{ "id": 3777689, "name": "THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF MAINE TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 207, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Board of Education v. International Insurance", "decision_date": "2003-09-30", "docket_number": "No. 1-02-1359", "first_page": "106", "last_page": "119", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "344 Ill. App. 3d 106" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "720 N.E.2d 622", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "625-26" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 Ill. App. 3d 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 261334 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "602" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/308/0597-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 N.E.2d 389", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. App. 3d 589", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3564230 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "591" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/127/0589-01" ] }, { "cite": "726 N.E.2d 38", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "41" }, { "page": "41" }, { "page": "41" }, { "page": "41" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 Ill. App. 3d 123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 411696 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "127" }, { "page": "127" }, { "page": "127" }, { "page": "127" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/312/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "620 N.E.2d 1073", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1077" }, { "page": "1078" }, { "page": "1078" }, { "page": "1078" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777543 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391" }, { "page": "391" }, { "page": "391" }, { "page": "391" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "757 N.E.2d 481", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491" }, { "page": "491" }, { "page": "491" }, { "page": "491" }, { "page": "491" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259023 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "292" }, { "page": "292" }, { "page": "292" }, { "page": "292-93" }, { "page": "293" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "666 N.E.2d 693", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "696" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 Ill. App. 3d 224", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 150183 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "229" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/281/0224-01" ] }, { "cite": "689 N.E.2d 259", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 Ill. App. 3d 1089", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 847596 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1091" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/293/1089-01" ] }, { "cite": "765 N.E.2d 1163", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1169" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 Ill. App. 3d 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2183306 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/328/0523-01" ] }, { "cite": "489 N.E.2d 867", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "871" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 Ill. 2d 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3166688 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/111/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "684 N.E.2d 978", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "983" }, { "page": "983" }, { "page": "983" }, { "page": "984" }, { "page": "984" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 Ill. App. 3d 14", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1725073 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "20" }, { "page": "21" }, { "page": "21-22" }, { "page": "22" }, { "page": "21-22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/292/0014-01" ] }, { "cite": "546 N.E.2d 580", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "584" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 Ill. 2d 428", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5569862 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "437" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/131/0428-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1036, "char_count": 33522, "ocr_confidence": 0.764, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.715676293513575e-08, "percentile": 0.4539407509858683 }, "sha256": "648125622b107f8708e62dd8283caa6b9bef2bb50c6afa4884e05aba2708072a", "simhash": "1:f7b7c5b611e686b1", "word_count": 5204 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:11:26.904766+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF MAINE TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 207, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KARNEZIS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, the