{ "id": 3719497, "name": "THE CITY OF LOVES PARK, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS LABOR RELATIONS BOARD STATE PANEL et al., Respondents-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "City of Loves Park v. Illinois Labor Relations Board State Panel", "decision_date": "2003-10-10", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201403\u20140020", "first_page": "389", "last_page": "396", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "343 Ill. App. 3d 389" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "329 Ill. App. 3d 409", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1472429 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/329/0409-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 Ill. App. 3d 795", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 222677 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "803", "parenthetical": "construction of a contract is a question of law" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/296/0795-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 540", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209977 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "554", "parenthetical": "construction of a statute is a question of law" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0540-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821407 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "204" }, { "page": "205" }, { "page": "205" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0191-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 675, "char_count": 15799, "ocr_confidence": 0.764, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.10874050958183276 }, "sha256": "08f69b2fdf91f941a68a23bc5dc3fd2ff4e45f4815e988a921072d51a3749092", "simhash": "1:9dfdd6f636279a23", "word_count": 2520 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:02:30.760533+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "McLaren and GILLERAN JOHNSON, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "THE CITY OF LOVES PARK, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS LABOR RELATIONS BOARD STATE PANEL et al., Respondents-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BOWMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe City of Loves Park (City) appeals a decision by the State Panel of the Illinois Labor Relations Board (Board) finding that the City committed an unfair labor practice by repudiating the terms of its collective bargaining agreement (Agreement) with the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150 (Union). The City sets forth four issues for review. In our view, the City\u2019s contentions can be consolidated into the following two issues: (1) whether the arbitration clause contained in the Agreement is legal and enforceable, and (2) whether the Board erred in finding that the City committed an unfair labor practice.\nBACKGROUND\nThe following statement of facts is taken in large part from the Board\u2019s written decision in this matter. At all relevant times, the Union was the exclusive representative of a bargaining unit of production and maintenance employees for the City\u2019s street and water department. The Union and the City entered into a collective bargaining agreement that was effective from May 1, 1996, until April 30, 2000. At issue in this case is section 8.2 of the Agreement, which provides in relevant part that, \u201c[i]n cases of discipline or discharge, an employee who files a grievance under this Agreement shall have no recourse to the City\u2019s Civil Service Commission, and the Commission shall not have jurisdiction to review a case regarding discipline or discharge.\u201d\nOn January 13, 2000, the City notified Union member David Turn-rose that he would be placed on suspension beginning January 17, 2000, and that the City intended to file charges with the Civil Service Commission (Commission) seeking his discharge. The Union filed a grievance on Turnrose\u2019s behalf on February 1, 2000, and informed counsel for the City that the Union objected to processing the matter through the Commission. On February 8, counsel for the City acknowledged by letter that Turnrose had waived his right to a hearing before the Commission and that the City intended for the issue of Turnrose\u2019s discharge to be heard in only one forum.\nNonetheless, the Commission conducted a hearing on February 11 on the charges against Turnrose. The Union moved to dismiss the matter because Turnrose had opted for grievance arbitration rather than a hearing before the Commission. Pursuant to an agreement with the City\u2019s legal counsel, the Union waived its right to defend Turnrose before the Commission and allowed the Commission to render its decision following a brief prove-up by the City. The City, in return, agreed that it would not raise any procedural or collateral estoppel arguments in the grievance arbitration proceedings. The Commission then discharged Turnrose on February 11. The Union filed a grievance that same day.\nThe arbitration hearing commenced on September 26, 2000. At the hearing, the parties stipulated that the issue was whether Turn-rose was suspended and discharged for just cause. They further stipulated that the grievance was properly before the arbitrator for a final and binding decision and that the procedural requirements were either satisfied or waived. On February 27, 2001, the arbitrator issued a decision sustaining the Union\u2019s grievance, concluding that the City did not have just cause to discharge Turnrose, and ordering the City to reinstate Turnrose to his former position with full seniority, back pay, and benefits.\nFollowing the arbitrator\u2019s decision, the City\u2019s mayor, Darryl Lind-berg, asked the City\u2019s attorney to review options for appealing the arbitrator\u2019s ruling. Mayor Lindberg was concerned with the legality of the grievance arbitration provision of the Agreement. Prior to the arbitrator\u2019s ruling, the City had decided that there was no reason to look into the legality of this provision unless the arbitrator\u2019s ruling was unfavorable to the City.\nThe City filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the Winnebago County circuit court on March 22, 2001, requesting the entry of orders holding that (1) the City, as a non-home-rule entity, does not have the authority to contract away the requirements of the Illinois Municipal Code (Code) (65 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 1\u20141 et seq. (West 2000)), and (2) the arbitrator\u2019s ruling is void for lack of jurisdiction. The City refused to reinstate Turnrose and grant him back pay.