{ "id": 3777458, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ABEL COLIN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Colin", "decision_date": "2003-09-30", "docket_number": "No. 1-00-2755", "first_page": "119", "last_page": "134", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "344 Ill. App. 3d 119" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "705 N.E.2d 850", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "185 Ill. 2d 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 122017 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "127" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/185/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 N.E.2d 1124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550081 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "772 N.E.2d 1268", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 45", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1477013 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0045-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 N.E.2d 44", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2607415 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "406" }, { "page": "406" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/179/0395-01" ] }, { "cite": "513 N.E.2d 457", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 Ill. App. 3d 218", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499200 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "486-87" }, { "page": "486" }, { "page": "489" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/138/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "449 N.E.2d 821", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3115107 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "182" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/96/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "583 N.E.2d 515", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 Ill. 2d 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5596242 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364-65" }, { "page": "375" }, { "page": "376" }, { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/145/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 U.S. 466", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9413911 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Apprendi" }, { "parenthetical": "Apprendi" }, { "parenthetical": "Apprendi" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/530/0466-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1438, "char_count": 38751, "ocr_confidence": 0.761, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.19494947051719e-08, "percentile": 0.43036292849505897 }, "sha256": "ea8e96fc829f12d7bd37f1b85e673866cc719670670841b1eab0a7d7903cabca", "simhash": "1:e23632704f74b6f7", "word_count": 6336 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:11:26.904766+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ABEL COLIN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HARTMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial, defendant, Abel Colin, was convicted on two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14(a)(2) (West 1994)) and sentenced to two consecutive 60-year terms in custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections. Defendant appeals, arguing (1) the circuit court erred in admitting other-crimes evidence involving him in a prior sexual assault; and (2) his sentence is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000) (Apprendi). Defendant\u2019s conviction and sentencing are affirmed.\nPrior to trial, the State moved in limine to present evidence of other crimes to establish defendant\u2019s modus operandi, claiming sufficient similarities between the assaults of H.R., a previous victim, and S.F., the complainant in this case, which made the other-crimes evidence admissible. The State argued that in both cases, the victims were young, vulnerable females, who knew defendant and his wife, Stephanie Colin (Stephanie), as neighbors. The State emphasized that defendant and Stephanie were a husband and wife team that worked together to get their victims alone. Once alone, Stephanie restrained the victims while defendant sexually assaulted them, and threatened them with physical harm. Both victims complained about being sexually violated.\nThe defense responded that evidence of the sexual assault of H.R. could not be admitted as other-crimes evidence because: (1) although defendant was charged only with sexual assault he pled guilty and was convicted of aggravated kidnapping with respect to H.R.; (2) the other-crimes evidence could not establish defendant\u2019s modus operandi because the two crimes were not sufficiently unique; and (3) the prejudicial effect of this evidence outweighed its probative value.\nThe circuit court admitted the other-crimes evidence, noting \u201cthe facts of the two cases are stunningly similar to each other,\u201d and ruled that its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect. The court did not limit the evidence to defendant\u2019s plea of guilty to aggravated kidnapping, but found the entire case involving H.R. admissible.\nThere was evidence that between 1993 and 1995, S.F., who was then six to eight years old, was orally assaulted and vaginally raped, sodomized and tortured by defendant on a daily basis with the aid and abetment of his wife, Stephanie. S.F., 13 years old at the time of trial, testified she was six years old in 1993 and began kindergarten. Defendant and Stephanie lived two houses away and were friendly with S.F.