{ "id": 3720033, "name": "MARTIN DEKELAITA et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. NISSAN MOTOR CORPORATION IN USA, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Dekelaita v. Nissan Motor Corp. in USA", "decision_date": "2003-09-29", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201402\u20143618", "first_page": "801", "last_page": "815", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "343 Ill. App. 3d 801" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "738 N.E.2d 964", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "970" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 Ill. App. 3d 1023", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1096659 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1030" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/316/1023-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 C 7792", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cow.", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "518 N.E.2d 1028", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "characterizing Szajna as holding that privity is not required to bring an action for breach of implied warranty where there is a written warranty under the Act" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 Ill. 2d 288", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3193494 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "characterizing Szajna as holding that privity is not required to bring an action for breach of implied warranty where there is a written warranty under the Act" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/119/0288-01" ] }, { "cite": "503 N.E.2d 760", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "769" }, { "page": "769" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 Ill. 2d 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3180014 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "314-15" }, { "page": "315" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/115/0294-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 Misc. 2d 667", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Misc. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1140403 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "671" }, { "page": "811" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/misc2d/185/0667-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 U.S.C. \u00a7 2601", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(6)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "417 S.E.2d 290", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "car dealership was in the business of making used cars directly available to consumers so as to meet the Act's definition of \"supplier\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 N.C. App. 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 5313557 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "car dealership was in the business of making used cars directly available to consumers so as to meet the Act's definition of \"supplier\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/106/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "795 F.2d 238", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1596123 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "248" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/795/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 Ga. 698", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga.", "case_ids": [ 1201101 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "702", "parenthetical": "same" }, { "page": "467", "parenthetical": "same" }, { "page": "702" }, { "page": "467" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga/253/0698-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 Pa. D. & C.3d 6", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa. D. & C.3d", "case_ids": [ 1943389 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa-d-c3d/33/0006-01" ] }, { "cite": "532 N.E.2d 834", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "assignee of warrantee's rights under express warranty succeeds to all those rights and stands in privity with warrantor" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 Ill. 2d 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5555263 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "assignee of warrantee's rights under express warranty succeeds to all those rights and stands in privity with warrantor" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/125/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "264 F. Supp. 2d 616", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9109744 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "619", "parenthetical": "summarily noting that all rights in warranty were transferred to lessees" }, { "page": "620" }, { "page": "619" }, { "page": "619" }, { "page": "620" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/264/0616-01" ] }, { "cite": "02 C 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cow.", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "statute requires transfer of a product" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 N.Y.2d 463", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.2d", "case_ids": [ 1061817 ], "weight": 25, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "469" }, { "page": "1124" }, { "page": "184" }, { "page": "470" }, { "page": "1124" }, { "page": "185" }, { "page": "475" }, { "page": "1127" }, { "page": "188" }, { "page": "470" }, { "page": "1124" }, { "page": "185" }, { "page": "470" }, { "page": "1124" }, { "page": "185" }, { "page": "470" }, { "page": "1124" }, { "page": "185" }, { "page": "474" }, { "page": "1127" }, { "page": "188" }, { "page": "474" }, { "page": "1126-27" }, { "page": "188" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ny-2d/97/0463-01" ] }, { "cite": "787 