{ "id": 3738850, "name": "JOSEPH K. GERWIN et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE LIVINGSTON COUNTY BOARD et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Gerwin v. Livingston County Board", "decision_date": "2003-12-31", "docket_number": "No. 4-03-0158", "first_page": "352", "last_page": "363", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "345 Ill. App. 3d 352" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "410 N.E.2d 902", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "910-11" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 Ill. App. 3d 581", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3171135 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "590-91" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/88/0581-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 Wis. 2d 553", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wis. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8666716 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "579", "parenthetical": "interpreting a statute requiring that the meeting place be \"reasonably accessible\"" }, { "page": "418", "parenthetical": "interpreting a statute requiring that the meeting place be \"reasonably accessible\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wis-2d/173/0553-01" ] }, { "cite": "273 Ga. 864", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga.", "case_ids": [ 401104 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "865" }, { "page": "295" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga/273/0864-01" ] }, { "cite": "759 N.E.2d 533", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "555" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "198 Ill. 2d 21", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 29953 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "59" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/198/0021-01" ] }, { "cite": "772 N.E.2d 315", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 Ill. App. 3d 582", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1209184 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "587" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/331/0582-01" ] }, { "cite": "701 P.2d 754", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10418938 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "761" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/701/0754-01" ] }, { "cite": "Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 25, \u00a7 303", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Okla. Stat. Ann.", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"All meetings of public bodies *** shall be held at specified times and places which are convenient to the public and shall be open to the public\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 61.820", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Banks-Baldwin 2002" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "270 Minn. 164", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Minn.", "case_ids": [ 317165 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "167" }, { "page": "26" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/minn/270/0164-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 N.E.2d 731", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "735" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 Ill. 2d 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5472704 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "202" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/83/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "1994 Ill. Laws 1416", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "750 N.E.2d 202", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "214" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 70", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351260 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "91" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0070-01" ] }, { "cite": "1995 WL 547784", "category": "reporters:specialty_west", "reporter": "WL", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "*5" }, { "page": "*4" }, { "page": "*4" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 N.M. 398", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1577328 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "400", "parenthetical": "statutory right to \"attend and listen\" means that \"no one will be systematically excluded or arbitrarily refused admittance\" and \"[e]veryone'desiring to attend\" will be \"afforded an opportunity to do so\"" }, { "page": "306", "parenthetical": "statutory right to \"attend and listen\" means that \"no one will be systematically excluded or arbitrarily refused admittance\" and \"[e]veryone'desiring to attend\" will be \"afforded an opportunity to do so\"" }, { "page": "400" }, { "page": "306" }, { "page": "400" }, { "page": "306" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/96/0398-01" ] }, { "cite": "435 N.E.2d 887", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "892" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. App. 3d 587", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3030177 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "594" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/106/0587-01" ] }, { "cite": "489 N.E.2d 308", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 Ill. App. 3d 556", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3532217 