\u2019s family, her father having been godfather to one of defendant\u2019s five children. S.F.\u2019s mother began work at 6 a.m. and her father worked nights. Stephanie began babysitting for S.F. She and defendant routinely drove S.F. to school in their van.\nS.F. testified she dressed herself before school each morning. Stephanie arrived at S.F.\u2019s home and brought her back to the Colins\u2019 home, where Stephanie took S.F. to defendant\u2019s bedroom, or the basement, which the Colins fixed up with a bed, toys and an Easy-Bake oven. Before going to the bedroom, Stephanie took S.F. to the second-floor bathroom, removed S.F.\u2019s clothing and \u201ccleaned\u201d her vagina using a hose attached to the bathroom sink. Once \u201cclean,\u201d Stephanie took S.F., who was naked, into the bedroom where defendant was waiting; sometimes being naked himself. Defendant would tell S.F. to get on the bed, and he would fold a large pillow, placing it behind S.F.\u2019s back for her to lie on. She would open her legs and defendant would put his penis in her vagina and \u201cmove up and down\u201d until a \u201cwhite thing,\u201d sperm, came out, which defendant referred to as \u201cmilk.\u201d He used various slang terms for penis and vagina that S.F. never had heard before. Defendant taught her the words. Afterwards, defendant would make S.F. suck on his penis and drink his ejaculate. Sometimes S.F. would attempt to resist and bite defendant\u2019s penis. Defendant at times used a \u201cfake penis\u201d in S.F.\u2019s mouth to make her mouth bigger so she would not bite his penis.\nAt times defendant wanted S.F. brought to the basement and, on these days, Stephanie would not \u201cclean\u201d her vagina. Defendant would tell S.F. to take her clothes off. Occasionally she would resist by untying and retying her shoes, so defendant would have less time to be with her, but these attempts never worked. Defendant did the same things to S.F. in the basement as he did in his bedroom. Defendant kept a baseball bat and a knife next to a makeshift bed in the basement and told S.F. if she screamed, which she once tried to do, he would stick the bat into her vagina or cut her. Defendant told her he could hurt her or her family and, since her parents were going through a divorce at the time, he threatened that she would have to live with the Colins. After defendant\u2019s attacks upon S.F., he and Stephanie would drive her to school. Then, in the afternoon, they would pick her up from school, and the violations would again take place. On some afternoons, defendant would urinate in a plastic pink cup he kept in a nearby drawer and force S.F. to drink his urine.\nS.F. testified that, occasionally, defendant would bring her into the bedroom of his teenage son, Anthony. There, Anthony would put his penis in her vagina while defendant put his penis in her mouth. Sometimes, defendant and Anthony swapped positions. \u201cMilk\u201d would come out of Anthony\u2019s penis. Later in the course of the sexual assaults, defendant would put his penis in her anus. After he first started doing this, he did it everyday. As time went on, S.F. spent more and more time at the Colins\u2019 house. It was Stephanie\u2019s idea for S.F. to eat dinner there, visit on weekends and sleep overnight. Stephanie would go to S.F.\u2019s house to bring S.F. to her home, but when her family wanted her to stay home, Stephanie would beg the family, telling them that she wanted S.F. to play with her daughters. Stephanie would also wash S.F.\u2019s clothes and not return them.\nS.F. testified that Stephanie\u2019s role in helping defendant grew dim-ing the course of the sexual assaults. Early on, Stephanie would remain in the room to clean or put things away, and would watch defendant sexually assault S.F. Later, she would aid defendant by grabbing S.F.\u2019s legs while defendant put his penis in her vagina. Stephanie would also untie S.F.\u2019s shoes when S.F. tried to stall as she was getting undressed.\nS.F. stated that in October of 1994, defendant made tape recordings involving S.F., where he would tell her exactly what to say: that she went out late at night to see \u201cgangbangers,\u201d who put their penises in her vagina. On the tape, S.F. also stated she had sex with a man named Martin and other fictitious people. S.F. denied having sex with \u201cgangbangers\u201d and made the tape only by reason of defendant\u2019s force.\nDefendant sexually assaulted S.F. for the last time on February 6, 1995. Two days later, S.F. went to the hospital accompanied by her mother and Stephanie, with defendant driving them. Stephanie, who was carrying a pair of S.F.\u2019s underwear in a bag, told a nurse that a man named Martin, a \u201cgangbanger,\u201d had touched S.F. and cut her vagina with a knife. S.F. relayed the same story to a female police officer. S.F. was examined by a physician, to whom Stephanie told the fabricated story. S.F. did not remember whether her mother was present during the various conversations at the hospital, or not.\nWhen S.F. and her mother were in the privacy of their own home, S.F.\u2019s mother asked S.F. to tell the truth about who really touched her, and S.F. replied it was defendant.