{ "id": 3778143, "name": "AMERICAN COUNTRY INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES McHUGH CONSTRUCTION COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "American Country Insurance v. James McHugh Construction Co.", "decision_date": "2003-12-04", "docket_number": "No. 1-02-2826", "first_page": "960", "last_page": "977", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "344 Ill. App. 3d 960" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "82 Ill. App. 3d 1034", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3225023 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1039" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/82/1034-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 Ill. App. 3d 1026", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 521976 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1029", "parenthetical": "held that where the insurer owes no duty to defend, it owes no duty to indemnify" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/334/1026-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 Ill. App. 3d 998", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 411683 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1007" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/312/0998-01" ] }, { "cite": "227 Ill. App. 3d 360", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5793398 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "367" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/227/0360-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 660", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 Ill. App. 3d 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 894480 ], "weight": 14, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358" }, { "page": "359" }, { "page": "359" }, { "page": "359" }, { "page": "359" }, { "page": "359" }, { "page": "359" }, { "page": "360" }, { "page": "361" }, { "page": "362" }, { "page": "362" }, { "page": "361" }, { "page": "362" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/337/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 Ill. App. 3d 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1472430 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "232" }, { "page": "234" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/329/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "298 Ill. App. 3d 805", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1073560 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "808" }, { "page": "814" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/298/0805-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 Ill. App. 3d 1011", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 182773 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1013" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/283/1011-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 Ill. App. 3d 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3596668 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/126/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "271 Ill. App. 3d 898", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 249081 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/271/0898-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 Ill. App. 3d 148", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 365893 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/269/0148-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 Ill. App. 3d 501", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 349573 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "507", "parenthetical": "held that the additional insured was not entitled to a defense where the policy provided coverage \" 'solely limited to liability specifically resulting from the conduct of the Named Insured which may be imputed to the Additional Insured' \"" }, { "page": "504" }, { "page": "515" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/309/0501-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 Ill. App. 3d 974", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 381811 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "978" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/268/0974-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 Ill. 2d 285", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2924538 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/53/0285-01" ] }, { "cite": "682 N.E.2d 1245", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 Ill. App. 3d 1056", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 351159 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1064" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/289/1056-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 N.E.2d 1203", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3083008 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "4" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/88/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "578 N.E.2d 926", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 Ill. 2d 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5592135 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73" }, { "page": "73" }, { "page": "73" }, { "page": "73" }, { "page": "74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/144/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "620 N.E.2d 1073", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777543 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "393" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "687 N.E.2d 72", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "177 Ill. 2d 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 317117 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/177/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "607 N.E.2d 1204", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 Ill. 2d 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4820940 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125" }, { "page": "125" }, { "page": "108-09" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/154/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 Ill. App. 3d 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 847479 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "132" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/293/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "692 N.E.2d 1150", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 395", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821394 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "401" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0395-01" ] }, { "cite": "701 N.E.2d 1084", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 407", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209982 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "416" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0407-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 