{ "id": 3719527, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RODNEY HARRIS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Harris", "decision_date": "2003-10-29", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201402\u20140481", "first_page": "1014", "last_page": "1025", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "343 Ill. App. 3d 1014" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "643 N.E.2d 789", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "796" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "162 Ill. 2d 497", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477543 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "511" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/162/0497-01" ] }, { "cite": "649 N.E.2d 1351", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1357" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 Ill. App. 3d 954", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 249142 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "961" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/271/0954-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 N.E.2d 695", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 Ill. 2d 510", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2903225 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/47/0510-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 N.E.2d 526", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "528" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 Ill. 2d 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3030946 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/87/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "781 N.E.2d 1092", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1103" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 Ill. App. 3d 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 637067 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/335/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "787 N.E.2d 180", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 696", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "779 N.E.2d 268", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "276" }, { "page": "276" }, { "page": "277", "parenthetical": "\"Finally, the State argues that, unlike, in Peete, no reversible error occurred because the evidence here was overwhelming\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 Ill. App. 3d 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 637110 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "112" }, { "page": "112" }, { "page": "113" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/335/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "519 U.S. 172", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11595223 ], "weight": 15, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174" }, { "page": "584" }, { "page": "647" }, { "page": "175-77" }, { "page": "585" }, { "page": "648" }, { "page": "180" }, { "page": "587" }, { "page": "650" }, { "page": "190-91" }, { "page": "594" }, { "page": "655" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/519/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "743 N.E.2d 689", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "692" }, { "page": "692" }, { "page": "694" }, { "page": "695" }, { "page": "695" }, { "page": "695", "parenthetical": "\"The State's final contention is that, even if the stipulation should have been allowed, the error did not prejudice defendant\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 Ill. App. 3d 961", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 279536 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "964" }, { "page": "964-65" }, { "page": "967" }, { "page": "969" }, { "page": "969" }, { "page": "969" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/318/0961-01" ] }, { "cite": "780 N.E.2d 1144", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1147", "parenthetical": "applying section 7 - 13 (720 ILCS 5/7 - 13 (West 2000)) and stating \"conduct that would otherwise be an offense is justified if the defendant was (1) without blame in occasioning or developing the situation and (2" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 Ill. App. 3d 798", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 637099 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "801", "parenthetical": "applying section 7 - 13 (720 ILCS 5/7 - 13 (West 2000)) and stating \"conduct that would otherwise be an offense is justified if the defendant was (1) without blame in occasioning or developing the situation and (2" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/335/0798-01" ] }, { "cite": "791 N.E.2d 100", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111", "parenthetical": "rejecting a similar hypothetical and argument" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 Ill. App. 3d 792", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2468995 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "806-07", "parenthetical": "rejecting a similar hypothetical and argument" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/339/0792-01" ] }, { "cite": "646 N.E.2d 1299", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1304" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "269 Ill. App. 3d 851", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 365885 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "857" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/269/0851-01" ] }, { "cite": "581 N.E.2d 637", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "642" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 Ill. 2d 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5592803 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "390" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/144/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "481 N.E.2d 676", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "677-78" }, { "page": "678" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 Ill. 2d 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3134711 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "64" }, { "page": "66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/107/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "630 N.E.2d 797", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "800" }, { "page": "800" }, { "page": "798" }, { "page": "800" }, { "page": "798" }, { "page": "798-800" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 36", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780275 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "42" }, { "page": "42" }, { "page": "39-40" }, { "page": "42" }, { "page": "38" }, { "page": "38-42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "714 N.E.2d 491", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 9, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "495-96" }, { "page": "495" }, { "page": "496" }, { "page": "497" }, { "page": "493" }, { "page": "497" }, { "page": "497" }, { "page": "497" }, { "page": "497" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "186 Ill. 2d 542", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 243867 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "550" }, { "page": "550" }, { "page": "551" }, { "page": "553" }, { "page": "545" }, { "page": "553" }, { "page": "553" }, { "page": "553" }, { "page": "553" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/186/0542-01" ] }, { "cite": "740 N.E.2d 755", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "766" }, { "page": "766-67" }, { "page": "767" }, { "page": "767" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "194 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1096297 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "24" }, { "page": "24" }, { "page": "24" }, { "page": "25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/194/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1201, "char_count": 28744, "ocr_confidence": 0.744, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.856319230494445e-08, "percentile": 0.30516528183689473 }, "sha256": "3c5f3759de578a49caa90b2d71922590a459bf973d0a7c17b70718c47fed444f", "simhash": "1:9b72955c6e64fde6", "word_count": 4806 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:02:30.760533+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "MYERSCOUGH, EJ., and STEIGMANN, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RODNEY HARRIS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KNECHT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn January 2002, a jury convicted defendant, Rodney Harris, of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24 \u2014 1.1(a) (West 2000)). In May 2002, the trial court sentenced defendant to a five-year prison term. On appeal, defendant argues (1) section 24 \u2014 1.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Criminal Code) (720 ILCS 5/24 \u2014 1.1 (West 2000)) violates due process because it potentially punishes innocent conduct without requiring a culpable mental state, (2) the trial court erroneously refused his stipulation of a prior felony, and (3) the trial court improperly excused the transcribing of voir dire by a court reporter. We reverse and remand.\nI. BACKGROUND\nAt trial, the State offered defendant\u2019s four prior felony convictions, aggravated battery, intimidation, and two counts of unlawful delivery of controlled substance, into evidence to prove defendant\u2019s status as a felon. Defendant offered to stipulate to the convictions and asked that the specific felonies not be published to the jury. The State objected to the stipulation, and the trial court agreed with the State:\n\u201cTHE COURT: I agree with you. But the Supreme Court doesn\u2019t. Aren\u2019t we supposed to identify the crimes? We\u2019re no longer to allow the jury to speculate because of what you just said. They might think it\u2019s murder. Or do you think a different rule applies in a prove up of an underlying felony?