\nOn cross-examination, S.F. testified that during the entire time she was sexually assaulted, she never told her teachers, sisters, brothers or her parents. She admitted that she told various stories of how she had been abused to hospital personnel, but could not remember any of the details she told the nurse. She did not remember the stories she told to the examining doctor, the detective or the social worker. S.F. stated she was made to drink defendant\u2019s urine between 5 to 10 times and, afterwards, she would try to vomit.\nS.F.\u2019s older sister, N.F., testified that Stephanie came to their house almost every morning to pick up S.F., but S.F. never went to the Co-lins\u2019 home on her own. N.F. stated that her other younger sister, whose initials are also N.F, was supposed to pick up S.F. from school, but at some point Stephanie began picking up S.F. before her sister would arrive. As time went on, S.F. was spending an increasing amount of time with the Colins, but their daughters would never go to S.F.\u2019s house to ask for her. N.F. stated there were occasions when she knew the Colins were home and would go to their house looking for S.F. and no one would answer the door, but she would see Anthony look out the window. Other times, the Colins would answer the door, but say S.F. was not there. N.F. also testified that she would frequently notice a smell about S.F. when she arrived home; her clothes were \u201cstinky\u201d and her mouth smelled. N.F. denied that S.F. would sneak out at night.\nS.F.\u2019s mother, EF, testified through an interpreter and reiterated how defendant and Stephanie became involved with S.F. On February 8, 1995, EF. went to the Colins\u2019 house and found Stephanie there with S.F. Stephanie told EF. that there was blood in S.F.\u2019s underwear and that Martin had violated her, which prompted EF. to take her daughter to the hospital. Stephanie said, \u201c[n]o. No. I will go with you.\u201d Stephanie spoke to the nurse at the hospital and translated for EF. Once EF. learned what had actually happened from S.F., she went to the police station and made a report.\nStephanie, defendant\u2019s wife and codefendant, also testified for the prosecution. She admitted she pled guilty to aggravated criminal sexual assault for her involvement in the assaults of S.F. and was currently serving a 23-year sentence. Stephanie testified she, defendant and their five children were neighbors of S.F. She confirmed the details of how she became involved with S.F., stating that she would bring S.F. over to play with her daughters. When questioned about defendant\u2019s assault of S.F., she denied ever witnessing the assaults and any knowledge thereof.\nStephanie was confronted with a statement she had given on February 10, 1995, written out by Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Laura Forrester. Although Stephanie admitted she signed the statement numerous times, she denied almost every assertion in her statement including: (1) she saw defendant \u201cmake love\u201d to S.F.; (2) defendant told her to bring S.F. to him or he would leave her; (3) when S.F. came over in the morning before school, Stephanie would bring S.F. to defendant so he could have sex with her; (4) she helped S.F. get undressed and dressed; (5) defendant would have sex with S.F. in the afternoon; (6) sometimes she would help defendant by holding S.F.\u2019s legs apart; and (7) defendant made up the story that \u201cgangbangers\u201d sexually assaulted her and cut her vagina with a knife. As to the tape recording, Stephanie testified it was S.F.\u2019s idea to make it so her mother would believe the \u201cgangbanger\u201d story and that S.F. told her that \u201cgangbangers\u201d called her downstairs, cut her vagina with a knife and had sex with her.\nDetective Edmund Mook testified that on February 8, 1995, he was assigned to investigate the sexual assault of S.F. Mook spoke with defendant at the police station later that night and defendant denied sexually assaulting S.F. Defendant, however, told Mook about his prior conviction in a previous similar incident. Defendant explained he had been arrested in 1987 for the sexual assault of a 13-year-old girl.\nIn establishing defendant\u2019s modus operandi, the State introduced other-crimes evidence through the following testimony: H.R., the victim of a 1987 sexual assault involving defendant; Detective Robert Collins; Assistant State\u2019s Attorney (ASA) Demetrios Kottaras; and Stephanie Colin. The State also used Stephanie\u2019s 1987 handwritten statement and a statement taken from defendant at the time of that arrest.\nH.R., who was 26 at the time of trial, testified that in 1987 she was sexually assaulted by defendant when she was 13 years old. She has a learning disability and attended slow learning disability classes. The Colins were her neighbors and she played with their children. H.R. recounted that on January 24, 1987, H.R. was at a laundromat by herself doing the family\u2019s laundry. The Cohns asked her to take a ride. H.R. refused. The Cohns begged her to go with them, which she eventually did because she was scared. H.R. got inside the Cohns\u2019 van, which they drove to an alley behind a building where they stopped the van. Stephanie gave her a pill that made her drowsy and told H.R. to he down on the bed. The next thing she knew, Stephanie was holding her arms down as defendant raped her vaginally. They told her to get dressed and dropped her off at the laundromat. Almost a week later on February 2, 1987, she told her teacher, who notified her mother and the pohce.