{ "id": 3778396, "name": "INLAND LAND APPRECIATION FUND, L.P., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE COUNTY OF KANE, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Inland Land Appreciation Fund, L.P. v. County of Kane", "decision_date": "2003-12-05", "docket_number": "No. 2-02-1117", "first_page": "720", "last_page": "728", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "344 Ill. App. 3d 720" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "271 Ill. App. 3d 833", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 249296 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "842" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/271/0833-01" ] }, { "cite": "303 Ill. App. 3d 84", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 511346 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "91" }, { "page": "91" }, { "page": "91" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/303/0084-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 Ill. App. 3d 935", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5798065 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "951" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/221/0935-01" ] }, { "cite": "339 Ill. App. 3d 618", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2469092 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "628" }, { "page": "628-29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/339/0618-01" ] }, { "cite": "141 Ill. 2d 147", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3238453 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "158" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/141/0147-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 Ill. 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5278252 ], "year": 1935, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "543" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/359/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609700 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62" }, { "page": "62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "16 Ill. App. 3d 947", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2522077 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "949" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/16/0947-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 Ill. App. 3d 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 927642 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/276/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 Ill. App. 3d 1016", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1352889 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1017-18" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/302/1016-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 815, "char_count": 17199, "ocr_confidence": 0.758, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.423299422489509e-07, "percentile": 0.6494409519628365 }, "sha256": "dd5f32c653465dc5485a9435b7fc1cbe8e92c56c23841a8b0333997f4f26d26a", "simhash": "1:2af710a4614e07f3", "word_count": 2715 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:11:26.904766+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "INLAND LAND APPRECIATION FUND, L.P., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE COUNTY OF KANE, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiffs, Inland Land Appreciation Fund, L.P, and Firstar Bank of Illinois, appeal the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County in favor of defendant Kane County entered after a bench trial on count IV of plaintiffs\u2019 complaint and defendant\u2019s counterclaim. We affirm.\nThe following facts are undisputed. Plaintiffs, who own several properties in Kane County, submitted their proposed Prairie Lakes Subdivision plan to defendant for review in 1995. In April 1996, Paul Schuch, director of defendant\u2019s water resources and platting division, sent the following letter to Anthony Casaccio, plaintiffs\u2019 representative:\n\u201cDear Mr. Casaccio:\nWe have retained an outside consultant to perform the preliminary storewater engineering review for the [proposed] subdivision.\nThe consultant that the County is contracting with is Mr. Don Dressel, EE., Christopher B. Burke Engineering, Ltd., 9575 West Higgins Road, Suite 600, Rosemont, Illinois 60018.\nThis arrangement is permissible under the Kane County Subdivision Regulations, section 19 \u2014 37 Outside Consultants [Kane County Subdivision Regulations \u00a7 19 \u2014 37 (eff. December 11, 1962)]. This section permits the plat officer to engage professional assistance other than the staff, in order to provide a more timely review of the preliminary plans for your site and then pass on the billing to the developer.\nIf you have any questions or need any additional information, please do not hesitate to contact this office. Please acknowledge receipt of this correspondence and acceptance of these arrangements by signing and returning a copy of this letter.\u201d\nSection 19 \u2014 37 of the Kane County Subdivision Regulations (Subdivision Regulations), referred to in the letter, states as follows:\n\u201cDuring the plan review process and during installation and acceptance of the required improvements, the plat officer may engage professional assistance other than staff, in order to properly review or observe the improvement proposed by the applicant. The applicant shall be notified in writing that such professional assistance will be engaged. Prior to such review or observation, the applicant may meet with the plat officer in order to discuss the activity. In addition, the applicant and the county shall enter into an agreement whereby the applicant shall reimburse the county for costs associated with such professional review assistance.