\nI\u2019m going to name the offense. *** Although, I would agree there is some reason logically to think that it\u2019s different when you\u2019re just proving up a prior felony than when you\u2019re impeaching.\u201d\nTo establish defendant knowingly possessed an operable firearm, the State offered the testimony of officers and crime-lab technicians. Testimony relevant to this appeal follows.\nOliver Love, a Bloomington police officer, testified he was the officer who made the initial contact with defendant on April 2, 2001. At approximately 4:20 p.m., Love was driving on Market Street, near Mason Street, when he saw defendant in a group of six to eight men near the corner of Mason and Market Streets. Love knew there was a warrant for defendant; he did not recognize the others. After confirming the warrant was still valid, Love requested backup, exited his squad car, and approached defendant.\nLove testified defendant was wearing blue sweatpants and sweatshirt, with a black baseball cap, and was holding a pit bull by a leash. Love told defendant to give the leash to someone and to come to him. Instead, defendant walked away from Love approximately 10 feet north on Mason Street.\nLove testified one of the men took the pit bull from defendant. In that time, Love\u2019s backup, including Officer Chad Reeser, arrived. After Love gave the backup officers a description of defendant, defendant began sprinting south through the intersection of Mason and Market Streets. Love yelled for defendant to stop. Love and Reeser then chased defendant.\nLove testified that as defendant ran through the intersection, he saw a handgun fall from defendant\u2019s waistband, at the small of defendant\u2019s back, and bounce in the intersection of Market and Mason Streets. Love retrieved the handgun as he ran. At Monroe Street, the next street they crossed, Love lost sight of defendant. Love called the canine unit and set a perimeter to watch for defendant. The officers found defendant in a large pine tree in the 600 block of West Jefferson. At the tree, Love saw what he believed might be a weapon in defendant\u2019s hand. Love told defendant to drop what was in his hand, which was a cellular phone. After defendant did not release the object, Officer Richard Hirsch, the canine officer, released his dog, which retrieved defendant from the tree by biting defendant\u2019s shoulder and pulling him from the tree.\nLove testified defendant used vulgarities toward the police officers. Defendant repeatedly was \u201cvery much negative towards the dog\u201d and \u201ccontinuously bringing the theme that we would not have caught him without the dog.\u201d Love found cannabis on defendant.\nLove testified he wrote in his report the handgun fell on Mason Street approximately 30 feet south of Market, not in the intersection. Love believed the waistband on defendant\u2019s sweatsuit was elastic. The handgun was approximately 6 inches long, 4V2 inches wide and weighed 2 to 3 pounds. Love denied defendant ran through two buildings on Market Street and not through the intersection.\nLove further testified that after he lost sight of defendant, defendant could not have run north toward Econowash and then through the buildings to the location where he was found.\nDefendant presented the testimony of four witnesses, who testified defendant did not run through the intersection where Love testified the handgun was found. Yeakia Thompson testified she was cleaning her tires at Econowash on Market Street when she noticed \u201cthe commotion.\u201d She watched defendant run through two buildings, a small business and a house, next to Econowash on Market Street. She was \u201cpositive\u201d defendant did not run down Mason Street, and she did not see defendant drop anything. Thompson admitted she knew defendant, but only by name, because she had seen him at parties.\nToby Carlos III, who had known defendant for 15 to 20 years, testified he was with defendant, defendant\u2019s brother Azielis Phillip Harris (Phil), and Marcus Johnson on April 2, 2001. For approximately one to two hours in the afternoon, they lifted weights in defendant\u2019s mother\u2019s garage. When defendant \u201cwas doing the above-head presses,\u201d Carlos could see defendant\u2019s waistband. Carlos did not see a gun.\nCarlos testified that after they lifted weights, the group went to Red Fox, a grocery store on West Market Street. After the police arrived, Carlos heard defendant say, \u201cI got [marijuana] on me.\u201d Defendant then ran. Carlos watched defendant run between the small business and the house on the corner. Carlos did not see a gun fall from defendant\u2019s pants.