\nDetective Collins testified as to Stephanie\u2019s statement taken subsequent to her arrest in February of 1987, in connection with the assault of H.R. Stephanie told him she had known H.R. for about four years and that she and defendant picked up H.R. at the laundromat and were driving around in the van with her until they stopped on a side street. They went to the back of the van, where there was a bed, and H.R. took her clothes off. Stephanie said she gave H.R. a birth control pill and sat next to H.R. as defendant had vaginal intercourse with her.\nDetective Collins also testified regarding defendant\u2019s statement to him. Defendant stated H.R. called him and asked him to pick her up from the laundromat. Once in the van, H.R. told defendant she wanted to have sex with him, so Stephanie gave H.R. a birth control pill. H.R. then reached into defendant\u2019s pants and pulled out his penis, after which defendant took off her underwear. Defendant had sex with H.R. and then dropped her off at the laundromat.\nASA Kottaras testified that Stephanie gave a statement to him about the incident with H.R. Through Kottaras, Stephanie\u2019s statement was published to the jury, wherein Stephanie gave a similar account of the events she had given to Collins. Stephanie\u2019s statement read, in part:\n\u201cThey [defendant and H.R.] made love without any force by Abel or Stephanie. [H.R.] and Abel have made love before in the van just like on Saturday, January 24. They would usually meet [H.R.] at the laundromat. On this particular day[,] as well as others times[,] Mrs. Colin would give [H.R.] a birth control pill before her husband and [H.R.] would make love. Mrs. Colin told [H.R.] the pill was so that [H.R.] would not get pregnant. After the two made love they [defendant and Stephanie] dropped [H.R.] off at the laundromat.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nAt the conclusion of evidence, a jury found defendant guilty of two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault. After hearing aggravation and mitigation evidence, the circuit court sentenced defendant to two consecutive terms of 60 years in custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections.\nI\nDefendant first contends that the circuit court erred in admitting evidence of defendant\u2019s prior sexual assault of H.R. because of insufficient similarities between the two offenses.\nGenerally, evidence of other crimes is not admissible for the purpose of showing defendant\u2019s disposition or propensity to commit crime (People v. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 364-65, 583 N.E.2d 515 (1991)) (Illgen), but it is admissible to prove modus operandi, intent, identity, motive or absence of mistake. People v. McKibbins, 96 Ill. 2d 176, 182, 449 N.E.2d 821 (1983). Modus operandi, or \u201cmethod of working,\u201d refers to a pattern of criminal behavior so distinct that separate crimes are recognized as the work of the same person. People v. Kimbrough, 138 Ill. App. 3d 481, 486-87, 485 N.E.2d 1292 (1985). If evidence of other crimes is offered to prove modus operandi, there must be some clear connection which creates a logical inference that if defendant committed the former crime, he may have committed the crime charged. Kimbrough, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 486. Accordingly, there must be distinctive features that are not common to most offenses of that type. People v. Dickerson, 119 Ill. App. 3d 568, 574, 456 N.E.2d 920 (1983) (Dickerson).\nAlthough there must be a \u201c \u2018strong and persuasive showing of similarity\u2019 [citation]\u201d between the crimes, \u201cit is \u2018not necessary that the crimes be identical\u2019 [citation]\u201d for the other crime to be admitted into evidence to prove modus operandi. People v. Williams, 185 Ill. App. 3d 840, 853, 541 N.E.2d 1175 (1989) (Williams). Where common features may be insufficient to raise the inference of modus operandi on an individual basis, the combination of such features may reveal a distinctive combination so as to suggest the work of the same person. People v. Smith, 236,Ill. App. 3d 1060, 1063, 602 N.E.2d 1388 (1992) (Smith). The test is not one of exact, rigorous identity, as some dissimilarity will always exist between independent crimes (People v. Phillips, 127 Ill. 2d 499, 520-21, 538 N.E.2d 500 (1989)); rather, it is the similarity of the conduct as a whole, not the uniqueness of any single factor, which is the key to establishing modus operandi. Smith, 236 Ill. App. 3d at 1063. The determination as to the admissibility of other-crimes evidence rests within the sound discretion of the circuit court and will not be disturbed absent its abuse. People v. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d 53, 63, 656 N.E.2d 1090 (1995) (Robinson).\nIn People v. Bayer, 160 Ill. App. 3d 218, 513 N.E.2d 457 (1987), defendant was charged with sexually assaulting his stepdaughter between the ages of 9 and 12. Evidence of defendant\u2019s prior sexual assault of a different young girl was held properly admitted to prove modus operandi because both girls were about the same age, they performed similar acts of oral sex on defendant, defendant took photographs of both girls, and he made threats to prevent disclosure of the assaults. Bayer, 160 Ill. App. 3d at 221.