\u201d Kane County Subdivision Regulations \u00a7 19 \u2014 37 (eff. December 11, 1962).\nCasaccio signed and returned the letter on May 11, 1996, indicating plaintiffs\u2019 acceptance of the proposed arrangement and requesting a copy of defendant\u2019s contract with Burke Engineering. Defendant sent plaintiffs a copy of the contract. Burke Engineering generated a total of $6,964.25 in fees in connection with its review of the Prairie Lakes plan. Before filing suit in this matter, plaintiffs reimbursed defendant in the amount of $2,815.50. The payments were made over the course of eight months. Neither in accepting the reimbursement arrangement nor in making their regular payments did plaintiffs voice any objection to the arrangement.\nUltimately, defendant rejected the Prairie Lakes plan, which prompted plaintiffs to file a five-count complaint against defendant. In count iy plaintiffs requested a declaratory judgment that section 19 \u2014 37 of the Subdivision Regulations is ultra vires because it is not authorized by the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 1001 et seq. (West 2000)). Plaintiffs also sought restitution of the $2,815.50 they paid pursuant to the reimbursement agreement. Defendant filed a counterclaim for the balance owed under the reimbursement agreement. As an affirmative defense, plaintiffs claimed the agreement was void because they entered it under duress. Following a bench trial, the trial court ruled against plaintiffs on count iy finding authorization for section 19 \u2014 37 of the Subdivision Regulations in sections 5 \u2014 1005(3), 5 \u2014 1018, and 5 \u2014 1041 of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/5\u2014 1005(3), 5 \u2014 1018, 5 \u2014 1041 (West 2000)). The trial court ruled for defendant on its counterclaim, rejecting plaintiffs\u2019 defense of duress. Plaintiffs filed this timely appeal challenging both rulings of the trial court.\nWe review first the trial court\u2019s ruling on plaintiffs\u2019 request for a declaratory judgment that section 19 \u2014 37 of the Subdivision Regulations is ultra vires. Section 2 \u2014 701(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 701(a) (West 2000)), also known as the Declaratory Judgment Act, provides: \u201cThe court may, in cases of actual controversy, make binding declarations of rights, having the force of final judgments, *** including the determination, at the instance of anyone interested in the controversy, of the construction of any statute *** [or] municipal ordinance ***.\u201d The grant or denial of a request for a declaratory judgment is subject to de novo review to the extent it is not based on factual determinations that are the trial court\u2019s province. Galesburg Clinic Ass\u2019n v. West, 302 Ill. App. 3d 1016, 1017-18 (1999); Anthanas v. City of Lake Forest, 276 Ill. App. 3d 48, 52 (1995).\nSince we are asked to determine whether a county\u2019s ordinance is within the scope of authority granted the county by the legislature, our review is also guided by the following principles:\n\u201cIt is a well established rule that the powers of the multifarious units of local government in our State, including counties, are not to be enlarged by liberally construing the statutory grant, but, quite to the contrary, are to be strictly construed against the governmental entity. [Citation.] A county is a mere creature of the State and can exercise only the powers expressly delegated by the legislature or those that arise by necessary implication from expressly granted powers. [Citation.] This necessarily implied power has been interpreted to mean that which is essential to the accomplishment of the statute\u2019s declared object and purpose \u2014 not simply convenient, but indispensable. [Citation.] However, the implied power need not be absolutely indispensable, and it is sufficient if it is reasonably necessary to effectuate a power expressly granted. [Citations.]\u201d Connelly v. County of Clark, 16 Ill. App. 3d 947, 949 (1973).\nOur review also implicates canons of statutory construction. In construing a statute, a court must ascertain and give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent in enacting the statute. In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d 50, 62 (2003). To determine the intention of the legislature, a court first examines the language of the statute, which is the most reliable indicator of the legislature\u2019s intent. J.W., 203 Ill. 2d at 62. Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, a court must give effect to the statute as written without reading into the statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not express. J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 62.\nThe trial court cited sections 5 \u2014 1005(3), 5 \u2014 1018, and 5 \u2014 1041 of the Counties Code as bases for section 19 \u2014 37 of the Subdivision Regulations. Section 5 \u2014 1005(3) provides:\n\u201cPowers. Each county shall have the power:\n* $ji $?:\n3. To make all contracts and do all other acts in relation to the property and concerns of the county necessary to the exercise of its corporate powers.\u201d 55 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 1005(3) (West 2000).