{ "id": 3720002, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TRAVIS L. POWELL, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Powell", "decision_date": "2003-10-29", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201402\u20140567", "first_page": "699", "last_page": "708", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "343 Ill. App. 3d 699" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "491 N.E.2d 493", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "500" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 Ill. App. 3d 108", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3448176 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/142/0108-01" ] }, { "cite": "207 Ill. 2d 7", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 975007 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16" }, { "page": "17", "parenthetical": "\"questioning of defendant *** occurred after the purpose of the stop was concluded\" (emphasis in original)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/207/0007-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 F.3d 679", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11090473 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/254/0679-01" ] }, { "cite": "935 F.2d 1518", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10541547 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1525" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/935/1518-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 F.3d 1275", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 571893 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1282" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/85/1275-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 F.3d 68", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 7410015 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "71", "parenthetical": "probable cause existed to search vehicle, partly based upon odor of air freshener" }, { "page": "69" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/65/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "789 N.E.2d 260", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "265" }, { "page": "266" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 220", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609689 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "227" }, { "page": "228" }, { "page": "235" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0220-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "21-22" }, { "page": "906" }, { "page": "1880" }, { "page": "19-20" }, { "page": "905" }, { "page": "1879" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "782 N.E.2d 275", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278" }, { "page": "278" }, { "page": "278" }, { "page": "279" }, { "page": "279" }, { "page": "279" }, { "page": "279" }, { "page": "279" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442058 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "465-66" }, { "page": "466" }, { "page": "467" }, { "page": "467" }, { "page": "468" }, { "page": "468" }, { "page": "468" }, { "page": "468" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.E.2d 1110", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1111-12" }, { "page": "1112" }, { "page": "1111-12" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 Ill. App. 3d 506", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2894436 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "508" }, { "page": "508" }, { "page": "508" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/45/0506-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "738 N.E.2d 1011", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1020" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "317 Ill. App. 3d 212", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1026044 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "223" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/317/0212-01" ] }, { "cite": "207 Ill. 2d 7", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 975007 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/207/0007-01" ] }, { "cite": "789 N.E.2d 260", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "265" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 220", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609689 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "227" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0220-01" ] }, { "cite": "782 N.E.2d 275", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "279" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442058 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "468" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0462-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 854, "char_count": 20315, "ocr_confidence": 0.751, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.1087659936930686 }, "sha256": "601be6511c1e34d0b6e0641c1d3b2988c203b9414e369e96b4d45c11000ff84d", "simhash": "1:b36dc43cdb27d021", "word_count": 3278 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:02:30.760533+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "COOK, J., concurs." ], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TRAVIS L. POWELL, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE APPLETON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter a stipulated bench trial, the trial court found defendant, Travis L. Powell, guilty of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 550/5(f) (West 2000)) and sentenced him to an agreed four-year prison term. Defendant appeals the trial court\u2019s denial of his motion to suppress, arguing (1) the traffic offense of following too closely (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 710(a) (West 2000)) is unconstitutionally vague and (2) the police illegally detained him after the traffic stop was complete. We reverse.