\nSimilarly, in People v. Uzelac, 179 Ill. App. 3d 395, 534 N.E.2d 1250 (1988), defendant argued that the circuit court improperly admitted evidence of a prior attempted rape under the modus operandi exception because of the many differences between the two crimes. The court held that the circuit court properly admitted evidence of the prior offense despite some differences because \u201cthe differences were inconsequential in comparison to the similarities common to both crimes.\u201d Uzelac, 179 Ill. App. 3d at 406. In so ruling, the court noted particularly that defendant was positively identified in court as the assailant in both attacks. Uzelac, 179 Ill. App. 3d at 406.\nFinally, in Smith, the court held that the circuit court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of defendant\u2019s prior sexual assaults on the basis that the prior attacks did not possess any distinctive features uncommon to most offenses of that nature. Smith, 236 Ill. App. 3d at 1061. There, in the crime charged, defendant had not even sexually assaulted the victim but had done so during the prior attacks. In reversing the circuit court, the Smith court acknowledged the differences in the cases but stated, \u201c[s]uch dissimilarities do not justify excluding evidence of the other two offenses.\u201d Smith, 236 Ill. App. 3d at 1064.\nIn the case at bar, sufficient similarities existed between the offense charged and the prior offense involving H.R. to warrant the circuit court\u2019s admission of other-crimes evidence. When the facts of these cases are considered together and in their entireties, the similarities between defendant\u2019s conduct toward S.F. and his crime against H.R. plainly outweigh the differences. See Williams, 185 Ill. App. 3d at 855.\nIn both cases, defendant selected his victims using virtually identical criteria. The victims, S.F. and H.R., were vulnerable, young girls. S.F. was vulnerable to attack since she was so young, and H.R. had a \u201cslow\u201d learning disability. They each knew and were neighbors of the Colins. The families of each victim were friends of the Colins. They each allowed their daughters ostensibly to play with the Colins\u2019 children at their home.\nDefendant\u2019s strategy in seducing the victims was strikingly similar in each case. Defendant\u2019s technique was to act in concert with his wife, Stephanie, to procure the young girls for him. In both cases, Stephanie exploited her position of trust as a neighbor and mother to lure the victims into perilous situations. Stephanie\u2019s role, however, did not end there.\nIn each case, Stephanie not only viewed, but participated in, defendant\u2019s sexual assaults. In the case of H.R., Stephanie \u201cprepared\u201d H.R. to be sexually assaulted by first giving her a pill that made her drowsy. Then, she subdued H.R. by holding down H.R.\u2019s arms while defendant removed her clothes and put his penis inside her vagina. Stephanie was present and observed as defendant sexually assaulted H.R. Here, Stephanie \u201cprepared\u201d S.F. by first washing her vagina with water, and then bringing her to defendant so he could violate her. She would hold S.F.\u2019s legs open while defendant put his penis inside her vagina. Again, Stephanie was present and observed as defendant sexually assaulted S.F. Finally, in describing each instance Stephanie referred to the sexual assaults as defendant and the victim \u201cmaking love.\u201d\nThe overall similarities between the sexual assaults of H.R. and S.F. support the propriety of the circuit court\u2019s admission into evidence of defendant\u2019s prior sexual assaults. The similarities sufficiently justified the inference that both victims were sexually assaulted by defendant. See Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d at 65. Significantly, because defendant used his wife in procuring both victims, \u201cpreparing\u201d them and in physically aiding him in accomplishing the assaults, the two crimes contain distinctive features not common in most offenses of that nature. See Dickerson, 119 Ill. App. 3d 568. Inevitable incongruities may exist among the two offenses; however, these differences are inconsequential when the similitudes of defendant\u2019s conduct are considered as a whole. See Smith, 236 Ill. App. 3d at 1063. The finding of the circuit court, \u201cthat the facts of the two cases are stunningly sufficiently similar to each other\u201d and are admissible to establish defendant\u2019s modus operandi, is well supported by the evidence. The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the other-crimes evidence.\nDefendant\u2019s argument, that even if the circuit court properly admitted other-crimes evidence to establish modus operandi, the prejudicial impact of the evidence outweighed its probative value, therefore depriving him of a fair trial, also lacks sufficient evidentiary support.\nThe circuit court must weigh the relevance of the evidence to establish the purpose for which it is offered against the potential undue prejudice. People v. Thingvold, 145 Ill. 2d 441, 452, 584 N.E.2d 89 (1991) (Thingvold). Whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by its undue prejudicial effect is within the sound discretion of the circuit court which will not be reversed absent its clear abuse. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d at 375.