{ "id": 3719661, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CECIL CRAWFORD, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Crawford", "decision_date": "2003-10-08", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201400\u20143672", "first_page": "1050", "last_page": "1062", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "343 Ill. App. 3d 1050" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "391 N.E.2d 366", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 289", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2982988 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309-10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0289-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 N.E.2d 1254", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 Ill. 2d 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5473083 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "126" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/83/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "679 N.E.2d 425", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "287 Ill. App. 3d 988", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 520962 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "993" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/287/0988-01" ] }, { "cite": "494 N.E.2d 1275", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 Ill. App. 3d 459", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3499655 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "462" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/144/0459-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 N.E.2d 210", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1 Ill. App. 3d 988", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5313827 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "993" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/1/0988-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 N.E.2d 303", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1951, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "410 Ill. 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5311612 ], "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/410/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 N.E.2d 26", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "concluding that defendant's contention that different and reasonable inference may be drawn from the same evidence did not make inference which the State chose to argue improper or impossible" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 Ill. App. 3d 555", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3173980 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "574-75", "parenthetical": "concluding that defendant's contention that different and reasonable inference may be drawn from the same evidence did not make inference which the State chose to argue improper or impossible" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/88/0555-01" ] }, { "cite": "770 N.E.2d 1271", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 Ill. App. 3d 416", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1209219 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "421" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/331/0416-01" ] }, { "cite": "657 N.E.2d 642", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 Ill. App. 3d 1105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 906696 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1114" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/275/1105-01" ] }, { "cite": "532 N.E.2d 531", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "177 Ill. App. 3d 593", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3620494 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "601" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/177/0593-01" ] }, { "cite": "675 N.E.2d 200", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 Ill. App. 3d 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1544405 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "112" }, { "page": "112" }, { "page": "112" }, { "page": "112" }, { "page": "112-13" }, { "page": "112" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/286/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "562 N.E.2d 553", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "205 Ill. App. 3d 153", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2568462 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "156-57" }, { "page": "156-57" }, { "page": "157" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/205/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "422 U.S. 853", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9689 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "856-65" }, { "page": "597-602" }, { "page": "2552-57" }, { "page": "856-57" }, { "page": "597" }, { "page": "2552-53" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/422/0853-01" ] }, { "cite": "745 N.E.2d 13", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 Ill. App. 3d 411", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1527757 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "425", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/319/0411-01" ] }, { "cite": "719 