Board of Education of Maine Township High School District No. 207 (the school district), filed a declaratory judgment action against defendant, International Insurance Company (International), seeking a determination of coverage for $18 million in asbestos-related property damage under seven insurance polices issued by International from 1985 through 1991 (hereinafter referred to individually by the policy year, i.e., 1985 policy, 1986 policy, etc.). This appeal concerns the parties\u2019 cross-motions for summary judgment filed with regard to the 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988 and 1989 policies. The court found that a \u201clatent defect\u201d exclusion for asbestos-related losses in the policies precluded the school district\u2019s claims and that asbestos-related costs the school district allegedly incurred pursuant to the Illinois Asbestos Abatement Act (Asbestos Abatement Act) (105 ILCS 105/1 (West 1992)) and its implementing regulations were not a covered loss under the policies\u2019 \u201cOrdinance Deficiency Clause.\u201d The court granted summary judgment to International and denied the school district\u2019s motion for summary judgment.\nThe school district appeals the court\u2019s order regarding the 1986, 1987, 1988 and 1989 policies, arguing that the court erred in entering summary judgment for International on those policies because (1) the policies\u2019 ordinance deficiency clause extended coverage over the school district\u2019s claims; and (2) supplemental coverage applied to the school district\u2019s claims pursuant to the \u201cAll-Risk\u201d clause. The school district, having abandoned its claims under the 1985 policy, concedes that summary judgment should be affirmed with regard to the 1985 policy. The school district does not appeal the court\u2019s denial of its cross-motion for summary judgment. We affirm summary, judgment for International with regard to the 1985 policy and reverse with regard to the 1986, 1987, 1988 and 1989 policies.\nBACKGROUND\nIn 1979, pursuant to a guidance document p\u00fablished by the Environmental Protection Agency regarding the dangers of asbestos exposure in schools, the school district inspected its schools for asbestos-containing building materials and found such materials in the schools. In 1984, the Asbestos Abatement Act took effect, requiring Illinois schools to identify, contain and remove \u201call asbestos materials that constitute a significant health hazard\u201d and to repair and maintain those which do not constitute a significant, health hazard. Board of Education of the City of Chicago v. A, C & S, Inc., 131 Ill. 2d 428, 437, 546 N.E.2d 580, 584 (1989); 105 ILCS 105/2 (West 1992).\nIn 1985, the school district, as a member of the CLIC Insurance Cooperative, purchased a one-year insurance policy from International for coverage of loss or damage to the school district\u2019s property during the policy period. Pursuant to agreement A contained in the \u201cProperty Insurance\u201d section of the policy, International agreed, \u201csubject to the limitations, terms and conditions of this Insurance, to indemnify the Insured for all risks of physical loss or damage to All Property of the Insured of every kind and description wherever located occurring during the period of this Insurance.\u201d The property insurance section of the policy contained numerous coverage exclusions, including exclusions for wear, tear and contamination, but no exclusion for asbestos-related loss or damage. The 1985 policy did, however, contain an \u201casbestos endorsement\u201d which excluded losses\n\u201c[i]n connection with any claim (i) arising out of or (ii) related to any event or happening, or (iii) directly or indirectly caused by based upon or resulting from:\n(a) Asbestos or any asbestos related injury or damage; or\n(b) Any alleged act, error, omission or duty involving asbestos, its use, exposure, presence, existence, detection, removal, elimination or avoidance; or\n(c) The use, exposure, presence, existence, detection, removal, elimination or avoidance of asbestos in any environment, building or structure.\u201d\nThe school district renewed the policy six times, from 1986 to 1991.\nIn 1986, International ehminated the asbestos endorsement but added a \u201clatent defect\u201d exclusion to the exclusions subsection of the policy\u2019s property insurance section. The new exclusion provided that there would be no coverage for\n\u201c[floss by latent defect including damage or loss caused by, aggravated by or contributed by the presence of asbestos and all asbestos related products including but not limited to paint, ceiling tile, floor tile, insulation and/or other sources.\nUNLESS LOSS BY A PERIL INSURED AGAINST ENSUES AND THEN ONLY FOR SUCH ENSUING LOSS.\u201d\nThis exclusion was included in subsequent polices until the 1990 and 1991 policies, wherein it was slightly modified. The modification is not relevant here.