N.E.2d 852", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "856" }, { "page": "856" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 Ill. App. 3d 1054", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 894478 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1060" }, { "page": "1060" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/337/1054-01" ] }, { "cite": "782 N.E.2d 217", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "220" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 510", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442035 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "514" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0510-01" ] }, { "cite": "761 N.E.2d 192", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "194" }, { "page": "194" }, { "page": "194" }, { "page": "194" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 Ill. App. 3d 752", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1281405 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "755" }, { "page": "755" }, { "page": "755" }, { "page": "755" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/326/0752-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2310", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(d)(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "15 U.S.C. \u00a7 2302", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "794 N.E.2d 1027", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1030" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 Ill. App. 3d 480", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3474359 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "483" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/342/0480-01" ] }, { "cite": "692 N.E.2d 739", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "742" }, { "page": "742" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 Ill. App. 3d 784", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 45718 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "790" }, { "page": "790" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/295/0784-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 U.S.C. \u00a7 2301", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 14, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "et seq." }, { "page": "(3)" }, { "page": "(6)" }, { "page": "(7)" }, { "page": "(3)" }, { "page": "(3)" }, { "page": "(6)" }, { "page": "(6)" }, { "page": "(7)" }, { "page": "(4)" }, { "page": "(3)" }, { "page": "(6)" }, { "page": "(7)" }, { "page": "(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1168, "char_count": 32026, "ocr_confidence": 0.732, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.906919820547522e-07, "percentile": 0.7310200324420458 }, "sha256": "b22df76fc81b3b09c02043d2632704ee2f047c8acdf15ba011c5157ac524e0a7", "simhash": "1:3334d9b88d66afd7", "word_count": 5263 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:02:30.760533+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "McNULTY and McBRIDE, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "MARTIN DEKELAITA et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. NISSAN MOTOR CORPORATION IN USA, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GORDON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nMartin and Akhshirash Dekelaita (plaintiffs or lessees) appeal from the circuit court of Cook County dismissing their three-count action under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty \u2014 Federal Trade Improvement Act (the Act) (15 U.S.C. \u00a7 2301 et seq. (2000)), set forth below, concerning a defective vehicle. Plaintiffs contend that they have successfully stated a claim even though they are lessees, not purchasers, of the defective automobile. For the reasons below, we reverse.\nBACKGROUND\nIn February 2000, plaintiffs leased a 2000 Nissan Maxima from a local Nissan dealership. The dealership, Fergus Nissan (Fergus), then assigned its interest in the lease and sold the car to Nissan Motor Acceptance Corporation (NMAC). NMAC purchased the car from Fergus in order to lease it to plaintiffs.\nIn connection with that sale, defendant Nissan Motor Company (defendant or Nissan) issued to NMAC a written warranty that covered the car for 3 years or 36,000 miles. Plaintiffs averred that NMAC would have not purchased the car, nor would plaintiffs have leased it, without this warranty. NMAC assigned its rights in defendant\u2019s written warranty to plaintiffs. NMAC thus is not a party to this action.\nThe lease between NMAC and plaintiffs restricted plaintiffs from a number of activities. Among other things, the lease forbade plaintiffs from using the vehicle to transport goods for hire; it forbade plaintiffs from altering or installing equipment and required plaintiffs to restore the vehicle to its original condition; it forbade plaintiffs from removing the vehicle from the contiguous states without consent. It also noted that plaintiffs had no right to assign, transfer or sublease any of their rights under the lease.