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/140/0556-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 N.E.2d 385", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "390" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 Ill. App. 3d 293", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5436580 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "300" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/112/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "786 N.E.2d 980", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "984" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "203 Ill. 2d 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 799409 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/203/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "795 N.E.2d 281", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "290", "parenthetical": "\"quo warranto will not lie because the validity of the annexation process has already been given final judicial approval\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "206 Ill. 2d 541", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1578273 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "558", "parenthetical": "\"quo warranto will not lie because the validity of the annexation process has already been given final judicial approval\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/206/0541-01" ] }, { "cite": "748 N.E.2d 801", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 9, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "811" }, { "page": "811" }, { "page": "811" }, { "page": "811" }, { "page": "811" }, { "page": "811" }, { "page": "811" }, { "page": "811", "parenthetical": "making a distinction between \"perceiv[ing] what was taking place in the meeting\" and \"participating\" in the meeting" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 Ill. App. 3d 897", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 132487 ], "weight": 9, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "907" }, { "page": "908" }, { "page": "907" }, { "page": "907" }, { "page": "907" }, { "page": "907" }, { "page": "907" }, { "page": "907" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/321/0897-01" ] }, { "cite": "775 N.E.2d 231", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "234" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 Ill. App. 3d 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 486854 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "136" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/333/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "720 N.E.2d 1034", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1039" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "188 Ill. 2d 211", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 536023 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "221" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/188/0211-01" ] }, { "cite": "700 N.E.2d 202", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "207" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 Ill. App. 3d 1040", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1073634 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1047" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/298/1040-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1155, "char_count": 26696, "ocr_confidence": 0.74, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0980430457371549e-07, "percentile": 0.5673516100745641 }, "sha256": "a5c483990370997588886aaf48a62227bc3c8ffe7f05e0b5832132e540912a56", "simhash": "1:59b0915daa47a4c7", "word_count": 4446 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:40:04.128176+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "KNECHT, EJ., and MYERSCOUGH, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "JOSEPH K. GERWIN et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE LIVINGSTON COUNTY BOARD et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE APPLETON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiffs, Joseph K. and Carolyn K. Gerwin, sued the Livingston County board and its chairman, John T. Jacobson, for holding a public meeting in an \u201cinconvenient\u201d place, in violation of section 2.01 of the Open Meetings Act (Act) (5 ILCS 120/2.01 (West 2002)). In that meeting, the board voted to amend the county solid-waste disposal plan (plan) so that American Disposal Services of Illinois (American Disposal) could expand a landfill in Pontiac. The trial court allowed American Disposal to intervene as a defendant, and American Disposal and the other defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs\u2019 first-amended complaint, with prejudice, pursuant to sections 2 \u2014 615(e) and 2 \u2014 619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2\u2014 615(e), 2 \u2014 619(a)(9) (West 2002)). The court granted the motions to dismiss, and plaintiffs appeal.\nPlaintiffs argue that because the board knew ahead of time that the meeting would attract more people than would fit into the county boardroom and because alternative venues were available, the boardroom was not \u201cconvenient *** to the public\u201d within the meaning of section 2.01 of the Act. We hold that the issue of public convenience was one of fact that the trial court should not have resolved on the pleadings. Plaintiffs have stated a cause of action, and we reverse the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nI. BACKGROUND\nBecause the trial court dismissed the first-amended complaint pursuant to sections 2 \u2014 615 and 2 \u2014 619, we accept all well-pleaded facts in the first-amended complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences from those facts in plaintiffs favor. See Storm & Associates, Ltd. v. Cuculich, 298 Ill. App. 3d 1040, 1047, 700 N.E.2d 202, 207 (1998). We review the dismissal de novo. Glisson v. City of Marion, 188 Ill. 2d 211, 221, 720 N.E.2d 1034, 1039 (1999); Thomas v. Hileman, 333 Ill. App. 3d 132, 136, 775 N.E.2d 231, 234 (2002).