\nDefendant argues that evidence of other-crimes ran rampant throughout his trial and \u201c[t]he State exploited this other crimes evidence excessively.\u201d He points to possible instances of error where other-crimes evidence pervaded the trial, namely, through the in-court testimony of: H.R., who testified that defendant sexually assaulted her in 1987; Detective Collins, who testified that Stephanie confessed in 1987 to defendant\u2019s assault of H.R.; ASA Kottaras, through whose testimony Stephanie\u2019s 1987 handwritten statement was published to the jury; and Detective Mook, to whom defendant admitted sexually assaulting H.R. in 1987 when he was arrested for the assault of S.F. Defendant further complains the assault of H.R. was \u201cpredominantly\u201d mentioned during closing argument, leaving the jurors with the impression that defendant\u2019s assault of H.R. was \u201cpart and parcel\u201d of S.F.\u2019s assault. Allegedly, the result of the continuous focus on H.R.\u2019s assault, defendant contends, developed into a \u201cmini-trial\u201d and the details presented to the jury exceeded that which was necessary to show defendant\u2019s modus operandi.\nOrdinarily, the admission of other-crimes evidence, although relevant, does not justify a \u201cmini-trial\u201d of a collateral offense. People v. Aleman, 313 Ill. App. 3d 51, 65, 729 N.E.2d 20 (2000). The evidentiary details should be limited to those necessary to illuminate the issue for which the other crime was introduced. People v. Bartall, 98 Ill. 2d 294, 315, 456 N.E.2d 59 (1983). Where an explanation or description of circumstances surrounding defendant\u2019s other crimes becomes difficult without introducing evidence concerning the other crimes, however, then relevant, detailed evidence of the other crimes is admissible to the extent necessary to fulfill the purpose for which the evidence is being admitted. Kimbrough, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 489. Here, evidence of defendant\u2019s prior sexual assault of H.R., although prejudicial, clearly was probative and relevant, and detailed only to the extent necessary to demonstrate defendant\u2019s modus operandi. The record demonstrates that the circuit court balanced the other-crimes evidence and found it more probative than prejudicial: \u201c[t]he court finds that the probative value outweighs the prejudice to defendant. So this evidence will be allowed. It will not be limited only to the plea of guilty on the kidnappingC,] but will be allowed on the entire action involving the victim in the case from 1987.\u201d\nIn her opening statement, the prosecutor told the jury that evidence relating to H.R.\u2019s assault was important to show that defendant and his wife were guilty in this case since \u201cthey have a certain modus operandiShe stated the similarities between the two crimes were \u201ca virtual fingerprint of guilt.\u201d The State called Stephanie Colin and briefly questioned her about her role in H.R.\u2019s assault. Stephanie admitted pleading guilty to aggravated kidnapping in connection with H.R.\u2019s case, but could not recall a statement she gave to ASA Kottaras in 1987, denied giving the statement, and denied the veracity of its substance.\nOf 12 witnesses called by the State, only three offered testimony to establish exclusively defendant\u2019s prior assault of H.R. One witness was H.R., who identified defendant and testified in abbreviated detail about defendant\u2019s sexual assault of her in 1987. Next, testimony given by Detective Collins and ASA Kottaras, both involved in H.R.\u2019s case, was required to impeach Stephanie\u2019s in-court denial and failure to recall defendant\u2019s sexual assault of H.R. Through this evidence, Stephanie\u2019s statement was published to the jury to prove her knowledge of and involvement in H.R.\u2019s assault. Despite defendant\u2019s assertion that the assault of H.R. differed from that of S.F. because it was a one-time incident, Stephanie\u2019s 1987 statement, previously quoted above, contradicts defendant and reveals his multiple sexual violations of her. Furthermore, because modus operandi was at issue in this matter and defendant pled guilty to kidnapping H.R. but not her sexual assaults with which he was charged, the State necessarily had to delve in sufficient detail of H.R.\u2019s assaults to establish the similarities to the present charged offense. See People v. Bragg, 277 Ill. App. 3d 468, 477, 659 N.E.2d 1378 (1995).\nDefendant maintains that Detective Hook\u2019s testimony was excessive and nonprobative. Prior to Hook\u2019s testimony, the circuit court preinstructed the jury about other-crimes evidence, stating that such evidence was only to be considered for the limited purpose of showing modus operandi. Hook recounted defendant\u2019s admission that he sexually assaulted H.R. when he was arrested for the assault of S.F. Considering the highly limited detail of the testimony and the narrow purpose for which it was offered, the court did not abuse its discretion in allowing this testimony.\nLastly, defendant takes issue with the prosecutor\u2019s comments during closing argument where she referred to the similarities between defendant\u2019s assault of H.R. and S.F., the prosecutor stating, \u201c[ljet\u2019s look at [H.R.] for a minute. The only reason you are able to hear evidence about her is to explain some issues, and Laura [an assistant State\u2019s Attorney] told you about them in opening statement, modus operandi. It\u2019s a virtual fingerprint, their method of operation, how they do things. *** And was this the same method of operation? Absolutely.