\nI. BACKGROUND\nAt the preliminary hearing on May 26, 2000, Sergeant Tony Cessna of the Illinois State Police testified that on April 29, 2000, at about 8:35 a.m., while patrolling Interstate 57, he pulled defendant over because he had seen him following a semitrailer too closely. Defendant gave Cessna a valid Mississippi driver\u2019s license and a rental car agreement for the vehicle. Cessna informed defendant of the offense, and defendant admitted he had followed the truck too closely. While taking defendant\u2019s information, Cessna smelled the odor of air freshener coming from inside the car.\nCessna asked defendant to come into his squad car while he wrote a warning ticket for following too closely. As defendant sat with him in the squad car, Cessna ran a criminal history and driver\u2019s license inquiry on defendant. While waiting for the results, Cessna asked defendant where he was traveling. Defendant responded that he and his passenger were coming from Chicago and traveling to Jackson and West Pointe, Mississippi. Cessna asked defendant if he had ever been arrested; defendant told him he had been arrested for possession of cannabis. When Cessna received the inquiry results, they showed defendant had several prior arrests for possession of a controlled substance as well as possession of cannabis; there was an outstanding warrant for defendant\u2019s arrest in Cook County, but it could not be executed outside of that county; and defendant\u2019s Illinois license had been revoked.\nCessna completed the warning ticket and handed it to defendant. He kept defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license, however, and told him he was going to talk to the passenger in his car while defendant signed the warning ticket. \u201cI handed him the warning and asked him to sign it and advised him I was going to talk to his passenger while he was doing that.\u201d Cessna then exited his squad car and returned to defendant\u2019s vehicle, where he spoke to the passenger, Candace Martin, for two to three minutes. Martin told Cessna they were on their way to May-wood, Illinois, from Chicago, to visit relatives. Cessna returned to his squad car, returned defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license, and gave defendant a copy of the warning ticket. Cessna then told defendant that Martin stated they were traveling to a destination different from the one defendant had stated. Defendant responded that Martin knew where they were going and he could not explain her answer. Cessna asked defendant for permission to search his car, and defendant consented. After Cessna opened the trunk and began the search, defendant asked him what would happen if defendant told him he could not search the car. Cessna told defendant he had the right to refuse, and defendant responded that he was in a hurry and \u201cwould like to get going.\u201d Considering that comment a withdrawal of consent to search, Cessna stopped searching. At that point, Cessna told defendant he was free to leave \u2014 but not with the vehicle, or at least not yet, because he had sufficient suspicion to detain it and call for a canine unit. Master Sergeant Jeffrey Gaither arrived on the scene.\nWhile waiting approximately 24 minutes for the canine unit, Gaither spoke to Martin and saw what appeared to be cannabis on the floor of defendant\u2019s car. Gaither removed some of the material, and it field-tested positive for cannabis. Two or three minutes later, the canine unit arrived, and the dog alerted to the driver\u2019s door of defendant\u2019s car. Cessna told defendant he was going to complete his search of the car. A search of the trunk revealed a shopping bag, inside of which was a grocery bag containing seven clear Ziploc bags of green plant material. The police field-tested two of the bags, and both tested positive for cannabis. They arrested defendant for possession of cannabis (720 ILCS 550/4(f) (West 2000)) and possession with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 550/5(f) (West 2000)). At the conclusion of the testimony in the preliminary hearing, the court found probable cause.\nIn July 2001, defendant filed a motion to suppress his statements and the physical evidence against him, arguing that the offense of following too closely (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 710(a) (West 2000)), for which the police had stopped him, was unconstitutionally vague. Defendant further argued that if even the offense were constitutional, the search of his car and seizure of his person were unreasonable because the traffic stop was complete before Cessna discovered any reason-for suspicion. At the hearing on the motion, Cessna\u2019s testimony was essentially the same as his earlier testimony at the preliminary hearing. He testified that defendant was traveling 20 to 30 feet, or roughly a car-and-a-half length, behind a semitrailer, a distance Cessna considered too small for defendant to come to a stop if the semitrailer stopped. According to Cessna, defendant was traveling faster than the semitrailer and had to hit the brakes to slow down. Cessna again testified that during the stop, he smelled an odor of air freshener coming from defendant\u2019s car and, in his experience, air fresheners were often used to mask the odor of narcotics.