{ "id": 3739480, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PAUL A. SMITH, Defendant-Appellant.-THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GEORGE NELSON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Smith", "decision_date": "2004-01-09", "docket_number": "Nos. 2-02-0910, 2-02-0909 cons", "first_page": "179", "last_page": "190", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "345 Ill. App. 3d 179" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "339 Ill. App. 3d 887", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2469757 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "890" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/339/0887-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 343", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351244 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354" }, { "page": "354-55" }, { "page": "355" }, { "page": "355" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0343-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 Ill. 2d 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 198915 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "257" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/166/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 Ill. App. 3d 418", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2183305 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "423" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/328/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 192", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3152614 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206-07" }, { "page": "205-06" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 453273 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "5" }, { "page": "5" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/192/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 U.S. 466", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9413911 ], "weight": 9, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490" }, { "page": "455" }, { "page": "2362-63" }, { "page": "490" }, { "page": "455" }, { "page": "2362-63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/530/0466-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 Ill. App. 3d 793", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1336125 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "802" }, { "page": "802" }, { "page": "802" }, { "page": "802" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/306/0793-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 298", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307257 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "306" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0298-01" ] }, { "cite": "5 Ill. App. 3d 499", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2530089 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "502" }, { "page": "507" }, { "page": "507-08" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/5/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 92", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609697 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "96" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0092-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609702 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171-72" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "207 Ill. 2d 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 974991 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497-98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/207/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 300", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1477020 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0300-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 808, "char_count": 23793, "ocr_confidence": 0.705, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.9578508343931852e-07, "percentile": 0.7376198380677792 }, "sha256": "dbff71b9abf865457caa2e174df7e1cde82f12dd2c57581ecebd921e8ddefeb3", "simhash": "1:fa3fa88a0e4c8094", "word_count": 3954 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:40:04.128176+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "HUTCHINSON, EJ., and McLAREN, J, concur." ], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PAUL A. SMITH, Defendant-Appellant.\u2014THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GEORGE NELSON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GILLERAN JOHNSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn case No. 01 \u2014 CF\u20143030, the defendant, Paul Smith, was convicted of aggravated driving while license revoked (DWLR) (625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 303(a), (d) (West 2000)), a Class 4 felony. Smith was sentenced to 60 days\u2019 imprisonment in the Du Page County jail and two years\u2019 probation. On appeal, Smith argues that, in sentencing him as a Class 4 felony DWLR offender, the trial court improperly considered a prior conviction of driving under the influence (DUI) that had resulted from a bond forfeiture.