{ "id": 3719417, "name": "STEPHEN BARRETT, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. OWEN R. FONOROW et al., Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Barrett v. Fonorow", "decision_date": "2003-10-28", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201402\u20140886", "first_page": "1184", "last_page": "1201", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "343 Ill. App. 3d 1184" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "237 Ill. App. 3d 782", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5162928 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "791", "parenthetical": "the trial court is entitled to deferential review of its ruling on a sanctions motion only if it provides \"explicit factual findings\" to support its ruling" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/237/0782-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 Ill. App. 3d 562", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2434452 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "570" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/241/0562-01" ] }, { "cite": "39 Santa Clara L. Rev. 905", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Santa Clara L. Rev.", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 Alb. L. Rev. 147", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Alb. L. Rev.", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "14 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 569", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Harv. J.L. & Tech.", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "9 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 775", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J.", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 Ill. App. 3d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 186551 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/313/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209971 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "349" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 Ill. App. 3d 696", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 221460 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "705" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/299/0696-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 Ill. App. 3d 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 847508 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427" }, { "page": "427" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/293/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 Ill. App. 3d 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1336069 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243" }, { "page": "243" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/306/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr. 2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 Cal. App. 4th 816", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 4th", "case_ids": [ 977696 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-4th/99/0816-01" ] }, { "cite": "339 F.3d 1119", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9104618 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1125", "parenthetical": "\"[Section 230] would still bar Carafano's claims unless Matchmaker created or developed the particular information at issue\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/339/1119-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 U.S.C. \u00a7 51", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "et seq." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 Ill. 2d 325", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 909164 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/169/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "46 U.S.C. \u00a7 4301", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "et seq." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259123 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "119" }, { "page": "119-20" }, { "page": "131" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 Ill. 2d 415", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 535885 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "423" }, { "page": "423" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/188/0415-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 Ill. 2d 369", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1131044 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "383" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/187/0369-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 Ill. App. 3d 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1156816 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/278/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 Ill. 2d 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3260348 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/133/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 Ill. App. 3d 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 261332 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "452" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/308/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 Ill. 2d 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5810309 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/68/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259023 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "302" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "783 So. 2d 1010", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 11109285 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1013-17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/783/1010-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 F. Supp. 2d 1069", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9481880 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1071" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/163/1069-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 F.3d 327", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11894955 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "331", "parenthetical": "distinguishing between distributors and publishers and explaining different standards of defamation liability