{ "id": 3739424, "name": "In re MARRIAGE OF JENNIFER PETERS-FARRELL, Petitioner-Appellant, and THOMAS PETERS-FARRELL, Respondent-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "In re Marriage of Peters-Farrell", "decision_date": "2003-12-31", "docket_number": "No. 1-02-2140", "first_page": "603", "last_page": "610", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "345 Ill. App. 3d 603" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "751 N.E.2d 221", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "224", "parenthetical": "another division of this court holds that the appellate court is not limited to reviewing the question presented but may also consider the appropriateness of the order giving rise to the appeal" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 Ill. App. 3d 138", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 171707 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "142", "parenthetical": "another division of this court holds that the appellate court is not limited to reviewing the question presented but may also consider the appropriateness of the order giving rise to the appeal" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/323/0138-01" ] }, { "cite": "693 N.E.2d 358", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365", "parenthetical": "court may go beyond the limits of a certified question in the interests of judicial economy" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 460", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821410 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "472", "parenthetical": "court may go beyond the limits of a certified question in the interests of judicial economy" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0460-01" ] }, { "cite": "724 N.E.2d 1008", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1009" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 Ill. App. 3d 552", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 415298 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "554" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/311/0552-01" ] }, { "cite": "701 N.E.2d 127", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "131" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 Ill. App. 3d 593", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 221450 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "599" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/299/0593-01" ] }, { "cite": "693 N.E.2d 1287", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1290" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 Ill. App. 3d 80", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 222586 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "84-85" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/296/0080-01" ] }, { "cite": "755 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "9" }, { "page": "10" }, { "page": "10" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 60", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259028 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "71" }, { "page": "71-72" }, { "page": "72" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "731 N.E.2d 844", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "849" }, { "page": "849" }, { "page": "849" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 Ill. App. 3d 902", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 186545 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "907" }, { "page": "908-09" }, { "page": "908" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/313/0902-01" ] }, { "cite": "765 N.E.2d 1002", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1007" }, { "page": "1007" }, { "page": "1007" }, { "page": "1007" }, { "page": "1007" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58943 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "55" }, { "page": "55" }, { "page": "55" }, { "page": "55" }, { "page": "55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "663 N.E.2d 1039", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "rejecting the argument that a pharmacist is a therapist because he dispenses pharmaceuticals" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 Ill. App. 3d 767", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1156910 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "rejecting the argument that a pharmacist is a therapist because he dispenses pharmaceuticals" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/278/0767-01" ] }, { "cite": "774 N.E.2d 14", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "19" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 Ill. App. 3d 595", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1034075 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "600" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/332/0595-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 638, "char_count": 13513, "ocr_confidence": 0.732, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.848989183728895e-08, "percentile": 