\nIn case No. 02 \u2014 CF\u2014559, the defendant, George Nelson, was convicted of aggravated DUI (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(a)(2), (c \u2014 1)(3) (West 2002)), a Class 2 felony, and of obstructing justice (720 ILCS 5/31 \u2014 4(a) (West 2002)), a Class 4 felony. Nelson was sentenced to two concurrent terms of six years\u2019 imprisonment in the Illinois Department of Corrections. On appeal, Nelson argues that, in sentencing him as a Class 2 DUI felony offender, the trial court improperly considered a prior conviction of DUI that had resulted from a bond forfeiture. He additionally argues that the trial court erred in imposing an extended-term sentence for his obstructing justice conviction.\nAt issue in both case No. 01 \u2014 CF\u20143030 and case No. 02 \u2014 CF\u2014 559 is whether a trial court may consider a conviction that arose from a bond forfeiture in imposing an enhanced sentence. Therefore, on July 18, 2003, we consolidated the two cases to facilitate review of that issue.\nBACKGROUND\nCase No. 01 \u2014 CF\u20143030\nOn October 26, 2001, Smith was charged by indictment with aggravated DWLR (625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 303(a), (d) (West 2000)). The indictment alleged that (1) Smith had committed the offense while his driver\u2019s license was revoked for DUI and (2) Smith previously had been convicted of DWLR.\nThe trial court conducted a bench trial. Wheaton police officer Dennis Smith testified that on October 26, 2001, he observed a vehicle traveling on Butterfield Road at a high rate of speed. Officer Dennis Smith used a handheld radar device and determined that the vehicle was traveling 62 miles per hour. The speed limit on Butterfield Road was 40 miles per hour. Officer Dennis Smith stopped the vehicle, which was driven by Smith. When officer Dennis Smith asked Smith for his license, Smith stated that his license was revoked.\nThe State introduced a driver\u2019s abstract from the Illinois Secretary of State\u2019s office. The driver\u2019s abstract revealed that Smith\u2019s driver\u2019s license had been revoked since 1986 due to a DUI conviction. The 1986 conviction and subsequent revocation resulted from a bond forfeiture. The driver\u2019s abstract further revealed that Smith had previously committed offenses of DWLR in 2000 and in August 2001. Following the trial, the trial court found Smith guilty of DWLR.\nAt the sentencing hearing, the trial court determined that the 1986 bond forfeiture conviction of DUI and subsequent revocation could be considered for purposes of enhancing Smith\u2019s DWLR offense under section 6 \u2014 303(d) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Vehicle Code) (625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 303(d) (West 2000)). In considering Smith\u2019s prior DUI conviction, along with his previous convictions of DWLR, the trial court sentenced Smith, as a Class 4 DWLR offender, to 60 days\u2019 imprisonment in the Du Page County jail and 2 years\u2019 probation. Smith thereafter filed a timely appeal.\nCase No. 02 \u2014 CF\u2014559\nOn March 26, 2002, Nelson was charged by indictment with aggravated DUI (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(a)(2), (c \u2014 1)(3) (West 2002)). The indictment alleged that (1) Nelson committed the offense while his driver\u2019s license was revoked for DUI and (2) Nelson had previously committed three or more violations of DUI. Nelson was also charged by indictment with obstructing justice (720 ILCS 5/31 \u2014 4(a) (West 2002)).\nThe trial court held a stipulated bench trial on the aggravated DUI charge. At the trial, the State proffered that on January 7, 2002, Wheaton police officer Claiendo conducted a traffic stop on a motor vehicle driven by Nelson for improper lane usage and failure to signal. Officer Claiendo observed that Nelson had red and glassy eyes, a strong odor of alcohol on his breath, and slurred speech. Nelson had difficulty performing field sobriety tests. Nelson admitted to Officer Claiendo that he had been drinking. Following the introduction of this stipulated evidence, the trial court found Nelson guilty of DUI.\nNelson pleaded guilty to the obstructing justice charge. According to the State, when Nelson was arrested on January 7, 2002, for DUI, he told police that his name was Charles Racer. Nelson also presented police with false identification.\nAt the sentencing hearing, the State presented a driver\u2019s abstract from the Illinois Secretary of State\u2019s office. The driver\u2019s abstract revealed that Nelson\u2019s driver\u2019s license had been revoked since 1966 for DUI. The driver\u2019s abstract further revealed that Nelson had five prior convictions of DUI, two in 1966 and one in 1971, 1986, and 1995. Nelson\u2019s convictions of DUI in 1966 and 1971 were the result of bond forfeitures.