Ill. App. 3d 545", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1336130 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "548" }, { "page": "549" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/306/0545-01" ] }, { "cite": "49 Ill. 2d 131", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2909764 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "135-36" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/49/0131-01" ] }, { "cite": "332 Ill. App. 3d 51", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1034209 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "53", "parenthetical": "\"To qualify as a postjudgment motion, the motion must request at least one of the forms of relief specified in section 2 - 1203 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 - 1203 (West 1998)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/332/0051-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 Ill. 2d 122", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3092064 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "127" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/91/0122-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 514", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259086 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "524" }, { "page": "524" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 Ill. App. 3d 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 257126 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "522-26" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/301/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 Ill. App. 3d 126", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 182732 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "131" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/283/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "00 L 008245", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Lans. Ch.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "234 Ill. App. 3d 70", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5187838 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/234/0070-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 Ill. 2d 570", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1224800 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/189/0570-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1257, "char_count": 42624, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.561572571887321e-07, "percentile": 0.6770311705431475 }, "sha256": "2480f12949f1d1be2a624887b26d4d095d2e9df4d5b8efc5e86f74fbe8578d99", "simhash": "1:4eeb03cc4149b5e4", "word_count": 6839 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:11:26.904766+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "AMERICAN COUNTRY INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES McHUGH CONSTRUCTION COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GREIMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendants James McHugh Construction Co. and James McHugh Development Co. (collectively, McHugh) sought insurance coverage with plaintiff American Country Insurance Co. (American) for a bodily injury claim and lawsuit filed by Michael Marciano against McHugh for its alleged negligence. McHugh was the general contractor on a construction project and Spectrum Stone (Spectrum) was a subcontractor and Marciano\u2019s employer. Marciano was injured as a result of his employment. As a condition of the contract between McHugh and Spectrum, McHugh was added as an additional party insured, subject to certain conditions, on the American liability policy issued to Spectrum. American denied coverage for McHugh with reference to the Marciano claim.\nAmerican filed a complaint for declaratory relief and judgment against McHugh, asserting that it had no duty to defend or indemnify McHugh in the Marciano lawsuit. McHugh answered the complaint and filed its own request for declaratory relief. The parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and McHugh filed its first \u201cmotion for turnover.\u201d That motion sought compensation for the period of time that McHugh alleges American \u201cacknowledged the claim and agreed to \u2018handle this claim and lawsuit,\u2019 \u201d before American filed its complaint for declaratory relief. The trial court \u201centered and continued\u201d McHugh\u2019s request for payment of defense expenses as listed in the court\u2019s \u201cmotion for turnover order.\u201d\nEventually, the trial court granted American\u2019s motion for summary judgment and denied McHugh\u2019s motion for summary judgment. However, the court did not rule on McHugh\u2019s \u201cmotion for turnover.\u201d Thereafter, McHugh filed a \u201csecond motion for turnover,\u201d which again sought payment of defense expenses for the period of time after which American allegedly acknowledged the underlying claim and lawsuit. The trial court denied the second motion for payment of defense expenses, and defendants appealed.\nAfter McHugh\u2019s appeal was docketed in this court, but before it filed its brief, American moved to dismiss the appeal. It argued that McHugh\u2019s postjudgment trial proceedings \u2014 namely, the second motion for turnover \u2014 did not qualify as a postjudgment motion under section 2 \u2014 1203 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) (735 ILCS 5/2\u2014 1203 (West 2000)) and, therefore, could not toll the 30-day time limit found in Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1) for filing a timely appeal. See 155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(1). Plaintiff asserted that because McHugh\u2019s notice of appeal was untimely it could not confer jurisdiction upon this court. McHugh answered the plaintiffs motion, and plaintiff replied. Upon review, a motion panel of this court ordered that plaintiff\u2019s dismissal motion be taken with the case. For the reasons that follow, we deny plaintiffs motion for dismissal and affirm the trial court\u2019s decision.\nBy way of background, we note that McHugh\u2019s responsibility as a general contractor is to control the project schedule and insure that the structure complies with the project specifications. However, McHugh is not involved in the work performed by employees of subcontractors, as the subcontractors are ultimately responsible for the \u201cmeans and methods\u201d of their employees\u2019 work as well as their safety.\nWe are also aware that the Illinois Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/5(a) (West 2000)) bars injured workers from suing their own employers. Consequently, because injured construction workers cannot sue their subcontractor employers, it is common practice for them to sue the general contractor involved with the project. In realization of that possibility, general contractors will usually set up insurance requirements for their subcontractors, with the intent of passing the liability for worker injuries along to the worker\u2019s employer\u2019s insurance carrier.