\nThe property insurance section of the 1985 through 1989 policies also included a \u201cConditions\u201d subsection consisting of eight clauses, one of which was the ordinance deficiency clause. The ordinance deficiency clause provided:\n\u201cNotwithstanding anything contained herein to the contrary, the Company shall be liable also for the loss occasioned by the enforcement of any state or municipal law, ordinance or code, which necessitates, in repairing or rebuilding, replacement of material to meet such requirements. If demolition is required to comply with such enforcement, the Company shall also be liable for such additional costs.\u201d\nIn the 1990 and 1991 policies, the ordinance deficiency clause was changed to state that \u201c[o]nce there is a covered loss, we will be hable for loss caused by enforcement of any state or municipal law, ordinance or code that requires that Insured to repair, rebuild, replace materials or demolish the Insured\u2019s property.\u201d\nThe school district allegedly discovered in 1992 and/or 1993 that the majority of its floor and ceiling tiles contained asbestos and were a hazard. The school district abated the asbestos dangers by demolishing, repairing and replacing the asbestos-containing building materials.\nIn 1992, the school district filed a claim under the 1986 and 1987 policies for its asbestos-related property damage with International. In 1993, after International allegedly failed to respond to the claim, the school district filed a complaint against International for breach of contract pursuant to the 1986 and 1987 polices. In 1995, the school district filed an amended complaint alleging breach of contract of the 1985 through 1991 polices. Count I of the amended complaint requested that the court find coverage under the 1986 and 1987 policies for risks of physical damage or loss resulting from asbestos-containing materials or asbestos in the school buildings and costs of asbestos inspection, removal, abatement and maintenance programs and consequential damages resulting therefrom. Count II requested a similar declaration under the 1985, 1988, 1989, 1990 and 1991 policies.\nIn 1996, the court granted partial summary judgment to International on the 1990 and 1991 policies. We addressed the school district\u2019s appeal from that judgment in Board of Education of Maine Township High School District 207 v. International Insurance Co., 292 Ill. App. 3d 14, 684 N.E.2d 978 (1997). As shown above, the latent defect exclusion provision in the 1990 and 1991 polices was essentially the same as that in the 1985 through 1989 policies, as was an exception to the exclusion for \u201ca loss from covered peril that follows; and then only for the following loss.\u201d For the purpose of the 1990 and 1991 policies, we determined that \u201closs or damage caused by, aggravated by, or added to by asbestos-related products is a latent defect excluded from coverage under the \u2018exclusions\u2019 section of the policies,\u201d and affirmed the trial court. Board of Education of Maine Township High School District 207, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 20, 684 N.E.2d at 983. We held that coverage was similarly excluded pursuant to the contamination, gradual deterioration and \u201cwear and tear\u201d exclusions, given that all the events which caused the asbestos fibers to be released into the air constituted ordinary wear and tear. Board of Education of Maine Township High School District 207, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 21, 684 N.E.2d at 983.\nWe found that, \u201calthough the \u2018exceptions\u2019 clause would bring within coverage a loss from a covered peril that follows an excluded peril, the clause did not operate [in the instance of the 1990 and 1991 policies] to give back coverage for loss or damage caused by, aggravated by, or added to by asbestos-related products. Such a loss or damage is not a covered peril.\u201d Board of Education of Maine Township High School District 207, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 21-22, 684 N.E.2d at 983. Our earlier decision did not address the applicability of the ordinance deficiency clause. The ordinance deficiency clause in the 1990 and 1991 policies was vastly different from the clause at issue here, having been changed to require a covered loss as a prerequisite to applicability.\nIn 2001, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988 and 1989 policies. The court found, as a matter of law, that the policies were not ambiguous and its determination would be based solely on the instruments themselves and not on witness testimony regarding the parties\u2019 intent. Noting this court\u2019s previous decision in Board of Education of Maine Township High School District 207, the court held that there was \u201cunequivocally\u201d no liability under the policies for any loss or damage relating to asbestos in any form or under any circumstances pursuant to the latent defect exclusion.