\nIn addition to those restrictions, the lease contained an option to purchase the vehicle from the \u201coriginating dealer\u201d or other specified location. That option provided that plaintiffs could purchase the vehicle prior to or at the end of the lease. If plaintiffs chose to exercise that right at the end of the lease, they would have paid $17,168.40 in monthly payments and would pay $17,059.20, the residual value of the vehicle. Plaintiffs also paid an \u201cup-front sales tax\u201d and all title, license, and registration fees. They were responsible for obtaining insurance coverage for comprehensive, collision, property damage, and bodily injury.\nShortly after they took possession, plaintiffs began to experience problems with the engine (failing to start, running rough, and intermittent illumination of the check-engine light) and the brakes. Pursuant to the warranty, on numerous occasions, plaintiffs tendered the car to defendant\u2019s authorized dealerships for repair, and the dealerships serviced the car. Despite these efforts, however, defendant ultimately did not repair the car.\nBecause of defendant\u2019s failure to repair the car and because of its subsequent refusal to revoke acceptance of the car, plaintiffs sought redress. Under the Act, plaintiffs alleged breach of written warranty and breach of implied warranty, and they sought revocation of acceptance. The trial court dismissed the action pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619 (West 2000)), determining that by its plain language, the Act governs only when a vehicle is sold, not when it is leased. Plaintiffs appeal. Further facts are set forth as necessary.\nANALYSIS\nAs noted above, this case is before us on a section 2 \u2014 619 motion to dismiss. Such a motion presents only a question of law, and an appeal taken from a motion to dismiss is reviewed de novo. Intergovernmental Risk Management v. O\u2019Donnell, Wicklund, Pigozzi & Peterson Architects, Inc., 295 Ill. App. 3d 784, 790, 692 N.E.2d 739, 742 (1998). All well-pleaded facts are accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bartow v. Ford Motor Co., 342 Ill. App. 3d 480, 483, 794 N.E.2d 1027, 1030 (2003). \u201c[T]he appellate court must consider whether the existence of a material fact should have precluded the dismissal or, absent such an issue of fact, whether dismissal was proper as a matter of law.\u201d Intergovernmental, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 790, 692 N.E.2d at 742.\nVery generally, the Act was designed to enhance the enforceability of various warranties. In its own words, the statute is designed to \u201cimprove the adequacy of information available to consumers, prevent deception, and improve competition in the marketing of consumer products.\u201d 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 2302(a) (2000). It requires that any written warranty be \u201cfully and conspicuously\u201d disclosed in \u201csimple and readily understood language.\u201d 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 2302(a) (2000).\nMore specifically, the Act permits \u201ca consumer who is damaged by the failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to comply with any obligation under this chapter, or under a written warranty, implied warranty, or service contract\u201d to sue the warrantor for damages; elect repair, replacement, or refund of defective parts; and collect attorney fees. 15 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2310(d)(1), (d)(2) (2000).\nStatutory Definitions\nThe crux of this appeal turns on statutory interpretation of various portions of the Act. Three particular issues arise: (1) whether lessees are \u201cconsumers\u201d under either of the three definitions in the Act; (2) given that the definition of \u201cwritten warranty\u201d states that the warranty must be issued \u201cin connection with the sale\u201d of the consumer product, whether lessees effectively must obtain transfer of title or, alternately, whether that language can apply to the sale between Fergus, the dealership, and the lessor, NMAC; and (3) whether lessees have stated an action for breach of an implied warranty so as to become consumers regardless of whether the definition of \u201cwritten warranty\u201d is satisfied.\nWe begin with an overview of the statutory terms in question. The Act gives a three-pronged definition of \u201cconsumer\u201d:\n\u201c[1] a buyer (other than for purposes of resale) of any consumer product, [2] any person to whom such product is transferred during the duration of an implied or written warranty (or service contract) applicable to the product, and [3] any other person who is entitled by the terms of such warranty (or service contract) or under applicable State law to enforce against the warrantor (or service contractor) the obligations of the warranty (or service contract).\u201d 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 2301(3) (2000).\nEmbedded twice within the meaning of \u201cconsumer\u201d is the term \u201cwritten warranty.\u201d The Act defines \u201cwritten warranty\u201d as:\n\u201c(A) any written affirmation of fact or written promise made in connection with the sale of a consumer product by a supplier to a buyer which relates to the nature of the material or workmanship and affirms or promises that such material or workmanship is defect free or will meet a specified level of performance over a specified period of time, or\n(B) any undertaking in writing in connection with the sale by a supplier of a consumer product to refund, repair, replace, or take other remedial action with respect to such product in the event that such product fails to meet the specifications set forth in the undertaking,\nwhich written affirmation, promise, or undertaking becomes part of the basis of the bargain between a supplier and a buyer for purposes other than resale of such product.