N.E.2d 255", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 Ill. App. 3d 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 261414 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "185", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/308/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "566 N.E.2d 392", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "stating that the waiver rule is relaxed when the trial judge's conduct is the basis of the objection because of the fundamental importance of a fair trial and the practical difficulties in objecting to the conduct of the trial judge" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 Ill. App. 3d 772", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2555574 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "778", "parenthetical": "stating that the waiver rule is relaxed when the trial judge's conduct is the basis of the objection because of the fundamental importance of a fair trial and the practical difficulties in objecting to the conduct of the trial judge" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/207/0772-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1057, "char_count": 28418, "ocr_confidence": 0.754, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.471702598405085e-08, "percentile": 0.3432729089611016 }, "sha256": "b0b6c1db25e442ac9306c907f4ccf5462eafbf46984c4bc61f3b389c38076f10", "simhash": "1:1e7d95846e584dd3", "word_count": 4729 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:02:30.760533+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "HOFFMAN, EJ., and SOUTH, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CECIL CRAWFORD, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HALL\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial, defendant Cecil D. Crawford, also known as Dowell, was found guilty of aggravated criminal sexual assault. On October 12, 2000, he was sentenced to 18 years\u2019 imprisonment. Defendant filed his timely notice of appeal on October 17, 2000.\nOn appeal, defendant contends that: (1) his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel was violated by the trial court\u2019s repeated interruptions of defense counsel\u2019s closing argument; (2) the trial court\u2019s repeated interruptions of defense counsel\u2019s closing argument revealed that the court was biased against him so as to deny him a fair trial; (3) he was denied a fair trial by the trial judge\u2019s inaccurate memory regarding the examining doctor\u2019s testimony pertaining to a vaginal abrasion; (4) the trial court failed to conduct an adequate inquiry into his pro se posttrial allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel; and (5) his mittimus should be corrected. Defendant also raises two issues regarding his sentence.\nBased upon our decision as to defendant\u2019s second issue, we need not address the rest of the issues raised by defendant. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand.\nFACTUAL BACKGROUND\nI.R., the alleged victim, was 18 years old at the time of the incident; defendant was 55 years old. I.R. testified that she had known defendant since she was a small child and that her aunt was married to defendant\u2019s brother. I.R. testified that on the night of March 29, 1999, defendant picked her up from the apartment she shared with her mother, uncle and his wife and daughter, and she and defendant traveled to \u201cRicky\u2019s\u201d apartment. They arrived at the apartment at about 12 midnight. No one was in the apartment. I.R. testified that defendant briefly left her in the apartment and went out to purchase some beers. When defendant returned to the apartment, I.R. and defendant sat down to drink the beers and I.R. took out some marijuana to smoke. At about 3 a.m., I.R. testified that she realized it was getting late, so she asked if she could call a cab.\nI.R. testified that when she asked to call a cab defendant told her to take off her clothes. She testified that when she refused the request, defendant grabbed her by the neck, pulled her into the bedroom and pulled her pants down. I.R. testified that once her pants were pulled down, defendant inserted his penis into her vagina for a couple of minutes as she attempted to fight him off. She testified that when she pulled back from defendant, he began choking her and threatening her life.\nI.R. testified that defendant then told her to perform oral sex on him. She testified that she complied because she was scared. I.R. testified that defendant continued choking her until she jumped off the bed. She then asked to use the bathroom. She testified that she took a cigarette defendant offered her and went into the bathroom. Once in the bathroom, I.R. began throwing objects out of the bathroom window in an attempt to get someone\u2019s attention.\nI.R. testified that as she was exiting the bathroom, defendant walked in to use the bathroom. She told defendant that she was going to call a cab. She testified that defendant replied, \u201cwell, hurry up because I\u2019m not through with you.