\nPlaintiff argued that the ordinance deficiency clause reinstated coverage because the school district\u2019s losses were occasioned by its compliance with statutory mandates to abate the asbestos hazard. The court disagreed, finding that the ordinance deficiency clause did not negate the asbestos exclusion because the word \u201calso\u201d in the ordinance deficiency clause refers to something which came before, i.e., a covered loss. The court noted that, \u201c[w]ithout a previous covered loss, the ordinance deficiency clause is without a predicate which has to be in existence for the clause to have any real meaning.\u201d Having previously determined that asbestos-related damage was not a covered loss, the court, therefore, held that costs of compliance with the abatement statute were not a covered loss. The court granted summary judgment to International and denied the school district\u2019s motion for summary judgment. The school district timely appeals the grant of summary judgment to International.\nANALYSIS\nSummary Judgment\nSummary judgment is a drastic means of disposing of litigation and should be granted only when the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, construed strictly against the movant and liberally in favor of the opponent of the motion, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240-41, 489 N.E.2d 867, 871 (1986). \u201c \u2018When all parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, the court is invited to decide the issues presented as a question of law.\u2019 \u201d Nudi Auto RV & Boat Sales, Inc. v. John Deere Insurance Co., 328 Ill. App. 3d 523, 531, 765 N.E.2d 1163, 1169 (2002), quoting Container Corp. of America v. Wagner, 293 Ill. App. 3d 1089, 1091, 689 N.E.2d 259, 261 (1997). We review the trial court\u2019s entry of summary judgment de novo. Axen v. Ockerlund Construction Co., 281 Ill. App. 3d 224, 229, 666 N.E.2d 693, 696 (1996).\nOrdinance Deficiency Clause\nThe construction of an insurance policy and a determination of the rights and obligations thereunder are also questions of law that we review de novo and thus are appropriate for disposition by way of summary judgment. Travelers Insurance Co. v. Eljer Manufacturing, Inc., 197 Ill. 2d 278, 292, 757 N.E.2d 481, 491 (2001); Crum & Forster Managers Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 156 Ill. 2d 384, 391, 620 N.E.2d 1073, 1077 (1993). Our primary objective in construing the policy language is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties to the contract. Travelers Insurance Co., 197 Ill. 2d at 292, 757 N.E.2d at 491. To determine the meaning of the policy language and the parties\u2019 intent, we must construe the policy as a whole, taking into account the type of insurance purchased, the subject matter, the risks undertaken and purchased, and the overall purpose of the contract. Travelers Insurance Co., 197 Ill. 2d at 292, 757 N.E.2d at 491; Crum & Forster Managers Corp., 156 Ill. 2d at 391, 620 N.E.2d at 1078.\nIf the words in a policy are clear and unambiguous, there is no need for construction. Rohe v. CNA Insurance Co., 312 Ill. App. 3d 123, 127, 726 N.E.2d 38, 41 (2000). Rather, words that are plain and unambiguous will be accorded their plain, ordinary and popular meaning, and we will enforce the policy according to its terms as written unless to do so contravenes public policy. Travelers Insurance Co., 197 Ill. 2d at 292-93, 757 N.E.2d at 491; Crum & Forster Managers Corp., 156 Ill. 2d at 391, 620 N.E.2d at 1078; Rohe, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 127, 726 N.E.2d at 41. Policy language is not considered ambiguous merely because a term is not defined within the policy or because the parties can suggest creative possibilities for the term\u2019s meaning. Rohe, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 127, 726 N.E.2d at 41. \u201cThe court will not search for ambiguity where there is none.\u201d Crum & Forster Managers Corp., 156 Ill. 2d at 391, 620 N.E.2d at 1078. If, however, the language of a policy is susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning, such language is ambiguous and will be construed strictly in favor of the insured and against the insurer that drafted the policy. Travelers Insurance Co., 197 Ill. 2d at 293, 757 N.E.2d at 491; Rohe, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 127, 726 N.E.2d at 41.\nAs the trial court stated, the ultimate issue in this case is whether the ordinance deficiency clause in the 1986, 1987, 1988 and 1989 insurance policies negates the latent defect exclusion for asbestos-related damages in those polices. In Board of Education of Maine Township High School District 207, we determined that a similar latent defect exclusion and exception to that exclusion in the 1990 and 1991 policies precluded coverage for asbestos-related damages. Board of Education of Maine Township High School District 207, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 22, 684 N.E.2d at 984. \u201cA question of law decided on a previous appeal is binding on both the trial court and the appellate court.