\nIn the present case, for example, McHugh claims that, as part of its contract, it required its subcontractors to provide it with insurance coverage for claims against it that arise out of the subcontractor\u2019s work. In particular, the McHugh-Spectrum subcontract provided:\n\u201cEach of the aforesaid policies shall name [McHugh] and such other parties designated on Schedule B as additional insured parties and provide that it is primary to any general liability insurance maintained by Contractor or any other additional insured party\n* * *\nSubcontractor shall cause James McHugh Construction Co. *** to be included as Additional Insureds under Subcontractor\u2019s General Liability policy and Umbrella policy, if any, Coverage shall be primary for the benefit of the Additional Insureds.\u201d\nTo that end, American issued a certificate of insurance adding McHugh as an additional insured under the policy. That certificate provided in pertinent part:\n\u201cThis is to certify that the policies of insurance listed below have been issued to the insured named above for the policy period indicated. Notwithstanding any requirement, term or condition of any contract or other document with respect to which this certificate may be issued or may pertain, the insurance afforded by the policies described herein is subject to ah the terms, exclusions, and conditions of such policies. Limits shown may have been reduced by paid claims.\u201d\nThe policy also contains an endorsement form 2030M, which in relevant part provides:\n\u201cThe insurance provided to additional insureds is limited as follows:\n(1) The person or organization is an additional insured but only with respect to your acts or omissions in connection with \u2018your work\u2019 for that additional insured by you or on your behalf at the location designated in the agreement and designated in a Certificate of Insurance issued by our authorized producer.\n(2) Additional exclusions. This insurance does not apply to:\n* * *\n(c) \u2018Bodily Injury\u2019 or \u2018property damage\u2019 arising out of any act or omission of the additional insured(s) or any of their employees.\u201d\nThe defendants in the present case assert that it is this policy endorsement that gives plaintiff the duty to defend or indemnify the underlying defendants named in that action.\nIn the underlying action, Marciano\u2019s complaint asserts that McHugh constructed or erected a scaffolding from which Marciano fell, and that McHugh failed to: (1) inspect, manage and supervise the jobsite; (2) warn Marciano of dangerous conditions; or (3) provide adequate safeguards to prevent Marciano\u2019s injury. Each one of these allegations, Marciano claimed, proximately caused his injuries. However, Marciano\u2019s employer, Spectrum, was not a named defendant and was never joined as a third-party defendant. Accordingly, no acts or omissions on the part of Spectrum were alleged to have caused Marciano\u2019s injuries.\nAfter McHugh was served with a summons in the Marciano lawsuit, it tendered the defense to American as an additional insured under Spectrum\u2019s policy. On November 6, 2000, American responded in writing to McHugh\u2019s tender and accepted the tender under a full reservation of rights. However, the letter also noted that the policy issued to Spectrum contained endorsement AC 2038M, which states in pertinent part:\n\u201cThe following is added to paragraph 2c of \u2018Duties In The Event of Occurrence, Claim or Suit\u2019 of the \u2018SECTION IV COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY CONDITIONS\u2019:\n*\n(6) Promptly tender the defense of any claim made or \u2018Suit\u2019 to any other Insurer which also has available insurance for a loss which we cover under Coverage A or B of this coverage part.\u201d\nBased on that endorsement, American requested that McHugh tender the defense of the Marciano lawsuit to its own insurer and provide American a copy of the policy. American allegedly advised McHugh that McHugh\u2019s compliance with its request was a condition precedent to coverage and that American would take no further action until McHugh complied.\nOn November 10, 2000, McHugh sent a letter to American that stated: \u201cMcHugh refuses to tender this matter to any insurer other than American Country.\u201d McHugh stated that in light of two Illinois decisions, John Burns Construction Co. v. Indiana Insurance Co., 189 Ill. 2d 570 (2000), and Institute of London Underwriters v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 234 Ill. App. 3d 70 (1992), and the absence of mention of the tender requirement in the certificate of insurance issued to McHugh, American could not put its financial interest ahead of McHugh to require a tender.\nAfter receiving McHugh\u2019s November 10, 2000, letter, American commenced this declaratory judgment action. The complaint sought a judicial determination that American had no duty to defend McHugh in the Marciano action because: (1) endorsement form 2030M excluded coverage for McHugh\u2019s own negligent acts or omissions, and (2) McHugh repudiated its \u201ctender-to-others\u201d obligation under endorsement form AC 2038M. McHugh answered the complaint and counterclaimed, arguing that (1) American still owed McHugh a defense in the Marciano lawsuit, and (2) the \u201ctender-to-others\u201d provision of form AC 2038M was invalid.\nThereafter, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and McHugh filed a written motion entitled \u201cmotion for a turnover order.\u201d The impetus behind that motion was that American was obligated to pay McHugh\u2019s defense cost in the Marciano action from the time that American allegedly accepted McHugh\u2019s tender until the time American filed its declaratory judgment action. The trial court ordered the motion \u201centered and continued.\u201d\nOn June 17, 2002, the trial court heard arguments on the cross-motions for summary judgment and ruled in favor of American. The court\u2019s order stated:\n\u201c(1) Motion of McHugh Defendants denied.\n(2) Motion of plaintiff is granted.\n(3) Court adjudges and declares that Plaintiff has no duty to pay, defend, or indemnify McHugh Defendants for the alleged injurious occurrence of the Marciano complaint in [case number] 00 L 008245.\n(4) Court declines to enter summary judgment for either party with respect to the \u2018duty to tender\u2019 provisions of the policy.\u201d\nTen days later, McHugh filed its \u201csecond motion for turnover order,\u201d which was a slightly modified version of its previous \u201cmotion for turnover order\u201d that had been \u201centered and continued.\u201d\nOn August 20, 2002, upon review of American\u2019s response to McHugh\u2019s second turnover motion, the trial court denied it. In making its ruling, the trial court disagreed with American\u2019s argument that the passage of time from June 17, 2002, to August 20, 2002, had divested the court of jurisdiction to rule on the motion. On September 12, 2002, McHugh filed its notice of appeal.