\nPlaintiffs allege the following facts in their first-amended complaint. Allied Waste Disposal, through its subsidiary, American Disposal (we will refer to the two collectively as Allied Waste), operates a landfill in Pontiac. Sometime prior to May 16, 2002, Allied Waste informed the board that it wished to expand the landfill. Such an expansion would have been impermissible under the plan in effect at the time. Therefore, Allied Waste requested the board to amend the plan to allow the expansion. The board published an announcement in a local newspaper that it would hold a public hearing on the proposed amendment on May 16, 2002.\nApproximately 20 members of the public, including Carolyn Ger-win, attended the May 16 meeting. \u201cThe room was crowded ***.\u201d Plaintiffs allege, on information and belief, that Jacobson supported the expansion of the landfill. He announced that members of the public would be allowed only three minutes apiece to address the board on the proposed amendment of the plan. \u201cIn contrast to the limits put on citizens\u2019 comments, representatives of Allied Waste were permitted to address the [bjoard in an interactive format for an extended period of time,\u201d and \u201cJacobson and the [bjoard allowed representatives of Allied Waste to have greater access to [b]oard members during the public meeting than was provided to members of the general public, including [p]laintiffs.\u201d The board decided to delay voting on the proposed amendment of the plan until its meeting scheduled for June 13, 2002.\nIn the meantime, opponents of the landfill collected signatures on petitions and took out \u201clarge ads\u201d in local and regional newspapers, urging citizens to attend a meeting of the agricultural committee scheduled for June 4, 2002, as well as a meeting of the board scheduled for June 13, 2002. (The agricultural committee was a standing committee of the board and had jurisdiction over landfills.)\n\u201c[A]n overflow crowd of citizens\u201d attended the June 4 committee meeting. \u201cMany people,\u201d including Joseph Gerwin, \u201cwere forced to stand in the hallway.\u201d Plaintiffs allege, on information and belief, that the room where the board met had \u201ca maximum capacity of 49 persons under the fire code. This number would have to include the 28 [b]oard members and their advisors.\u201d Carolyn Gerwin managed to get into the boardroom on that occasion and gave the board a petition bearing the signatures of 500 Livingston County residents opposed to the expansion of the landfill.\nThe \u201c[a]dministrative [c]ommittee of the [b]oard\u201d had a meeting on June 6, 2002, and according to the minutes of that meeting, Frank Livingston of the agricultural committee reported that 97 people had attended the June 4 meeting. Another board member, Dee Woodburn, \u201cexpressed concern about the lack of space for spectators in the [b]oard room and asked if there was any possibility of changing the location for the June [b]oard meeting. According to the minutes, \u2018Jacobson suggested it would be difficult to change at this point in time.\u2019 \u201d\nPlaintiffs allege, on information and belief, that Jacobson and the board knew, at least seven days in advance, that the June 13 meeting would attract large numbers of the public. Nevertheless, the board made no effort to move the meeting to a larger room. Plaintiffs allege:\n\u201cDespite inquiries from news organizations and members of the public regarding changing the venue of the meeting to accommodate anticipated crowds, Mr. Jacobson stated to the press and to individuals that the [b]oard would meet in its regular chambers [in the county courthouse,] despite the very limited capacity of the room.\u201d\nPlaintiffs further allege, on information and belief, that Jacobson actually \u201cattempted to discourage public participation in the June 13 board meeting by telling members of the public and the press that the June 13 meeting would not be moved to a larger room.\u201d\nPlaintiffs further allege:\n\u201cIn the past, when large numbers of citizens were known to be interested in matters before the [b]oard, the [b]oard arranged to hold its meeting in a larger space. For example, a meeting concerning property tax caps was held at the Pontiac Township High School.\u201d\nAfter voting to amend the plan, the board held hearings for an entire week on Allied Waste\u2019s application to expand the landfill, and the location of those hearings was the more expansive Pontiac city council chambers rather than the boardroom.\nPlaintiffs further allege, on information and belief, that members of the public began arriving an hour ahead of time for the June 13 board meeting, lining up outside the courthouse, but Allied Waste had \u201cencouraged its employees, union members!,] and their families to arrive at the courthouse extremely early so that they could fill the [b]oard[ ]room with pro-landfill employees.