\u201d Gord Industrial Plastics, Inc. v. Aubrey Manufacturing, Inc., 127 Ill. App. 3d 589, 591, 469 N.E.2d 389, 391 (1984). Accordingly, following Board of Education of Maine Township High School District 207, we agree with the trial court that, standing alone, the latent defect exclusion in the 1986, 1987, 1988 and 1989 policies precludes coverage for asbestos-related damages.\nAlthough asbestos-related property damage initially falls within the scope of the broad \u201call risks\u201d clause in the policies (Board of Education of Township High School District No. 211 v. International Insurance Co., 308 Ill. App. 3d 597, 602, 720 N.E.2d 622, 625-26 (1999)), the contracts state that coverage is \u201csubject to the limitations, terms and conditions\u201d of the policies. One such limitation is the latent defect exclusion clause, which serves to specifically exclude asbestos-related property damage from coverage. Since such damage is therefore not a covered peril, the exception to the exclusion, which provides \u201cunless loss by a peril insured against ensues and then only for such ensuing loss,\u201d does not serve to reinstate coverage. Board of Education of Maine Township High School District 207, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 21-22, 684 N.E.2d at 984.\nCoverage of asbestos-related damage is, however, provided in the 1986 through 1989 policies by the ordinance deficiency clause. We find, as a matter of law, that the ordinance deficiency clause in those policies does provide coverage for asbestos-related damages and losses resulting from replacement of material required to meet state or municipal laws, codes or ordinances. In other words, the ordinance deficiency clause negates the asbestos exclusion if the claimed losses were incurred as a result of compliance with statutorily mandated requirements. In fact, we agree with the school district\u2019s interpretation of the policies that \u201cthe ordinance deficiency clause overcomes all exclusions,\u201d including the \u201cwear and tear\u201d and contamination exclusions raised by International.\nThe language of the ordinance deficiency clause, and of the policy as a whole, is not ambiguous. The words contained therein are clear and susceptible to only a single meaning. The ordinance deficiency clause states in full as follows:\n\u201cNotwithstanding anything contained herein to the contrary, the Company shall be liable also for the loss occasioned by the enforcement of any state or municipal law, ordinance or code, which necessitates, in repairing or rebuilding, replacement of material to meet such requirements. If demolition is required to comply with such enforcement, the Company shall also be liable for such additional costs.\u201d\nThe words \u201cnotwithstanding,\u201d \u201cherein\u201d and \u201calso\u201d in the above clause are determinative of whether the ordinance deficiency clause provides coverage for previously excluded damages. Although the parties appear to agree on what the words mean, they do not agree on how those words should be applied.\nWhen used, as here, as a preposition, \u201cnotwithstanding\u201d is defined as \u201c[w]ithout prevention or obstruction from or by; in spite of; *** despite,\u201d and it \u201cimplies the presence of an obstacle.\u201d Webster\u2019s Second New International Dictionary 1669 (1954). As the trial court noted, \u201cnotwithstanding\u201d in essence \u201cwipes out\u201d anything to the contrary. \u201cHerein\u201d means \u201cin or into this (place, or matter, circumstance, etc.).\u201d Webster\u2019s Second New International Dictionary 1167 (1954). Giving the words \u201cnotwithstanding\u201d and \u201cherein\u201d their plain and ordinary meaning, the introductory phrase \u201c[notwithstanding anything contained herein to the contrary\u201d clearly means that the terms of the ordinance deficiency clause apply no matter what the other clauses, terms or conditions in the policy might otherwise provide. In other words, if a loss falls within the scope of the ordinance deficiency clause, i.e., a \u201closs occasioned by the enforcement of any state or municipal law, ordinance or code, which necessitates, in repairing or rebuilding, replacement of material,\u201d the introductory phrase serves to create coverage where none existed previously under the \u201call risks\u201d clause or to restore coverage where it had been eliminated by an exclusion.\nAlthough International argues that \u201cherein\u201d applies only to the conditions subsection, nothing in the ordinance deficiency clause, the conditions subsection or the policy as a whole limits the ordinance deficiency clause\u2019s application to the conditions subsection. In fact, \u201cherein\u201d makes better sense if applied to the agreement as a whole. Although some conflicts with the coverage provided by the ordinance deficiency clause do arise in the conditions subsection, they arise more egregiously in the preceding exclusions subsection, as evidenced by the asbestos exclusion. If the ordinance deficiency clause was not intended to apply to the entire property insurance agreement, limiting language could have been inserted to that effect. The \u201ccivil authority\u201d clause, which precedes the ordinance deficiency clause in the property insurance conditions subsection of the policies, expressly states that its terms apply \u201c [notwithstanding anything contained in this Insurance, property which is insured under this Insurance is also covered against the risk of damage or destruction by civil authority.