0.4175685532245316 }, "sha256": "4b9ab750ac2a9043553e91724cb076c455628b62c90f68da40c89c5db0999e47", "simhash": "1:28d50594efd8b660", "word_count": 2122 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:40:04.128176+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "SOUTH and KARNEZIS, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "In re MARRIAGE OF JENNIFER PETERS-FARRELL, Petitioner-Appellant, and THOMAS PETERS-FARRELL, Respondent-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HALL\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis case comes before us as a permissive appeal of a certified question pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308). The question certified arose during a dissolution of marriage proceeding in which the respondent, Thomas Peters-Farrell (Thomas), served subpoenas on three drugstores seeking prescription records for the petitioner, Jennifer Peters-Farrell (Jennifer). The circuit court denied Jennifer\u2019s motion to quash the subpoenas but certified the following question to this court.\n\u201cAre requests for pharmaceutical records from pharmacy protected under the Illinois Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities [Confidentiality] Act?\u201d\nThis court allowed the appeal pursuant to Rule 308.\nFACTS\nOn May 29, 2002, Jennifer filed a motion to quash three subpoenas issued by Thomas to three drugstores to produce their prescription records for Jennifer, including the name of the medication, what the medication was used to treat, the dosage, the refill history, a copy of the prescription and any other related records.\nOn July 18, 2002, the circuit court denied Jennifer\u2019s motion to quash the subpoenas but, pursuant to Rule 308, certified the question as to whether pharmaceutical records are protected under the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act (the Confidentiality Act) (740 ILCS 110/1 et seq. (West 2000)).\nOn September 18, 2002, this court allowed the appeal.\nANALYSIS\nThe plaintiff contends that requests for pharmaceutical records from pharmacies are protected under the Confidentiality Act. This issue has not previously been decided, and its determination requires that this court construe the Confidentiality Act.\nI. Standard of Review\nIssues as to statutory construction are reviewed de novo. Revolution Portfolio, LLC v. Beale, 332 Ill. App. 3d 595, 600, 774 N.E.2d 14, 19 (2002).\nII. The Confidentiality Act\nThe following sections of the Confidentiality Act are pertinent to the issue in this case:\n\u201c \u2018Mental health or developmental disabilities services\u2019 or \u2018services\u2019 includes but is not limited to examination, diagnosis, evaluation, treatment, training, pharmaceuticals, aftercare, habitation or rehabilitation.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 740 ILCS 110/2 (West 2000).\n\u201c \u2018Recipient\u2019 means a person who is receiving or has received mental health or developmental disabilities services.\u201d 740 ILCS 110/2 (West 2000).\n\u201c \u2018Record\u2019 means any record kept by a therapist or by an agency in the course of providing mental health or developmental disabilities service to a recipient concerning the recipient and the services provided. \u2018Records\u2019 includes all records maintained by a court that have been created in connection with, in preparation for, or as a result of the filing of any petition or certificate under Chapter II, Chapter III, or Chapter IV of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code and includes the petitions, certificates, dispositional reports, treatment plans, and reports of diagnostic evaluations and of hearings under Article VIII of Chapter III or under Article V of Chapter IV of that Code. Record does not include the therapist\u2019s personal notes, if such notes are kept in the therapist\u2019s sole possession for his own personal use and are not disclosed to any other person, except the therapist\u2019s supervisor, consulting therapist or attorney. If at any time such notes are disclosed, they shall be considered part of the recipient\u2019s record for purposes of this Act.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 740 ILCS 110/2 (West 2000).\nIII. Discussion\nPursuant to the Confidentiality Act and subject to enumerated exceptions not relevant in this case, Jennifer has the privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent disclosure of her mental health records and communications. See 740 ILCS 110/10 (West 2000). She argues that her pharmaceutical records are mental health records and therefore are protected from disclosure pursuant to section 10 of the Confidentiality Act.\nThomas responds that pharmacists and their records are not covered by the Confidentiality Act. He notes that the Confidentiality Act does not refer to pharmacists in its definition of therapists. See 740 ILCS 110/2 (West 2000); see also Suarez v. Pierard, 278 Ill. App. 3d 767, 663 N.E.2d 1039 (1996) (rejecting the argument that a pharmacist is a therapist because he dispenses pharmaceuticals).