\nSection 5 \u2014 1018 provides in relevant part:\n\u201cReimbursement for expenses; employment of personnel. ***\nA county board may employ, appoint or contract for the services of such clerical, stenographic and professional personnel for the members of the county board, the committees of the board and the chairman of the board as the board finds necessary or desirable to the conduct of the business of the county, and may fix the compensation of and pay for the services of such personnel.\u201d 55 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 1018 (West 2000).\nWe hold that the preceding sections of the Counties Code provide authority for section 19 \u2014 37 of the Subdivision Regulations. Section 19 \u2014 37 essentially permits defendant to engage in two types of contracts. First, it authorizes defendant to contract with an outside professional for assistance in reviewing a plan. Authority for such contracts lies in section 5 \u2014 1018 of the Counties Code, which expressly permits a county board to \u201ccontract for the services of such *** professional personnel for the members of the county board, the committees of the board and the chairman of the board as the board finds necessary or desirable to the conduct of the business of the county.\u201d 55 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 1018 (West 2000). Section 19 \u2014 37 of the Subdivision Regulations states that contracts with consultants are designed to enable defendant \u201cto properly review or observe the improvement proposed by the applicant.\u201d Kane County Subdivision Regulations \u00a7 19 \u2014 37 (eff. December 11, 1962). Defendant thus expresses its finding that such contracts are \u201cnecessary or desirable\u201d to the conduct of defendant\u2019s business, and hence, section 19 \u2014 37\u2019s provision for such contracts falls within the imprimatur of section 5 \u2014 1018.\nThe second type of contract that section 19 \u2014 37 authorizes is a contract between the applicant and defendant by which the applicant agrees to reimburse defendant for the fees paid to the consultant. Although there is no specific authorization in the Counties Code for such reimbursement agreements, they fall within the broad contractual power conferred by section 5 \u2014 1005(3), which authorizes counties to \u201cmake all contracts and do all other acts in relation to the property and concerns of the county necessary to the exercise of its corporate powers.\u201d 55 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 1005(3) (West 2000). The word \u201cnecessary,\u201d as used here, \u201cis not to be interpreted as referring to such measures as are absolutely and indispensably necessary, but includes all appropriate means which are conducive or adaptable to the end to be accomplished and which in the judgment of the [county] board will most advantageously effect it.\u201d Hall v. County of Cook, 359 Ill. 528, 543 (1935). Defendant has given its plat officer the authority to contract not only for a consultant\u2019s services in reviewing a planner\u2019s submission but also for the reimbursement of the consultant\u2019s fees in order to defray defendant\u2019s costs. We cannot say such reimbursement contracts are not \u201cconducive or adaptable to the end to be accomplished\u201d or that they are not the means \u201cwhich in the judgment of the [county] board will most advantageously effect it.\u201d We note that, although defendant does not rely on section 5- \u2014 1005(3) in its brief, we may affirm the judgment of the trial court on any basis in the record (People v. Everette, 141 Ill. 2d 147, 158 (1990)). Because we find adequate authority for section 19 \u2014 37 of the Subdivision Regulations in sections 5 \u2014 1005(3) and 5 \u2014 1018 of the Counties Code, we need not inquire whether section 5 \u2014 1041 also provides such authority as defendant argues. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in holding that authority for section 19 \u2014 37 of the Subdivision Regulations rests in the Counties Code.\nWe turn now to the judgment of the trial court on defendant\u2019s counterclaim for the remainder of the balance owed under the reimbursement agreement. In their answer to the counterclaim, plaintiffs did not dispute that they entered into the reimbursement arrangement with defendant. Instead, they asserted the affirmative defense of duress, claiming that they agreed to reimburse defendant only because they believed, based on Schuch\u2019s letter to Casaccio, that refusal either was impossible because the consultant had already been hired, or would in any event result in defendant delaying or altogether halting its review of plaintiffs\u2019 plan. At trial, plaintiffs presented the testimony of Casaccio to support these two claims. The trial court rejected the duress claim, finding that \u201cat the request of the plaintiffs and with the plaintiffs\u2019 concurrence, the defendant completed the review process under the statute which included the use of the professional services accepted by the plaintiffs.\u201d Plaintiffs, the trial court found, \u201croutinely paid *** invoices for professional services submitted to it as they came due until approximately October 1999.\u201d\nA reviewing court may reverse the trial court\u2019s judgment following a bench trial only if it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. 