\u201d The ordinance deficiency clause merely substitutes \u201cherein to the contrary\u201d for \u201cin this insurance\u201d; the meaning is the same: no matter what else might be contained in the policy, the specified losses and risks are \u201calso\u201d covered.\nWe agree with the school district that the word \u201calso\u201d clearly indicates that the insurer is adding responsibility in an area where it felt it had no responsibility. In context, \u201calso\u201d means \u201cin addition; as well; besides; too.\u201d Webster\u2019s Second New International Dictionary 76 (1954). \u201cAlso\u201d serves to provide liability \u201cin addition to\u201d preexisting liability but not, as International argues, in addition to \u201cpre-existing liability for a covered loss.\u201d There is absolutely no language in the conditions subsection or elsewhere in the policy limiting application of the condition clauses only to covered losses that have not been otherwise excluded. Some of the condition clauses contain language limiting their application to \u201cany loss hereby insured against\u201d (debris removal clause) or \u201cperils insured against\u201d (removal clause). Other conditions such as the valuation clause and the appraisal clause necessarily apply only to covered losses. However, no clause specifies that it applies only to a loss which has not previously been excluded or that any condition is tied to another condition\u2019s limiting language.\nMoreover, we do not agree with International that the ordinance deficiency clause operates only as a sub-clause of the valuation clause and that, therefore, because the valuation clause assumes a covered loss in setting.valuation limits, the ordinance deficiency clause requires a covered loss. The conditions subsection contains the following eight clauses: valuation (\u201cThe Company shall not be liable for loss or damage in excess of: ***\u201d); debris removal; removal clause; appraisal; civil authority clause; ordinance deficiency clause; expense to prevent or reduce loss clause; and automatic acquisition clause. No language in the conditions subsection expressly ties one clause to another or makes any clause subordinate to another. Reading the clauses together, they are clearly independent of each other and concern separate matters, the valuation clause being the most detailed among them but certainly not controlling over the other seven clauses.\nThe insuring agreement states that \u201c[International] agrees, subject to the limitations, terms and conditions of this Insurance, to indemnify the Insured for all risks of physical loss or damage to All Property of the Insured *** occurring during the period of this Insurance.\u201d It is International\u2019s agreement to indemnify the school district for all risks of loss or damage which is subject to the limitations, terms and conditions. That agreement is modified by those limitations and conditions, one of which excludes coverage for asbestos-related losses while another extends coverage for losses incurred due to statutorily required replacement of materials, no matter what else the agreement might state. Nothing in the policy indicates that the conditions are subordinate to the exclusions. Indeed, the \u201call risks\u201d agreement states that coverage is \u201csubject to the limitations, terms and conditions of this Insurance.\u201d It does not specifically mention exceptions, although an exception is certainly a limitation. Clearly exceptions and conditions are to be considered on the same footing unless, as here, qualifying language such as 1 \u2018 [n] otwithstanding anything contained herein to the contrary\u201d serves to change that standing.\nExamining the property insurance agreement as whole, we find that, initially, all risks are covered. The exclusion subsection then eliminated coverage for specific losses, including asbestos-related losses. Subsequently, the conditions subsection added, expanded and/or reinstated coverage for various losses/costs such as removal of \u201cdebris remaining after any loss hereby insured against\u201d; \u201cexpense and damage occasioned by removal from the premise endangered by the perils insured against or removed for preservation\u201d; and \u201calso\u201d for \u201crisk of damage or destruction by civil authority,\u201d \u201closs occasioned by enforcement\u201d of statutory requirements, and \u201csuch expenses as are necessarily incurred for the purpose of reducing or preventing any loss under this Insurance.