\nCarlos testified after defendant ran, the officer ran down Mason Street. Carlos saw the officer either drop something or bend over.\nMarcus L. Johnson, defendant\u2019s cousin, testified he was with Carlos, defendant, and Phil lifting weights on April 2, 2001. During the workout, defendant had removed his shirt. Johnson could see the waistband to the pants, and he did not see a handgun. Johnson also did not see a handgun lying on a bench or car. Before they left the garage, Johnson did not see defendant tuck anything into his pants. Johnson did not recall seeing defendant\u2019s cellular phone.\nJohnson testified the group decided to walk to Red Fox at approximately 3:30 to 4 p.m. While on Market Street, a police officer arrived. Defendant whispered he had marijuana on him and handed the leash to Carlos. Defendant then ran between two buildings. One officer followed defendant. Other officers were also in the area. Johnson did not see defendant drop anything in the intersection of Mason and Market Streets.\nPhil testified he was defendant\u2019s brother, and he had been convicted of a felony nine years earlier. Phil confirmed the testimony of Carlos and Johnson regarding the weight lifting. He did not see defendant in possession of a handgun, and he believed he would have noticed a weapon of that size if it had been in defendant\u2019s waistband.\nPhil testified that when the police arrived, defendant turned to him, said \u201cI got [marijuana] on me,\u201d and started running. Defendant ran between the house and the \u201cbroken down business.\u201d Phil watched defendant run. Phil did not see anything fall from defendant\u2019s pants.\nDefendant also testified on his behalf. During the April 2, 2001, workout, he was wearing a sweatsuit with an elastic waistband and a T-shirt. Defendant denied having the handgun. At Red Fox, defendant waited outside with his dog while the others went inside. While waiting, he purchased $10 worth of marijuana and placed the marijuana in his sock. When the police officer arrived, defendant told his brother, \u201chold my dog, I got [marijuana] on me.\u201d Defendant took a step back and then ran. Defendant ran through the abandoned house on Market Street. Defendant further testified that when he was found in the tree, he did not hold his cellular phone in his hand.\nChad Reeser, formerly a Bloomington police officer, testified for the State in rebuttal. Reeser drove to the intersection of Market and Mason Streets after he heard on the radio that Love had seen defendant. Reeser saw Love approaching defendant and heard Love telling defendant to give someone his dog and come to him. About the time Reeser opened his door, defendant fled. Defendant ran behind Reeser\u2019s squad car to the intersection of Market and Mason. Defendant did not run between the two buildings.\nAs defendant ran through the intersection, Reeser ran behind him and saw a handgun fall from the rear waistband of his sweatpants. When he saw the handgun fall, Reeser was four or five feet behind defendant. When Reeser looked back to insure the handgun was secured, he saw Love grab the handgun.\nIn closing arguments, the State referred to defendant, on more than one occasion, as a \u201cfour-time felon.\u201d In its instructions, the trial court repeatedly listed defendant\u2019s four prior felony convictions. The court did instruct the jury to consider the convictions only to the extent they establish defendant was a felon:\n\u201cOrdinarily evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior conviction of an offense may be considered by you only as it may affect his believability as a witness and must not be considered by you as evidence of his guilt of the offense for which he was charged.\nHowever, in this case, because the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the proposition that the defendant was previously convicted of aggravated battery, intimidation[,] and delivery of a controlled substance, you may consider evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior conviction of the offenses of aggravated battery, intimidation[,] and delivery of a controlled substance only for the purpose of determining whether the State has proved that proposition.\u201d\nThe jury found defendant guilty of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. On March 14, 2002, defendant filed a posttrial motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict or for new trial, which the trial court denied. On May 7, 2002, the court sentenced defendant as stated. This appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Constitutionality of the Unlawful-Possession-of-a-Weapon-by-a-Felon Statute\nDefendant argues the unlawful-possession-of-a-weapon-by-a-felon statute (720 ILCS 5/24 \u2014 1.1(a) (West 2000)) is unconstitutional because it requires no culpable mental state and permits a felony conviction based on innocent conduct. Defendant asserts the following as an example of innocent conduct unconstitutionally criminalized under section 24 \u2014 1.1(a):\n\u201cA Good Samaritan, who has been convicted of any felony but has not been granted relief under [sjection [24 \u2014 1.1 of the Criminal Code], is walking down the street and happens upon a gun. Not wanting the neighborhood children to find the gun, the Good Samaritan takes the gun and is on her way to the police station to turn it in, but gets stopped for speeding before she can do so, and the gun is recovered. Depending on the prior felony, she is guilty of at least a Class 3 felony, and a sentence of imprisonment of up to 14 years, even though she had no culpable mental state.