\nWe first address the motion taken with this case, which focuses on the same jurisdictional issue posed to the trial court: whether McHugh\u2019s \u201csecond motion for turnover order\u201d qualifies as a postjudgment motion under Code section 2 \u2014 1203, thereby tolling the 30-day time limit found in Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1) for filing a timely appeal. See 155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(1). For if it does not, defendants\u2019 notice of appeal is late and we have no jurisdiction to hear this appeal.\nAs this court has noted:\n\u201cUnder Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1), a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after the entry of the final judgment from which the appeal is taken, or, if a timely post-trial motion directed at the judgment is filed, within 30 days after entry of the order disposing of the last pending post-trial motion. 134 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(1). Under section 2 \u2014 1203 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, a post-trial motion must be filed within 30 days of a final judgment. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1203 (West 1994). Otherwise, the trial court will lose jurisdiction to modify or vacate the final order which it entered after the lapse of 30 days.\u201d Lajato v. AT&T, Inc., 283 Ill. App. 3d 126, 131 (1996).\nMoreover, Code section 2 \u2014 1203 provides that in a nonjury case, within 30 days after the entry of judgment, a party may file a motion for a rehearing, a retrial, a modification of the judgment, a vacatur of the judgment, or other relief. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1203 (West 2000). However, to be valid and to extend the time for appeal, such a motion must be directed against the judgment and must contain specific grounds warranting relief such as reconsideration or vacatur. See Robertson v. Winnebago County Forest Preserve District, 301 Ill. App. 3d 520, 522-26 (1998).\nIn the present case, American notes that McHugh\u2019s counterclaim for declaratory relief alleged that it was not required to tender the defense of the Marciano lawsuit to its oWn insurer. Further, American argues, the prayer for relief in McHugh\u2019s counterclaim \u201cmerely asks the [cjourt to declare, construe, and adjudicate that the American Country policy affords full coverage to the McHugh [djefendants for their claim; that American Country has a full duty to defend the McHugh [djefendants with respect to the Marciano [ljawsuit; and that American Country has a full duty to indemnify the McHugh [djefen-dants with respect to the Marciano claim.\u201d However, American notes, McHugh\u2019s counterclaim did not seek payment of its defense costs from the date it tendered the Marciano lawsuit to American until the date the judgment in that action was entered.\nIn addition, American asserts that the trial court\u2019s June 17, 2002, order granting summary judgment for American on its claim, and denying summary judgment for McHugh on its counterclaim, was a final judgment because it disposed of the rights of the parties. Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514, 524 (2001). A \u201cfinal judgment \u2018decides the controversies between the parties on the merits and fixes their rights, so that, if the judgment is affirmed, nothing remains for the trial court to do but proceed with its execution.\u2019 In re J.N., 91 Ill. 2d 122, 127 (1982).\u201d Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d at 524. In other words, American asserts, where the trial court ruled on all of the issues listed in plaintiffs claim and defendants\u2019 counterclaim, its June 17, 2002, order was final and appealable as to those issues.\nHowever, it was not until that final judgment was entered that McHugh filed its second turnover motion which, American asserts, proceeded under the purportedly new theory that McHugh was entitled to defense costs from the date of tender of the Marciano lawsuit to American until the date that judgment was entered. McHugh\u2019s reasoning in that motion was clear: the reservation of rights letter issued by American created rights for McHugh to receive interim costs for the Marciano lawsuit during the pendency of the coverage case. Nevertheless, American notes, no such claim was contained or asserted in McHugh\u2019s counterclaim.\nAccordingly, American argues that the second turnover motion was \u201cnothing more than an attempt to amend the [cjounterclaim to assert this theory,\u201d and did not seek a rehearing, retrial, vacation, or modification of the court\u2019s judgment, as provided by Code section 2 \u2014 1203. See, e.g., Vanderplow v. Krych, 332 Ill. App. 3d 51, 53 (2002) (\u201cTo qualify as a postjudgment motion, the motion must request at least one of the forms of relief specified in section 2 \u2014 1203 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1203 (West 1998)), it must specify the grounds that would warrant granting the relief requested, and it must be filed with the clerk\u201d). American also asserts that the second turnover motion did not seek the \u201cother relief\u2019 which the supreme court has held must be \u201csimilar in nature\u201d to the other forms of relief enumerated in Code section 2 \u2014 1203. See Fultz v. Haugan, 49 Ill. 2d 131,135-36 (1971). As a result, American claims that McHugh\u2019s second turnover motion cannot operate to extend the 30-day limitations period of Rule 303(a)(1) and that its notice of appeal was untimely in that it was filed more than 86 days after June 17, 2002 \u2014 the entry of final judgment. Thus, American concludes, we do not possess the jurisdiction to hear McHugh\u2019s appeal.\nAfter reviewing McHugh\u2019s counterclaim, we agree with the plaintiff that McHugh never specifically delineated the time frame for which it was requesting payment of its defense costs. Instead, paragraphs 11 and 13 of the counterclaim state:\n\u201c11. That upon service in the underlying action, McHugh tendered its defense to [American] requesting a full defense and indemnification pursuant to the Institute of London Underwriters v. Hartford Fire Insfurance] Co. decision allowing McHugh to choose one insurer and knowingly forgo another insurer\u2019s participation in the defense of a claim.\n13. That [American] has a duty to fully defense [sic] and indemnify McHugh in the Marciano [action] as an additional insured under the [American] policy.\u201d\nIn the words of plaintiff, McHugh simply sought a declaration that American\u2019s policy afforded full coverage to it and that American had a full duty to defend and indemnify it with respect to the Marciano lawsuit.