\nThe trial court determined that the bond forfeiture convictions of DUI could be considered for purposes of enhancing Nelson\u2019s DUI offense under section 11 \u2014 5Ql(c\u20141)(3) of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(c\u20141)(3) (West 2002)). The trial court subsequently sentenced Nelson, as a Class 2 DUI offender, to a term of six years\u2019 imprisonment in the Illinois Department of Corrections on the aggravated DUI conviction. The trial court sentenced Nelson to a maximum extended term of six years\u2019 imprisonment in the Illinois Department of Corrections on the obstruction of justice conviction. The court ordered that Nelson\u2019s sentences run concurrently. Following the denial of his motion to reconsider sentence, Nelson filed a timely appeal.\nDISCUSSION\nCase No. 01 \u2014 CF\u20143030\nOn appeal, Smith contends that the trial court improperly considered a prior DUI conviction and revocation that had resulted from a bond forfeiture in sentencing him as a Class 4 felony DWLR offender. Section 6 \u2014 303(a) of the Vehicle Code provides that a defendant commits the offense of DWLR if he or she:\n\u201cdrives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle on any highway of this State at a time when such person\u2019s driver\u2019s license, permit or privilege to do so or the privilege to obtain a driver\u2019s license or permit is revoked or suspended as provided by this Code or the law of another state.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 303(a) (West 2000).\nGenerally, DWLR is a Class A misdemeanor. 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 303(a) (West 2000).\nHowever, DWLR may be enhanced to a Class 4 felony, upon the existence of certain aggravating circumstances. 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 303(d) (West 2000). In particular, section 6 \u2014 303(d) of the Vehicle Code, the section under which Smith was convicted, provides:\n\u201cAny person convicted of a second or subsequent violation of this Section shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony if the original revocation or suspension was for a violation of Section 11 \u2014 401 or 11 \u2014 501 of this Code, or a similar out-of-state offense ***.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/6\u2014 303(d) (West 2000).\nThe issue before us is whether a DWLR conviction can be enhanced based on a prior conviction that resulted from a bond forfeiture. Our research has failed to reveal any previous, applicable explanations of section 6 \u2014 303(d). Accordingly, we will apply the appropriate rules of statutory interpretation. The cardinal rule of statutory construction, to which all other rules are subordinate, is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent. In re Detention of Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d 300, 307 (2002). The best indicator of the legislature\u2019s intent is the language of the statute; such language should be accorded its plain or ordinary and popularly understood meaning. All parts of the statute should be considered together. People v. Hanna, 207 Ill. 2d 486, 497-98 (2003). In determining the legislature\u2019s intent, the court should consider, in addition to the statutory language, the reason for the law, the problems to be remedied, and the objects and purposes sought. People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 171-72 (2003). Issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law subject to de novo review. Eads v. Heritage Enterprises, Inc., 204 Ill. 2d 92, 96 (2003).\nThe plain language of section 6 \u2014 303(d) reveals that the legislature intended to punish repeat DWLR offenders more severely than first-time offenders. Pursuant to this provision, a DWLR offender with a prior conviction of DWLR may be sentenced as a Class 4 felon if the revocation was based on a violation of section 11 \u2014 501 of the Vehicle Code, the DUI statute. The two most significant words in section 6 \u2014 303(d) are the terms \u201cconviction\u201d and \u201cviolation.\u201d The term \u201cconviction\u201d is defined in both the Criminal Code of 1961 and the Unified Code of Corrections as:\n\u201ca judgment of conviction or sentence entered upon a plea of guilty or upon a verdict or finding of guilty of an offense.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 5 (West 2000); 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 1\u20145 (West 2000).\nThis definition does not include convictions based on bond forfeiture or default orders.\nHowever, the Vehicle Code offers an alternate definition of \u201cconviction\u201d that includes convictions based on bond forfeitures or default orders. Section 6 \u2014 100(b) of the Vehicle Code provides that a conviction is:\n\u201c[a] final adjudication of guilty by a court of competent jurisdiction either after a bench trial, trial by jury, plea of guilty, order of forfeiture, or default.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 100(b) (West 2000).\nSection 6 \u2014 204(c) of the Vehicle Code further describes the term \u201cconviction.\u201d That section states:\n\u201c[A] forfeiture of bail or collateral deposited to secure a defendant\u2019s appearance in court when forfeiture has not been vacated, or the failure of a defendant to appear for trial after depositing his driver\u2019s license in lieu of other bail, shall be equivalent to a conviction.