pertaining to each" }, { "page": "332" }, { "page": "332" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/129/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 Fed. Comm. L.J. 647", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Fed. Comm. L.J.", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "650-51" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 Ill. App. 3d 917", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1034069 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "926", "parenthetical": "when a plaintiff brings a claim for false light and defamation based on the same communication, he is permitted only a single recovery" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/332/0917-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 Ill. 2d 411", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5556950 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419-20" }, { "page": "418" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/126/0411-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 Ill. App. 3d 393", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 261339 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "400" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/308/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 F.3d 1018", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9113442 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1030", "parenthetical": "noting that \"services providing access to the Internet *** are only a subset of the services to which the statutory immunity applies,\" and citing numerous cases applying section 230 to protect interactive computer services that do not provide access to the Internet" }, { "page": "1031", "parenthetical": "defendant website operator who disseminated third party's e-mail to members of a mailing list was not responsible for the \"creation or development\" of the e-mail because third party \"composed the e-mail entirely on his own\" and the defendant made only \"minor alterations\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/333/1018-01" ] }, { "cite": "992 F. Supp. 44", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 247826 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "49" }, { "page": "52" }, { "page": "50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/992/0044-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 F.3d 980", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11457569 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "986" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/206/0980-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 Ill. 2d 233", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 453267 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "248" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/192/0233-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 Ill. 2d 370", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 385561 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "383" }, { "page": "383" }, { "page": "383" }, { "page": "383" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/178/0370-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 Ill. App. 3d 563", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 521930 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "569-70" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/334/0563-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 Ill. App. 3d 126", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1281489 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/326/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "47 U.S.C. \u00a7 230", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 6, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(f)(2)" }, { "page": "(c)(1)" }, { "page": "(c)(1)" }, { "page": "(f)(3)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1406, "char_count": 38387, "ocr_confidence": 0.732, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.929647425966623e-08, "percentile": 0.5363470997729983 }, "sha256": "7778d087b86ff83c96e04541aa457cd12aabd93b07375be8bdd84cc13cf973e4", "simhash": "1:805c5aa177021c34", "word_count": 6083 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:02:30.760533+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "McLAREN and BYRNE, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "STEPHEN BARRETT, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. OWEN R. FONOROW et al., Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nStephen Barrett, M.D., appeals from the judgment of the circuit court dismissing his complaint against Owen Fonorow and Intelisoft Multimedia, Inc. (Intelisoft). Fonorow and Intelisoft cross-appeal, challenging the circuit court\u2019s judgment granting summary judgment in favor of Barrett on their motion for sanctions under Supreme Court Rule 137 (155 Ill. 2d R. 137). We affirm both the dismissal of Barrett\u2019s complaint and the denial of Intelisoft\u2019s motion for sanctions.\nBarrett alleged in his complaint that he is a medical journalist, consultant, and consumer advocate who runs a website at \u201cwww.quackwatch.com.\u201d The aims of \u201cquackwatch\u201d are to warn the public of \u201chealth fraud\u201d and \u201cunfounded medical claims\u201d and to help the public \u201cmake educated and informed consumer decisions about healthcare practices.\u201d A common target of \u201cquackwatch\u201d is the practice of \u201calternative medicine.\u201d Fonorow is president of Intelisoft and operates a website at \u201cwww.internetwks.com,\u201d where he posts articles and other commentary. (Hereinafter Fonorow and Intelisoft are together referred to as Intelisoft.) Between January 6, 2001, and May 22, 2001, Intelisoft posted on its website 10 articles authored by Patrick \u201cTim\u201d Bolen. The articles contained several disparaging claims about Barrett, the gist of which was that he was a liar and a charlatan. Barrett alleged that Intelisoft knew or had reason to know that the disparaging remarks in the articles were false and defamatory because \u201c[o]ther webpages and articles that Fonorow and Intelisoft have posted to their websites have had false and defamatory material about Dr. Barrett in them, and this has been brought to their attention.