\nThe Union then filed a charge with the Board, alleging that, by refusing to comply with the arbitrator\u2019s decision and challenging the validity of the arbitration clause in the circuit court, the City repudiated the Agreement and committed an unfair labor practice. The administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that the City did commit an unfair labor practice in violation of sections 10(a)(1) and 10(a)(4) of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (5 ILCS 315/10(a)(l), (a)(4) (West 2000)). The City filed exceptions to the ALJ\u2019s recommended decision, and the Board subsequently adopted the ALJ\u2019s decision. The City filed a timely petition for review of the Board\u2019s decision.\nSTANDARD OF REVIEW\nBefore reaching the merits, we must first address the proper standard of review. The City contends that our review is de novo because there are no disputed facts. The Board and the Union, on the other hand, argue that the appropriate standard is whether the Board\u2019s decision was clearly erroneous.\nIn City of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191 (1998), our supreme court held that the applicable standard of review of an administrative agency\u2019s decision depends on whether the question presented is one of fact or law. A reviewing court will overturn an agency\u2019s findings of fact only if the agency\u2019s determinations are against the manifest weight of the evidence. City of Belvidere, 181 Ill. 2d at 204. An agency\u2019s determination of a question of law, however, is entitled to less deference and is reviewed de novo. City of Belvidere, 181 Ill. 2d at 205. The court in City of Belvidere further held that the appropriate standard of review for a mixed question of fact and law is the clearly erroneous standard. City of Belvidere, 181 Ill. 2d at 205.\nThe issue of whether section 8.2 of the Agreement is legal and enforceable involves interpretation of the Code and the Agreement, both of which are questions of law. Department of Public Aid v. Brewer, 183 Ill. 2d 540, 554 (1998) (construction of a statute is a question of law); Gray v. Mundelein College, 296 Ill. App. 3d 795, 803 (1998) (construction of a contract is a question of law). Accordingly, we apply a de novo review to this issue.\nWe further conclude that the issue of whether the City committed an unfair labor practice constitutes a mixed question of fact and law, as the Board\u2019s determination involved examining the legal effect of a given set of facts, namely, the City\u2019s actions following the arbitration decision. Consequently, we will apply the clearly erroneous standard of review to the City\u2019s second issue.\nANALYSIS\nThe City asserts that the arbitration provision in the Agreement was not legal and enforceable. That provision provides as follows:\n\u201cIn cases of discipline or discharge, an employee who files a grievance under this Agreement shall have no recourse to the City\u2019s Civil Service Commission, and the Commission shall not have jurisdiction to review a case regarding discipline or discharge.\u201d\nSection 10 \u2014 1\u201418(a) of the Code provides as follows with respect to a municipality\u2019s ability to negotiate regarding arbitration of employment disputes as part of a collective bargaining agreement:\n\u201cExcept as hereinafter provided in this Section, no officer or employee in the classified civil service of any municipality who is appointed under the rules and after examination, may be removed or discharged, or suspended for a period of more than 30 days, except for cause upon written charges and after an opportunity to be heard in his own defense. The hearing shall be as hereinafter provided, unless the employer and the labor organization representing the person have negotiated an alternative or supplemental form of due process based upon impartial arbitration as a term of a collective bargaining agreement. In non-home rule units of government, such bargaining shall be permissive rather than mandatory unless such contract term was negotiated by the employer and the labor organization prior to or at the time of the effective date of the amendatory Act, in which case such bargaining shall be considered mandatory.\u201d 65 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 1\u201418(a) (West 2000).\nThe City contends that, under the Agreement, it was required to conduct a civil service hearing in order to terminate Turnrose, and only after that hearing did Turnrose have the option of seeking an arbitrator\u2019s review of the termination. The City further argues that the Commission\u2019s termination decision constitutes a final administrative decision that, pursuant to section 3 \u2014 104 of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 104 (West 2000)), is reviewable only by the courts. Consequently, the City maintains that the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to review the Commission\u2019s decision that termination of Turnrose\u2019s employment was proper. We find the City\u2019s argument untenable for the following reasons.\nFirst, we disagree with the City\u2019s premise that under the Agreement the employee may seek arbitration only after the Commission has terminated his employment. Section 8.2 of the Agreement states that \u201c[i]n cases of discipline or discharge, an employee who files a grievance under the Agreement shall have no recourse to the City\u2019s Civil Service Commission, and the Commission shall not have jurisdiction to review a case regarding discipline or discharge.\u201d The plain language of section 8.2 does not support the City\u2019s interpretation. It does not state that an employee must be officially discharged by the Commission before he may file a grievance. Instead, it discusses the effect of filing a grievance \u201c[i]n cases of discipline or discharge.\u201d Under section 10 \u2014 1\u201418(a) of the Code, a municipality must file written charges before it may discharge an employee. In our view, a fair and reasonable interpretation of section 8.2 is that, once a Union employee receives notice that the City intends to seek discipline or discharge, the employee may file a grievance. By doing so, the employee removes the matter from the Commission\u2019s jurisdiction. The provisions of section 8.3 of the Agreement, entitled \u201cGRIEVANCE STEPS,\u201d support our interpretation.