Quintana, 332 Ill. App. 3d 96, 104, 772 N.E.2d 833, 842 (2002). Regarding the first factor, defendant argues that the duration of L.E.\u2019s detention was insufficient, pointing out that, according to her testimony, the assault occurred at about 4 p.m. and she was talking to police an hour later. However, \u201cit is well settled that \u2018a kidnaping conviction is not precluded by the brevity of the asportation or the limited distance of the movement.\u2019 \u201d People v. Jackson, 331 Ill. App. 3d 279, 294, 771 N.E.2d 982, 995 (2002) (noting cases in which asportation of less than one block and detention of a few minutes have been sufficient to support a kidnaping conviction), quoting People v. Ware, 323 Ill. App. 3d 47, 54, 751 N.E.2d 81, 88 (2001).\n\u20225 Regarding the second and third factors, the detention and asportation of L.E. occurred separately from the offense of sexual assault. L.E. was forcibly taken from a car and into defendant\u2019s apartment prior to being assaulted. Defendant argues that the detention and asportation of L.E. were inherent to the sexual assault because L.E. was taken to the apartment \u201cfor the sole purpose of committing\u201d that offense. We do not agree that circumstance makes the asportation of L.E. inherent in the underlying offense. The asportation or detention of a victim is not an element of the offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault. Jackson, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 295, 771 N.E.2d at 996, citing 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14 (West 1998). These facts are clearly distinguishable from the cases on which defendant relies, including People v. Young, 115 Ill. App. 3d 455, 450 N.E.2d 947 (1983) (defendant grabbed victim and threw her against a wall before sexually assaulting her; kidnaping conviction reversed), and People v. Smith, 91 Ill. App. 3d 523, 414 N.E.2d 1117 (1980) (defendants forced themselves into victim\u2019s car and drove victim around in his car before robbing him; aggravated kidnaping conviction reversed). In Young and Smith, the defendants\u2019 restraint and detention of their victims were necessary to the commission of the crimes. Here, in contrast, defendant and McIntosh did not have to force L.E. out of the car at gunpoint and take her into defendant\u2019s apartment in order to sexually assault her. As to the final factor, defendant, while holding a gun, told L.E. he would shoot her if she did not get out of the car. L.E. therefore faced a danger independent of the sexual assault. The facts of this case support defendant\u2019s conviction for aggravated kidnaping as a separate offense. Therefore, we reject his assertion that consecutive sentences are not warranted in this case. Moreover, because we conclude that the asportation and detention of L.E. were not incidental to the sexual assault, we reject defendant\u2019s argument that consecutive sentences are improper because he was convicted of two crimes that arose from the same physical act.\nThose contentions aside, defendant accurately states that at his sentencing hearing, the prosecutor expressly asked the trial court to sentence defendant to concurrent terms. Defendant asserts that the State cannot now contend that consecutive terms are mandated. However, the State\u2019s failure to demand consecutive sentences is not determinative because if the trial court sentences a defendant to concurrent terms where the statute requires consecutive terms, the trial court has acted beyond its power, albeit unintentionally. People v. Childs, 278 Ill. App. 3d 65, 75, 662 N.E.2d 161, 167 (1996). The requirements of section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) are not the type of \u201cpersonal rights\u201d that the State or the defendant can waive. People v. Medrano, 282 Ill. App. 3d 887, 893, 669 N.E.2d 114, 118 .(1996). As defendant acknowledges, a sentence that does not conform to a statutory requirement is void, and the appellate court has the authority to correct such an order at any time. People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107, 113, 658 N.E.2d 445, 448 (1995). Accordingly, we affirm defendant\u2019s convictions and grant the State\u2019s request to remand this case to the trial court for the imposition of consecutive sentences.\nAffirmed in part and vacated in part; cause remanded.\nO\u2019BRIEN, EJ., and O\u2019MARA FROSSARD, J., concur.\nIn a bench trial simultaneous to defendant\u2019s jury trial, McIntosh was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault and aggravated kidnaping. This court has affirmed McIntosh\u2019s convictions. People v. McIntosh, No. 1 \u2014 01\u20142740 (2003) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). In addition, this court vacated McIntosh\u2019s concurrent sentences of 16 years and 10 years and remanded for the imposition of consecutive sentences pursuant to section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) (West 1998)).\nAs his defense, McIntosh presented alibi testimony. McIntosh, slip op. at 6-7.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GALLAGHER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Heather Sutton-Lewis, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Peter D. Fischer, and Janet Powers Doyle, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BRISCOE WATSON, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1-01-1988\nOpinion filed August 29, 2003.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Heather Sutton-Lewis, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Peter D. Fischer, and Janet Powers Doyle, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1089-01", "first_page_order": 1107, "last_page_order": 1118 }