\u201d I.R. testified that instead of calling a cab, she called 911 and told the operator that she had just been raped and to send help. She testified that she hung up the phone when she thought she heard defendant leaving the bathroom. She then dialed a random telephone number so that defendant could not press redial and discover that she had called the police.\nI.R. testified that she unlocked the front door to the apartment while defendant was still in the bathroom. When defendant exited the bathroom, he told her to \u201ccome on.\u201d She testified that she told defendant to wait because she needed some air since he had choked her. She then stood by the window. I.R. testified then when she saw the police arrive, she called out the window for help. She testified that when defendant discovered that she was calling for help, he grabbed her by the neck and threatened to kill her. I.R. testified that the police soon arrived in the apartment and took defendant into custody. She was transported to St. Mary\u2019s Hospital for examination.\nDetective Terrence Hart testified that he arrived at the scene after responding to a radio call and saw I.R. at a second-floor window yelling for help. As the detective ascended the stairs toward the second floor, he heard a woman scream, and then the scream abruptly stopped.\nDetective Hart testified that when he entered the apartment he saw defendant choking I.R. The detective pulled his service revolver, pointed it at defendant, and ordered defendant to take his hands off of I.R. Defendant complied. I.R. then ran to the detective, gasping and crying. She told Detective Hart that she had been raped by the defendant. Defendant was arrested and taken into custody. The detective testified that he observed redness or bruising near I.R.\u2019s eye and redness and scrapes around her neck.\nDoctor Jose Yanong testified that on March 30, 1999, at approximately 4 a.m., he examined I.R. at St. Mary\u2019s Hospital\u2019s emergency room. The doctor testified that I.R. had bruising on her face. The doctor testified that he performed a pelvic examination on I.R. which revealed redness and a small abrasion on the labia or lips of her vagina. He testified that his diagnosis was alleged sexual assault.\nOn cross-examination, Dr. Yanong testified that there were many causes for redness and abrasion in a woman\u2019s vaginal area, some of which do not involve any type of sexual penetration or conduct. The doctor also confirmed that his diagnosis was alleged sexual assault rather than sexual assault.\nDino Lucchesi and Charles Crawford testified on defendant\u2019s behalf. Lucchesi testified that he had known defendant for about 20 years and had known I.R. all of her fife. Lucchesi owned a neighborhood bar called Dino\u2019s Tap Bar. Defendant had worked at the bar. Lucchesi testified that I.R. frequently called the bar asking to speak to defendant.\nCharles Crawford, defendant\u2019s brother, testified that he had known I.R. all of her life. He testified that two or three months before the incident occurred, he had seen defendant and I.R. together on two occasions. On one occasion, he went to the apartment I.R. shared with her mother and saw I.R. and defendant lying in bed together watching television. On the second occasion, he saw I.R. and defendant together outside Dino\u2019s bar.\nDefendant testified on his own behalf. He testified that prior to the incident, he and I.R. had been dating for two or three months and had lived together in I.R.\u2019s aunt\u2019s apartment. Defendant testified that on the afternoon preceding the incident, I.R. called him at Dino\u2019s bar asking to borrow $40. Defendant traveled to I.R.\u2019s uncle\u2019s home, gave I.R. the money she requested and left. Defendant testified that about 4:30 p.m., I.R. paged him asking to be picked up from a pizza parlor.\nDefendant testified that he picked up I.R. along with her grandmother and her aunt\u2019s two children and drove them all to the aunt\u2019s house. He testified that later that evening at about 10 p.m., he took a cab to I.R.\u2019s apartment and afterwards they left together and took a cab to the apartment where the incident occurred. Defendant used a cab because he did not have access to the vehicle he had driven earlier that day. He and I.R. arrived at the apartment at about 1:30 a.m. Defendant testified that I.R. was planning to spend the week with him at the apartment.\nDefendant testified that when he and I.R. arrived at the apartment she asked him to go to the liquor store to purchase some liquor. He responded that the liquor store was closed, but remembered that his downstairs neighbor had some beer. Defendant testified that after he returned to the apartment with the beer, I.R. asked him to catch a cab with her to go over to the \u201cdrug spot\u201d to obtain some drugs. Defendant testified that after he refused I.R.\u2019s request, they both sat down and drank the beer and afterwards went to bed.\nDefendant testified that shortly after they went to bed, I.R. again requested that they catch a cab together and go to the \u201cdrug spot.\u201d When defendant again refused, I.R. got angry and told defendant that she wanted to go back to her mother\u2019s house. Defendant testified that he told I.R. to go and catch a cab. According to defendant, I.R. responded that he should go with her. Defendant testified that when he refused, I.R. got out of the bed and left the bedroom. Defendant testified that he thought that I.R. had left to call a cab.