{ "id": 3778217, "name": "HELEN K. BRUCE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JESSE WHITE, Secretary of State, State of Illinois, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Bruce v. White", "decision_date": "2003-12-05", "docket_number": "No. 4-03-0150", "first_page": "795", "last_page": "800", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "344 Ill. App. 3d 795" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "525 N.E.2d 546", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "550" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "170 Ill. App. 3d 828", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3586713 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "832" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/170/0828-01" ] }, { "cite": "773 N.E.2d 84", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "92" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 Ill. App. 3d 300", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1033968 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308-09" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/332/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "498 N.E.2d 295", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "299" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 Ill. App. 3d 723", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3605135 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "729" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/147/0723-01" ] }, { "cite": "770 N.E.2d 1251", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1256" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 Ill. App. 3d 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1209194 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "173" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/331/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "756 N.E.2d 434", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "437" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 Ill. App. 3d 643", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 256358 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "647" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/324/0643-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 517, "char_count": 11037, "ocr_confidence": 0.77, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.66217029417753e-08, "percentile": 0.5286723280005899 }, "sha256": "31aa7e9812f34bda86a2d1b630903c1efccbf366d4ac12c7738d443f025c382a", "simhash": "1:411e588ebd11e700", "word_count": 1790 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:11:26.904766+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "HELEN K. BRUCE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JESSE WHITE, Secretary of State, State of Illinois, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE TURNER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIllinois Secretary of State Jesse White (Secretary) appeals a Sanga-mon County circuit court order, reversing his June 13, 2002, order that denied the petition for the rescission of an order of suspension filed by plaintiff, Helen K. Bruce. We reverse the circuit court\u2019s judgment and reinstate the Secretary\u2019s denial of plaintiffs petition.\nI. BACKGROUND\nPlaintiff was born in July 1967 and got her first driver\u2019s license at age 16 under the name Helen K. Chamberlin. On June 4, 1989, plaintiff received a suspension for failing to appear, which was cleared on August 12, 1998. In August 1990, plaintiff got married and changed her name to Helen K. Bruce. In 1995, she obtained a driver\u2019s license in her married name.\nPursuant to section 6 \u2014 206(a)(9) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Vehicle Code) (625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 206(a)(9) (West Supp. 1997)), the Secretary entered an order of suspension, effective June 10, 1998, based on plaintiffs \u201chaving made a false statement or knowingly concealed a material fact or having used false information or identification in an application for a license, identification card[,] or permit.\u201d The suspension had a termination date of June 10,1999. The Secretary also entered an order, effective June 15, 1998, cancelling plaintiffs driver\u2019s license because section 6 \u2014 103(3) of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 103(3) (West Supp. 1997)) prohibited her from obtaining a license during a period of suspension.\nIn April 2002, pursuant to section 2 \u2014 118 of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 118 (West 2002)), plaintiff filed a request for a formal hearing, seeking to clear her record of the 1998 suspension. On May 3, 2002, the hearing officer held a hearing. Plaintiff first testified she got a driver\u2019s license in her married name at the time of her August 1990 marriage. She later testified she got a driver\u2019s license in her married name in 1995. She explained that she did not drive after she got married because she lived in Chicago, and her husband did all of the driving.\nWhen she got her driver\u2019s license in her married name, plaintiff recalled an employee filling out the application and asking her several questions, including whether her license had ever been suspended, to which she replied no. When presented with the application, plaintiff stated it was her signature on the application. Plaintiff denied knowing at that time that her license was suspended.\nIn 1998, a police officer pulled plaintiff over and informed her that her license was suspended. She called the Secretary\u2019s office and learned she had failed to pay a ticket. According to the certification of traffic violation disposition, on July 21, 1998, plaintiff paid the fine for a case disposed of on March 22, 1989. She did not remember getting the 1989 ticket. Plaintiff testified she never got notice the Secretary suspended her license and did not know of the suspension when she obtained her driver\u2019s license in her married name. She also denied knowingly making a false statement to the Secretary\u2019s office. Plaintiff admitted she had moved a lot and had not notified the Secretary\u2019s office of her address changes. However, she did have her mail forwarded. Plaintiff also testified she did not recall moving for a period of time when she did not have a driver\u2019s license.\nAfter the hearing, the hearing officer entered an order, finding, inter alia, the following: (1) plaintiff admitted she applied for a driver\u2019s license on February 21, 1995, in the name of Helen K. Bruce; (2) plaintiff answered no to the application\u2019s question of whether her driver\u2019s license had \u201c \u2018ever been suspended, revoked, cancelled[,] or refused in any state under this or any other name\u2019 \u201d; (3) plaintiff also admitted she previously held a license in the name Helen K. Chamber-lin; (4) that license was suspended on June 4, 1989, pursuant to section 6 \u2014 306.3 of the Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95V2, par. 6 \u2014 306.3), when plaintiff failed to appear in court on a traffic citation where she had posted her driver\u2019s license in lieu of bail; (5) plaintiff did not deny the suspension was entered but did deny she was aware of the suspension when she applied for a license in February 1995; (6) plaintiffs demeanor was indignant; and (7) plaintiffs testimony was not credible.\nThe hearing officer concluded plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proof, noting that, if plaintiff did not receive the notice of the 1989 suspension, it was because she failed to fulfill her obligation of informing the Secretary of her change in address. He also noted plaintiff did not have a license in her possession for nearly six years.