\u201d\nIn support of his argument, defendant relies on a number of Illinois Supreme Court cases that overturned statutes that swept too broadly: People v. Wright, 194 Ill. 2d 1, 740 N.E.2d 755 (2000); In re K.C., 186 Ill. 2d 542, 550, 714 N.E.2d 491, 495-96 (1999); People v. Zaremba, 158 Ill. 2d 36, 630 N.E.2d 797 (1994); and People v. Wick, 107 Ill. 2d 62, 481 N.E.2d 676 (1985).\nWhen we consider the constitutionality of a statute, we presume that statute is constitutional. Wright, 194 Ill. 2d at 24, 740 N.E.2d at 766. The challenger to the statute has the burden of proving its invalidity. K.C., 186 Ill. 2d at 550, 714 N.E.2d at 495. Although \u201cthe legislature has wide discretion to establish penalties for criminal offenses,\u201d its \u201cdiscretion is limited by the constitutional guarantee that a person may not be deprived of liberty without due process of law.\u201d Wright, 194 Ill. 2d at 24, 740 N.E.2d at 766-67. To determine whether legislation complies with substantive due process, we apply the rational-basis test and will uphold a statute under this test if it \u201c \u2018bears a reasonable relationship to a public interest to be served, and the means adopted are a reasonable method of accomplishing the desired objective.\u2019 \u201d Wright, 194 Ill. 2d at 24, 740 N.E.2d at 767, quoting People v. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d 381, 390, 581 N.E.2d 637, 642 (1991).\nDefendant\u2019s case law demonstrates the Supreme Court of Illinois has held \u201ca statute violates the due process clauses of both the Illinois and the United States Constitutions if it potentially subjects wholly innocent conduct to criminal penalty without requiring a culpable mental state.\u201d K.C., 186 Ill. 2d at 551, 714 N.E.2d at 496; Wright, 194 Ill. 2d at 25, 740 N.E.2d at 767; Zaremba, 158 Ill. 2d at 42, 630 N.E.2d at 800. In K.C., the court held sections 4 \u2014 102(a)(1) and (a)(2) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 102(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 1996)) violate due process. K.C., 186 Ill. 2d at 553, 714 N.E.2d at 497. Section 4 \u2014 102 provided, in relevant part:\n\u201c \u2018(a) It is a violation of this [c]hapter for:\n(1) A person, without authority to do so, to damage a vehicle or to damage or remove any part of a vehicle;\n(2) A person, without authority to do so, to tamper with a vehicle or go in it, on it, or work or attempt to work any of its parts, or set or attempt to set it in motion[.]\u2019 \u201d K.C., 186 Ill. 2d at 545, 714 N.E.2d at 493, quoting 625 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 102 (West 1996).\nAt argument in K.C., the State conceded the relevant sections made \u201ccriminals out of people who decorate the bride and groom\u2019s car during a wedding ceremony, get in a traffic accident, or inadvertently hit a baseball through a neighbor\u2019s windshield.\u201d K.C., 186 Ill. 2d at 553, 714 N.E.2d at 497. The court concluded \u201c[a]lthough the prevention of vandalism and malicious mischief are undoubtedly laudable goals,\u201d the goal of protecting innocent conduct from prosecution is \u201can equally laudable goal.\u201d K.C., 186 Ill. 2d at 553, 714 N.E.2d at 497. Because these sections potentially punished innocent conduct with \u201cwholly innocent motives,\u201d the court held the statutes were unconstitutional. K.C., 186 Ill. 2d at 553, 714 N.E.2d at 497.\nIn Zaremba, the court found section 16 \u2014 1(a)(5) of the Criminal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 16 \u2014 1(a)(5)) unconstitutional on similar grounds. Zaremba, 158 Ill. 2d at 42, 630 N.E.2d at 800. Section 16 \u2014 1(a)(5) stated theft was committed when one does the following:\n\u201c \u2018Obtains or exerts control over property in the custody of any law enforcement agency which is explicitly represented to him by any law enforcement officer or any individual acting in behalf of a law enforcement agency as being stolen.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis omitted.) Zaremba, 158 Ill. 2d at 39-40, 630 N.E.2d at 798, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 16 \u2014 1.