\u201d Barrett brought one claim of defamation and one claim of false light invasion of privacy (hereinafter false light) against Intelisoft.\nIntelisoft moved to dismiss the complaint under section 2 \u2014 619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2\u2014 619(a)(9) (West 2000)). Intelisoft argued that Barrett\u2019s claims were barred by section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (Act) (47 U.S.C. \u00a7 230 (2000)), which preempts all state causes of action that would hold a \u201cprovider or user of an interactive computer service\u201d liable as the \u201cpublisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.\u201d Barrett responded that section 230 did not bar his suit because (1) Intelisoft was not a \u201cprovider or user of an interactive computer service\u201d but an \u201cinformation content provider\u201d as those terms are defined in section 230; and (2) section 230 was intended to grant immunity only to \u201cpublishers\u201d and Intelisoft acted not as a \u201cpublisher\u201d but as a \u201cdistributor\u201d in posting Bolen\u2019s articles to its website. The trial court granted Intelisoft\u2019s motion and dismissed Barrett\u2019s complaint. Afterwards, Intelisoft filed a motion for sanctions under Supreme Court Rule 137 (155 Ill. 2d R. 137), which the court denied. This appeal followed.\nWe first address Intelisoft\u2019s motion to strike Barrett\u2019s reply brief. Intelisoft argues that the reply brief violates Supreme Court Rule 341 (Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 21 (October 17, 2001), R. 341(a), eff. October 1, 2001) in that it exceeds the maximum page length by four pages and its statement of facts is inappropriately argumentative at points. Intelisoft desires that we strike the whole brief or at least the offending parts. We decline to do so. \u201cWhere violations of supreme court rules are not so flagrant as to hinder or preclude review, the striking of a brief in whole or in part may be unwarranted.\u201d Amcore Bank, N.A. v. Hahnaman-Albrecht, Inc., 326 Ill. App. 3d 126, 134 (2001). While we do perceive some violations of Rule 341 in the reply brief \u2014 its length being the most obvious \u2014 we decline to strike any part of it because the violations do not hamper our review of the issues. Intelisoft\u2019s motion is denied. However, we do admonish Barrett that the supreme court rules are not merely advisory and that courts do enforce them.\nWe turn now to Barrett\u2019s appeal from the trial court\u2019s judgment dismissing his complaint under section 2 \u2014 619(a)(9) of the Code. Generally, a motion to dismiss made under section 2 \u2014 619 admits the legal sufficiency of a plaintiffs complaint but raises defects, defenses, or other affirmative matters that appear on the face of the complaint or that are established by external submissions acting to defeat the allegations of the complaint. Krilich v. American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 334 Ill. App. 3d 563, 569-70 (2002). Section 2 \u2014 619(a)(9) in particular allows dismissal when \u201cthe claim asserted *** is barred by other affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the claim.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619(a)(9) (West 2000). Immunity from suit is an \u201caffirmative matter\u201d properly raised under section 2 \u2014 619(a)(9). Epstein v. Chicago Board of Education, 178 Ill. 2d 370, 383 (1997). The \u201caffirmative matter\u201d asserted by the defendant must be apparent on the face of the complaint or supported by affidavits or certain other evidentiary materials. Epstein, 178 Ill. 2d at 383. Once a defendant satisfies this initial burden of going forward on the section 2 \u2014 619(a)(9) motion to dismiss, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff, who must establish that the affirmative defense asserted either is unfounded as a matter of law or requires the resolution of an essential element of material fact before it is proven. Epstein, 178 Ill. 2d at 383. The plaintiff may establish this by presenting \u201caffidavits or other proof.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619(c) (West 2000). If, after considering the pleadings and affidavits, the trial judge finds that the plaintiff has failed to carry the shifted burden of going forward, the motion may be granted and the cause of action dismissed. Epstein, 178 Ill. 2d at 383. As in reviewing a grant of summary judgment, a court reviewing the dismissal of a complaint under section 2 \u2014 619 determines de novo whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Nichol v. Stass, 192 Ill. 2d 233, 248 (2000).\nIn its section 2 \u2014 619 motion, Intelisoft claimed that section 230 of the Act provided it immunity from Barrett\u2019s suit because the defamatory material it disseminated was created by a third party, Bolen. Section 230 \u201ccreates a federal immunity to any state law cause of action that would hold computer service providers hable for information originating with a third party.\u201d Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. America Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2000). Section 230 provides in relevant part:\n\u201c(c) Protection for \u2018Good Samaritan\u2019 blocking and screening of offensive material\n(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker\nNo provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.\n(2) Civil liability\nNo provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held hable on account of\u2014\n(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or\n(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1) [subparagraph (A)].\n(e) Effect on other laws\n(3) State law\nNothing in this section shall be construed to prevent any State from enforcing any State law that is consistent with this section. No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.\n(f) Definitions\nAs used in this section:\n(1) Internet\nThe term \u2018Internet\u2019 means the international computer network of both Federal and non-Federal interoperable packet switched data networks.\n(2) Interactive computer service\nThe term \u2018interactive computer service\u2019 means any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.