\u201d\nThe coverage provided by the assorted condition clauses consists of coverage for losses which are not evident as being covered under the \u201call risks\u201d agreement. For example, although it might be obvious that the cost of replacing a roof damaged by a tree falling on it is a covered loss, it would not be evident that the cost of removing the debris remaining after the roof has been replaced is covered. The debris removal clause provides that coverage just as the ordinance deficiency clause \u201calso\u201d provides coverage for statutorily mandated replacement. It makes no sense to require that a loss covered by the ordinance deficiency clause be a covered loss, i.e., a loss not previously excluded. The ordinance deficiency clause then adds nothing to the coverage since the reason for a covered loss is irrelevant. To use the previous example, under the \u201call risks\u201d agreement, whether done pursuant to statutory mandate or because a tree fell on it, replacement of a roof is a covered loss. The court\u2019s and International\u2019s interpretation of the ordinance deficiency clause renders the word \u201calso\u201d redundant because, under their interpretation, no coverage is added which did not exist before. As used in the later three condition clauses, including the ordinance deficiency clause, \u201calso\u201d serves as an acknowledgment that the coverage provided is in addition to a covered loss (i.e., an \u201call risks\u201d loss not otherwise excluded) or losses covered under any of the other conditions.\nHaving found that the ordinance deficiency clause extends coverage over the previously excluded asbestos-related losses if those losses were incurred in the enforcement of state or municipal laws, codes or ordinances, we reverse the grant of summary judgment to International on the 1986, 1987, 1988 =and 1989 policies.\nIn addition, we find that, given that the ordinance deficiency clause extends coverage for asbestos-related losses, the supplemental coverage provided by the \u201cdebris removal,\u201d \u201cremoval\u201d and \u201cexpense to reduce or prevent loss\u201d clauses also applies to asbestos-related losses if those losses triggered coverage under the ordinance deficiency clause.\nTimeliness of Suit\nInternational argues that it should be awarded summary judgment because the school district\u2019s suit is time barred. Under the \u201cGeneral Conditions\u201d section of the policies, the \u201clitigation proceedings clause\u201d provides:\n\u201cNo suit to recover on account of loss under this Insurance shall be brought until ninety days after the proof of loss shall have been furnished, nor at all unless commenced within twenty-seven months from the date upon which loss occurred, if such loss is within the knowledge of the Insured; if not, the twenty-seven months shall begin upon notice to the insured of such loss or claim.\u201d\nInternational asserts that the school district\u2019s suit is untimely because it was filed on July 26, 1993, more than 27 months after the school district first had notice of its loss given evidence in the record that the school district began its asbestos abatement program in the 1980s. The school district responds that the general conditions only apply to agreements C (general liability) and F (auto liability) in section II of the contract, the casualty insurance section, rather than to the entire contract and that the litigation proceedings clause therefore does not apply to section I, property insurance agreement A, at issue here. We disagree.\nOf the 13 agreements in the contract, only agreements C and F in section II specifically incorporate the general conditions, providing that the C and F coverages are \u201csubject to limitations, terms and conditions hereunder mentioned in Section II, General Conditions, or added hereto by endorsement.\u201d However, reading the contract as a whole, it is clear that the general conditions apply to the entire contract, including the property insurance agreement under which the school district is claiming.\nThere is no overall statement in the \u201cGeneral Conditions\u201d section limiting the general conditions from being applied to the entire contract. In the three general condition clauses where a restriction is necessary, the clause at issue specifically limits that condition\u2019s applicability (two nuclear exclusion clauses limit their applicability, to sections I and II; part 2 of the \u201cname of insured\u201d clause limits its applicability to section II, agreement F). The other clauses have no restrictions and can be presumed to apply to the entire contract.\n\u201cGeneral\u201d is defined as \u201cof or pertaining to the whole of a body ***; held throughout or for the whole or in every division\u201d; and \u201cpertaining to, affecting, or applicable to, each and all of the members of a class, kind, or order; universal within the limits of the reference.\u201d Webster\u2019s Second New International Dictionary 1043 (1954). \u201cGeneral denotes that which pertains to all, or almost all.