\u201d When Carolyn Gerwin arrived 15 minutes before the meeting, \u201cthe crowd outside the courthouse had grown to at least 75 people. More than 150 people attempted to attend the June 13 meeting.\u201d Although Jacobson and the board knew that most of those people would not fit into the boardroom, they made no arrangements to accommodate them. \u201cSeveral alternatives were available *** that could have provided the public access to the meeting.\u201d\nFive minutes before the meeting, the courthouse doors swung open, and the crowd entered the courthouse, but \u201c[o]nly a few members of the public were able to enter the meeting room.\u201d Plaintiffs allege that \u201c[m]ost of the citizens who were permitted to enter the [b]oard[ ]room were in favor of the landfill. Only a few landfill protesters gained admittance,\u201d although (plaintiffs allege on information and belief) more people in the crowd were opposed to the landfill than in favor of it. \u201cAgents of Allied Waste were permitted to enter the meeting room despite having arrived after citizens who were made to stand in the hall.\u201d By \u201c!e]xcluding members of the public from the meeting room,\u201d the board \u201cprevented most opponents of the landfill from observing and visually confronting [b]oard members during the meeting.\u201d Had the board admitted plaintiffs and other protesters into the room, it \u201cmay have decided to allow additional public comment from interested citizens.\u201d\nAt first, Carolyn Gerwin had to stand in a stairwell between the first and second floors of the courthouse. Later, she was able to reach the second-floor hallway and stand about 10 feet from the door of the boardroom, along with 100 other people. Joseph Gerwin, who had arrived just before the meeting began, also was forced to stand in the second-floor hallway, about 20 feet from the door. Neither plaintiff could hear or see any of the proceedings of the board meeting. The air in the packed hallway was \u201cclose, hot, airless, and uncomfortable. No seating was made available at any time.\u201d Plaintiffs allege, on information and belief, that many members of the public left, either because they could not hear or see the meeting or because conditions in the courthouse were intolerable.\nThe board voted 16 to 11 in favor of amending the plan, with one member abstaining.\nIn their first-amended complaint, plaintiffs requested the trial court to (1) nullify the vote of June 13, 2002; (2) issue an injunction against future violations of the Act; (3) require that \u201call future meetings concerning the *** [l]andfill be held at such locations as are sufficient to accommodate all interested members of the public, such that they may see and hear all proceedings in reasonable comfort and safety\u201d; (4) award plaintiffs reasonable attorney fees and costs; and (5) appoint a \u201cspecial prosecutor\u201d to investigate possible violations of the Act.\nIn granting the motions to dismiss, the trial court chiefly relied on the Second District\u2019s decision in People ex rel. Graf v. Village of Lake Bluff, 321 Ill. App. 3d 897, 748 N.E.2d 801 (2001), rev\u2019d, 206 Ill. 2d 541, 795 N.E.2d 281 (2002). Some four months after the dismissal of plaintiffs\u2019 first-amended complaint, the supreme court reversed the appellate court\u2019s judgment in Graf for reasons having nothing to do with the Act. People ex rel. Graf v. Village of Lake Bluff, 206 Ill. 2d 541, 558, 795 N.E.2d 281, 290 (2002) (\u201cquo warranto will not lie because the validity of the annexation process has already been given final judicial approval\u201d). In the present case, the trial court interpreted the appellate court\u2019s decision in Graf as holding that \u201cpeople do not have an absolute right to be present in the meeting room or to participate in the public meeting; and that the purpose of the Act is satisfied as long as the meeting is not conducted in secrecy.\u201d The trial court stated: \u201c[T]his was a publicly noticed meeting open to the public[,] and *** members of the public were in fact there; *** that some people were not able to get into the room[ ] [was] not a violation.\u201d\nThe trial court acknowledged that \u201csome size of room\u201d \u2014 a \u201cbroom closet,\u201d for example \u2014 could \u201cviolate[ ] the spirit of the law,\u201d but the county board room was \u201cregularly used for open meetings,\u201d and \u201cthere were lots of people there.\u201d\nThis appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA motion to dismiss under section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615 (West 2002)) challenges the legal sufficiency of the complaint, whereas a motion to dismiss under section 2 \u2014 619(a) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619(a) (West 2002)) admits the legal sufficiency of the complaint but asserts additional matters outside the complaint that defeat the plaintiffs claim. Wallace v. Smyth, 203 Ill. 2d 441, 447, 786 N.E.2d 980, 984 (2002).\nAccording to the board\u2019s and Jacobson\u2019s motion to dismiss, those additional matters were the minutes of the June 13, 2002, meeting, which showed that the board had deliberated and voted \u201cin open session[ ] and not in closed session.\u201d The board and Jacobson argue that those minutes defeat plaintiffs\u2019 claim for two reasons: (1) a court may not nullify the vote of June 13, 2002, because it occurred in an open rather than a closed meeting (5 ILCS 120/3(c) (West 2002)); and (2) the Act requires only that the meeting be open or \u201cnot conducted in secrecy\u201d (Graf, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 907, 748 N.E.2d at 811).