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 204(c) (West 2000).\nA third provision of the Vehicle Code defines \u201cconviction.\u201d Section 6 \u2014 500 provides:\n\u201c \u2018Conviction\u2019 means an unvacated adjudication of guilt or a determination that a person has violated or failed to comply with the law in a court of original jurisdiction or an authorized administrative tribunal; an unvacated forfeiture of bail or collateral deposited to secure the person\u2019s appearance in court ***.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 500 (West 2000).\nFinally, section 6 \u2014 700(c) of the Vehicle Code states:\n\u201c \u2018Conviction\u2019 means a conviction of any offense related to the use or operation of a motor vehicle which is prohibited by state law, municipal ordinance or administrative rule or regulation, or a forfeiture of bail, bond or other security deposited to secure appearance by a person charged with having committed any such offense, and which conviction or forfeiture is required to be reported to the licensing authority.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 700(c) (West 2000).\nGiving effect to the unambiguous language in each of these provisions, we conclude that, for purposes of the offenses outlined in the Vehicle Code, the term \u201cconviction\u201d encompasses convictions that resulted from bond forfeitures or default orders.\nOur interpretation is consistent with that of the Appellate Court, First District, in People v. Harvey, 5 Ill. App. 3d 499 (1972). In Harvey, the defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter, DWLR, leaving the scene of an accident involving personal injury, and failure to report an accident within 48 hours. Harvey, 5 Ill. App. 3d at 502. On appeal, the defendant complained, among other things, that his sentence was excessive because the trial court improperly considered prior DUI convictions that arose from bond forfeitures. Harvey, 5 Ill. App. 3d at 507. Citing to the Vehicle Code\u2019s definition of \u201cconviction,\u201d the Harvey court rejected the defendant\u2019s argument, finding that a bond forfeiture conviction was equivalent to any other conviction. Harvey, 5 Ill. App. 3d at 507-08.\nThe term \u201cviolation\u201d is not defined by statute. We may accordingly assume that the legislature intended for the word to possess its ordinary and popularly understood meaning. See People v. Sheehan, 168 Ill. 2d 298, 306 (1995). This court has previously defined a violation as \u201can \u2018[ijnjury; infringement; breach of right, duty or law; ravishment; seduction. The act of breaking, infringing, or transgressing the law.\u2019 \u201d People v. Jones, 306 Ill. App. 3d 793, 802 (1999), quoting Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1570 (6th ed. 1990). As is apparent, the term \u201cviolation\u201d is broader in scope than the term \u201cconviction.\u201d One may violate a statute without being convicted of such. See Jones, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 802. On the other hand, one who is convicted of an offense is deemed to have violated that statute.\nApplying our interpretation of section 6 \u2014 303(d) and its terms to the present case, we determine that Smith\u2019s DWLR offense was properly enhanced to a Class 4 felony. First, as required by section 6 \u2014 303(d), Smith had a prior conviction of DWLR. Second, Smith committed the offense while his driver\u2019s license was revoked due to a violation of the DUI statute. We note that Smith\u2019s DUI conviction and revocation resulted from a bond forfeiture. However, under the Vehicle Code, a conviction that stems from a bond forfeiture is equivalent to any other conviction. A conviction is necessarily a violation.\nContrary to Smith\u2019s concerns, our ruling does not run afoul of the rule articulated in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). In Apprendi, the United States Supreme Court held that any fact, other than a prior conviction, that increases the penalty for an offense beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63. The Supreme Court reasoned that prior convictions do not implicate Apprendi because they involve proceedings equipped with procedural safeguards. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63. The defendant\u2019s previous DUI conviction, although it resulted from a bond forfeiture, falls within the prior conviction or recidivist exception to Apprendi.