\nThe purpose of section 16 \u2014 1(a)(5) was \u201cto enable law enforcement officers to conduct undercover operations aimed at breaking up fencing operations\u201d (Zaremba, 158 Ill. 2d at 42, 630 N.E.2d at 800), but the statute criminalized \u201cthe actions of a police evidence technician who took from a police officer for safekeeping the proceeds of a theft\u201d (Zaremba, 158 Ill. 2d at 38, 630 N.E.2d at 798).\nIn Wick, the court found a portion of the aggravated-arson statute violated due process. Under the relevant statute, aggravated arson was a Class X felony and was defined in relevant part as follows:\n\u201c \u2018(a) A person commits aggravated arson when by means of fire or explosive he knowingly damages, partially or totally, any building or structure, including any adjacent building or structure, and *** (3) a fireman or policeman who is present at the scene acting in the line of duty, is injured as a result of the fire or explosion.\u2019 \u201d Wick 107 Ill. 2d at 64, 481 N.E.2d at 677-78, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 20\u20141.1.\nThe court found the statute was not reasonably related to its purpose because it required no unlawful purpose in setting the fire, as the lesser arson statute did, and therefore subjected innocent conduct to a Class X felony conviction. The court cited as an example \u201ca farmer who demolishes his deteriorated barn to clear space for a new one is liable for a Class X penalty if a fireman standing by is injured at the scene.\u201d Wick, 107 Ill. 2d at 66, 481 N.E.2d at 678.\nThe purpose of section 24 \u2014 1.1 is to protect the public in \u201ckeeping firearms from convicted felons.\u201d People v. Jackson, 269 Ill. App. 3d 851, 857, 646 N.E.2d 1299, 1304 (1995). We find the statute is reasonably designed to remedy the evils the legislature has found to be a threat to public safety.\nSection 24 \u2014 1.1 does not attempt to punish \u201cwholly innocent conduct\u201d without a culpable mental state. The conduct of the Good Samaritan, although benevolent, is not innocent. It is not analogous to the conduct of a lab technician who takes control of evidence from a police officer and thereby commits theft (Zaremba, 158 Ill. 2d at 38-42, 630 N.E.2d at 798-800) or to the conduct of a child who accidentally hits a baseball through the windshield of his neighbor\u2019s car and becomes a criminal (K.C., 186 Ill. 2d at 553, 714 N.E.2d at 497).\nThe act of the Good Samaritan felon in knowingly possessing the weapon is not innocent conduct. See People v. Grant, 339 Ill. App. 3d 792, 806-07, 791 N.E.2d 100, 111 (2003) (rejecting a similar hypothetical and argument). If the Good Samaritan has no other reasonable option, such as calling the police or asking another adult to secure the weapon, the necessity defense serves the dual purpose of protecting the public both from a stray weapon and from felons possessing weapons. See generally People v. Roberson, 335 Ill. App. 3d 798, 801, 780 N.E.2d 1144, 1147 (2002) (applying section 7 \u2014 13 (720 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 13 (West 2000)) and stating \u201cconduct that would otherwise be an offense is justified if the defendant was (1) without blame in occasioning or developing the situation and (2) reasonably believed the conduct was necessary to avoid a public or private injury greater than the injury that might reasonably result from her own conduct\u201d); 720 ILCS 5/24 \u2014 1.1(b), (d) (West 2000) (denying the necessity defense to only inmates in possession of prohibited weapons).\nBecause section 24 \u2014 1.1(a) is reasonably designed to achieve its purpose, defendant has not overcome the presumption section 24\u2014 1.1(a) is constitutional.\nB. Stipulation of Prior Conviction\nDefendant next contends the trial court erroneously refused his request to stipulate his prior convictions in violation of our holding in People v. Peete, 318 Ill. App. 3d 961, 743 N.E.2d 689 (2001). Defendant acknowledges the error was not raised in his posttrial motion but contends (1) we may review the trial court\u2019s decision under the plain-error doctrine, and (2) defense counsel was ineffective.\nTo convict a defendant for unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, the State must prove, among other things, the defendant is a felon:\n\u201cIt is unlawful for a person to knowingly possess on or about his person or on his land or in his own abode or fixed place of business any weapon prohibited under [s]ection 24 \u2014 1 of this [a]ct or any firearm or any firearm ammunition if the person has been convicted of a felony under the laws of this State or any other jurisdiction.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/24 \u2014 1.1(a) (West 2000).