\n(3) Information content provider\nThe term \u2018information content provider\u2019 means any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.\u201d 47 U.S.C. \u00a7 230 (2000).\nIn passing section 230, \u201cCongress decided not to treat providers of interactive computer services like other information providers such as newspapers, magazines, or television and radio stations, all of which may be liable for publishing or distributing obscene or defamatory material written or prepared by others.\u201d Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 49 (D.D.C. 1998).\nThe threshold issue for our consideration is whether the trial court erred in holding that Intelisoft is a \u201cprovider or user of an interactive computer service.\u201d Barrett\u2019s sole argument on this point is that Intelisoft cannot be a \u201cprovider or user of an interactive computer service\u201d because it is not in the business of providing access to the Internet. Barrett cites two unpublished cases to support this notion, which we find refuted by the plain text of the Act. An \u201cinteractive computer service\u201d is defined as \u201cany information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 47 U.S.C. \u00a7 230(f)(2) (2000). The definition includes, but is not limited to, Internet providers. See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that \u201cservices providing access to the Internet *** are only a subset of the services to which the statutory immunity applies,\u201d and citing numerous cases applying section 230 to protect interactive computer services that do not provide access to the Internet). We reject the suggestion that Intelisoft is not a \u201cprovider or user of an interactive computer service\u201d merely because it does not provide Internet access. As Barrett offers no other reason to dispute the trial court\u2019s finding that Intelisoft is a. \u201cprovider or user of an interactive computer service,\u201d we uphold that finding.\nBarrett\u2019s next argument is that the trial court erred in holding that section 230 insulated Intelisoft from liability for posting Bolen\u2019s articles even though Intelisoft had reason to know that the articles contained defamatory statements. Barrett contends that Congress did not intend section 230 to insulate parties who know or have reason to know that the materials they disseminate are defamatory. Disagreeing, Intelisoft claims that section 230 precludes liability even when a party disseminates what it knows or has reason to know is defamatory material, provided the material is created by a third party.\nSection 230(c)(1) provides: \u201cNo provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 47 U.S.C. \u00a7 230(c)(1) (2000). Intelisoft suggests that, by barring a court from finding that a party acted as the \u201cpublisher\u201d of information created by a third party, section 230 precludes liability for all intentional torts containing the element of \u201cpublication,\u201d including defamation and false light. To state a case for defamation, the plaintiff must allege: (1) the defendant made a false statement about the plaintiff; (2) there was an unprivileged publication of the statement; and (3) the plaintiff was damaged from the publication. Vickers v. Abbott Laboratories, 308 Ill. App. 3d 393, 400 (1999). To state a case for the \u201cfalse light\u201d variety of invasion of privacy, the plaintiff must allege: (1) the defendant\u2019s actions placed the plaintiff in a false light before the public; (2) the false light would be highly offensive to a reasonable person; and (3) the defendant acted with actual malice. Lovgren v. Citizens First National Bank of Princeton, 126 Ill. 2d 411, 419-20 (1989). The law of false light protects a person\u2019s interest in being free from false publicity. Lovgren, 126 Ill. 2d at 418. \u201cPublishing\u201d matter for purposes of defamation and bringing that matter \u201cbefore the public\u201d or creating \u201cpublicity\u201d differ only in degree:\n\u201c \u2018Publication\u2019 *** is a word of art, which includes any communication by the defendant to a third person. \u2018Publicity,\u2019 on the other hand, means that the matter is made public, by communicating it to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge. The difference is not one of the means of communication, which may be oral, written or by any other means. It is one of a communication that reaches, or is sure to reach, the public.\u201d Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 652D, Comment a (1977).\nTo \u201ccreate publicity\u201d is simply to \u201cpublish\u201d a matter to a wider degree than is necessary for defamation. Thus, both false light and defamation contain the element of \u201cpublication.\u201d See Myers v. The Telegraph, 332 Ill. App. 3d 917, 926 (2002) (when a plaintiff brings a claim for false light and defamation based on the same communication, he is permitted only a single recovery). Intelisoft concludes that, under section 230(c)(1), a \u201cprovider or user of an interactive computer service\u201d who disseminates information \u201cprovided by another information content provider\u201d may not be found to be the \u201cpublisher\u201d of the information for purposes of defamation and false light. Barrett disagrees. He argues that the term \u201cpublisher\u201d as used in section 230(c)(1) was intended, not as a reference to the \u201cpublication\u201d element of defamation and false light, but to the \u201cpublisher/distributor\u201d dichotomy in defamation law and to the differing standards of liability that attach to \u201cpublishers\u201d and \u201cdistributors.\u201d The distinction Barrett invokes is widely recognized by courts and commentators:\n\u201c[A]n entity that exercises some degree of editorial control over the dissemination of the defamatory material will be generally liable for its publication (i.e., publisher liability). A newspaper, for example, may be liable for defamation if a letter to the editor that it publishes contains false and defamatory statements. Second, an entity that distributes but does not exercise editorial control over defamatory material may only be liable if such entity knew or had reason to know of the defamation (i.e., distributor liability). News vendors, bookstores, and libraries generally qualify for this standard of liability.