\u201d 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 2301(6) (2000).\nAlso at issue is whether plaintiffs are entitled to sue for breach of \u201cimplied warranty,\u201d which is defined as: \u201can implied warranty arising under State law (as modified by sections 2308 and 2304(a) of this title) in connection with the sale by a supplier of a consumer product.\u201d 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 2301(7) (2000).\nIn analyzing these definitions, we are cognizant of several canons of statutory interpretation. \u201c \u2018The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent of the legislature.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d Schawk, Inc. v. Zehnder, 326 Ill. App. 3d 752, 755, 761 N.E.2d 192, 194 (2001). In divining intent, we presume the legislature did not intend to create absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results. In re B.L.S., 202 Ill. 2d 510, 514, 782 N.E.2d 217, 220 (2002). \u201c \u2018The best evidence of legislative intent is the language used in the statute itself, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d Schawk, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 755, 761 N.E.2d at 194. \u201c \u2018The statute should be evaluated as a whole, with each provision construed in connection with every other section.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d Schawk, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 755, 761 N.E.2d at 194. \u201c \u2018If legislative intent can be ascertained from the statute\u2019s plain language, that intent must prevail without resort to other interpretive aids.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d Schawk, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 755, 761 N.E.2d at 194. \u201cSections of the same statute should be considered in pari materia and each section should be construed with every other part or section of the statute to produce a harmonious whole.\u201d St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Smith, 337 Ill. App. 3d 1054, 1060, 787 N.E.2d 852, 856 (2003).\nDefining \u201cConsumer\u201d under the Act\nBeginning with the definition of \u201cconsumer,\u201d we note at the outset that courts have interpreted this provision as meaning that a person need only meet one of the three criteria set out above. DiCintio v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 97 N.Y.2d 463, 469, 768 N.E.2d 1121, 1124, 742 N.Y.S.2d 182, 184 (2002). Thus, lessees must fall within only one of the three options set forth above to meet the Act\u2019s definition of \u201cconsumer\u201d \u2014 either they are a \u201cbuyer,\u201d a \u201ctransferee\u201d or are otherwise entitled to enforce a warranty.\nDefendant argues that a lessee cannot be a \u201cconsumer\u201d as defined in the Act because each prong of the definition requires a sale. As shall be more fully explained below, defendant asserts that the first prong of the definition uses the term \u201cbuyer\u201d and thus contemplates a sale. The remaining two prongs reference the terms \u201cwritten warranty\u201d and \u201cimplied warranty,\u201d in which both definitions explicitly require a sale. This argument impacts the definition of \u201cconsumer,\u201d it argues, because if there is no sale, then plaintiffs are not \u201cconsumers\u201d under the first prong of the definition; similarly, if there is no sale, there is no \u201cwritten warranty\u201d or \u201cimplied warranty,\u201d and plaintiffs are not \u201cconsumers\u201d under the second two prongs.\nWith respect to the first prong, neither party specifically contends that plaintiffs meet the first definition of \u201cconsumer\u201d \u2014 not even plaintiffs contend they are buyers. Although it is arguable that a long-term lessee with an option to purchase could be considered a \u201cbuyer\u201d so as to constitute a \u201cconsumer,\u201d the lessees nevertheless bypass the first prong and argue that they are consumers under either the second or third prong. We note however that we are not satisfied that long-term lessees would not meet the definition of a buyer under the first prong, but shall deal with that question later on. We will first analyze whether a lessee fits under the second and third prongs because that is the argument advanced by lessees.\nThus, assuming without deciding for the moment that plaintiffs do not meet the first prong, we turn to the second and third prongs. Defendant asserts that lessees do not meet either of these prongs because there is no sale as required in the definition of \u201cwritten warranty\u201d or \u201cimplied warranty.\u201d Again, we revisit that particular contention below, and for now examine those terms in isolation.\nRegardless of whether plaintiffs meet the first prong, at first blush it appears that lessees, in general, meet the second prong of \u201cconsumer,\u201d which includes \u201cany person to whom such product is transferred during the duration of an implied or written warranty *** applicable to the product.\u201d 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 2301(3) (2000). A consumer product, the automobile, was physically transferred into lessees\u2019 possession, even though it carried specific obligations and restrictions in connection with their use and enjoyment. Also, because requiring the consumer to be a \u201cbuyer\u201d was in the definition\u2019s first prong, supra, and because legislators are presumed to give each word meaning, it would seem inappropriate to read this clause in the second prong as requiring a purchase or a transfer of title, as such requirement is typically read into terms like \u201cbuyer.