\nIn Peete, we determined the trial court erred when it refused defendant\u2019s proposed stipulation to his prior felony convictions as proof of his status as a felon. The defendant, who was charged with unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, offered to stipulate his prior felony convictions for residential burglary and aggravated battery. The court refused the defendant\u2019s stipulation and permitted the State to publish the residential burglary conviction to the jury. Peete, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 964, 743 N.E.2d at 692. A jury found the defendant guilty, and the defendant appealed. Peete, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 964-65, 743 N.E.2d at 692.\nWe began our analysis in Peete by considering whether Illinois courts should adopt the holding in Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 136 L. Ed. 2d 574, 117 S. Ct. 644 (1997). In Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 174, 136 L. Ed. 2d at 584, 117 S. Ct. at 647, the defendant was charged with violating a federal law that prohibited a convicted felon from possessing a firearm. The Old Chief defendant offered to stipulate to his prior felony conviction, the government refused, and the district court agreed with the government. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 175-77, 136 L. Ed. 2d at 585, 117 S. Ct. at 648.\nThe Supreme Court concluded that although the record of the defendant\u2019s felony conviction was relevant, under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence the \u201c \u2018probative value\u2019 \u201d of the prior conviction was \u201c \u2018substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.\u2019 \u201d Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 180, 136 L. Ed. 2d at 587, 117 S. Ct. at 650, quoting Fed. R. Evid. 403. The Supreme Court further concluded \u201cthe most a jury needs to know about the prior-conviction element is that the conviction admitted by the defendant falls within the class of crimes enumerated in the statute.\u201d Peete, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 967, 743 N.E.2d at 694, citing Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 190-91, 136 L. Ed. 2d at 594, 117 S. Ct. at 655.\nAfter finding the laws in Old Chief were similar to those in Illinois, we decided to adopt Old Chiefs holding: \u201c[T]he Supreme Court\u2019s approach in Old Chief regarding stipulations on prior convictions that are an element of the crime charged is the proper procedure.\u201d Peete, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 969, 743 N.E.2d at 695.\nIn People v. Walker, 335 Ill. App. 3d 102, 112, 779 N.E.2d 268, 276 (2002), the Second District opted to follow Peete and adopted Old Chief. Currently, the issue is before the Supreme Court of Illinois. Walker, 335 Ill. App. 3d 102, 779 N.E.2d 268, appeal allowed, 202 Ill. 2d 696, 787 N.E.2d 180 (No. 95285).\nThe State first contends Old Chief, Peete, and Walker hinge on the existence of unfair prejudice to the defendants. The State relies upon People v. Parker, 335 Ill. App. 3d 474, 781 N.E.2d 1092 (2002), as establishing the \u201c[f]ailure to accept a defendant\u2019s stipulation to his prior convictions to prove unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon is not error if it is not unduly prejudicial.\u201d In Parker, the First District examined Old Chief, Peete and Walker and concluded it need not decide whether to follow Old Chief, because \u201c[b]oth Peete and Walker make clear that their respective analyses turn on the fact that the evidence against the defendants in those cases was not overwhelming.\u201d Parker, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 486, 781 N.E.2d at 1103.\nWe disagree with the State\u2019s analysis and Parker. The Peete and Walker decisions do not turn on whether the evidence against a defendant is overwhelming. Both first held it is error to refuse the defendant\u2019s stipulation to prior convictions to prove unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. Peete, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 969, 743 N.E.2d at 695; Walker, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 112, 779 N.E.2d at 276. Only after finding the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the prior convictions did the Peete and Walker courts consider the State\u2019s arguments the defendants\u2019 convictions were nevertheless not harmed or prejudiced by the error. Peete, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 969, 743 N.E.2d at 695 (\u201cThe State\u2019s final contention is that, even if the stipulation should have been allowed, the error did not prejudice defendant\u201d); Walker, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 113, 779 N.E.2d at 277 (\u201cFinally, the State argues that, unlike, in Peete, no reversible error occurred because the evidence here was overwhelming\u201d).\nUnder Peete, the trial court erred by refusing defendant\u2019s stipulation and admitting the four felony convictions. The error, however, is not reversible if it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Wilkerson, 87 Ill. 2d 151, 157, 429 N.E.2d 526, 528 (1981).