1350 Lake Shore Associates v. Mazur-Berg, 339 Ill. App. 3d 618, 628 (2003). A judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when an opposite conclusion is clearly evident or the factual findings on which it is based are unreasonable, arbitrary or not based on the evidence. Mazur-Berg, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 628-29. The trial court rejected plaintiffs\u2019 duress claim, having found that plaintiffs agreed to the reimbursement arrangement and paid amounts under the contract over the course of eight months. The trial court provided no other findings, yet we will presume that the court found all controverted facts in favor of the prevailing party (McMahon v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 221 Ill. App. 3d 935, 951 (1991)).\nEconomic duress is a condition where one is induced by a wrongful act or threat of another to make a contract under circumstances that deprive one of the exercise of one\u2019s own free will. Hurd v. Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, 303 Ill. App. 3d 84, 91 (1999). To establish duress, it must be shown that the act or threat left the individual bereft of the quality of mind essential to the making of a contract. Hurd, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 91. The acts or threats complained of must be wrongful; however, the term \u201cwrongful\u201d is not limited to acts that are criminal, tortious, or in violation of a contractual duty, but extends to acts that are wrongful in a moral sense as well. Hurd, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 91.\nThe trial court found implausible Casaccio\u2019s claim that he believed it impossible to refuse defendant\u2019s offer because Schuch\u2019s letter implied that defendant had already retained the consultant. Indeed, Casaccio\u2019s claim of impossibility begs the question. Whether or not the consultant had already been hired, Schuch\u2019s letter at least purports to give plaintiffs the opportunity to accept or reject the reimbursement arrangement. Section 19 \u2014 37, as noted above, contemplates two separate contracts: one between defendant and the consultant, the other between defendant and the applicant. The core question, then, is whether the purported opportunity to refuse the reimbursement arrangement was illusory, i.e., whether plaintiffs\u2019 wills were overborne by the adverse consequences they perceived would follow upon refusal. The trial court rightly found incredible Casaccio\u2019s testimony that he believed defendant would halt its review of plaintiffs\u2019 plan if they refused to reimburse defendant. The letter contains not even a hint of such a threat.\nOf course, Casaccio also testified that Schuch\u2019s remark that the consultant would enable defendant \u201cto provide a more timely review\u201d implied that review would not be timely if plaintiffs rejected the arrangement. Casaccio\u2019s inference is dubious; the letter states that the consultant was retained to provide \u201cmore timely review\u201d not simply \u201ctimely review.\u201d (Emphasis added.) However, the degree of timeliness that defendant conditioned on plaintiffs\u2019 agreeing to reimburse is ultimately beside the point, for the Subdivision Regulations require that defendant complete its review of a proposed plan \u201cwithin 60 days\u201d after it is submitted. Kane County Subdivision Regulations \u00a7 19 \u2014 34(5) (eff. December 11, 1962). Schuch nowhere suggested in his letter that defendant would fail to meet this deadline if plaintiffs refused to reimburse defendant. Therefore, the trial court rightly found that what plaintiffs risked by declining the reimbursement agreement, i.e., review completed not as soon as might otherwise occur, was not so significant that they were coerced into agreeing.\nImportantly, the trial court found an alternative ground for its ruling in the fact that plaintiffs submitted payments under the agreement for eight months as defendant continued to review the plan. A victim of duress who accepts the benefits flowing from the contract for any considerable length of time ratifies the contract. Carlile v. Snap-on Tools, 271 Ill. App. 3d 833, 842 (1995). The trial court correctly found that plaintiffs ratified the contract by performing and receiving the benefits of performance over several months.\nFor the reasons stated above, the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nBOWMAN and GILLERAN JOHNSON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Thomas R Burney, Brian M. Fornek, and Timothy J. McGonegle, all of Schain, Burney, Ross & Citron, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellants.", "Meg G\u00f3recki, State\u2019s Attorney, of St. Charles (Martin E Moltz and Sally A. Swiss, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), and Kenneth C. Shepro, of Katz, Randall, Weinberg & Richmond, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "INLAND LAND APPRECIATION FUND, L.P., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE COUNTY OF KANE, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 2-02-1117\nOpinion filed December 5, 2003.\nThomas R Burney, Brian M. Fornek, and Timothy J. McGonegle, all of Schain, Burney, Ross & Citron, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellants.\nMeg G\u00f3recki, State\u2019s Attorney, of St. Charles (Martin E Moltz and Sally A. Swiss, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), and Kenneth C. Shepro, of Katz, Randall, Weinberg & Richmond, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0720-01", "first_page_order": 738, "last_page_order": 746 }