\nBecause of the smell of air freshener, defendant\u2019s prior criminal record, and defendant\u2019s and his passenger\u2019s conflicting accounts of their destination and what they were doing, Cessna believed some type of illegal activity was afoot. Therefore, he requested permission to search the vehicle, and defendant consented.\nAfter finding the cannabis and arresting defendant, Cessna read him his Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966)). Defendant told Cessna that Martin had nothing to do with the marijuana. Defendant also claimed not to have seen the dog alert Gaither to the presence of drugs in his car. Cessna took defendant to the door that the canine had pawed, and defendant tried to wipe out the paw-marks with his foot.\nOn cross-examination, Cessna stated that he had five years\u2019 experience with a canine unit and had received \u201cValkyrie\u201d training (training for drug-interdiction patrol). He could not recall the particular smell of the air freshener and acknowledged that air fresheners in cars are not illegal. Cessna testified that he went to talk to Martin, the passenger, because he suspected criminal activity.\nOn January 3, 2001, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. The State dismissed the count for possession and on July 11, 2002, proceeded with a bench trial on the remaining count, with defendant\u2019s stipulation that the evidence in the preliminary hearing and in the hearing on his motion to suppress was sufficient for a finding of guilt. He expressly preserved for appeal the issues he had raised in his motion to suppress. The trial court found defendant guilty of possession of cannabis with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 550/5 (West 2000)) and sentenced him to an agreed four-year prison term, assessing fines and court costs accordingly. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied. This appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Constitutionality of the Offense of Following Too Closely\nDefendant argues that the traffic offense of following too closely (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 710(a) (West 2000)) is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to provide adequate notice of the prohibited conduct as meaningful guidance to authorities enforcing its provisions.\nA person attacking a statute\u2019s constitutionality must bring himself within the class as to whom the statute is unconstitutional by showing that he has been aggrieved by the statute. People v. Green, 45 Ill. App. 3d 506, 508, 359 N.E.2d 1110, 1111-12 (1977). Defendant admitted to Cessna he had been following too closely. Defendant himself could not have been aggrieved by any alleged vagueness in the statutory prohibition of \u201cfollowing too closely\u201d because by admitting to following too closely, he necessarily admitted the prohibition was clear and definite enough for him (and, therefore, Cessna) to know he had violated it under the circumstances. Thus, defendant lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of section 11 \u2014 710(a). See Green, 45 Ill. App. 3d at 508, 359 N.E.2d at 1112. He has failed to bring himself within the class as to whom the statute is allegedly unconstitutional. See Green, 45 Ill. App. 3d at 508, 359 N.E.2d at 1111-12.\nB. Denial of Motion To Suppress\nDefendant next claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We agree.\nOn a motion to suppress evidence, the trial court first weighs the evidence and determines the facts surrounding the complained-of conduct, after which it decides whether, as a matter of law, these facts constitute an unconstitutional seizure. People v. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d 462, 465-66, 782 N.E.2d 275, 278 (2002). A reviewing court gives great deference to the trial court\u2019s factual findings but reviews de novo the trial court\u2019s ultimate decision to grant or deny the motion to suppress. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d at 466, 782 N.E.2d at 278.\nRecently, the Supreme Court of Illinois held, in accordance with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), that a police officer may conduct a brief, investigative stop of individuals, absent probable cause to arrest, provided the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220, 227, 789 N.E.2d 260, 265 (2003), citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 906, 88 S. Ct. at 1880. A court objectively considers whether the detention of the defendant was appropriate based on the facts available to the police officer, and the police officer must be able to articulate specific facts to justify the intrusion. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d at 467, 782 N.E.2d at 278. Further, a police officer\u2019s action must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the intrusion. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d at 467, 782 N.E.2d at 279.