\u201d Nonetheless, some courts excluded lessees by logically drawing the definition of \u201ctransferee\u201d from the Uniform Commercial Code (Uniform Commercial Code \u2014 Sales \u00a7 2\u2014 106(1), 1 U.L.A. 215 (1989)), which is \u201cpassing of title.\u201d DiCintio, 97 N.Y.2d at 470, 768 N.E.2d at 1124, 742 N.Y.S.2d at 185. Under that definition, courts have held that title must be transferred, and a lessee would be excluded therefrom. See also Diamond v. Porsche, No. 02 C 414, slip op. at 3 (N.D. Ill. September 26, 2002) (statute requires transfer of a product), vacated on other grounds, No. 02 \u2014 3585 (7th Cir. July 16, 2003); but see Cohen v. AM General Corp., 264 F. Supp. 2d 616, 619 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (summarily noting that all rights in warranty were transferred to lessees).\nAgain, assuming, without deciding, that plaintiffs did not meet the first and second prongs of the \u201cconsumer\u201d definition set forth above, we examine whether plaintiffs meet the third prong. That prong is broader than the other two and is somewhat of a catchall provision: \u201cany other person who is entitled by the terms of such warranty (or service contract) or under applicable State law to enforce against the warrantor (or service contractor) the obligations of the warranty (or service contract).\u201d 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 2301(3) (2000). Plaintiffs were assigned the rights of the warranty by NMAC and were entitled to enforce them, perhaps even if only under state law. See, e.g., Collins Co. v. Carboline Co., 125 Ill. 2d 498, 532 N.E.2d 834 (1988) (assignee of warrantee\u2019s rights under express warranty succeeds to all those rights and stands in privity with warrantor).\nIndeed, defendant did service the automobile on numerous occasions pursuant to the warranty. Moreover, defendant does not challenge that plaintiffs have an enforceable warranty that exists under state law; it merely argues that the written warranty does not meet the specialized definition imposed under the Act, which requires that a warranty be connected to a sale. Even if one accepts that contention, however, the lessees would satisfy the third prong of the Act, which does not require that the warranty be connected to a sale but simply that it would be enforceable under state law. And, as noted, no one asserts that this warranty is unenforceable under state law by a lessee as well as by a purchaser. This is particularly true in this case, where the lessees would be entitled to enforce the warranty by virtue of its assignment to them. Because they otherwise were entitled to enforce the warranty, then, plaintiffs meet the third definition of \u201cconsumer\u201d under the Act. See Diamond, slip op. at 3; Cohen, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 620.\n\u201cWritten Warranty,\u201d \u201cImplied Warranty\u201d and \u201cConsumer\u201d\nRather than directly confront whether plaintiffs are consumers under the Act, defendant argues that to enforce a written or implied warranty, the consumer must have acquired the consumer product by way of a sale. As spelled out above, both definitions of \u201cwritten warranty\u201d and the definition of \u201cimplied warranty\u201d include the language, \u201cmade in connection with a sale.\u201d 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 2301(6) (2000).\nNotwithstanding whether the provisions defining \u201cconsumer\u201d are satisfied by the mere enforceability under state law, there remains a question whether enhanced enforcement of this warranty is permissible under the specific definitions of \u201cwritten warranty\u201d and \u201cimplied warranty\u201d under sections 2301(6) and 2301(7) of the Act. Defendant argues that because lessees have no ownership rights, they cannot recover under the Act. Such reasoning is widely adopted. See, e.g., Diamond, slip op. at 4-5; DiCintio, 97 N.Y.2d at 475, 768 N.E.2d at 1127, 742 N.Y.S.2d at 188.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 arguments appear twofold and are argued somewhat in the alternative. First, they argue that the phrase \u201cin connection with a sale\u201d in the two definitions of \u201cwritten warranty\u201d and in the definition of \u201cimplied warranty\u201d can be construed to mean the sale between Fergus Nissan and NMAC and thereby satisfy the Act. Cohen, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 619. Second, as alluded to above, they argue that the lease agreement is a \u201csale\u201d for purposes of the Act. Henderson v. Benson-Hartman Motors, Inc., 33 Pa. D. & C.3d 6, 8, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 782, 783-84 (1983) (allowing claim under Act to automobile lessee); Freeman v. Hubco Leasing, Inc., 253 Ga. 698, 702, 324 S.E.2d 462, 467 (1985) (same). We agree with plaintiffs\u2019 first argument.\nThough the majority of courts fall on the side of the defendant, we are persuaded by the Act\u2019s plain language that the legislature\u2019s intent was to cover lessees. In so holding, we return to our examination of the Act\u2019s plain language. The legislature\u2019s definitions of \u201cwritten warranty\u201d and \u201cimplied warranty\u201d state quite simply that the warranty be issued \u201cin connection with the sale\u201d of a consumer product: Congress does not demand its readers to conclude that the sale must be between the consumer and the supplier.