\nThat stated, however, we are not persuaded by plaintiffs attempt to severalize McHugh\u2019s later, more specific request in its second motion for turnover for the interim costs of the Marciano lawsuit from McHugh\u2019s broader prayer for relief. Instead, we find that McHugh\u2019s counterclaim put the issue of payment of all past, present, and future fees and costs of the Marciano lawsuit before the trial court and that the trial court gave a final order as to that issue: \u201c[The] Court adjudges and declares that Plaintiff has no duty to pay, defend, or indemnify McHugh Defendants for the alleged injurious occurrence of the Marciano complaint in [case number] 00 L 008245.\u201d McHugh\u2019s second motion for turnover simply sought a modification of that judgment. It is apparent that McHugh filed that second motion for turnover because it believed the particular issue of its claim for the \u201cinterim\u201d defense fees and costs had not been adjudicated and, therefore, that the trial court\u2019s June 17, 2002, order was not final. As noted, however, we agree with the trial court\u2019s assessment that it entered a final order on June 17, 2002, on all of the motions before it, and that it simply found that plaintiff had no duty to pay, defend or indemnify the defendants whatsoever in connection with the Marciano case. Accordingly, we, like the trial court, construe defendants\u2019 \u201csecond motion for turnover\u201d as a motion seeking modification of that final judgment; namely, that the court should alter its previous finding and award the \u201cinterim\u201d costs of defending the Marciano lawsuit to the defendants.\nIn light of that determination and the fact that defendants\u2019 \u201csecond motion for turnover\u201d contains specific grounds that would warrant the modification of the trial court\u2019s judgment, we conclude that defendants\u2019 \u201csecond motion for turnover\u201d was, in effect, a proper Code section 2 \u2014 1203 motion. And because the defendants filed their notice of appeal 16 business days after the trial court ruled upon that motion, we find their appeal to be timely. See 155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(1). Plaintiffs motion to dismiss is denied.\nIn their opening brief on appeal, defendants initially argued that the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff was in error and that summary judgment should have been granted to the defendants. Defendants argued in the alternative that: (1) plaintiff had a duty to pay the costs of the defense from the day plaintiff accepted the duty to defend to the day the trial court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff; or (2) at the very least, the plaintiff had a duty to pay the costs of the defense from the day plaintiff accepted the duty to defend to the day plaintiff filed this declaratory action. Plaintiff replied that no statute requires such payments and no court has ever held that insurers have such a liability. In their reply brief, the defendants appear to concede the point and only raise the argument that the trial court should have granted summary judgment to the defendants rather than to the plaintiff.\nAs this court noted in Abrams v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 306 Ill. App. 3d 545, 548 (1999), our review of a trial court\u2019s grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment is de novo:\n\u201cSummary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits, when taken together and in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1005(c) (West 1996); Majca v. Beekil, 183 Ill. 2d 407, 416, 701 N.E.2d 1084 (1998). We review the trial court\u2019s granting of a summary judgment de novo. In re Estate of Rennick, 181 Ill. 2d 395, 401, 692 N.E.2d 1150 (1998).\u201d\n\u201cWhere no factual issues are raised on appeal, the sole question on review is whether the trial court\u2019s entry of summary judgment is proper as a matter of law.\u201d Spiegel v. Zurich Insurance Co., 293 Ill. App. 3d 129, 132 (1997). As a result, we are to conduct an independent review of this issue. Abrams also commented generally upon an insurer\u2019s duty to defend:\n\u201cAn insurer\u2019s duty to defend, which is much broader than its duty to indemnify, is generally determined by comparing the allegations of the underlying complaint against the insured to the language of the insurance policy. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 125, 607 N.E.2d 1204 (1992). If the facts alleged in the underlying complaint fall even potentially within the policy\u2019s coverage, the insurer is obligated to defend its insured. American States Insurance Co. v. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d 473, 479, 687 N.E.2d 72 (1997); Crum & Forster Managers Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 156 Ill. 2d 384, 393, 620 N.E.2d 1073 (1993). This is true even if the allegations are groundless, false, or fraudulent. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Wilkin Insulation Co., 144 Ill. 2d 64, 73, 578 N.E.2d 926 (1991). In determining the insurer\u2019s duty to defend, \u2018[t]he allegations in the underlying complaint must be liberally construed in favor of the insured.\u2019 Outboard Marine, 154 Ill. 2d at 125. Additionally, if a provision of the insurance policy can reasonably be said to be ambiguous, that provision will be construed in favor of the insured. United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Schnackenberg, 88 Ill. 2d 1, 4, 429 N.E.2d 1203 (1981). We will not, however, distort the language of a policy to create an ambiguity where one does not exist. Smith v. Neu-mann, 289 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 1064, 682 N.E.2d 1245 (1997).\u201d Abrams, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 549.\nIn other words, these rules of construction do not justify construing a contract against an insurer where no real ambiguity exists. Cobbins v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 53 Ill. 2d 285, 294 (1972).\nMcHugh\u2019s argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in granting American\u2019s motion for summary judgment and finding that it had no duty to defend McHugh in the underlying action. McHugh first asserts that the policy does not exclude the tort allegations raised in the underlying complaint from American\u2019s coverage of the additional insureds. Specifically, McHugh points to a portion of endorsement form 2030M, which provides:\n\u201cThe person or organization [McHugh] is an additional insured but only with respect to your [Spectrum\u2019s] acts or omissions in connection with \u2018your work\u2019 for that additional insured by you or on your behalf at the location designated in the agreement and designated in a Certificate of Insurance issued by our authorized producer.\u201d\nUnder provision (2)(c) of endorsement form 2030M, McHugh notes, it is entitled to a defense of the lawsuit so long as it is possible that the injuries incurred by Marciano arose out of Spectrum\u2019s work on the project.