\nIf the June 13, 2002, meeting had been an open meeting, we agree that fact would partly defeat plaintiffs\u2019 claim in that it would narrow their remedies. In their first-amended complaint, plaintiffs request a nullification of the board\u2019s vote of June 13, 2002. A court may \u201cdeclar[e] null and void any final action taken at a closed meeting in violation of this Act.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 5 ILCS 120/3(c) (West 2002). \u201cThe statute permitting the court to declare the action void refers by its terms only to a \u2018closed session.\u2019 \u201d Williamson v. Doyle, 112 Ill. App. 3d 293, 300, 445 N.E.2d 385, 390 (1983).\nKeeping in mind that dismissal is a drastic way to end a case (Friedman, Alschuler, & Sincere v. Arlington Structural Steel Co., 140 Ill. App. 3d 556, 489 N.E.2d 308 (1985)) and a court should not dismiss a complaint unless it clearly appears that no set of facts could be proved under the complaint that would entitle the plaintiff to relief (City of North Chicago v. North Chicago News, Inc., 106 Ill. App. 3d 587, 594, 435 N.E.2d 887, 892 (1982)), we hold that plaintiffs have pleaded a meeting that was not entirely open. According to the first-amended complaint, the board gave one segment of the public, agents of Allied Waste, preferential access to the June 13, 2002, meeting and, to that extent, excluded opponents of the landfill. Plaintiffs allege: \u201cAgents of Allied Waste were permitted to enter the meeting room despite having arrived after citizens who were made to stand in the hall.\u201d\n\u201cOpen\u201d means \u201cnot restricted to a particular group or category of participants.\u201d Merriam-Webster\u2019s Collegiate Dictionary 811 (10th ed. 2000). That the board was officially \u201cin open session\u201d does not refute plaintiffs allegation that the board gave preferential admission to agents of Allied Waste and, to that extent, restricted the audience to a particular group. Cf. Gutierrez v. City of Albuquerque, 96 N.M. 398, 400, 631 P.2d 304, 306 (1981) (statutory right to \u201cattend and listen\u201d means that \u201cno one will be systematically excluded or arbitrarily refused admittance\u201d and \u201c[e]veryone'desiring to attend\u201d will be \u201cafforded an opportunity to do so\u201d); Wyse v. Rupp, No. F-94-19 (Ohio App. September 15, 1995) (1995 WL 547784, at *5) (finding a meeting was open because the public agency \u201cdealt with the large crowd in a reasonable and impartial manner,\u201d without \u201cintentionally barr[ing] certain members of the public from having access to the meeting\u201d). Taking the factual allegations in the first-amended complaint as true, we hold that nullification of the vote is a potential remedy, discretionary with, the trial court (Graf, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 908, 748 N.E.2d at 811).\nWe also disagree with defendants\u2019 contention that the Act requires only \u201copen\u201d meetings in the technical sense, i.e., meetings in open rather than closed session. On its face, section 2.01 of the Act requires more than mere \u201copenness.\u201d It provides: \u201cAll meetings required by this Act to be public shall be held at specified times and places which are convenient and open to the public.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 5 ILCS 120/ 2.01 (West 2002). We strive to interpret a statute in such a way that no word is superfluous. Primeco Personal Communications, L.P. v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n, 196 Ill. 2d 70, 91, 750 N.E.2d 202, 214 (2001). By its plain terms, section 2.01 requires a venue that is not only \u201copen,\u201d but \u201cconvenient,\u201d to the public.\nFrom the legislative history of section 2.01, \u201copen\u201d and \u201cconvenient\u201d are clearly not synonymous. Section 2.01 formerly read: \u201cAll meetings required by this Act to be public shall be held at specified times and places which are convenient to the public.\u201d 5 ILCS 120/2.01 (West 1992). Section 5 of Public Act 88 \u2014 621 added the words \u201cand open\u201d after \u201cconvenient.\u201d Pub. Act 88 \u2014 621, \u00a7 5, eff. January 1, 1995 (1994 Ill. Laws 1416, 1422). Because the legislature saw the need to add \u201copen,\u201d it must follow that \u201cconvenient\u201d and \u201copen\u201d have different meanings.\nLike the trial court, defendants rely heavily on the Second District\u2019s decision in Graf, particularly its statement that \u201cthe Act\u2019s purpose is satisfied so long as meetings are not conducted in secrecy.\u201d Graf, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 907, 748 N.E.2d at 811. One could push that statement too far by applying it to facts that were not before the appellate court in Graf. Section by section, the Act does more than require open meetings. The overall purpose of the Act is \u201cto prohibit secret deliberation\u201d (People ex rel. Difanis v. Barr, 83 Ill. 2d 191, 202, 414 N.E.2d 731, 735 (1980)), and to implement that broad requirement of openness, the Act imposes a number of subsidiary requirements. For example, it provides: \u201cAll public bodies shall keep written minutes of all their meetings, whether open or closed.