\nWhere, as here, there was a sale \u2014 between the dealer and the lessor \u2014 it suffices to say that there was a written warranty issued in connection with the sale. In no event does the Act limit a \u201csale\u201d to transactions between the warrantor and the ultimate consumer. Cohen, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 619. Taking the relevant \u201csale\u201d to be between Fergus and NMAC confers warranty rights under the Act to the plaintiffs. The warranty gave rise to rights produced \u201cin connection with the sale\u201d as mandated by the Act, and those rights now are enforceable by the plaintiffs as assignees. In the instant case, then, in connection with the sale, the warranty was assigned to the lessees, who are consumers entitled to enforce the Act.\nWe find further support from expanding the language we examine, thereby employing the canon, in pari materia. St. Paul Fire, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 1060, 787 N.E.2d at 856. Under subsection A, a \u201cwritten warranty\u201d must be \u201cin connection with the sale of a consumer product by a supplier\u201d; under subsection B, a \u201cwritten warranty\u201d must be \u201cin connection with the sale by a supplier of a consumer product.\u201d (Emphases added.) 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 2301(6) (2000). The definition of \u201cimplied warranty\u201d also includes the phrase \u201cin connection with a sale by a supplier.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 2301(7) (2000). The term \u201csupplier\u201d means \u201cany person engaged in the business of making a consumer product directly or indirectly available to consumers.\u201d 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 2301(4) (2000). If the term \u201csupplier\u201d could apply only to NMAC and not to defendant, then we would agree that a sale must necessarily have occurred between NMAC and plaintiffs in order for plaintiffs to have a \u201cwritten warranty\u201d enforceable under the Act. But that is not the case.\nDefendant, as manufacturer, is in the business of making its vehicles directly or indirectly available to consumers. At least with written warranties, the Act does not require that a supplier be in contractual privity with the consumer so as to restrict the meaning of \u201csale\u201d to be a transaction only between a direct supplier and a consumer. Abraham v. Volkswagen of America, Inc, 795 F.2d 238, 248 (2d Cir. 1986); G. Monserud, Rounding out the Remedial Structure of Article 2: The Case for a Forced Exchange between a Buyer and a Remote Seller, 19 Dayton L. Rev. 353 (1994). Rather, the Act implicates those suppliers who make their products \u201cindirectly available to consumers.\u201d Here, Fergus made the car directly available to the lessor and lessees. See Ismael v. Goodman Toyota, 106 N.C. App. 421, 417 S.E.2d 290 (1992) (car dealership was in the business of making used cars directly available to consumers so as to meet the Act\u2019s definition of \u201csupplier\u201d). Applying the plain language of the statute, it follows that defendant manufacturer, from whom Fergus purchased the automobile, made the automobile indirectly available to consumers. In short, there was a \u201cwritten warranty\u201d issued in connection with the sale from a \u201csupplier\u201d to a \u201cconsumer\u201d \u2014 albeit, but permissibly, indirectly.\nHaving determined that lessees should be entitled to enforce their warranty under the Act, we confront one leading case, DiCintio, supra, from the New York Court of Appeals, which is in opposition. In DiCintio, as here, the court faced the question whether the sale of a vehicle after it was leased to a lessor was a \u201csale\u201d under the Act so as to trigger the definition of \u201cwritten warranty.\u201d As advocated by defendant, the court determined that a lessee could not be a \u201cconsumer\u201d by determining that each prong in the definition of \u201cconsumer\u201d required a sale. DiCintio, 97 N.Y.2d at 470, 768 N.E.2d at 1124, 742 N.Y.S.2d at 185. The court noted that the first prong required that the consumer be a buyer and therefrom concluded that title must pass.\nAs for the remaining two prongs of \u201cconsumer,\u201d the court determined that both required a \u201cwritten warranty\u201d or \u201cimplied warranty\u201d to be in effect and relied on the \u201csale\u201d language in the definition of \u201cwritten warranty\u201d and \u201cimplied warranty\u201d to hold that both prongs \u201cpresuppose \u2018a sale.\u2019 \u201d Because \u201csale\u201d is not defined in the Act, the DiCintio court used the Uniform Commercial Code\u2019s definition of \u201csale,\u201d which entails the \u201cpassing of title.\u201d DiCintio, 97 N.Y.2d at 470, 768 N.E.2d at 1124, 742 N.Y.S.2d at 185. From that definition of \u201csale,\u201d the court logically determined that a lessee had no \u201cwritten warranty\u201d or \u201cimplied warranty\u201d under 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 2601(6), supra; under that framework, the lessee could not be a \u201cconsumer.\u201d DiCintio, 97 N.Y.2d at 470, 768 N.E.2d at 1124, 742 N.Y.S.2d at 185.\nAs noted above, however, the third prong does not exclusively require that the warranty meets the Act\u2019s definition if in fact it is enforceable under state law. As previously noted, no one disputes that lessees are entitled to enforce the warranty under state law, and the Act includes as consumers those entitled to enforce a warranty under the Act \u201cor under applicable State law.