\u201d J. Friedman & F. Buono, Limiting Tort Liability for Online Third-Party Content Under Section 230 of the Communications Act, 52 Fed. Comm. L.J. 647, 650-51 (2000).\nSee also Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (distinguishing between distributors and publishers and explaining different standards of defamation liability pertaining to each).\nBarrett reasons that, because Congress expressly limited what manner of Internet user could be deemed a \u201cpublisher\u201d but said nothing about distributor liability, Congress must have intended to immunize publishers but not distributors. That is, Congress partially abrogated the strict liability pertaining to publishers but left intact the fault-based liability pertaining to distributors. Accordingly, Barrett reasons, section 230 is no bar to holding liable a provider or user of an interactive computer service who, while exercising none of the traditional functions of a publisher, disseminates material originating with another information content provider that the user or provider knows or has reason to know is defamatory. Barrett suggests that Intelisoft acted as a distributor in disseminating Bolen\u2019s articles because Intelisoft exercised no editorial control over the material but merely transmitted it to the public. Intelisoft is liable, Barrett concludes, because it knew or had reason to know that Bolen\u2019s articles were defamatory.\nWe reject Barrett\u2019s interpretation of section 230. Barrett admits, and we have confirmed, that every state and federal court to confront the issue in a published decision has held that Congress intended section 230 to prevent the element of \u201cpublication\u201d from being satisfied in a state tort cause of action where a provider or user of an interactive computer service disseminates information provided by another information content provider. See, e.g., Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332; Patentwizard, Inc. v. Kinko\u2019s, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1071 (D.S.D. 2001); Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 52; Doe v. America Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010, 1013-17 (Fla. 2001). Barrett\u2019s argument is premised on the notion that \u201cpublisher liability\u201d is distinct from \u201cdistributor liability\u201d such that Congress could have limited the former while retaining the latter. Zeran was the earliest case to reject this suggestion:\n\u201cThe terms \u2018publisher\u2019 and \u2018distributor\u2019 derive their legal significance from the context of defamation law. *** Because the publication of a statement is a necessary element in a defamation action, only one who publishes can be subject to this form of tort liability. ***\n*** Even distributors are considered to be publishers for purposes of defamation law ***.\u201d Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332.\nZeran held that, by using the word \u201cpublisher,\u201d Congress limited courts from finding the \u201cpublication\u201d element of defamation liability satisfied with respect to any provider or user of an interactive computer service who disseminates defamatory material provided by another information content provider, whether or not the provider or user exercised the traditional functions of a publisher in disseminating the material. According to Zeran and the many courts that have adopted its holding, Congress partially precluded liability for defamation under both the strict liability standard applicable to \u201cpublishers\u201d and the fault-based standard applicable to \u201cdistributors.\u201d\nThe parties agree that Barrett\u2019s interpretation of section 230 has been uniformly rejected in published federal decisions but disagree as to what, if any, deference we owe these cases. Barrett points to Travelers Insurance Co. of Illinois v. Eljer Manufacturing, Inc., where the supreme court, declining to follow a federal circuit court case interpreting Illinois law, declared that \u201c \u2018decisions of United States district and circuit courts are not binding upon Illinois courts.\u2019 \u201d Travelers Insurance Co. of Illinois v. Eljer Manufacturing, Inc., 197 Ill. 2d 278, 302 (2001), quoting City of Chicago v. Groffman, 68 Ill. 2d 112, 118 (1977). However, neither in Groffman nor Travelers was the court asked to follow a federal court\u2019s interpretation of a federal statute, as we are here. Travelers did, we note, also cite Hinterlong v. Baldwin, 308 Ill. App. 3d 441, 452 (1999), where, in interpreting a federal statute, this court remarked that \u201c[s]tate courts are not bound to follow decisions of the federal district courts or circuit courts of appeal.\u201d However, neither People v. Eyler, 133 Ill. 2d 173 (1989), nor People v. Kozlowski, 278 Ill. App. 3d 40 (1996), the two cases Hinterlong cites for that proposition, was interpreting a federal statute. More relevant to the situation at hand are the several recent supreme court cases explaining the degree of deference owed by Illinois courts to federal cases interpreting federal statutes. In Wilson v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 187 Ill. 2d 369, 383 (1999), the court said: \u201cThe reason that, federal decisions are considered controlling on Illinois state courts interpreting a federal statute *** is so that the statute will be given uniform application.\u201d In Weiland v. Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc., 188 Ill. 2d 415, 423 (1999), the court elaborated on Wilson's rule, explaining:\n\u201cThis court need not follow Seventh Circuit precedent interpreting a federal statute where, as here, the Supreme Court has not ruled on the question presented, there is a split of authority among the federal circuit courts of appeals, and, we believe, the case from the Seventh Circuit was wrongly decided.