\nHowever, the fact that a pharmacist is not a therapist and therefore not a provider of mental health services under the Confidentiality Act is not determinative of the issue before us. We must determine if pharmacy records are records kept by an agency, as opposed to a therapist, which provides mental health services.\nThe legislative intent of a statute is best determined from the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language. Reda v. Advocate Health Care, 199 Ill. 2d 47, 55, 765 N.E.2d 1002, 1007 (2002). If the legislative intent is clear from the statutory language, the court must confine its inquiry to a consideration of that language and must not look to extrinsic aids. Reda, 199 Ill. 2d at 55, 765 N.E.2d at 1007. However, if the statutory language is susceptible of more than one interpretation, the court may look beyond the language to consider the purposes of the statute. Reda, 199 Ill. 2d at 55, 765 N.E.2d at 1007. In that event, the court may look beyond the language to consider the purpose of the statute. Reda, 199 Ill. 2d at 55, 765 N.E.2d at 1007. The court may ascertain legislative intent by considering the objects of the law and the evils it seeks to remedy. People v. Gemeny, 313 Ill. App. 3d 902, 907, 731 N.E.2d 844, 849 (2000).\nUnder the definitions in the Act, \u201crecord\u201d includes any record kept, not just by a therapist, but also by \u201can agency in the course of providing mental health *** service to a recipient concerning the recipient and the services provided.\u201d 740 ILCS 110/2 (West 2000). Such \u201cservices\u201d include \u201cpharmaceuticals.\u201d 740 ILCS 110/2 (West 2000).\nThe term \u201cagency\u201d is not defined by the Act. \u201cAgency\u201d is defined as \u201can establishment engaged in doing business for another .\u201d Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 40 (1993).\nThe Pharmacy Practice Act of 1987 (the Pharmacy Act) (225 ILCS 85/1 et seq. (West 2000)) defines \u201cpharmacy\u201d as meaning and including \u201cevery store, shop, pharmacy department, or other place where pharmaceutical care is provided by a pharmacist *** or (2) where prescriptions of physicians, dentists, veterinarians, podiatrists, or therapeutically certified optometrists, within the limits of their licenses, are compounded, filled, or dispensed.\u201d 225 ILCS 85/3(a) (West 2000). Section 18 of the Pharmacy Act requires pharmacies to keep a \u201csuitable book, file, or electronic record keeping system in which shall be preserved for a period of not less than 5 years the original of every written prescription and the original transcript or copy of every verbal prescription filled, compounded, or dispensed, in such pharmacy.\u201d 225 ILCS 85/18 (West 2000).\nA \u201cpharmacy\u201d fits the definition of an agency because it is engaged in doing business for another, i.e., preparing prescriptions ordered by physicians for their patients. As an \u201cagency\u201d it keeps records of the prescriptions it fills, including those filled for mental health recipients for the treatment of mental health problems. Unlike Suarez, the present case concerns the records, not the relationship of the pharmacist to the mental health recipient.\nWhile the Confidentiality Act does not specially refer to pharmacies, we conclude that a pharmacy is an \u201cagency\u201d which provides pharmaceutical services to a mental health recipient and that the pharmacy\u2019s records of the prescriptions issued to a mental health recipient are therefore protected from disclosure under the Confidentiality Act.\nWhile we are of the opinion that the clear language of the Confidentiality Act protects the pharmaceutical records of a mental health recipient from disclosure, nevertheless, at the very least, the language of the Confidentiality Act defining \u201crecord\u201d is ambiguous, since the above definition renders \u201crecords kept by an agency\u201d susceptible to different interpretations, either including or excluding records kept by a pharmacist.\nA finding of ambiguity in statutory language permits this court to look to the purpose of a statute in construing its meaning. Reda, 199 Ill. 2d at 55, 765 N.E.2d at 1007. In this case, the purpose of the statute provides ample support for our determination that a mental health recipient\u2019s pharmacy records are protected from disclosure under the Confidentiality Act.\n\u201c \u2018The Confidentiality Act is carefully drawn to maintain the confidentiality of mental health records except in specific circumstances explicitly enumerated.\u2019 \u201d Norskog v. Pfiel, 197 Ill. 2d 60, 71, 755 N.E.2d 1, 9 (2001), quoting Sassali v. Rockford Memorial Hospital, 296 Ill. App. 3d 80, 84-85, 693 N.E.2d 1287, 1290 (1998). When viewed as a whole, the Act constitutes a \u201c \u2018strong statement\u2019 \u201d about the importance of keeping mental health records confidential. Norskog, 197 Ill. 2d at 71-72, 755 N.E.2d at 10, quoting Mandziara v. Canulli, 299 Ill. App. 3d 593, 599, 701 N.E.2d 127, 131 (1998). Consequently, anyone seeking the nonconsensual release of mental health information faces a formidable challenge and must show that disclosure is authorized by the Confidentiality Act. Norskog, 197 Ill. 2d at 72, 755 N.E.2d at 10.