\u201d 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 2301(3) (2000). This third prong bypasses the need for title to transfer to the consumer because it does not necessarily require a \u201csale,\u201d even as DiCintio defines one. Thus, we find flawed the DiCintio court\u2019s presuppositions concerning the \u201csale\u201d requirement.\nFurther, as noted above, although plaintiffs did not argue that long-term lessees do not satisfy the first prong under the definition of consumer, we are unconvinced that Congress did not intend to include long-term lessees even when they used terms such as \u201cpurchaser\u201d in the first prong of the definition of \u201cconsumer\u201d under section 2301(3), and \u201csale\u201d in the two definitions of \u201cwritten warranty\u201d under section 2301(6). We find persuasive the authority noting that long-term lease agreements are akin to an installment contract or a chattel mortgage, in which the seller\u2019s restrictions are aimed at protecting its interests until the balance is paid in full. Facing similar facts as ours, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court wrote:\n\u201cThis [48-month] lease agreement extends for most of the useful life of the automobile. The payments due under the lease agreement may be almost equal to the full purchase price, with interest, of the automobile under a four year installment sales agreement. Also, unlike typical lease agreements, the responsibility for maintaining the automobile rests with the lessee, taxes are to be paid by the lessee, the lessee must obtain insurance, and in the event of default, the lessee pays the remaining installments and receives a credit for the proceeds from the sale of the automobile.\u201d Henderson, 31 Pa. D. & C.3d at 8, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) at 783-84.\nSee also Freeman, 253 Ga. at 702, 324 S.E.2d at 467.\nIn this case, as in the Pennsylvania case, the long-term lessee has substantial obligations that are consistent with ownership, such as paying taxes and obtaining insurance, and here, the lessees had the right to purchase the vehicle after having paid a substantial amount of rent on it. Henderson, 31 Pa. D. & C.3d at 8, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) at 783-84.\nWhile we find dispositive the Act\u2019s plain language and do not view a foray into the Act\u2019s legislative history as necessary or even prudent, we are cognizant of the DiCintio court\u2019s examination that found legislative history that Congress did not intend lessees to be included in the Act. However, other legislative history supports the opposite result. A stated purpose behind this bill, not a precursor to it, was making warranties more readily understood and providing the Federal Trade Commission with a means of \u201cbetter protecting consumers,\u201d particularly those with new car warranties. See DiCintio v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 185 Misc. 2d 667, 671, 713 N.Y.S.2d 808, 811 (2000), quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1107 at_(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702, 7708). Having determined that the lessees in this case meet the statutory definition of \u201cconsumer,\u201d at least under the third prong, and having noted that a \u201cconsumer product\u201d is one which the supplier can make \u201cindirectly\u201d available to consumers, we find that the legislative intent is best served by protecting them with a broad reading of the definitions of \u201cwritten warranty\u201d and \u201cimplied warranty.\u201d\nThe DiCintio court also concludes that it is questionable whether a written warranty can become \u201cthe basis of the bargain between a supplier and a buyer for purposes other than resale of such product\u201d when it is sold to a lessor under 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 2301(6), supra. The court noted that while the lessor\u2019s purpose in buying the car may not be solely for resale, it collects rent and \u201cultimate resale is presumably an intrinsic part of its plan when it takes title to the vehicle.\u201d DiCintio, 97 N.Y.2d at 474, 768 N.E.2d at 1127, 742 N.Y.S.2d at 188. As such, the court concluded that the lessor\u2019s intent was ultimately to resell the automobile and thus the lease was likely not the basis of the bargain and the lessor was not a buyer \u201cfor -purposes other than resale.\u201d The problem with that reasoning is that most automobile purchasers buy a car with the ultimate goal of resale, although maybe not until much later. Under the DiCintio court\u2019s reasoning,, few buyers could ever enforce the Act. Cohen, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 620.\nIt would seem that public policy is best served by affording long-term automobile lessees the same rights afforded to buyers. At least in this case, the lessees paid sales taxes, maintained insurance on the vehicle, and had the option to exercise at any time an option to purchase the vehicle. Lessees committed more than $17,000 towards the purchase of the vehicle and bound themselves to its care for three years. Where extensive warranties, such as the one defendant issued here, presumably are factored into the value of the automobile, from which the monthly leasing amount is fashioned, it would serve no function to deny lessees the ability to enforce the warranty.