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 5 ILCS 120/2.06(a) (West 2002). Thus, the complete openness, or lack of secrecy, of a meeting will not save it from violating the Act if the public body failed to keep minutes of the meeting. Convenience of place is another subsidiary requirement (5 ILCS 120/2.01 (West 2002)), and an open meeting in an inconvenient place violates the Act.\nConvenience of place was not even an issue in Graf, and its facts do not remotely resemble those in this case. In Graf, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 907, 748 N.E.2d at 811, the plaintiffs argued an annexation of land was invalid under the Act because one of the trustees who had voted in favor of the annexation had participated in the meeting by telephone rather than in person. Thus, according to the plaintiffs, the trustee did not fully participate in the meeting, and the plaintiffs were denied the opportunity \u201cto fully express their views to this trustee.\u201d Graf, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 907, 748 N.E.2d at 811. According to the plaintiffs, the purpose of the Act was \u201cto \u2018allow full public participation\u2019 in meetings.\u201d Graf, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 907, 748 N.E.2d at 811.\nThe Second District held that the Act had a different purpose. The appellate court explained:\n\u201c[T]he Act itself states that its purpose is to ensure that the actions of public bodies \u2018be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.\u2019 5 ILCS 120/1 (West 1998). No reasonable construction of the Act\u2019s statement of purpose confers a right upon the plaintiffs to participate in a public hearing. Rather, the Act\u2019s purpose is satisfied so long as meetings are not conducted in secrecy. Plaintiffs do not argue that they were unable to perceive what was taking place in the meeting.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Graf, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 907, 748 N.E.2d at 811.\nIn the present case, plaintiffs do not complain of being forbidden to participate in the meeting of June 13, 2002 (although they had hoped the board, in its discretion, would have allowed them to do so). Rather, they complain that the inconvenience of the location barred them (and approximately 100 other members of the public) from attending the meeting. Unlike the plaintiffs in Graf, plaintiffs in this case could neither hear nor see the meeting. American Disposal asserts that the distinction between \u201cattendance\u201d and \u201cparticipation\u201d is \u201cpurely semantic.\u201d We disagree. Merely attending a meeting means being a spectator. A member of the public who participates in a meeting does more than attend; he or she takes part in the discussion. Graf, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 907, 748 N.E.2d at 811 (making a distinction between \u201cperceiv[ing] what was taking place in the meeting\u201d and \u201cparticipating\u201d in the meeting); Wyse, slip op. at_ (1995 WL 547784, at *4) (\u201caccess does not necessarily include participation\u201d).\nBecause no Illinois case explains what a \u201cconvenient\u201d place is within the meaning of section 2.01, defendants cite two foreign cases, Wyse and Lindahl v. Independent School District No. 306, 270 Minn. 164, 133 N.W.2d 23 (1965), which interpret statutes analogous to the Act. (We note Wyse is an unpublished opinion issued in 1995, prior to the Ohio Supreme Court\u2019s rule change that stated such opinions issued \u201cafter the effective date of these rules may be cited as legal authority and weighted as deemed appropriate by the courts\u201d (Ohio Rev. Code Ann. Rep. R. 4(B) (West 2003)) (adopted eff. May 1, 2002); prior to adoption of that rule, unpublished opinions were not controlling except as specified and were persuasive only in the judicial district in which rendered (3 Ohio St. 3d Rep. Rs. 2(G)(1), (G)(2) (1983)).) It does not appear, however, that either the Ohio or Minnesota statute contained an explicit requirement that the location of the meeting be \u201cconvenient\u201d; those statutes merely required that the meeting be \u201copen.\u201d Wyse, slip op. at_ (1995 WL 547784, at *4); Lindahl, 270 Minn, at 167, 133 N.W.2d at 26. Thus, we do not find Wyse and Lindahl to be helpful on the question of where public meetings should be held under section 2.01 of the Act.\nAccording to our research, only two other states besides Illinois have open-meetings legislation explicitly requiring \u201cconvenience\u201d of location. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 61.820 (Banks-Baldwin 2002) (\u201cAll meetings of all public agencies *** shall be held at specified times and places which are convenient to the public\u201d); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 25, \u00a7 303 (West 2002) (\u201cAll meetings of public bodies *** shall be held at specified times and places which are convenient to the public and shall be open to the public\u201d). Other than a case holding that a locked courthouse on a holiday is not a \u201cconvenient\u201d location for a public meeting (Rogers v. Excise Board, 701 P.2d 754, 761 (Okla. 1984)), we are aware of no cases explaining the meaning of \u201cconvenient\u201d in those statutes.\nThe Act does not define \u201cconvenient.\u201d Unless a statute specially defines a word, we give the word its plain and ordinary meaning. Champaign Township v. County of Champaign, 331 Ill. App. 3d 582, 587, 772 N.E.2d 315, 320 (2002). \u201cConvenient\u201d means \u201csuited to personal comfort or to easy performance\u201d or \u201caffording accommodation or advantage.