\nAs to provision (2)(c), because the term \u201carising out of\u2019 does not necessarily require that Spectrum be the sole cause of the injury or damage (Sportmart, Inc. v. Daisy Manufacturing Co., 268 Ill. App. 3d 974, 978 (1994)), McHugh argues that American \u201ccannot rely on the possibility of McHugh\u2019s liability to deny a duty to defend.\u201d Indeed, McHugh argues, this is unlike other cases where the provision requires that the liability of the named insured be the sole and proximate cause of the injury. See American Country Insurance Co. v. Cline, 309 Ill. App. 3d 501, 507 (1999) (held that the additional insured was not entitled to a defense where the policy provided coverage \u201c \u2018solely limited to liability specifically resulting from the conduct of the Named Insured which may be imputed to the Additional Insured\u2019 \u201d). Accordingly, McHugh claims, because there is no requirement that Spectrum be the only negligent actor, so long as the complaint relates to the named insured\u2019s work, there is a potential for coverage and the policy is triggered.\nMcHugh also asserts that the present facts fit the prototypical construction site \u201cadditional insured\u201d case. In that scenario, the employee of a contractor injured in the course of his employment on a construction site sues another entity, usually the premises owner or another contractor, who is an additional insured under his employer\u2019s liability policy. Under such a factual situation, this court has frequently found that the additional insured is covered because it is apparent that the worker\u2019s injury arose out of the named insured\u2019s operations, and \u201cbut for\u201d the plaintiff\u2019s presence on the site in the service of the named insured, the accident would not have happened. See, e.g., J.A. Jones Construction Co. v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 269 Ill. App. 3d 148 (1995); West Bend Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sundance Homes, Inc., 238 IE. App. 3d 335 (1992); Shell Oil Co. v. AC&S, Inc., 271 Ill. App. 3d 898 (1995); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Chicago & North Western Transportation Co., 126 Ill. App. 3d 150 (1984).\nDefendants assert that in the present case, the same factual pattern exists: \u201cMarciano was hurt while working on or near scaffolding that he used as a mason. He was on the site and project not at the behest of McHugh; rather, he was working for, and at the immediate direction of, his employer Spectrum Stone. *** But for the fact of his employment with Spectrum, Marciano would not have been at the construction site and would not have been injured.\u201d Thus, where Marciano\u2019s injuries were related to Spectrum\u2019s presence and work on the site, McHugh concludes that American\u2019s duty to defend should have been triggered. We disagree.\nAs counsel for McHugh admitted during appellate oral arguments, the Marciano complaint alleges only direct negligence against McHugh. Accordingly, it does not trigger a duty to defend. In particular, Marciano alleged that McHugh erected or caused to be erected the scaffolding from which he fell; that McHugh failed to warn him of the danger posed by the scaffolding; that McHugh failed to properly inspect, manage and supervise the jobsite; that McHugh failed to provide adequate safeguards to prevent injury; and that these acts or omissions proximately caused his injury.\nSuch allegations, we think, take the Marciano complaint outside the protection of American\u2019s endorsement to Spectrum and place it squarely within the coverage exclusion that makes American\u2019s policy inapplicable to allegations of \u201c \u2018Bodily Injury\u2019 or \u2018property damage\u2019 arising out of any act or omission of the additional insured(s) or any of their employees.\u201d In other words, we find that the. endorsement requires, as a prerequisite to coverage for an additional insured, that the underlying complaint at least leaves open the possibility that the injuries at issue could have arisen out of the acts or omissions of Spectrum, provided that McHugh is not itself negligent by an act or omission.\nWe also find that recent holdings of this court suggest that the additional insured endorsement American had with Spectrum does not obligate it to defend McHugh. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Cincinnati Insurance Co., 283 Ill. App. 3d 1011 (1996); American Country Insurance Co. v. Kraemer Brothers, Inc., 298 Ill. App. 3d 805 (1998); American Country Insurance Co. v. Cline, 309 Ill. App. 3d 501 (1999); National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh v. R. Olson Construction Contractors, Inc., 329 Ill. App. 3d 228 (2002). In each of those cases, the court interpreted additional insured endorsements similar to that in the present case under nearly identical facts and excluded coverage for additional insureds by way of summary judgment.\nIn those cases, as here, the tort plaintiff was an employee of the named insured who was injured in the course of his employment and alleged direct negligence on the part of the additional insured without including a claim against the named insured. In Cline and Kraemer Brothers, the additional insured endorsement provided \u201c \u2018no coverage to the Additional Insured ***, other than which may be imputed to the Additional Insured by virtue of the conduct of the Named Insured.\u2019 \u201d Cline, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 504; Kraemer Brothers, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 808. Similarly, the additional insured clause in Hoffman Estates only covered additional insureds \u201c \u2018with respect to liability incurred solely as a result of some act or omission of the NAMED INSURED.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis omitted.) Hoffman Estates, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 1013. The additional insured provision in National Union excluded coverage for the additional insured\u2019s \u201c \u2018own negligence or the negligence of its servants, agents or employees.\u2019 \u201d National Union, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 232. In reviewing those additional insured endorsements, this court found in all four instances that an underlying complaint that alleges negligence only on the part of the additional insured did not trigger a duty to defend or indemnify. Cline, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 515; Kraemer Brothers, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 814; Village of Hoffman Estates, 283 III. App. 3d at 1014; National Union, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 234.