\nThe Cox court further stated that after observing a traffic violation and initiating a stop, the officer is justified in detaining the driver to investigate the violation as well as perform some initial inquiries, check the driver\u2019s license, and conduct a speedy warrant check. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d at 468, 782 N.E.2d at 279. Once these tasks have been completed, the traffic stop should go no further, unless \u201cfurther suspicion is aroused in the officer following these inquiries.\u201d Cox, 202 Ill. 2d at 468, 782 N.E.2d at 279.\nIn the instant case, Cessna observed defendant commit a traffic violation and initiated a traffic stop. The State argues that while investigating the violation and making permissible inquiries, Cessna\u2019s suspicions were further aroused; he became aware of specific and articulable facts, which, taken together with rational inferences therefrom, warranted defendant\u2019s continued detention and an investigation into matters unrelated to the traffic stop. Those articulable facts were as follows. Cessna testified that in his experience, air freshener was commonly used to mask the odor of narcotics and he had arrested people in rental vehicles for narcotics violations where air fresheners were present in an attempt to mask the odor. See United States v. Patterson, 65 F.3d 68, 71 (7th Cir. 1995) (probable cause existed to search vehicle, partly based upon odor of air freshener). In addition, Cessna suspected criminal activity because of defendant\u2019s criminal drug history (see United States v. Finke, 85 F.3d 1275, 1282 (7th Cir. 1996)), the outstanding warrant for his arrest in Cook County, the revocation of his Illinois driver\u2019s license, and, more important, the inconsistent stories from defendant and Martin regarding their destination (see Patterson, 65 F.3d at 69; United States v. Ferguson, 935 F.2d 1518, 1525 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Morrison, 254 F.3d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 2001)).\nOur supreme court has on several recent occasions considered the nature of traffic stops such as this and the extent to which they may result in probable cause for a greater intrusion. As the court in Gonzalez recognized:\n\u201cA Terry analysis includes a dual inquiry. We must consider (1) \u2018whether the officer\u2019s action was justified at its inception,\u2019 and (2) \u2018whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.\u2019 \u201d Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 228, 789 N.E.2d at 266, quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 905, 88 S. Ct. at 1879.\nThe supreme court recently used this construct again in People v. Bunch, 207 Ill. 2d 7, 16 (2003), quoting Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 235, 789 N.E.2d at 270:\n\u201c \u2018[W]e must consider, as an initial matter, whether the question is related to the initial justification for the stop. If the question is reasonably related to the purpose of the stop, no fourth amendment violation occurs. If the question is not reasonably related to the purpose of the stop, we must consider whether the law enforcement officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that would justify the question. If the question is so justified, no fourth amendment violation occurs. In the absence of a reasonable connection to the purpose of the stop or a reasonable, articulable suspicion, we must consider whether, in light of all the circumstances and common sense, the question impermissibly prolonged the detention or changed the fundamental nature of the stop.\u2019 \u201d\nThe conversations between defendant and the officers here occurred during a routine \u201cwants and warrants\u201d check. After completing that check, however, Cessna issued defendant a warning ticket for following too closely. At that point, the traffic stop was complete. See Cox, 202 Ill. 2d at 468, 782 N.E.2d at 279. As a consequence, the existence of reasonable, articulable suspicion is evaluated at that point in time. See Cox, 202 Ill. 2d at 468, 782 N.E.2d at 279. Cessna then knew that (1) the interior of the car smelled like air freshener, (2) defendant was driving a rental car, (3) defendant had an open, in-county warrant from Cook County, (4) defendant had prior convictions for offenses involving cannabis, and (5) defendant was traveling to Mississippi.\nIf those items of information had justified a continued detention of defendant or a search of the vehicle, Cessna would have had no reason to converse with the passenger. He rightly judged they did not, and therefore he found it necessary to investigate further. Evidently, in Cessna\u2019s own mind, reasonable and articulable suspicion to extend the stop did not exist when he issued the warning ticket. Even assuming that defendant had to sign the warning ticket after Cessna handed it to him, defendant\u2019s signing it would have taken but a few seconds, not enough time for Cessna to exit the squad car, walk to defendant\u2019s car, and have a conversation with the passenger. The traffic stop was effectively over when Cessna handed defendant the warning. Instead of allowing defendant to leave, however, he retained defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license, thereby indicating he was not free to leave (see People v. Hardy, 142 Ill. App. 3d 108, 118, 491 N.E.2d 493, 500 (1986)), and went to gather evidence from the passenger. Cessna\u2019s questioning of the passenger prolonged the traffic stop and, therefore, was not reasonably related in scope to the initial reason for the stop. See Bunch, 207 Ill. 2d at 17 (\u201cquestioning of defendant *** occurred after the purpose of the stop was concluded\u201d (emphasis in original)).