\u201d The prosecutor described H.R\u2019s assault, highlighted the similarities between H.R. and S.F. as victims, and emphasized Stephanie\u2019s integral role in procuring both victims for defendant. The prosecutor also argued that defendant and Stephanie learned from H.R.\u2019s assault to be more successful in the future sexual assaults.\nIn rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor reiterated the facts of H.R.\u2019s assault and characterized the girls as very similar victims. The prosecutor tempered the prejudicial nature of the comparisons by stating, \u201c[t]he evidence [of H.R.\u2019s assault] was introduced because those cases are so remarkably similar that it is his [defendant\u2019s] fingerprint of guilt, as if there was a fingerprint on this case.\u201d\nThe record demonstrates that the circuit court and prosecution made considerable efforts to ensure that the jury was aware of the limited purpose for introducing evidence of defendant\u2019s prior sexual assault. The prosecutors consistently told the jury in what respect defendant\u2019s assault of H.R. was relevant, and the judge specifically instructed the jury that the evidence regarding H.R.\u2019s assault could be considered for the sole and limited purpose of establishing defendant\u2019s modus operandi, Although the State\u2019s somewhat repetitious references to H.R.\u2019s assault in closing argument cannot be approved, and is discouraged, it was not of such magnitude as to warrant reversal. See People v. Cortes, 181 Ill. 2d 249, 285, 692 N.E.2d 1129 (1998). The State\u2019s repeated pronouncement of the modus operandi exception along with the court\u2019s limiting instruction substantially reduced any undue prejudicial impact which may have resulted by virtue of the admission of such evidence. See People v. Wolfbrandt, 27 Ill. App. 3d 836, 846, 469 N.E.2d 305 (1984). Faith in the ability of a properly instructed jury to separate issues and reach a correct result is the cornerstone of the jury system. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d at 376.\nUnder all the circumstances in this case, especially as they relate to defendant\u2019s modus operandi, the probative value of H.R\u2019s assault was not outweighed by undue prejudice. Any untoward mention of H.R\u2019s assault in the State\u2019s closing argument cannot be said to have been a material factor in defendant\u2019s conviction.\nII\nDefendant\u2019s final argument on appeal is that his two consecutive, extended-term 60-year sentences are unconstitutional under the holding of Apprendi. Defendant argues the circuit court\u2019s findings supporting the extended-term sentences were not alleged in the indictment, nor were the issues submitted and considered by the jury.\nIn imposing defendant\u2019s extended-term sentences, the circuit court specifically found that \u201cthe behavior of defendant was exceptionally brutal or heinous indicative of wanton cruelty.\u201d See 730 ILCS 5/5\u2014 5 \u2014 3.2(b)(2) (West 2000). The court also found that more than one offender participated in the sexual assaults; defendant\u2019s wife, Stephanie, participated in the planning and execution of the acts, and defendant\u2019s son, Anthony, was also a participant. See 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20143.2(b)(5) (West 2000). The circuit court did not specify which of the two grounds upon which it was imposing the extended-term sentences.\nThe State correctly asserts that defendant has waived review of this issue, not having objected at the sentencing hearing (People v. Smith, 257 Ill. App. 3d 252, 254, 628 N.E.2d 960 (1993)), nor did he specifically allege such error in his postsentencing motion. People v. Kluxdal, 225 Ill. App. 3d 217, 229, 586 N.E.2d 701 (1991). Defendant had the opportunity, which he chose not to exercise, to raise his Ap- prend\u00ed challenge before the circuit court. Defendant was sentenced and filed a motion for new trial on June 6, 2000, prior to Apprendi, which was decided on June 26, 2000. Defendant, however, moved to reduce his sentence on July 10, 2000, after Apprendi, but failed to include his Apprendi challenge in that motion. Therefore, defendant has waived this issue. Nevertheless, we elect to address the merits of defendant\u2019s claim of error under Apprendi.\nThe issue becomes whether the Apprendi violation constitutes plain error. In People v. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d 335, 788 N.E.2d 1117 (2001) (Crespo), the Illinois Supreme Court determined that defendant\u2019s extended-term sentence, imposed on the basis of the \u201cbrutal or heinous\u201d nature of the offense, violated Apprendi. The court held, however, that the error did not amount to plain error because there was \u201cno doubt that a jury, presented with these facts, would have found that the crime was committed in a brutal and heinous manner.\u201d Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d at 348.\nIn the case sub judice, no doubt the jury would have found that defendant\u2019s ongoing two-year sexual ravaging of an infant such as S.E was brutal and heinous. As we recently stated in People v. Gholston-.