\nLike the underlying complaints in those cases, the underlying complaint in the present case only alleges negligence on the part of the additional insured, McHugh. In addition, the additional insured endorsement here, like the additional insured endorsements at issue in the foregoing cases, does not cover the direct negligence of McHugh, the additional insured. Therefore, for the reasons stated in Cline, Kraemer Brothers, Hoffman Estates, and National Union, McHugh is not entitled to a defense as a matter of law.\nIn so holding, we find Illinois Emcasco Insurance Co. v. Northwestern National Casualty Co., 337 Ill. App. 3d 356 (2003), appeal denied, 204 Ill. 2d 660 (2003), cited by McHugh in its reply brief and the most recent case to grapple with this issue, to be factually inapposite. There, Rodriguez, a workman at a construction site, sued both the general contractor and his subcontractor employer for damages resulting from a work-related injury. The additional insured policy provision issued by Northwestern contained a specific endorsement for covering the general contractor, but \u201c \u2018only with respect to liability imputed to [the general contractor] as a result of negligent acts or omissions of [the subcontractor].\u2019 \u201d Emcasco, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 358. The general contractor tendered its defense to Northwestern, which replied that it was \u201c \u2018unable to accept this tender of defense due to many unknown facts.\u2019 \u201d Emcasco, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 359. However, Northwestern also did not sue for a judgment declaring that it had no duty to defend the general contractor. Emcasco, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 359.\nThe general contractor\u2019s general liability insurer, Emcasco, agreed to defend the general contractor, but then sued for a declaratory judgment and for damages attendant to Northwestern\u2019s breach of its insurance contract. Emcasco, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 359. Both Northwestern and Emcasco moved for summary judgment on Emcasco\u2019s claim against Northwestern for breach of contract, and the trial court found that Northwestern had no duty to defend the general contractor. Accordingly, the trial court granted Northwestern summary judgment on Emcasco\u2019s complaint. Emcasco, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 359. In apparent reliance on Cline and its ilk, the trial court reasoned:\n\u201c \u2018[L]ooking at those pleadings [Rodriguez filed against the general contractor], nowhere in them do they present potential coverage under additional insurance endorsement of Northwestern policy. ***\nUltimately, it may turn out that the [subcontractor] here will be found to have been an agent of the general contractor.\nAnd that the liability of the general contractor may result from negligence of the [subcontractor] being imputed to it within the meaning of this additional insured endorsement.\nBut realistically pleadings do not fairly present the policy.\u2019 \u201d Em-casco, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 359.\nIn reversing the trial court, this court began by emphasizing the standard used to determine whether an underlying complaint potentially falls within the pale of an insurer\u2019s policy:\n\u201cCourts look to the allegations of the underlying complaint to determine an insurer\u2019s duty to defend its insured. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Wilkin Insulation Co., 144 Ill. 2d 64, 73 (1991). The insurer has a duty to defend if the complaint alleges facts potentially within policy coverage. Wilkin, 144 Ill. 2d at 73. \u2018An insurer may not justifiably refuse to defend an action against its insured unless it is clear from the face of the underlying complaints that the allegations fail to state facts which bring the case within, or potentially within, the policy\u2019s coverage.\u2019 (Emphasis omitted.) Wilkin, 144 Ill. 2d at 73. The court must resolve all doubts concerning the scope of coverage in favor of the insured. Wilkin, 144 Ill. 2d at 74.\u201d Emcasco, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 359.\nIn other words, the Emcasco court reasoned:\n\u201cThe insurer may refuse to defend only if the insurance contract cannot possibly cover the liability arising from the facts alleged, and the contract cannot possibly cover that liability only when the terms of the policy clearly preclude the possibility of coverage. As the court said in Insurance Co. of the State of Pennsylvania v. Protective Insurance Co., 227 Ill. App. 3d 360, 367 (1992), \u2018an insurer can justifiably refuse to defend only when the allegations of the complaint clearly show on their face that the claim is beyond the coverage of the policy.\u2019 [Citations.] Thus, if the insurance covers the liability on any set of facts consistent with the allegations needed to support recovery on any theory raised in the complaint, the insurance company cannot simply refuse to defend, without suing for a judgment declaring that it has no duty to defend.\u201d Em-casco, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 360.\nIn applying the Wilkin standard to the facts before it, the Emcasco court ultimately concluded that this court\u2019s previous determination in Cline (and similar cases) resulted from an improper focus on the language of the underlying complaint in determining whether it was potentially within the scope of the policy:\n\u201cWe cannot agree with Cline insofar as it suggested that the failure to specifically identify [the subcontractor] as the negligent actor relieved [the insurance company] of the duty to defend. \u2018[T]he duty to defend does not require that the complaint allege or use language affirmatively bringing the claims within the scope of the policy. The question of coverage should not hinge on the draftsmanship skills or whims of the plaintiff in the underlying action.\u2019 International Insurance Co. v. Rollprint Packaging Products, Inc., 312 Ill. App. 3d 998, 1007 (2000). The insurer\u2019s duty to defend does not depend upon a sufficient suggestion of liability raised in the complaint; instead, the insurer has the duty to defend unless the allegations of the underlying complaint demonstrate that the plaintiff in the underlying suit will not be able to prove the insured liable, under any theory supported by the complaint, without also proving facts that show the loss falls outside the coverage of the insurance policy. [Citations.] The insurer may simply refuse to defend only if the allegations of the underlying complaint preclude any possibility of coverage.\u201d Emcasco, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 361.\nThe Emcasco court held that because there existed the possibility of imputed liability between the general contractor and the subcontractor, there was at least one set of facts that potentially brought the underlying complaint under the policy\u2019s coverage which, in turn, triggered the insurance company\u2019s duty to defend. Emcasco, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 362. Thus, the Emcasco court reversed the trial court\u2019s decision granting Northwestern summary judgment on Emcasco\u2019s complaint and remanded for determination of the appropriate relief for the breach of contract. Emcasco, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 362.