\u201d Merriam-Webster\u2019s Collegiate Dictionary 252 (10th ed. 2000). A meeting can be open in the sense that no one is prohibited from attending it, but it can be held in such an ill-suited, unaccommodating, unadvantageous place that members of the public, as a practical matter, would be deterred from attending it.\nThe legislature does not specify how far a public agency must go in accommodating members of the public who wish to attend public meetings. \u201c[W]e must interpret statutes in a manner that avoids absurd results.\u201d Burger v. Lutheran General Hospital, 198 Ill. 2d 21, 59, 759 N.E.2d 533, 555 (2001). It would be unreasonable to suppose the legislature intended, as plaintiffs demand in their first-amended complaint, that public bodies hold their meetings \u201cat such locations as are sufficient to accommodate all interested members of the public, such that they may see and hear all proceedings in reasonable comfort and safety.\u201d (Emphasis added.) If enough \u201cinterested members of the public\u201d showed up \u2014 in a mass demonstration, for instance \u2014 the business of government would come to a standstill for lack of a venue large enough to accommodate such crowds. \u201cThis narrow view would permit invalidation of any action by a public body by the simple method of overflowing\u201d the meeting room. Guiterrez, 96 N.M. at 400, 631 P.2d at 306. \u201c[T]o be safe,\u201d the public body \u201cwould have to hire [a] football stadium or hold its meetings in a wide open space.\u201d Guiterrez, 96 N.M. at 400, 631 P.2d at 306; see also Maxwell v. Carney, 273 Ga. 864, 865, 548 S.E.2d 293, 295 (2001) (\u201cThe superior court\u2019s injunction is too broad insofar as it requires the commission to provide adequate seating to enable all members of the public to attend the meeting. The superior court would have the commission provide seating for everyone in the county if they all decided to attend a meeting\u201d (emphasis in original)).\nSection 2.01 requires a place that is \u201cconvenient\u201d not merely to members of the public who show up for the meeting but to the \u201cpublic\u201d as a whole. 5 ILCS 120/2.01 (West 2002). Renting a football stadium for public meetings might be inconvenient, or unadvantageous, to the public as a whole because of the cost. By the same token, holding public meetings in a small room might be inconvenient to the public because persons wanting to attend would have difficulty gaining admittance. The concept of public convenience seems to imply a rule of reasonableness, not \u201cabsolute accessibility\u201d but \u201creasonable accessibility.\u201d See State ex rel. Badke v. Village Board of the Village of Greendale, 173 Wis. 2d 553, 579, 494 N.W.2d 408, 418 (1993) (interpreting a statute requiring that the meeting place be \u201creasonably accessible\u201d).\nIn the present case, a \u201cconvenient\u201d meeting place lay somewhere between the extremes of a broom closet and a football stadium. Just where it lay on that spectrum was an issue of fact that the trial court should not have resolved on the pleadings. Reasonableness is generally a question of fact rather than a question of law, unless reasonable minds could not differ. Tassan v. United Development Co., 88 Ill. App. 3d 581, 590-91, 410 N.E.2d 902, 910-11 (1980). Under the allegations of the first-amended complaint, a reasonable trier of fact could find that the boardroom was an inconvenient place for the June 13, 2002, meeting. That the board typically held its meetings in the boardroom does not end the inquiry; section 2.01 does not allow custom to trump public convenience. Flaintiffs have alleged that the board knew, at least a week before the June 13, 2002, meeting, that the boardroom would be too small for the numbers of citizens who wished to attend; that larger, alternative venues were available; and that Jacobson resolutely refused to hold the meeting in a larger venue because he wanted to make attendance by the public inconvenient. Given those facts, along with the alleged preferential admission of Allied Waste employees, we find that plaintiffs have pleaded a violation of the Act.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nReversed.\nKNECHT, EJ., and MYERSCOUGH, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE APPLETON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Joseph K. Gerwin and Carolyn K. Gerwin, both of Pontiac, appellants pro se.", "Douglas E. Lee, of Ehrmann, Gehlbach, Badger & Lee, of Dixon, for appellee American Disposal Services of Illinois.", "Thomas J. Brown, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pontiac (Cary J. Luckman, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for other appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JOSEPH K. GERWIN et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE LIVINGSTON COUNTY BOARD et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFourth District\nNo. 4-03-0158\nOpinion filed December 31, 2003.\nJoseph K. Gerwin and Carolyn K. Gerwin, both of Pontiac, appellants pro se.\nDouglas E. Lee, of Ehrmann, Gehlbach, Badger & Lee, of Dixon, for appellee American Disposal Services of Illinois.\nThomas J. Brown, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pontiac (Cary J. Luckman, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for other appellees." }, "file_name": "0352-01", "first_page_order": 372, "last_page_order": 383 }