{ "id": 5872985, "name": "CONSTRUX OF ILLINOIS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BETTE KAISERMAN, Indiv., as Successor Trustee of the Louis Kaiserman Trust and as Trustee as to an Undivided \u2153 Interest in Parcel I by Reason of Her Being Grantee in Warranty Deed Recorded as Document No. 89H030864, et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Construx of Illinois, Inc. v. Kaiserman", "decision_date": "2003-12-10", "docket_number": "No. 4-03-0136", "first_page": "847", "last_page": "859", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "345 Ill. App. 3d 847" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "666 N.E.2d 740", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "747", "parenthetical": "in determining whether the trial court's findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court \"may not reconsider the evidence or reassess the witnesses' credibility or demeanor\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 Ill. App. 3d 309", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 150151 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "318", "parenthetical": "in determining whether the trial court's findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court \"may not reconsider the evidence or reassess the witnesses' credibility or demeanor\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/281/0309-01" ] }, { "cite": "779 N.E.2d 1115", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1130", "parenthetical": "\"In close cases, where findings of fact depend on the credibility of witnesses, it is particularly true that a reviewing court will defer to the findings of the trial court unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442059 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "251", "parenthetical": "\"In close cases, where findings of fact depend on the credibility of witnesses, it is particularly true that a reviewing court will defer to the findings of the trial court unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "647 N.E.2d 273", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "276-77" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "164 Ill. 2d 207", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477000 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "214-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/164/0207-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 N.E.2d 131", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "13 Ill. App. 3d 1074", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5345752 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1077" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/13/1074-01" ] }, { "cite": "675 N.E.2d 217", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "226" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 Ill. App. 3d 1056", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1295524 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1068" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/285/1056-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 N.E.2d 786", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "788" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 Ill. 2d 214", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2824820 ], "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "217" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/29/0214-01" ] }, { "cite": "262 N.E.2d 74", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "76", "parenthetical": "the doctrine was designed to accomplish the parties' intent and ensure justice where technical rules of law might prevent it" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 Ill. App. 2d 293", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1576589 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "295", "parenthetical": "the doctrine was designed to accomplish the parties' intent and ensure justice where technical rules of law might prevent it" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/126/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 N.E.2d 184", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1943, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "384 Ill. 515", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2491564 ], "year": 1943, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "520" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/384/0515-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 Ill. 570", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 831438 ], "year": 1884, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/108/0570-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 N.E.2d 218", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "219" }, { "page": "219" }, { "page": "219" }, { "page": "220-21" }, { "page": "219-20" }, { "page": "220" }, { "page": "220" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "25 Ill. 2d 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5353071 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "448" }, { "page": "448" }, { "page": "449" }, { "page": "451" }, { "page": "449" }, { "page": "450" }, { "page": "450" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/25/0447-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 N.E. 275", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "weight": 4, "year": 1888, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "276" }, { "page": "277" }, { "page": "277" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 Ill. 72", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5404687 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1888, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "75" }, { "page": "78" }, { "page": "78" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/126/0072-01" ] }, { "cite": "14 N.E. 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "weight": 7, "year": 1887, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "2" }, { "page": "2" }, { "page": "1" }, { "page": "3" }, { "page": "3" }, { "page": "3" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 Ill. 98", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2923935 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1887, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "100" }, { "page": "101" }, { "page": "99-100" }, { "page": "102" }, { "page": "102" }, { "page": "103" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/123/0098-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 Ill. 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2730046 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1880, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "267" }, { "page": "268" }, { "page": "268" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/94/0266-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1092, "char_count": 30402, "ocr_confidence": 0.716, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.4033266686372354e-08, "percentile": 0.3394894837498248 }, "sha256": "ae90189d3028bf7878ae43c9fa6f8562d0b3bc05886f7c1001dc1643007a8163", "simhash": "1:ebd435483404bcfa", "word_count": 5024 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:40:04.128176+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "KNECHT, EJ., and TURNER, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "CONSTRUX OF ILLINOIS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BETTE KAISERMAN, Indiv., as Successor Trustee of the Louis Kaiserman Trust and as Trustee as to an Undivided \u2153 Interest in Parcel I by Reason of Her Being Grantee in Warranty Deed Recorded as Document No. 89H030864, et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court;\nIn December 1999, plaintiff, Construx of Illinois, Inc. (Construx), sought to foreclose and enforce a mechanic\u2019s lien against property located at 302, 304, and 306 East Washington Street in Springfield (subject property). In May 1999, when Construx entered into an agreement with John Shipley to make certain improvements to the building located on the subject property, the property was under an installment sale contract between Shipley as the purchaser, and defendant Bette Kaiserman, both individually and as a trustee, and her sons, defendants Donald L. Kaiserman and Herbert A. Kaiserman, as owners. Following an October 2002 bench trial, the trial court entered an order foreclosing and enforcing Construx\u2019s mechanic\u2019s hen.