\nWe think the court in Emcasco was dealing with a very different factual situation. There, the underlying complaint named both the general contractor and the subcontractor \u2014 presumably for whom the underlying plaintiff worked \u2014 as defendants. Curiously, the Emcasco court did not refer to the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act\u2019s bar against injured workers suing their own employers, or explain why the underlying plaintiff added a party that was apparently his employer as a codefendant. However, despite the Emcasco court\u2019s assertion that \u201c[w]e cannot agree with Cline insofar as it suggested that the failure to specifically identify [the subcontractor that purchased the additional insured clause for the general contractor] as the negligent actor relieved American of the duty to defend\u201d (Emcasco, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 361), the underlying plaintiff in Emcasco specifically did identify his employer in his complaint. And because both acts of the insured and the additional insured were referenced in the underlying complaint, the court had no choice but to find \u201c[t]he possibility of imputed liability that the complaint left open required Northwestern to defend [the general contractor].\u201d Emcasco, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 362. Such is not the case here.\nIn the present case, the underlying complaint alleges:\n\u201c8. Notwithstanding its duty, at said time and place, the Defendants, by and through their agents, servants, and employees, were then and there guilty of one or more of the following careless and negligent acts and/or omissions: ***.\u201d\nThe complaint then goes on to list nine different negligent acts or omissions allegedly committed by the defendants \u201cthrough their agents, servants, and employees.\u201d As counsel for McHugh admitted during appellate oral arguments, those allegations can only be read to assert the direct liability of McHugh, and say nothing \u2014 even remotely \u2014 of Spectrum or McHugh\u2019s relationship with Spectrum. Accordingly, the underlying complaint in the present case, combined with the evidence before us, forecloses any possibility that McHugh could have been found liable based upon the conduct of the named insured, Spectrum. And because those allegations preclude coverage for McHugh, we hold that the trial court correctly found that American had no duty to defend or indemnify. See American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Enright, 334 Ill. App. 3d 1026, 1029 (2002) (held that where the insurer owes no duty to defend, it owes no duty to indemnify).\nAlternatively, McHugh claims that because the American policy contains at least three endorsements under which McHugh is entitled to coverage for the Marciano lawsuit, the policy is ambiguous. As McHugh notes, if the intention of the parties to an insurance policy cannot be reasonably interpreted or if the terms in it are susceptible to more than one construction, the policy is ambiguous. Seeburg Corp. of Delaware v. United Founders Life Insurance Co. of Illinois, 82 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1039 (1980). And, McHugh notes, when a policy is determined to be ambiguous, all ambiguities are to be construed most strongly against the drafter and in favor of the insured. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 108-09 (1992).\nHowever, in all three purportedly applicable endorsements, coverage is afforded only \u201cto liability specifically resulting from the conduct of the named insured which may be imputed to the additional insured\u201d; \u201cwith respect to liability arising out of [the named insured\u2019s] ongoing operations performed for that insured\u201d; and \u201cwith respect to [the named insured\u2019s] actions or omissions in connection with [the named insured\u2019s] work for that additional insured by [the named insured] or on [the named insured\u2019s] behalf.\u201d In other words, even if we were to assume that American\u2019s policy was ambiguous, which we do not, it is clear that each potential endorsement does not cover the direct negligence of McHugh, the additional insured. And where the Marciano complaint only alleges negligence on the part of the additional insured McHugh, no potential for coverage exists under any endorsement.\nIn light of this conclusion, we need not decide American\u2019s argument regarding its \u201ctender to others\u201d clause in its policy with Spectrum. Quite simply, because American never had a duty to defend McHugh against the allegations in the Marciano complaint in the first place, it is unnecessary to determine whether McHugh adequately complied with American\u2019s \u201cconditions precedent\u201d before giving a proper tender to American. Likewise, it is unnecessary to consider McHugh\u2019s estoppel arguments. Regardless of American\u2019s actions prior to the inception of the underlying lawsuit, the underlying complaint simply did not allege any tortious conduct that was not already specifically excluded.\nIn the end, because we find that we, like the trial court, retain jurisdiction of this matter, we deny defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss. Moreover, we hold that because Marciano\u2019s complaint foreclosed the possibility of imputed liability between Spectrum and McHugh, American had no duty to defend and, thus, no duty to indemnify. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court\u2019s decision denying McHugh\u2019s motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment to American. In light of our holding that the plaintiff had no duty to defend, it is unnecessary for us to address American\u2019s arguments regarding its \u201ctender to others\u201d provision or McHugh\u2019s estoppel argument.\nAffirmed.\nQUINN, EJ., and THEIS, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GREIMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert J. Franco and Vincent E Tomkiewicz, both of Bollinger, Ruberry & Garvey, of Chicago, for appellants.", "Alvin R. Becker, of Beermann, Swerdlove, Woloshin & Barezky, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "AMERICAN COUNTRY INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES McHUGH CONSTRUCTION COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1-02-2826\nOpinion filed December 4, 2003.\nRobert J. Franco and Vincent E Tomkiewicz, both of Bollinger, Ruberry & Garvey, of Chicago, for appellants.\nAlvin R. Becker, of Beermann, Swerdlove, Woloshin & Barezky, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0960-01", "first_page_order": 978, "last_page_order": 995 }