\nAgain, for purposes of the Vehicle Code, a conviction that results from a bond forfeiture is functionally equivalent to any other conviction. Although Smith argues otherwise, bond forfeiture proceedings are not devoid of procedural safeguards. We note that when a defendant fails to appear on charges under the Vehicle Code and consequently sustains a conviction by way of a bond forfeiture, the defendant may move to vacate that conviction. However, when a defendant fails to avail himself of this safeguard, the legislature has permitted courts to infer that the defendant has committed the offense. See 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 100, 6 \u2014 204(c), 6 \u2014 500, 6 \u2014 700(c) (West 2000). This inference passes constitutional muster. Highway driving is a privilege and not a right. People v. Jung, 192 Ill. 2d 1, 5 (2000). When a person obtains a driver\u2019s license, he consents to the conditions imposed by the legislature in exchange for that privilege. Jung, 192 Ill. 2d at 5. One such condition is that a conviction that arises from a bond forfeiture is like any other conviction upon which a court may rely in imposing an enhanced sentence. Therefore, we find that the trial court did not err in sentencing Smith as a Class 4 DWLR offender.\nCase No. 02 \u2014 CF\u2014559\nNelson similarly contends in his appeal that the trial court improperly considered a previous DUI conviction that had resulted from a bond forfeiture in sentencing him as a Class 2 felony DUI offender. The statute defining the offense of DUI provides in part:\n\u201c(a) A person shall not drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle within this State while:\n(1) the alcohol concentration in the person\u2019s blood or breath is 0.08 or more based on the definition of blood and breath units in Section 11 \u2014 501.2;\n(2) under the influence of alcohol;\n(3) under the influence of any intoxicating compound or combination of intoxicating compounds to a degree that renders the person incapable of driving safely[.]\u201d 625 ILCS 5/11\u2014 501(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3) (West 2002).\nDUI is generally a Class A misdemeanor. 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(c) (West 2002).\nHowever, like DWLR, DUI may be enhanced upon the existence of certain aggravating circumstances. DUI may be enhanced to a Class 4, Class 3, or Class 2 felony. 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(c\u20141)(1), (c \u2014 1)(2), (c\u2014 1)(3) (West 2002). Section 11 \u2014 501(c\u20141)(3) of the Vehicle Code, the section under which Nelson was convicted, states:\n\u201cA person who violates this Section a fourth or subsequent time during a period in which his or her driving privileges are revoked or suspended where the revocation or suspension was for a violation of this Section, Section 11 \u2014 501.1, paragraph (b) of Section 11 \u2014 401, or Section 9 \u2014 3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 is guilty of a Class 2 felony.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(c\u20141)(3) (West 2002).\nOur interpretation of the DUI statute is analogous to our interpretation of the DWLR statute. The plain language of section 11 \u2014 501(c\u20141)(3) clearly reveals the legislature\u2019s intent to punish repeat DUI offenders more severely than first-time offenders. Pursuant to this section, a DUI offender with three or more prior DUI offenses may be sentenced as a Class 2 felon if the offender has committed the present offense while his or her driver\u2019s license was revoked or suspended for a violation of the DUI statute. 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(c\u2014 1)(3) (West 2002).\nAgain, the word \u201cviolation\u201d is significant. As previously explained, a violation is \u201can c[i]njury; infringement; breach of right, duty or law; ravishment; seduction. The act of breaking, infringing, or transgressing the law.\u2019 \u201d People v. Jones, 306 Ill. App. 3d 793, 802 (1999), quoting Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1570 (6th ed. 1990). The term \u201cviolation\u201d is broader in scope than the term \u201cconviction.\u201d See Jones, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 802. One who is convicted of an offense is deemed to have violated that statute.\nFinally, for purposes of the offenses outlined in the Vehicle Code, a conviction that arose from a bond forfeiture is equivalent to any other conviction. 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 100(b), 6 \u2014 204(c), 6 \u2014 500(8), 6 \u2014 700(c) (West 2002). Accordingly, one who has been convicted of an offense under the Vehicle Code by way of a bond forfeiture has necessarily violated that statute.\nApplying these principles .to section 11 \u2014 501(c\u20141)(3), we conclude that the trial court properly sentenced Nelson as a Class 2 felony DUI offender. First, as required by section 11 \u2014 501(c\u20141)(3), Nelson had three prior violations of the DUI statute. Specifically, Nelson had five prior DUI convictions, which are prior violations. We note that two of Nelson\u2019s DUI convictions resulted from bond forfeitures. However, Nelson\u2019s bond forfeiture convictions are no different from any of his other convictions. Second, Nelson committed the present offense while his driver\u2019s license was revoked for a violation of the DUI statute. Although Nelson\u2019s conviction of DUI and subsequent revocation arose from a bond forfeiture, Nelson\u2019s driver\u2019s license was nonetheless revoked due to a violation of the DUI statute.