\u201d\nIn Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 197 Ill. 2d 112, 119 (2001), the supreme court again restated Wilson\u2019s rule. The court addressed whether the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 (FBSA) (46 U.S.C. \u00a7 4301 et seq. (1994)) preempted a state common-law cause of action that was based on a manufacturer\u2019s failure to install propeller guards on boat engines. Regarding federal decisions interpreting the FBSA, the court said:\n\u201c[A]s we address the preemption issue, we will look to the decisions of federal district and circuit courts. Although we have stated in the past that the decisions of federal courts interpreting a federal statute are controlling on Illinois courts (see Busch v. Graphic Color Corp., 169 Ill. 2d 325, 335, (1996)), this overstates the degree of deference this court must pay to federal decisions. Thus, in Wilson\\, we elected to follow the precedent of the Seventh Circuit with regard to its interpretation of the Federal Employer\u2019s Liability Act (FELA) (45 U.S.C. \u00a7 51 et seq. (1994)), because we found the Seventh Circuit analysis to be \u2018reasonable and logical.\u2019 More recently, however, we declined to follow Seventh Circuit precedent in a case involving a preemption issue under FELA when there was a split of authority among the federal circuits and we believed the Seventh Circuit case was wrongly decided. See [Weiland, 188 Ill. 2d at 423.]\nNevertheless, as we have repeatedly recognized, uniformity of decision is an important consideration when state courts interpret federal statutes. [Citations.] Uniformity is particularly important where, as here, the federal statute relates to a product that is inherently mobile and thus likely to move from state to state. Indeed, this suit was brought to recover damages in an Illinois court, under Illinois law, for a death that took place in Tennessee. Boats also frequently navigate in lakes or rivers that mark the boundary between two states. Thus, it is essential that a uniform body of law be developed. In the absence of a decision of the United States Supreme Court, which would definitively answer the question presented by this case, we elect to give considerable weight to the decisions of federal courts of appeals and federal district courts that have addressed this issue.\u201d Sprietsma, 197 Ill. 2d at 119-20.\nAfter reviewing the federal cases interpreting the FBSA, the court concluded that \u201ca finding of preemption is warranted *** in order to continue the line of uniformity laid down by the federal courts that have found preemption under the FBSA.\u201d Sprietsma, 197 Ill. 2d at 131.\nAt least with respect to the issue of whether its immunity applies both to publishers and distributors, section 230 has thus far enjoyed perfectly uniform application in published decisions. Every federal case to decide the issue has held that section 230 immunizes distributors as well as publishers. We defer to these decisions in order to \u201ccontinue the line of uniformity,\u201d as the court in Sprietsma did in the face of a federal court consensus on the interpretation of the FBSA.\nLast, Barrett argues that, even if section 230 is read as insulating distributors as well as publishers of defamatory statements, Intelisoft is not immune because it acted as an \u201cinformation content provider\u201d in posting Bolen\u2019s articles to its website. Section 230(c)(1) states: \u201cNo provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 47 U.S.C. \u00a7 230(c)(1) (2000). The adjective \u201canother\u201d implies that a party may rightfully claim immunity even if it is itself an information content provider so long as it did not \u201cprovide[ ]\u201d the defamatory material at issue. See Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003) (\u201c[Section 230] would still bar Carafano\u2019s claims unless Matchmaker created or developed the particular information at issue\u201d); Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 99 Cal. App. 4th 816, 833 n.11, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 717 n.11 (2002) (\u201cIt is not inconsistent for eBay to be an interactive service provider and also an information content provider; the categories are not mutually exclusive. The critical issue is whether eBay acted as an information content provider with respect to the information that appellants claim is false or misleading\u201d).\nWe must, then, determine whether Intelisoft acted as an \u201cinformation content provider\u201d with respect to the Bolen articles. Section 230 defines an \u201cinformation content provider\u201d as \u201cany person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.\u201d 47 U.S.C. \u00a7 230(f)(3) (2000). The question is whether Barrett has alleged that Intelisoft was responsible at least partially for the \u201ccreation or development\u201d of the Bolen articles posted to its website. Clearly, he has not. Not only has Barrett failed to allege that Intelisoft contributed any original content to the Bolen articles or even edited them, he alleges nothing more than that Intelisoft posted Bolen\u2019s articles to its website simply as it found them. Barrett cites no case law for his argument that Intelisoft acted as an \u201cinformation content provider\u201d simply by \u201cplacing the defamatory content of [its] own choosing on [its] website.\u201d There are several cases rejecting the notion that one becomes an \u201cinformation content provider\u201d of defamatory material simply by choosing it from among other materials and disseminating it without having contributed any content. See, e.g., Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031 (defendant website operator who disseminated third party\u2019s e-mail to members of a mailing list was not responsible for the \u201ccreation or development\u201d of the e-mail because third party \u201ccomposed the e-mail entirely on his own\u201d and the defendant made only \u201cminor alterations\u201d); Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 50 (\u201cIt is undisputed that the Blumenthal story was written by Drudge without any substantive or editorial involvement by AOL. [Citation.] AOL was nothing more than a provider of an interactive computer service on which the Drudge Report was carried, and Congress has said quite clearly that such a provider shall not be treated as a \u2018publisher or speaker\u2019 and therefore may not be held liable in tort\u201d). We reject Barrett\u2019s argument that Intelisoft \u201cprovided\u201d the content of Bolen\u2019s articles. Therefore, based on the reasons set forth above, we hold that the trial court did not err in dismissing Barrett\u2019s complaint based on the affirmative defense of immunity.