\u201d Webster\u2019s Second New International Dictionary 1044 (1954). Therefore, taking the \u201cgeneral conditions\u201d section title at its plain meaning, the section would appear to be intended to apply to the entire contract.\nThis determination is reinforced by an examination of the general conditions themselves. The litigation proceedings clause is one of 24 clauses listed in the \u201cGeneral Conditions\u201d section at the end of each policy. Besides setting a time limit for suit, the clauses provide, among other things, that the insurance contract embodies all agreements existing between the parties; the contract may be cancelled at any time by International upon 30 days\u2019 written notice to the insured; if the insured goes bankrupt, International is not relieved of payment of any claims; International\u2019s coverage is to be considered excess coverage if the insured has other insurance covering the same loss; International will promptly pay its liabilities under the contract; and International will be subrogated to all rights the insured may have against other parties with respect to claims paid by International. These are all clearly conditions that apply to the entire contract.\nFor the above reasons, having examined the general conditions section in the context of the contract as a whole, we conclude that the general conditions apply to the entire contract and that, therefore, the litigation proceedings clause does apply to the school district\u2019s suit. However, timeliness of suit under the litigation proceedings clause depends on a determination of several factual questions, including when or whether proof of loss was furnished, the date upon which loss occurred, and whether the loss was in the insured\u2019s knowledge. Although there is evidence in the record regarding these questions, the evidence conflicts and the parties\u2019 interpretation of the evidence differs greatly. Given that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the timeliness of the suit, summary judgment on this issue is not warranted.\nAlthough we find that coverage exists under the policies for asbestos-related losses incurred as a result of compliance with statutory requirements, whether the school district\u2019s losses triggered the ordinance deficiency clause remains a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact. Similarly, the school district\u2019s arguments regarding issues that the trial court did not reach, such as whether International timely received notice of the claim, whether asbestos-related losses were continuous during the policy period(s) and whether the losses were fortuitous all concern genuine issues of material fact which cannot be decided by summary judgment. These issues will be decided, if appropriate, by the court on remand.\nThe school district does not appeal the court\u2019s denial of its cross-motion for summary judgment. Suffice it to say that, given the genuine issues of material fact remaining in the case, the court was entirely correct in doing so.\nFor the reasons stated above, we affirm the court\u2019s grant of summary judgment to International on the 1985 policy; reverse the court\u2019s grant of summary judgment to International on the 1986, 1987, 1988 and 1989 policies and remand for further proceedings on those four policies; and affirm the court\u2019s denial of summary judgment to the school district.\nAffirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part.\nHOFFMAN, EJ., and HALL, J., concur.\nInternational suggests, as an example of such a conflict, the limiting language in the valuation clause which limits liability to the cost of like size, kind and quality of materials whereas statutory compliance might require replacement with other materials. The ordinance deficiency clause would cover the additional cost of these materials.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KARNEZIS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Elaine K.B. Siegel & Associates, EC., of Chicago (Elaine K.B. Siegel, Leonard Saphire-Bernstein, and Kaci L. Holguin, of counsel), for appellant.", "Clausen Miller, EC. (James T. Ferrini, Stephen D. Marcus, and Susan Condon, of counsel), and Tressler, Soderstrom, Maloney & Eriess (James A. Finderski and Wen-Shin Cheng, of counsel), both of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF MAINE TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 207, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1-02-1359\nOpinion filed September 30, 2003.\nRehearing denied November 12, 2003.\nElaine K.B. Siegel & Associates, EC., of Chicago (Elaine K.B. Siegel, Leonard Saphire-Bernstein, and Kaci L. Holguin, of counsel), for appellant.\nClausen Miller, EC. (James T. Ferrini, Stephen D. Marcus, and Susan Condon, of counsel), and Tressler, Soderstrom, Maloney & Eriess (James A. Finderski and Wen-Shin Cheng, of counsel), both of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0106-01", "first_page_order": 124, "last_page_order": 137 }