\nIn Gemeny, the court held that a mental health recipient\u2019s taped telephone messages to his therapist were \u201ccommunications\u201d and protected by the general privilege created by the Confidentiality Act. Gemeny, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 908-09, 731 N.E.2d at 849. The court recognized that the \u201cstatutory privilege exists to encourage complete candor between patient and therapist and to provide motivation for persons who need treatment to seek it.\u201d Gemeny, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 908, 731 N.E.2d at 849.\nIt is not disputed that, under the Confidentiality Act, Jennifer\u2019s prescription records from a therapist, who was rendering her mental health services, are protected from disclosure. If Thomas were able to obtain the same records from the pharmacy where Jennifer filled a prescription for medication prescribed by a therapist, Jennifer might be reluctant to fill such a prescription and might not receive necessary treatment. Thus, if pharmacy records are not protected by the privilege, the purpose of the Confidentiality Act would be defeated.\nThomas notes that where there is a conflict between the Pharmacy Act and the Confidentiality Act, the Pharmacy Act controls. See 225 ILCS 85/37 (West 2000). He points out that under section 3(p) of the Pharmacy Act, a pharmacist may release confidential information to a person authorized by law to receive such information and that a person serving a subpoena is authorized by law to receive the information. See 225 ILCS 85/3(p) (West 2000); 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1101 (West 2000). \u201cConfidential information\u201d is defined as \u201cinformation maintained by the pharmacist in the patient\u2019s records.\u201d 225 ILCS 85/3(p) (West 2000).\nIf the pharmacy records are protected under the Confidentiality Act, then Thomas violated the Confidentiality Act by issuing a subpoena without the written order issued by a judge, authorizing the disclosure of the record or the issuance of the subpoena. See 740 ILCS 110/10(d) (West 2000). Thus, the subpoenas in this case did not serve to authorize the release of Jennifer\u2019s prescription records under the Pharmacy Act. See 225 ILCS 85/3(p) (West 2000). Therefore, no conflict exists between the Pharmacy Act and the Confidentiality Act.\nJennifer also contends that she has not placed her mental condition at issue in this case. See 740 ILCS 110/10(a)(l) (West 2000). However, in Levy v. Markal Sales Corp., 311 Ill. App. 3d 552, 724 N.E.2d 1008 (2000), this division held that review of an appeal under Rule 308 was strictly limited to the question identified by the circuit court\u2019s order and would not be expanded on appeal to encompass other matters that could have been included but were not. Levy, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 554, 724 N.E.2d at 1009; but see Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 181 Ill. 2d 460, 472, 693 N.E.2d 358, 365 (1998) (court may go beyond the limits of a certified question in the interests of judicial economy); Arriola v. Time Insurance Co., 323 Ill. App. 3d 138, 142, 751 N.E.2d 221, 224 (2001) (another division of this court holds that the appellate court is not limited to reviewing the question presented but may also consider the appropriateness of the order giving rise to the appeal).\nIn answering the certified question, we conclude that pharmacy records are included in those records protected from disclosure under the Confidentiality Act.\nCertified question answered and case remanded.\nSOUTH and KARNEZIS, JJ., concur.\nSection 18 of the Pharmacy Act provides that the records kept by the pharmacist \u201cshall *** be open to inspection to the pharmacy coordinator and the duly authorized agents or employees of the Department.\u201d 225 ILCS 85/18 (West 2000).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HALL" } ], "attorneys": [ "Enrico Mirabelli and Matthew Arnoux, both of Nadler, Pritikin & Mirabelli, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Rebecca B. Feinberg and Sharon M. Warning, both of Lake, Toback & Yavitz, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re MARRIAGE OF JENNIFER PETERS-FARRELL, Petitioner-Appellant, and THOMAS PETERS-FARRELL, Respondent-Appellee.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1-02-2140\nOpinion filed December 31, 2003.\nEnrico Mirabelli and Matthew Arnoux, both of Nadler, Pritikin & Mirabelli, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRebecca B. Feinberg and Sharon M. Warning, both of Lake, Toback & Yavitz, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0603-01", "first_page_order": 623, "last_page_order": 630 }