\nSection 8.3 delineates a three-step grievance process. Under the first step, the employee may attempt to resolve the dispute with his or her immediate supervisor within the time period set forth in the Agreement. If the grievance remains unresolved after step one, the Union, on the employee\u2019s behalf, may submit a written grievance to the City\u2019s mayor. If the mayor denies the grievance, the Union may proceed to step three, which allows the Union to refer the matter to arbitration. The arbitrator\u2019s decision is final and binding upon the City, the Union, and the employee. Nothing in section 8.3 refers to any involvement by the Commission if the employee has elected to pursue the grievance process. Thus, contrary to the City\u2019s argument, the Agreement does not require a hearing and decision to terminate by the Commission prior to the filing of a grievance.\nConsequently, the remainder of the City\u2019s argument unravels. Because Turnrose and the Union followed the proper grievance procedures in this case, the Commission did not have jurisdiction to review Turnrose\u2019s case. Therefore, the Commission\u2019s decision that Turnrose\u2019s termination was for just cause was not a valid \u201cfinal administrative decision\u201d for purposes of section 3 \u2014 104 of the Administrative Review Law, which states in pertinent part that jurisdiction to review final administrative decisions is vested in the circuit courts (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 104 (West 2000)).\nThe Administrative Review Law defines \u201cadministrative decision\u201d as \u201cany decision, order or determination of any administrative agency rendered in a particular case, which affects the legal rights, duties or privileges of parties and which terminates the proceedings before the administrative agency.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 101 (West 2000). The Commission\u2019s decision cannot be said to have affected the parties\u2019 legal rights or to have terminated the proceedings between the parties when the Commission did not properly have jurisdiction over the proceedings. Accordingly, the arbitrator did not improperly review a final administrative decision when it heard Turnrose\u2019s grievance. The difficulty in this case was caused by the City\u2019s insistence upon proceeding with the hearing before the Commission after the Union had filed its initial grievance and had objected to going forward with any proceedings before the Commission.\nThe City also argues that the Board\u2019s determination that it committed an unfair labor practice was erroneous. The Agreement provides that the arbitrator\u2019s decision shall be final and binding on the parties. Nonetheless, the City refused to abide by the arbitrator\u2019s decision and filed suit in the circuit court seeking to void the arbitrator\u2019s ruling and to have section 8.2 of the Agreement declared invalid. The Board found that the City\u2019s actions amounted to wrongful repudiation of the award.\nThe City claims that it was, in good faith, exercising its right to appeal the arbitrator\u2019s decision in the only manner available to it. The Board found that, although the City had the right to seek to vacate the award, its attempt to have the grievance arbitration clause nullified and its refusal to comply with the arbitrator\u2019s decision and the grievance arbitration clause demonstrated contempt and disdain for the bargaining process and the public policies underlying the Act.\nSection 10(a)(1) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for a public employer to interfere with a public employee\u2019s exercise of rights guaranteed under the Act. 5 ILCS 315/10(a)(l) (West 2000). Section 10(a)(4) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for a public employer to refuse to bargain in good faith with an exclusive representative. 5 ILCS 315/10(a)(4) (West 2000). When an employer\u2019s conduct demonstrates a disregard for the collective bargaining process, evidences an outright refusal to abide by a contractual term, or prevents the grievance process from working, that conduct constitutes repudiation and violates section 10(a)(4). See City of Collinsville, 16 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 2026, No. S \u2014 CA\u201499\u2014056 (ISLRB April 18, 2000), aff\u2019d, City of Collinsville v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 329 Ill. App. 3d 409 (2002).\nHere, the City sought not merely to vacate the arbitrator\u2019s decision regarding Turnrose\u2019s employment, but to retroactively nullify the entire bargained-for grievance provision and to deprive Turnrose of any meaningful due process. Under the specific facts of this case, we cannot say that the Board\u2019s decision was clearly erroneous.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we confirm the Board\u2019s decision.\nConfirmed.\nMcLaren and GILLERAN JOHNSON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BOWMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "David J. Kurlinkus and Charles A. Criswell, Jr., both of Nicolosi & Associates, PC., of Rockford, for petitioner.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General (Gary S. Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Jerald S. Post, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), and Jacalyn J. Zimmerman, of State Labor Relations Board, both of Chicago, for respondent Illinois Labor Relations Board.", "Steven A. Davidson, Dale D. Pierson, and Bryan P. Diemer, all of Countryside, for respondent International Union of Operating Engineers." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE CITY OF LOVES PARK, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS LABOR RELATIONS BOARD STATE PANEL et al., Respondents-Appellees.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201403\u20140020\nOpinion filed October 10, 2003.\nDavid J. Kurlinkus and Charles A. Criswell, Jr., both of Nicolosi & Associates, PC., of Rockford, for petitioner.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General (Gary S. Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Jerald S. Post, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), and Jacalyn J. Zimmerman, of State Labor Relations Board, both of Chicago, for respondent Illinois Labor Relations Board.\nSteven A. Davidson, Dale D. Pierson, and Bryan P. Diemer, all of Countryside, for respondent International Union of Operating Engineers." }, "file_name": "0389-01", "first_page_order": 407, "last_page_order": 414 }