\nDefendant testified that he got out of the bed and went into the dining room to give I.R. money for a cab and saw that she was talking out the window to someone. He testified that when he walked up behind I.R. and asked her who she talking to, she turned around and slapped him. He testified that he when attempted to grab I.R. by her arms to keep her from slapping him again, a detective came through the apartment\u2019s front door with his revolver drawn. The detective pointed the revolver at defendant and ordered him to put his hands on the dining room table. Defendant testified that he did not force I.R. to place her mouth on his penis or to engage in intercourse.\nOn cross-examination, defendant testified that before the incident occurred, I.R. drank beer but did not smoke marijuana in the apartment. He testified that I.R. had smoked crack cocaine at her mother\u2019s apartment just before going with him to the apartment where the incident occurred.\nDetective Hart testified in rebuttal for the State. He testified that he had three separate conversations with defendant at police headquarters. The detective testified that during one conversation, the defendant stated that he had informed I.R.\u2019s family that she was staying at the apartment with him, but that he had never discussed this with I.R. The detective also testified that defendant stated that he had never actually seen I.R. in possession of illegal drugs or that she was high on drugs prior to accompanying him to the apartment. Regarding the incident, the detective testified that defendant stated that he got angry with I.R. when he saw her yelling out of the window.\nOn cross-examination, Detective Hart conceded that although defendant stated that he had never actually seen I.R. in possession of drugs, defendant did state that he had given her money to purchase cocaine. The detective acknowledged that on the date of the incident, he never asked I.R. if she had taken any illegal narcotics. He also acknowledged that defendant stated that he and I.R. had engaged in sexual relations on previous occasions, but on the night of the incident, their sexual activity was limited to \u201ckissing different parts.\u201d\nANALYSIS\nThe sole issue addressed in this appeal is defendant\u2019s second issue wherein he contends that the trial court\u2019s repeated interruptions of defense counsel\u2019s closing argument revealed that the court was biased against him so as to deny him a fair trial. We agree with defendant.\nAs a preliminary matter, we find that defendant did not waive his right to assert this issue on appeal by failing to object at trial, since the application of the waiver rule is relaxed when the trial judge\u2019s conduct would have been the basis of the objection. See People v. West- field, 207 Ill. App. 3d 772, 778, 566 N.E.2d 392 (1990) (stating that the waiver rule is relaxed when the trial judge\u2019s conduct is the basis of the objection because of the fundamental importance of a fair trial and the practical difficulties in objecting to the conduct of the trial judge); People v. Rowjee, 308 Ill. App. 3d 179, 185, 719 N.E.2d 255 (1999) (same); People v. Primm, 319 Ill. App. 3d 411, 425, 745 N.E.2d 13 (2000) (same).\nRegarding the substantive arguments pertaining to defendant\u2019s claim, the State makes three principal contentions. First, the State contends that defendant cannot complain that he was prejudiced by defense counsel\u2019s failure to complete closing argument because this was a bench trial and evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt was overwhelming and therefore the trial court had the discretion to refuse to hear defense counsel\u2019s closing argument altogether. Second, the State contends that the trial court did not improperly curtail defense counsel\u2019s closing argument but rather interrupted defense counsel only to clarify the argument and to prevent misrepresentation of the evidence. Third and finally, the State contends that the trial court did not prejudge the merits of the case or show bias toward defendant because the trial court\u2019s comments were made during closing argument and not during the taking of testimony. We must reject each of the State\u2019s contentions.\nFirst, the United States Supreme Court and this court have determined that even in a bench trial, a trial court does not have the discretion to deny a defendant the right to make a proper closing argument. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 856-65, 45 L. Ed. 2d 593, 597-602, 95 S. Ct. 2550, 2552-57 (1975); People v. Smith, 205 Ill. App. 3d 153, 156-57, 562 N.E.2d 553 (1990); People v. Heiman, 286 Ill. App. 3d 102, 112, 675 N.E.2d 200 (1996). This right is rooted in the sixth amendment right to counsel. Herring, 422 U.S. at 856-57, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 597, 95 S. Ct. at 2552-53. Therefore, in the present case, defendant was entitled to an opportunity to make a proper closing argument even if he elected to have a bench trial.