\nThe State, applying Parker, then argues defendant\u2019s verdict was not harmed or prejudiced by the entry of the convictions because (1) a limiting instruction \u201cgreatly diminished\u201d the prejudice, and (2) the evidence overwhelmingly supports defendant\u2019s convictions. We disagree.\nThe evidence is not so overwhelming and the limiting instruction was insufficient to overcome the potential of unfair prejudice arising from the admission of defendant\u2019s four prior felonies. Other than the testimony of two police officers, no other evidence, such as fingerprints, linked the handgun to defendant. The testimony of five witnesses, including one who knew defendant by name only, testified defendant did not run where the officers testified the handgun was found. The decision of whether reasonable doubt existed boiled down to a credibility determination \u2014 a determination potentially affected by the admission of defendant\u2019s convictions for aggravated battery, intimidation, and two counts of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. Heightening the potential for prejudice were the repeated references to the four felony convictions in closing arguments and during the trial court\u2019s instructions. For example, the State, obviously aware of the stigma and influence of the earlier convictions, twice called defendant \u201ca four-time convicted felon.\u201d We cannot find defendant was not harmed or prejudiced by this error.\nThe State further argues the evidence was properly admitted for impeachment purposes. The State contends defendant testified and each of the convictions was within the 10-year limit, and thus, the convictions were properly admitted. We disagree. This is not a People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510, 268 N.E.2d 695 (1971), issue. Once a prior conviction is admitted under a Peete and Old Chief analysis, that conviction may be used for impeachment against a testifying defendant. People v. Hester, 271 Ill. App. 3d 954, 961, 649 N.E.2d 1351, 1357 (1995). However, such impeachment would be limited to a single felony conviction \u2014 the conviction required to prove defendant\u2019s status as a felon. The trial court admitted all four convictions based on a mistaken belief the Supreme Court of Illinois had ruled that it must do so. This mistake was exacerbated because four felony convictions are involved.\nDefendant concedes he failed to raise this argument in a posttrial motion. He maintains, however, we may review and reverse under the plain-error rule. We agree. The plain-error rule, a limited exception to forfeiture, may be invoked if (1) the evidence is closely balanced or (2) the error is so fundamental it may have denied the defendant a fair hearing. People v. Beals, 162 Ill. 2d 497, 511, 643 N.E.2d 789, 796 (1994). We find plain error under both prongs. The evidence was closely balanced, and the error was fundamental. The jury should have known defendant was a felon and could not possess a firearm. This jury should not have been informed of defendant\u2019s four felony convictions by name and reminded several times by the prosecution that defendant was a four-time convicted felon.\nWe therefore reverse defendant\u2019s conviction and remand the cause.\nC. Voir Dire\nHaving determined defendant is entitled to a new trial, we need not decide whether the trial court\u2019s failure to transcribe voir dire is reversible error. We address the issue only to stress Supreme Court Rule 608(a)(9) (177 Ill. 2d R. 608(a)(9)) ought to be followed. Perhaps using a court reporter at voir dire is not an efficient use of scarce resources, but that is a decision to be left to the supreme court. The failure to provide a court reporter for voir dire should not be an issue on appeal.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nWe reverse defendant\u2019s conviction. We find the evidence permits retrial without offending double jeopardy. We remand for a new trial consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nMYERSCOUGH, EJ., and STEIGMANN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KNECHT" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Miriam Sierig (argued), both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "William A. Yoder, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Kathy Shepard (argued), all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RODNEY HARRIS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201402\u20140481\nArgued August 28, 2003.\nOpinion filed October 29, 2003.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Miriam Sierig (argued), both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nWilliam A. Yoder, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Kathy Shepard (argued), all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1014-01", "first_page_order": 1032, "last_page_order": 1043 }