\n\u2022\u201c[I]t is contrary to human experience and reason that the conduct involved in this case should be placed into the technical reservoir of requiring a new sentencing hearing solely for the purpose of attaching a label of \u2018brutal and heinous\u2019 to the conclusion earlier reached by the fact finder. Surely these facts would be recognized by any rational and reasonable person as requiring an enhanced sentence.\u201d People v. Gholston, 332 Ill. App. 3d 179, 187, 772 N.E.2d 880 (2002) (Gholston).\nOn the record before us, there -is no basis for concluding that any error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d at 348; Gholston, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 188, citing United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 632-33, 152 L. Ed. 2d 860, 869, 122 S. Ct. 1781, 1787 (2002).\nAccordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed and defendant\u2019s extended-term sentences are affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nGREIMAN and KARNEZIS, JJ., concur.\nThe State argued other-crimes evidence was relevant and admissible to prove identity, and common design or scheme at trial, later focusing on the evidence under the modus operandi exception, which the State argues also on appeal.\n\u201cOther-crimes\u201d evidence does not pertain solely to prior convictions; the term encompasses prior bad acts (Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d at 365) as well as subsequent acts (People v. Bartall, 98 Ill. 2d 294, 312-13, 456 N.E.2d 59 (1983) (Bartall)), where the standard for admissibility of such evidence is more than mere suspicion, but less than beyond a reasonable doubt. Wernowsky v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 106 Ill. 2d 49, 55 (1985); Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689, 99 L. Ed. 2d 771, 782, 108 S. Ct. 1496, 1501 (1988).\nIn addition to vaginal intercourse, at various times between 1993 and 1995 defendant also forced S.F. to engage in sodomy and fellatio. In People v. Bullock, modus operandi was established although defendant engaged in anal intercourse with one victim and vaginal intercourse with the other. People v. Bullock, 154 Ill. App. 3d 266, 507 N.E.2d 44 (1987).\nAt the outset we note that defendant did not specifically include this claim in his posttrial motion. People v. Lindsey, 201 Ill. 2d 45, 772 N.E.2d 1268 (2002). The failure to raise an issue in a written motion for a new trial results in a waiver of that issue on appeal. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186, 522 N.E.2d 1124 (1988). Waiver, however, limits the parties\u2019 ability to raise an argument, not this court\u2019s right to entertain an argument. People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 127, 705 N.E.2d 850 (1998). For this reason, the merits of defendants\u2019 claim will be addressed.\nDuring the pretrial hearing on the State\u2019s motion to admit evidence of H.R.\u2019s sexual assault, the court asked whether H.R. had been assaulted more than once. The State twice informed the court that defendant sexually assaulted H.R. \u201con numerous occasions.\u201d\nThe court instructed the jury specifically: \u201cEvidence has been received that the defendant has been involved in an offense other than those charged in the indictment. This evidence has been received on the issues of the defendant\u2019s intent, motive, design, knowledge, modus operandi, and absence of innocent state of mind and may be considered by you only for that limited purpose. It is for you to determine whether the defendant was involved in that offense, and if so what weight should be given to this evidence on the issues of intent, motive, design, knowledge, modus operandi, and absence of innocent state of mind.\u201d\nNonetheless, as previously suggested, prosecutors must be more circumspect in sensitive situations of other-crimes evidence. Where such evidence is properly admitted for the limited purpose of demonstrating defendant\u2019s modus operandi, there is no need for the prosecution to belabor details of other crimes when sufficient evidence of the prior offense has been revealed to the jury adequately.\nDefendant\u2019s sentencing can be affirmed by mandate of statute alone. The circuit court did not base, but could have based, defendant\u2019s extended-term sentences solely on the fact that defendant was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault of a child under 18 years old. See 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u2014 3.2(c) (West 2000) (\u201c[t]he court may impose an extended term sentence *** upon any offender who was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault *** where the victim was under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense\u201d). We note that Apprendi would have no bearing on an extended-term sentence based on the preceding statutory authority.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HARTMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Lester Finkle, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Alan J. Spellberg, and Jane Liechty Loeb, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ABEL COLIN, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1-00-2755\nOpinion filed September 30, 2003.\nRita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Lester Finkle, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Alan J. Spellberg, and Jane Liechty Loeb, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0119-01", "first_page_order": 137, "last_page_order": 152 }