\nThe State next contends that the trial court did not improperly curtail defense counsel\u2019s closing argument but rather interrupted defense counsel to clarify the argument and to prevent misrepresentation of the evidence. The record does not support the State\u2019s assertions. The record does not show that the trial court attempted to assist defense counsel in refining his argument. Rather, the record demonstrates that the trial court repeatedly interrupted defense counsel each time counsel spoke and that the court expressed a belief that defense counsel was misrepresenting the evidence. The record shows the following exchange between the trial judge and defense counsel during defense counsel\u2019s closing argument:\n\u201c[Defense counsel]: Judge, you heard a substantial amount of testimony in this case, beginning with a doctor who testified that he saw no type of trauma of any sort to her vaginal area; that the injuries that he saw were to her \u2014 bruises on her face, some redness and some abrasions, which she testified could be indicative of both nonconsensual sex, as well as consensual sex, and he had other explanations that had nothing to do with sex for those particular findings. He had a finding of alleged sexual assault.\nTHE COURT: You mean to tell me that you\u2019d want the doctor to testify that what they saw was not an alleged sexual assault but a sexual assault? You think because the doctor used the word \u2018alleged,\u2019 that helps you?\n[Defense counsel]: Yes, I do. Obviously, you don\u2019t, but I do.\nTHE COURT: Go ahead. I mean, the facts are the facts. The person wasn\u2019t there. What she [he] observed was consistent with sexual assault.\n[Defense counsel]: And she [he] also testified it was not with\u2014 not sexual assault.\nTHE COURT: But there is redness and abrasions, you will admit to that?\n[Defense counsel]: Of course, Judge.\nTHE COURT: Go ahead.\n[Defense counsel]: Thank you, Judge. Thank you. You have heard testimony from the young lady that she \u2014 she states that she arrives there at approximately midnight, her testimony. From Ms. Maldonado, that they arrived there at approximately 1:00 in the morning. You heard testimony from this young lady, she had never had any real contact with my client alone, never made phone calls. You heard testimony from the owner of the bar, yes, there have been numerous phone calls.\nJudge, what we have here is not what the young lady would have you to believe, that this was a situation where my client is just attacking her. We have a young lady going over there to get high, to have beer, to get \u2014 to have marijuana.\nTHE COURT: So it\u2019s okay. Then it\u2019s okay. If she\u2019s \u2014 if she\u2019s some trollop that\u2019s going around smoking crack or weed or drinking beer, and she\u2019s not old enough, she has no right to say no.\n[Defense counsel]: I\u2019m saying she didn\u2019t say no because nothing occurred, Judge.\nTHE COURT: Oh.\n[Defense counsel]: I know your Honor, please\u2014\nTHE COURT: When the police are called and the person is choking the lady, and she\u2019s screaming T have just been raped,\u2019 and now you are telling me it had never happened, it never happened, the expectations of a man in pursuit never happened; right?\n[Defense counsel]: That is our allegation, Judge, yes. Made [may] I continue?\nTHE COURT: I would hope so.\n[Defense counsel]: Thank you Judge. As I stated, Judge, you have got no physical corroboration of these actions.\nTHE COURT: No physical corroboration. Why would you say something like that?\n[Defense counsel]: Because I\u2019m a Public Defender. I am not a State\u2019s Attorney.\nTHE COURT: So you are Public Defender and you are not a State\u2019s Attorney, so you misrepresent the evidence?\n[Defense counsel]: I have a job to do.\nTHE COURT: Don\u2019t misrepresent the evidence. Talk about the theory of Defense and not say there is no corroboration. We have pictures. We have doctor\u2019s testimony, and you are saying there\u2019s no corroboration.\n[Defense counsel]: Yes, I am Judge. Whether you like me saying it or not, I am saying it. That is my job. I will do my job.\nTHE COURT: That is not your job, to he about the evidence. [Defense counsel]: I am not lying.\nTHE COURT: What are you saying? You are misrepresenting the argument. You are arguing circumstances.\n[Defense counsel]: That\u2019s what I am trying to do, if you would let me.\nTHE COURT: You can\u2019t say there\u2019s nothing to corroborate when the physical evidence in the case does corroborate the theory. [Defense counsel]: In your opinion, yes, it does.\nTHE COURT: You have the police officer\u2019s testimony that he saw him choke the woman. You have the doctor\u2019s testimony that he observed the bruises and abrasions, which are consistent with what the observations are, immediate outcry of rape.\n[Defense counsel]: We have no further argument. We will be asking for a finding of not guilty.\u201d\nThe exchange between the trial judge and defense counsel clearly shows that the trial judge improperly curtailed defense counsel\u2019s closing argument. The trial judge repeatedly interrupted defense counsel, argued with counsel, challenging him at every turn and even characterized defense counsel\u2019s argument as a misrepresentation of the evidence.