\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons set forth above, we reverse the trial court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence and remand this cause for further proceedings not inconsistent with this order.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nCOOK, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE APPLETON" }, { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH,\nspecially concurring in part and dissenting in part:\nI respectfully specially concur in part and dissent in part. I would affirm on both grounds, including the trial court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nThe majority recognizes that Cox, Gonzalez, and Bunch all affirmatively state that a police officer may detain a driver beyond the completion of the traffic stop if an officer has articulable suspicion. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d at 468, 782 N.E.2d at 279; Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 227, 789 N.E.2d at 265; Bunch, 207 Ill. 2d at 16. However, the majority finds that the officer in the instant case did not have articulable suspicion at the completion of the traffic stop, and therefore, defendant was illegally seized. I disagree.\nIn the instant case, Cessna observed defendant commit a traffic violation and initiated a traffic stop. While investigating the violation and making permissible inquiries, Cessna\u2019s suspicions were further aroused to the extent that Cessna became aware of specific and articulable facts that, taken together with rational inferences therefrom, warranted defendant\u2019s continued detention and investigation into matters unrelated to the traffic stop.\nCessna testified that his articulable suspicion was based upon (1) the odor of air freshener coming from defendant\u2019s rental car, (2) defendant\u2019s criminal drug history, (3) defendant\u2019s outstanding warrant for his arrest in Cook County, (4) the revocation of defendant\u2019s Illinois driver\u2019s license, and (5) the inconsistent stories from defendant and Martin regarding their destination. While any one of these factors standing alone may not be sufficient to justify defendant\u2019s detention, the court considers the totality of the facts when determining if reasonable suspicion existed. People v. Ortiz, 317 Ill. App. 3d 212, 223, 738 N.E.2d 1011, 1020 (2000). Based upon the totality of the facts, Cessna had reasonable suspicion based upon specific and articulable facts to detain defendant to conduct a canine test.\nEven accepting arguendo the majority\u2019s finding that the traffic stop was complete when Cessna handed defendant the warning citation (which was before Cessna spoke to the passenger and was told of a different destination), I still find that the totality of the facts warranted Cessna\u2019s continued detention. Cessna still had articulable suspicion based on (1) the odor of air freshener coming from defendant\u2019s rental car, (2) defendant\u2019s criminal drug history, (3) defendant\u2019s outstanding warrant for his arrest in Cook County, and (4) the revocation of defendant\u2019s Illinois driver\u2019s license.\nMoreover, I find the majority\u2019s assumptions regarding Cessna\u2019s belief as to when he had established articulable suspicion inappropriate. The majority states that \u201cin Cessna\u2019s own mind,\u201d Cessna did not believe that he had reasonable and articulable suspicion to extend the stop after issuing defendant the warning citation. 343 Ill. App. 3d at 706. That was not Cessna\u2019s testimony. To the contrary, Cessna testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress that he was already suspicious of criminal activity when he made the decision to go talk to the passenger.\nMoreover, once an officer has articulable suspicion, the investigation does not halt. Rather, the officer is justified in briefly continuing his investigation to confirm or dispel his suspicions. Requesting a consent to search the vehicle or, as in the instant case, conversing with the passenger is part of that continuing investigation, which was based upon Cessna\u2019s already established articulable suspicion. Therefore, I would affirm the trial court on both grounds.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH," } ], "attorneys": [ "Frederick F. Cohn, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Diane Sipich, State\u2019s Attorney, of Tuscola (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Charles F. Mansfield, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Erosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the Feople." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TRAVIS L. POWELL, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201402\u20140567\nOpinion filed October 29, 2003.\nFrederick F. Cohn, of Chicago, for appellant.\nDiane Sipich, State\u2019s Attorney, of Tuscola (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Charles F. Mansfield, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Erosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the Feople." }, "file_name": "0699-01", "first_page_order": 717, "last_page_order": 726 }