\nUltimately, in this case whether title passed from the lessor to the lessee is inapposite because we determine that plaintiffs are \u201cconsumers\u201d under the Act and because we determine that there was a written warranty issued \u201cin connection with the sale.\u201d Plaintiffs stated an action for breach of written warranty under the Act. The trial court thus erred in dismissing their action.\nPrivity and Implied Warranties\nAlthough this issue was not raised in the briefs, we acknowledge the plaintiffs\u2019 pleading of breach of implied warranty under the Act. \u201cImplied warranty\u201d is defined as \u201can implied warranty arising under State law (as modified by sections 2308 and 2304(a) of this title) in connection with the sale by a supplier of a consumer product.\u201d 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 2301(7) (2000).\nPrivity typically is required under the Illinois Uniform Commercial Code (810 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 2000)) to establish a claim for breach of implied warranty, but the Illinois Supreme Court determined that this requirement was unnecessary where the claim is brought under the Act. Szajna v. General Motors Corp., 115 Ill. 2d 294, 503 N.E.2d 760 (1986). Specifically, the court determined that where there is a \u201cwritten warranty\u201d under the Act, the state law privity requirement is overridden by federal law and therefore a consumer with a written warranty under the Act could maintain an action for breach of implied warranty without having contractual privity with the manufacturer. Szajna, 115 Ill. 2d at 314-15, 503 N.E.2d at 769. The Szajna court reasoned that by extending a written warranty, the manufacturer creates a relationship akin to privity so as to support an implied warranty. 115 Ill. 2d at 315, 503 N.E.2d at 769. See also Rothe v. Maloney Cadillac, Inc., 119 Ill. 2d 288, 518 N.E.2d 1028 (1988) (characterizing Szajna as holding that privity is not required to bring an action for breach of implied warranty where there is a written warranty under the Act).\nThat holding has been criticized and not followed by federal courts sitting in this state. See Soldinger v. Aston Martin Lagonda of North America, Inc., No. 97 C 7792, slip. op. at 7-8 (N.D. Ill. 1999); Diamond, slip. op. at 5-6. We make no independent determination on the issue. \u201cWe are bound by the principle of stare decisis and must adhere to the decisions of our supreme court.\u201d Wreglesworth v. Arctco, Inc., 316 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1030, 738 N.E.2d 964, 970 (2000). Because plaintiffs have established they are \u201cconsumers\u201d under the \u201cAct\u201d entitled to enforce a \u201cwritten warranty,\u201d they are also entitled to sue for breach of implied warranty under the Act under the Illinois Supreme Court\u2019s interpretation thereof.\nCONCLUSION\nIn conclusion, we determine that the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs suit under the Act because they were lessees rather than purchasers. The cause is reversed and remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nMcNULTY and McBRIDE, JJ., concur.\nNo question arises as to whether the leased vehicle is a \u201cconsumer product.\u201d The Act defines a \u201cconsumer product\u201d as:\n\u201cany tangible personal property which is distributed in commerce and which is normally used for personal, family, or household purpose (including any such property intended to be attached to or installed in any real property without regard to whether it is so attached or installed).\u201d 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 2301(1) (2000).\nWe note that while lessees do not raise this argument under the first prong of the definition of \u201cconsumer,\u201d they do argue that a lessee should be a buyer with respect to the provisions of the Act that define \u201cwritten warranty\u201d and \u201cimplied warranty,\u201d as discussed below.\nAnother ground for rejecting that a lessee could be a transferee is based on the word \u201cduration.\u201d This argument is based on the timing of the transfer. Where the product was transferred to the lessee before the car was sold to the lessor, one court concluded that a lessee could not be a \u201cperson to whom such product is transferred during the duration of an implied or written warranty.\u201d (Emphasis added.) DiCintio, 97 N.Y.2d at 474, 768 N.E.2d at 1126-27, 742 N.Y.S.2d at 188. We find that to be a hyper-technical and imprecise application of the statute because, as explained below, a warranty attaches to those consumer products that the supplier makes \u201cindirectly\u201d available to consumers. The timing of the sale or transfer of the product, then, cannot be so determinative.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GORDON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Scott M. Cohen and Jennifer L. Bas\u00f3la, both of Krohn & Moss, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellants.", "Bruce S. Terlep and Matthew D. Jacobson, both of Swanson, Martin & Bell, of Wheaton, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MARTIN DEKELAITA et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. NISSAN MOTOR CORPORATION IN USA, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1\u201402\u20143618\nOpinion filed September 29, 2003.\nScott M. Cohen and Jennifer L. Bas\u00f3la, both of Krohn & Moss, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellants.\nBruce S. Terlep and Matthew D. Jacobson, both of Swanson, Martin & Bell, of Wheaton, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0801-01", "first_page_order": 819, "last_page_order": 833 }