\nWe now turn to Intelisoft\u2019s cross-appeal. Intelisoft argues that the trial court committed several errors in addressing Intelisoft\u2019s motion for sanctions under Rule 137. Rule 137 provides that the trial court may impose sanctions against a party or his counsel for filing a motion or pleading that is not well-grounded in fact or supported by existing law, lacks a good-faith basis for modification, reversal, or extension of the law, or is interposed for any improper purpose. 134 Ill. 2d R. 137. A trial court\u2019s decision to sanction a party under the rule will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Belfour v. Schaumburg Auto, 306 Ill. App. 3d 234, 243 (1999). A trial court abuses its discretion only if no reasonable person would take its view. Polosky v. BDO Seidman, 293 Ill. App. 3d 414, 427 (1997). Because sanctions under Rule 137 are penal in nature, courts must apply the rule strictly (Belfour, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 243) and reserve sanctions for the most egregious of cases (Amadeo v. Gaynor, 299 Ill. App. 3d 696, 705 (1998)).\nIn its motion, Intelisoft alleged that Barrett\u2019s complaint lacked support in the law because his argument that section 230 insulated publishers but not distributors was \u201ccontrary to established precedent.\u201d Intelisoft further alleged that Barrett\u2019s lawsuit was filed for the improper purpose of \u201cintimidat[ing] and harassing] those persons who disagree with [Barrett\u2019s] philosophy on the issue of alternative medicine and *** caus[ing] those persons unnecessary legal expenses to defend such lawsuits.\u201d Intelisoft further alleged that Barrett has \u201ccounseled others how to avoid being sued for libel and advocated filing suit to quiet detractors,\u201d and has \u201cpublicized all of the actions he has filed, including this one in an effort to discourage further debate on the issues of alternative medicine.\u201d\nBarrett moved to dismiss the motion for sanctions. After a protracted exchange of discovery motions pertaining to the sanctions request, Barrett renamed his motion to dismiss, styling it a summary judgment motion under section 2 \u2014 1005 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2\u2014 1005 (West 2000)). Barrett claimed it was \u201ctime *** for this Court to end this abuse of Rule 137 by Defendants and their counsel.\u201d Barrett remarked that summary judgment was appropriate because Intelisoft had produced \u201cno admissible evidence of a Rule 137 violation\u201d and had advanced \u201cno legal authority for the 137 Motion.\u201d At the hearing on the motion, Intelisoft argued that a summary judgment motion was an improper means of contesting a motion for sanctions. Intelisoft requested an opportunity to present evidence on Barrett\u2019s motives for filing his lawsuit. The trial court denied the request. Although the trial court echoed Intelisoft\u2019s doubts regarding Barrett\u2019s means of attacking the request for sanctions, the trial court denied the request for an evidentiary hearing and granted summary judgment for Barrett on the motion for sanctions.\nWe note first that, although Intelisoft continues to assail, and Barrett defend, the propriety of the trial court\u2019s accepting summary judgment as a vehicle for disposing a Rule 137 motion for sanctions, Intelisoft nonetheless appears to agree with Barrett that the appropriate standard of review here is the abuse of discretion standard applicable to sanctions motions rather than the de novo standard applicable where summary judgment is involved (see Ragan v. Columbia Mutual Insurance Co., 183 Ill. 2d 342, 349 (1998)). Therefore, we will apply the abuse of discretion standard normally applicable to motions for sanctions.\nWe address first Intelisoft\u2019s argument that the trial court erred in finding that Barrett\u2019s claim was supported by law. The trial court found as follows:\n\u201cIn my judgment, generally the common law evolves in this very fashion. Federal statutes are \u2014 or state statutes are enacted. They are contested. The higher courts interpret those states [sic]. There are exceptions. Every case has a different factual basis and this is the manner in which we moved forward in our society to formulate the laws and execute the laws as the legislature has drafted them.\u201d\nThe trial court remarked that \u201cthis is an evolving area of the law\u201d and \u201cnot an area where it\u2019s appropriate for a court to be sanctioning people to [sic] test the waters.\u201d\n\u201cA court should not impose sanctions on a party for failing to conduct an investigation of facts and law before filing if he presents objectively reasonable arguments for his position, regardless of whether those arguments are unpersuasive or incorrect.\u201d Peterson v. Randhava, 313 Ill. App. 3d 1, 7 (2000). Intelisoft\u2019s argument against the trial court\u2019s decision is directed exclusively at its assessment of Barrett\u2019s proposed \u201cpublisher/distributor\u201d distinction. Intelisoft argues that Barrett\u2019s construction of section 230 had no objectively reasonable basis in law at the time Barrett filed his brief because every federal court to address the issue in a published decision had rejected the interpretation. Further, reasons Intelisoft, the supreme court has clearly held that federal decisions interpreting a federal statute are binding on state courts for the purpose of maintaining uniform application of the statute. Barrett neither disputes Intelisoft\u2019s description of the state of the law at the time Barrett filed his lawsuit nor cites any supreme court cases that embrace a different degree of deference toward federal decisions interpreting federal statutes. Nonetheless, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court\u2019s finding that Barrett\u2019s complaint had an objectively reasonable basis in law. We recognize that \u201cRule 137 allows sanctions when a party asserts a legal proposition that is contrary to established precedent\u201d (Polosky, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 