\nOn June 13, 2002, the Secretary adopted the hearing officer\u2019s findings of fact and conclusions of law and thus denied plaintiffs petition.\nOn June 26, 2002, plaintiff filed a complaint in the circuit court pursuant to the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 101 through 3 \u2014 113 (West 2002)), seeking review of the Secretary\u2019s decision. After a January 2003 hearing, the circuit court reversed the Secretary\u2019s June 13, 2002, decision; reversed the June 1998 order suspending plaintiffs driver\u2019s license; and ordered the June 1998 suspension stricken from plaintiffs record. This appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA reviewing court may not overturn an administrative agency\u2019s decision unless the administrative agency exercised its authority in an arbitrary and capricious manner or its decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. An administrative agency\u2019s findings and conclusions on questions of fact are prima facie true and correct. If anything in the record fairly supports the agency\u2019s decision, that decision is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Mohr v. White, 324 Ill. App. 3d 643, 647, 756 N.E.2d 434, 437 (2001). Additionally, we review the administrative agency\u2019s decision and not the circuit court\u2019s decision. Mefford v. White, 331 Ill. App. 3d 167,173, 770 N.E.2d 1251, 1256 (2002).\nInitially, we begin by setting forth who had the burden of proof at the hearing and what the standard of proof was. In this case, plaintiff had the burden of proof to demonstrate she was entitled to rescission of the suspension order. See 92 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 1001.100(s) (Conway Greene CD-ROM January 2002). Citing Sutton v. Edgar, 147 Ill. App. 3d 723, 498 N.E.2d 295 (1986), and section 1001.440(b) of Title 92 of the Illinois Administrative Code (Administrative Code) (92 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 1001.440(b) (Conway Greene CD-ROM January 2002)), the hearing officer found the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard was the appropriate standard of proof. However, section 1001.100(s) of Title 92 of the Administrative Code (92 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 1001.100(s) (Conway Greene CD-ROM January 2002)) provides that, at formal hearings of the Secretary, \u201c[t]he standard of proof is the preponderance of the evidence, except as provided for in [s]ubpart D [(92 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7\u00a7 1001.400 through 1001.490 (Conway Greene CD-ROM January 2002))].\u201d The provisions of subpart D that provide for a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard do not apply to this case. See 92 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 1001.420 (restricted driving permits), \u00a7 1001.430 (reinstatement of driving privileges after revocation), \u00a7 1001.440 (alcohol- and drug-related revocations, suspensions, and cancellations), \u00a7 1001.485 (reinstatement application based upon another state\u2019s issuance of a driver\u2019s license) (Conway Greene CD-ROM January 2002). Moreover, Sutton addressed the standard of proof as provided for in a former version of section 1001.100 of Title 92 of the Administrative Code (92 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 1001.100(8) (1984)), which has since been amended. See Sutton, 147 Ill. App. 3d at 729, 498 N.E.2d at 299. Accordingly, plaintiff had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she was entitled to rescission of the 1998 suspension.\nWhile the hearing officer applied the incorrect standard of proof, that misapplication does not require reversal of the Secretary\u2019s denial of the petition. At the hearing, plaintiff did not dispute the fact that her driver\u2019s license was suspended in 1995 when she applied for a driver\u2019s license in her married name. Moreover, she admitted that, on the 1995 driver\u2019s license application, she answered no to the question of whether her driver\u2019s license had ever been suspended. Her only argument for rescission was that she did not know her license was suspended when she answered no on the application.\nSection 6 \u2014 206(a)(9) of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/6\u2014 206(a)(9) (West Supp. 1997)) allows the Secretary to suspend a person\u2019s driving privileges, without a preliminary hearing, upon a showing of the person\u2019s records or other sufficient evidence that the person \u201c[h]as made a false statement or knowingly concealed a material fact or has used false information or identification in any application for a license, identification card, or permit.\u201d Section 6 \u2014 206(a)(9) does not contain any language that the person had to know or should have known he or she was making a false statement.\nPlaintiff cites Prime Leasing, Inc. v. Kendig, 332 Ill. App. 3d 300, 773 N.E.2d 84 (2002), in support of her assertion that she must have knowingly made the false statement. However, Prime Leasing addressed the common-law action of fraud, not the Secretary\u2019s authority to suspend a person\u2019s driving privileges. See Prime Leasing, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 308-09, 773 N.E.2d at 92.\nOther provisions in the Vehicle Code do not require knowledge of a suspension of driving privileges. For example, the offense of driving while license is suspended is a strict liability offense, which only requires proof of the act of driving while privileges are suspended. Thus, evidence of the defendant\u2019s actual receipt of notice or knowledge of suspension is immaterial. People v. Johnson, 170 Ill. App. 3d 828, 832, 525 N.E.2d 546, 550 (1988).\nWe find section 6 \u2014 206(a)(9) of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 206(a)(9) (West Supp. 1997)) only requires evidence that a person made a false statement in an application for a license, identification card, or permit. Knowledge that the statement was false is immaterial. Thus, even if plaintiff lacked knowledge of the 1989 suspension, the Secretary still had the authority to suspend her license under section 2 \u2014 602(a)(9). Accordingly, plaintiff failed to prove she was entitled to rescission.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we reverse the circuit court\u2019s judgment and reinstate the Secretary\u2019s decision.\nCircuit court reversed; Secretary\u2019s decision reinstated.\nSTEIGMANN and APPLETON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE TURNER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Gary S. Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Leslye Jones-Beatty, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellant.", "Edmond H. Rees, of Brandenburg-Rees & Rees, of Carlinville, for appel-lee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "HELEN K. BRUCE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JESSE WHITE, Secretary of State, State of Illinois, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4-03-0150\nOpinion filed December 5, 2003.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Gary S. Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Leslye Jones-Beatty, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellant.\nEdmond H. Rees, of Brandenburg-Rees & Rees, of Carlinville, for appel-lee." }, "file_name": "0795-01", "first_page_order": 813, "last_page_order": 818 }