\nNelson additionally contends on appeal that the trial court erred in imposing an extended-term sentence of six years\u2019 imprisonment for his obstructing justice conviction. Nelson argues, relying on People v. Jordan, 103 Ill. 2d 192, 206-07 (1984), that he should have been sentenced to an extended-term sentence only on the most serious offense of which he was convicted, the aggravated DUI.\nThe issue of whether the trial court has imposed an unauthorized sentence is a question of law which we will review de novo. People v. Tooley, 328 Ill. App. 3d 418, 423 (2002). Section 5 \u2014 8\u20142(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections, which governs the imposition of an extended-term sentence, provides:\n\u201cA judge shall not sentence an offender to a term of imprisonment in excess of the maximum sentence authorized by Section 5 \u2014 8\u20141 for the class of the most serious offense of which the offender was convicted unless the factors in aggravation set forth in paragraph (b) of Section 5 \u2014 5\u20143.2 were found to be present.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20142(a) (West 2002).\nIn Jordan, the Illinois Supreme Court interpreted section 5 \u2014 8\u2014 2(a) to mean that a defendant who is convicted of multiple offenses may be sentenced to an extended-term sentence only for those offenses that are within the most serious class. Jordan, 103 Ill. 2d at 205-06. However, in People v. Coleman, 166 Ill. 2d 247, 257 (1995), the supreme court later clarified that extended-term sentences may be imposed \u201con separately charged, differing class offenses that arise from unrelated courses of conduct.\u201d In determining whether a defendant\u2019s multiple offenses arose from \u201cunrelated courses of conduct\u201d for purposes of section 5 \u2014 8\u20142(a), courts should consider whether there was a substantial change in the nature of the defendant\u2019s criminal objective. People v. Bell, 196 Ill. 2d 343, 354 (2001).\nIf there was a substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective, then the defendant\u2019s multiple offenses stem from unrelated courses of conduct and an extended-term sentence may be imposed on differing class offenses. Bell, 196 Ill. 2d at 354-55. If, however, there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective, then the defendant\u2019s offenses are not unrelated courses of conduct but, rather, part of a single course of conduct. Bell, 196 Ill. 2d at 355. When the defendant\u2019s offenses are part of a single course of conduct, an extended-term sentence may be imposed only on those offenses within the most serious class. Bell, 196 Ill. 2d at 355.\nIn the instant case, there was no substantial change in the nature of Nelson\u2019s criminal objective. Nelson first committed the offense of DUI. When police apprehended Nelson for this offense, Nelson presented false identification to avoid being prosecuted for DUI, thereby committing obstruction of justice. There was no substantial change in the nature of Nelson\u2019s objective. Nelson\u2019s two offenses were not even independently motivated. Thus, the two offenses were part of a single course of conduct. As such, an extended term sentence for the lesser offense, obstructing justice, was improper.\nThe nonextended term for obstruction of justice, a Class 4 felony, is between one and three years\u2019 imprisonment. 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u2014 1(a)(7) (West 2002). Pursuant to our authority under Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(4) (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(b)(4)), we reduce Nelson\u2019s sentence for obstructing justice to the maximum nonextended sentence of three years\u2019 imprisonment. See People v. Muntaner, 339 Ill. App. 3d 887, 890 (2003). Nelson\u2019s three-year obstructing justice sentence will continue to run concurrently with his DUI sentence.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County in appeal No. 2 \u2014 02\u20140910 is affirmed. The circuit court\u2019s judgment in appeal No. 2 \u2014 02\u20140909 is affirmed as modified.\nNo. 2 \u2014 02\u20140910, Affirmed.\nNo. 2 \u2014 02\u20140909, Affirmed as modified.\nHUTCHINSON, EJ., and McLAREN, J, concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GILLERAN JOHNSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller and Bruce Kirkham, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellants.", "Joseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Stephen E. Norris, Kendra S. Peterson, and Trent M. Marshall, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PAUL A. SMITH, Defendant-Appellant.\u2014THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GEORGE NELSON, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNos. 2-02-0910, 2-02-0909 cons.\nOpinion filed January 9, 2004.\nG. Joseph Weller and Bruce Kirkham, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellants.\nJoseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Stephen E. Norris, Kendra S. Peterson, and Trent M. Marshall, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0179-01", "first_page_order": 199, "last_page_order": 210 }