\nIn general, wide latitude is afforded counsel in closing argument. People v. Carter, 177 Ill. App. 3d 593, 601, 532 N.E.2d 531 (1988). Argument and statements that are based upon the facts in evidence, or upon reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, are within the scope of proper closing argument. People v. Brown, 275 Ill. App. 3d 1105, 1114, 657 N.E.2d 642 (1995); People v. Simmons, 331 Ill. App. 3d 416, 421, 770 N.E.2d 1271 (2002). In light of the inconsistencies between I.R.\u2019s and defendant\u2019s testimony, defense counsel\u2019s argument that the physical evidence did not necessarily corroborate the charge of aggravated criminal sexual assault was a permissible inference from the evidence rather than a misrepresentation of the evidence. See People v. McInnis, 88 Ill. App. 3d 555, 574-75, 411 N.E.2d 26 (1980) (concluding that defendant\u2019s contention that different and reasonable inference may be drawn from the same evidence did not make inference which the State chose to argue improper or impossible).\nIn a criminal case, the trial must include an opportunity for the defense counsel to argue the defendant\u2019s cause. Heiman, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 112; Smith, 205 Ill. App. 3d at 156-57. It is not uncommon for a trial court to change its initial impression following argument by defense counsel or the prosecutor. Heiman, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 112; Smith, 205 Ill. App. 3d at 157. Even though closing argument is not evidence, a trial judge has an obligation to be attentive, patient and impartial. Heiman, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 112. Here, the record indicates that the trial judge was neither patient nor impartial.\nWhen a defendant in a criminal case waives trial by jury and submits his rights and liberty to a trial judge, that judge is in the identical position of a jury and all recognized rules for protection of the defendant\u2019s rights apply with equal force. People v. Rivers, 410 Ill. 410, 419, 102 N.E.2d 303 (1951); People v. Diaz, 1 Ill. App. 3d 988, 993, 275 N.E.2d 210 (1971); People v. McDaniels, 144 Ill. App. 3d 459, 462, 494 N.E.2d 1275 (1986); People v. Phuong, 287 Ill. App. 3d 988, 993, 679 N.E.2d 425 (1997). The trial judge\u2019s comments and repeated interruptions of defense counsel\u2019s closing argument reveal that the court was biased against defendant so as to deny him a fair trial.\nThe State maintains that Heiman and Smith are inapplicable because in Heiman defense counsel\u2019s closing argument was interrupted 45 times and the trial judge made various derogatory and sarcastic remarks and in Smith the trial judge interrupted defense counsel\u2019s closing argument after defense counsel had only uttered one sentence. Even though Heiman and Smith are factually dissimilar, the same principle that was applied in these cases regarding a trial judge\u2019s conduct during closing argument applies in the present case. See Heiman, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 112-13 (concluding that even though the facts in Smith were dissimilar to those in Heiman, in that defense counsel in Smith was not allowed to argue more than one sentence, the same principle applied in both cases where the trial judge in Heiman repeatedly interrupted and argued with defense counsel).\nMoreover, the interruptions and comments the trial judge made in the instant case are qualitatively similar to the comments the trial judges made in Heiman and Smith. For example, in the instant case, the record shows that the trial judge interrupted defense counsel after just the first two sentences of closing argument. The trial judge commented that just because the examining doctor used the word \u201calleged\u201d in relation to the sexual assault charge, this did not help defendant. Thereafter, defense counsel got out only four sentences of argument before the trial judge again interrupted, commenting: \u201cSo it\u2019s okay. Then it\u2019s okay. If she\u2019s \u2014 if she\u2019s some trollop that\u2019s going around smoking crack or weed or drinking beer, and she\u2019s not old enough, she has no right to say no.\u201d After a second exchange, defense counsel moved to another point of argument. The trial judge again interrupted for a third time accusing defense counsel of misrepresenting the evidence. Thus, most of defense counsel\u2019s closing argument was interrupted.\nThe State also contends that the trial judge\u2019s comments made during defense counsel\u2019s opening argument did not demonstrate that the court was biased toward defendant because the comments were made to clarify the charge of aggravated criminal sexual assault. Again, we must reject the State\u2019s contention.\nIn his opening statement, defense counsel stated that the evidence would not show a sexual assault but, rather, a fight between defendant and I.R. An opening statement may include a discussion of the evidence and matters that may reasonably be inferred from the evidence. People v. Warmack, 83 Ill. 2d 112, 126, 413 N.E.2d 1254 (1980). However, before defense counsel could finish completing his opening statement, the trial judge interrupted stating, \u201c[w]ell, wait a second. He\u2019s not charged with fighting but the allegations are that he forcibly had a relationship -with this young lady and the police observed this fight but you\u2019re saying that doesn\u2019t corroborate the allegations?