427), but we hardly can dispute the trial court\u2019s observation that the case law construing section 230, which was passed only seven years ago, has not yet yielded an established interpretation of section 230. Not all federal circuit courts have ruled on the scope of section 230\u2019s immunity. The interpretation introduced by the Fourth Circuit in Zeran, and now prevailing in the federal courts, has been vigorously criticized by many legal commentators as a license for defamation on the Internet that was not intended by Congress. See generally I. Ballon, Defamation and Preemption Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Why the Rule of Zeran v. America Online, Inc. Is Wrong, The Cyberspace Lawyer, July/Aug. 1997, at 6; S. Cordero, Comment, Damnum Absque Injuria: Zeran v. AOL and Cyberspace Defamation Law, 9 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 775 (1999); S. Friewold, Comparative Institutional Analysis in Cyberspace: The Case of Intermediary Liability for Defamation, 14 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 569 (2001); D. Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act upon Liability for Defamation on the Internet, 61 Alb. L. Rev. 147 (1997); D. Wiener, Negligent Publication of Statements Posted on Electronic Bulletin Boards: Is There Any Liability Left After Zeran?, 39 Santa Clara L. Rev. 905 (1999). Based on the statute and its historical context (examined intensively by these commentators), we, too, find it plausible that Congress did not intend blanket immunity for those who disseminate the false and defamatory statements of third parties over the Internet. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court\u2019s finding that Barrett\u2019s interpretation of section 230 was not objectively unreasonable so as to be worthy of sanctions.\nIntelisoft also argues that the trial court erred in refusing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on Intelisoft\u2019s claim that Barrett filed his claim for an improper purpose. Generally, a trial court should hold an evidentiary hearing before ruling on a motion for sanctions unless the merits of the motion may be assessed by an examination of the record as it already stands. Edward Yavitz Eye Center, Ltd. v. Allen, 241 Ill. App. 3d 562, 570 (1993). Intelisoft alleges in its motion that Barrett filed his lawsuit to silence his detractors. Significantly, however, Intelisoft does not also allege that any of the factual allegations in Barrett\u2019s complaint are false, including Barrett\u2019s claim that the Bolen articles were false and defamatory. Intelisoft, therefore, has conceded that Barrett filed his lawsuit to recover for what were in fact tortious statements. The question that remains is whether Barrett acted with an improper purpose in seeking recovery from Intelisoft. Intelisoft claims that we may infer Barrett\u2019s bad animus from the fact that he sued Intelisoft knowing that no published state or federal case had interpreted section 230 to permit tort suits against distributors like Intelisoft. The question of whether Barrett acted improperly by filing suit in the face of contrary law is a question that clearly could be resolved without an evidentiary hearing. Indeed, it is the very question we addressed above. Therefore, we find no error in the trial court\u2019s refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing on whether Barrett sued Intelisoft for an improper purpose.\nLast, Intelisoft argues that, even if the trial court did not err in refusing to conduct an evidentiary hearing, its determination that Intelisoft failed to establish that Barrett filed his lawsuit for an improper purpose is entitled to no deference because the court failed to provide specific findings on that point. See North Shore Sign Co. v. Signature Design Group, Inc., 237 Ill. App. 3d 782, 791 (1992) (the trial court is entitled to deferential review of its ruling on a sanctions motion only if it provides \u201cexplicit factual findings\u201d to support its ruling). The trial court noted that the parties had submitted opposing affidavits on the issue of Barrett\u2019s motives and specifically found that the affidavits did not show bad faith on Barrett\u2019s part. This finding is adequately specific for us to accord it deference, and we find no abuse of discretion.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm both the dismissal of Barrett\u2019s complaint and the denial of Intelisoft\u2019s motion for sanctions.\nAffirmed.\nMcLAREN and BYRNE, JJ., concur.\nThe \u201cdistributor/publisher\u201d distinction does not exist in the law of false light. Barrett does discuss whether section 230 would bar his claim of false light if Congress intended to retain distributor liability. That issue need not concern us, however, because \u201cpublication\u201d is an element of both false light and defamation, and thus our holding that Congress intended to bar courts from finding the \u201cpublication\u201d element of torts satisfied in the circumstances set forth in section 230 entails that Barrett\u2019s false light and defamation claims are both barred.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "John E. Norton and Thomas J. Long, both of Norton, Mancini, Weiler & DeAno, of Wheaton, and Peter M. Katsaros, of Gessler, Hughes, Socol, Piers, Resnick & Dym, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.", "Zachary H. Lawrence, of Lawrence Law Firm, PC., of Lisle, and Robert G. Black, of Law Offices of Robert G. Black, of Naperville, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STEPHEN BARRETT, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. OWEN R. FONOROW et al., Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellants.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201402\u20140886\nOpinion filed October 28, 2003.\nJohn E. Norton and Thomas J. Long, both of Norton, Mancini, Weiler & DeAno, of Wheaton, and Peter M. Katsaros, of Gessler, Hughes, Socol, Piers, Resnick & Dym, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.\nZachary H. Lawrence, of Lawrence Law Firm, PC., of Lisle, and Robert G. Black, of Law Offices of Robert G. Black, of Naperville, for appellees." }, "file_name": "1184-01", "first_page_order": 1202, "last_page_order": 1219 }