\u201d The trial judge\u2019s comment suggests that the court had prejudged the merits of defendant\u2019s case before defense counsel presented any evidence regarding his theory of the case. Here, the trial judge expressed opposition to defense counsel\u2019s argument that the fighting did not corroborate the allegations of aggravated criminal sexual assault before counsel presented any evidence on the issue.\nContrary to the States\u2019 assertion, the trial judge\u2019s comment does not indicate that the court was attempting to clarify the charge of aggravated criminal sexual assault. Rather, the trial judge\u2019s comment was more in the form of a rebuttal and expression of the court\u2019s opposition to defense counsel\u2019s argument that the fighting did not corroborate the allegations of the charge. This is readily apparent when the comment is compared with similar comments the trial judge eventually makes during defense counsel\u2019s closing argument.\nThe trial judge\u2019s comments made during defense counsel\u2019s closing argument further demonstrated the court\u2019s bias toward defendant. For example, during defense counsel\u2019s closing argument counsel argued that the small abrasion and redness observed during I.R.\u2019s vaginal examination could have been caused by consensual as well as nonconsensual sexual intercourse and that therefore this physical evidence did not necessarily corroborate the allegations of aggravated criminal sexual assault. The trial judge interrupted and stated that what the doctor observed was consistent with sexual assault. When defense counsel attempted to interject that the medical findings were also consistent with consensual sexual conduct, the trial judge again interrupted and commented, \u201c[b]ut there is redness and abrasions, you will admit to that?\u201d\nWhen defense counsel attempted to discuss the prior relationship between I.R. and defendant and argued that on the date of the incident I.R. willingly accompanied defendant to the apartment to drink beer and use illegal drugs, the trial judge again interrupted defense counsel stating, \u201c[s]o it\u2019s okay. Then it\u2019s okay. If she\u2019s \u2014 if she\u2019s some trollop that\u2019s going around smoking crack or weed or drinking beer, and she\u2019s not old enough, she has no right to say no.\u201d Defense counsel responded by arguing that I.R. did not say \u201cno\u201d because nothing occurred. The trial judge stated, \u201coh,\u201d but then followed this up by stating, \u201c[w]hen the police are called and the person is choking the lady, and she\u2019s screaming T have just been raped,\u2019 and now you are telling me it had never happened, it never happened, the expectations of a man in pursuit never happened; right?\u201d Finally, when defense counsel attempted to argue that there was no physical corroboration of an aggravated criminal sexual assault, the trial judge accused defense counsel of misrepresenting the evidence.\nThe trial judge\u2019s comments made during defense counsel\u2019s opening and closing arguments clearly reveal the court\u2019s bias against defendant. The State contends that the trial court\u2019s comments do not show that the trial court was biased against defendant because the comments were not made during the presentation of any evidence. Again we must reject the State\u2019s contention. In Heiman, we determined that the law requires a trial court to remain impartial until the close of trial, which included closing arguments, since it is not uncommon for a trial court to change its initial impression following closing argument. Heiman, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 112. The right to closing argument would be virtually meaningless if we were to find it appropriate for a trial court to make comments evaluating the evidence and otherwise showing bias toward a defendant \u2014 prior to the end of closing argument.\nAccordingly, for the reasons set forth above, because there was sufficient evidence in the record to support defendant\u2019s conviction (People v. Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d 289, 309-10, 391 N.E.2d 366 (1979)), defendant\u2019s conviction is reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court of Cook County for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nHOFFMAN, EJ., and SOUTH, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HALL" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Geneva L. Penson, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Mary L. Boland, and Shannon B. Rigby, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CECIL CRAWFORD, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1\u201400\u20143672\nOpinion filed October 8, 2003.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Geneva L. Penson, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Mary L. Boland, and Shannon B. Rigby, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1050-01", "first_page_order": 1068, "last_page_order": 1080 }