\nThe Kaisermans appeal, arguing that (1) the trial court erred by determining that they as sellers under the installment sale contract, were \u201cowners\u201d under section 1 of the Mechanics Lien Act (Act), as opposed to lienholders under section 16 of the Act (770 ILCS 60/1, 16 (West 1998)); (2) section 16 of the Act, as applied, violates the equal protection clauses of the United States (U.S. Const., amend. XIV) and Illinois Constitutions (111. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 2); and (3) even accepting that they are \u201cowners\u201d under the Act, the court\u2019s finding that they authorized or knowingly permitted Construx to make the improvements was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nIn October 1996, the Kaisermans entered into an installment land sale contract (hereinafter contract) with Shipley for the sale of the subject property. The property consisted of a parcel of land and a three-story brick building, which housed three commercial units on the first floor (one of which Shipley was then leasing from the Kaiser-mans and operating as the Station House Tavern (hereinafter tavern)) and apartments on the second and third floors. According to the payment terms of the contract, the total sale price was $275,000, and Shipley was to make a $30,000 down payment, pay $2,504.32 in monthly installments for a five-year period, and then pay the remaining balance in a lump sum.\nThe contract also provided, in pertinent part, as follows:\n\u201c6. [Shipley] agrees to cause no improvements to be made upon said premises costing in excess of $1,000.00 without first securing the written consent of the [Kaisermans]. [Shipley] shall further keep said premises free and clear of any valid mechanic\u2019s lien and shall hold [the Kaisermans] indemnified against any valid lien arising by reason of [Shipley\u2019s] possession of said premises.\n7. No failure on the part of the [Kaisermans] to enforce any right accruing to [the Kaisermans] because of any default of [Shipley] in failing to perform promptly any of the provisions hereof, no matter how many times such failure to enforce such rights may be repeated by the [Kaisermans], shall be construed to operate as a waiver of any of the provisions of this agreement, but the [Kaisermans] may at any time omit to take advantage of, or waive any default in any of the provisions hereof without prejudice to the [Kaisermans\u2019] rights to enforce each and all of the provisions of this agreement with reference to any other or subsequent default.\u201d\nThe parties did not record the contract.\nIn May 1999, Shipley entered into an agreement with Construx to demolish the existing stairwell on the rear of the building and construct an exterior three-floor deck and staircase for a cost of $48,687. In late July 1999, following the completion of those improvements, Shipley informed Bette that he was no longer able to make monthly payments on the contract due to financial difficulties. At that time, the Internal Revenue Service had filed a $300,000 tax lien against Shipley, and Shipley had failed to pay 1998 property taxes (totaling $3,600). The Kaisermans agreed to terminate the contract, and Shipley continued to operate the tavern as the Kaisermans\u2019 lessee.\nIn August 1999, Construx recorded a $48,687 mechanic\u2019s lien against the property and Bette as owner. In December 1999, Construx filed a complaint, seeking to foreclose and enforce the mechanic\u2019s hen.\nAt the October 2002 bench trial, Bette testified as an adverse witness that she acted as Donald and Herbert\u2019s agent in managing the property. After she, Donald, and Herbert entered into the contract to sell the property to Shipley, she \u201cvery rarely\u201d drove by the rear of the building. She denied knowing that the rear stairs were in disrepair or observing Construx\u2019s construction on the rear of the building. Bette could not recall whether she spoke with Doyle Finley, a tavern employee, about the construction while it was taking place. She acknowledged speaking with a Construx employee but claimed that the conversation took place after the construction was completed. Bette also acknowledged that sometime between May and June 1999, Shipley provided her with a copy of an appraisal of the property, which indicated, in pertinent part, that the \u201crear stairwell/fire escape [was] in need of substantial repair or replacement.\u201d She further acknowledged that despite the language in paragraph six of the contract, she and Shipley had a verbal agreement that he could spend over $1,000 on the expansion and improvement of the tavern without first receiving the Kaisermans\u2019 written consent. However, she denied having an agreement with him regarding other improvements to the property.\nFinley testified that he worked as a janitor at the tavern during the time that Construx was completing the construction on the rear of the building. On one occasion during that time period, Finley saw Bette at the rear of the building. Bette saw the construction in progress, and Finley thought he remembered her commenting that it looked nice. Bette did not express disapproval or object to the construction. Finley did not think that the construction was \u201csubstantially completed\u201d on that occasion.\nShipley testified as an adverse witness that after he entered into the contract with the Kaisermans, he began remodeling the tavern and expanding it to encompass two of the building\u2019s three commercial units. Although Shipley spent around $30,000 on that project, he never received Bette\u2019s written consent. Between late 1996 and July 1999, he also spent between $30,000 or $40,000 to repair and remodel some of the apartments without receiving Bette\u2019s written consent. He acknowledged that he spent much of that money on new furnishings for the apartments. Before Shipley entered into the October 1996 contract with the Kaisermans, Bette visited the building frequently. After they entered into the contract, she did not visit as often.\nShipley also testified that in May 1999, the City of Springfield informed him that the stairwell at the rear of the building was rotten and in disrepair and he had to immediately repair or replace it. Shipley contacted Gary Sharp, Construx\u2019s director, and informed him that Shipley had a \u201cmajor problem.\u201d Sharp came to the building that same day, and Shipley later entered into an agreement with Construx to demolish the existing stairwell and construct an exterior three-floor deck and staircase at a cost of approximately $48,000. During the construction, Shipley agreed to around $2,400 in additional gutter work on the rear of the building. Construx completed the construction in early July 1999. Shipley never paid the amount owed to Construx for the project.\nShipley further testified that he did not tell Bette about the City\u2019s May 1999 inspection or his agreement with Construx. He did not remember telling William Clutter, a private investigator hired by Construx, that (1) he and Bette had discussed the construction project toward the project\u2019s completion; (2) Bette never objected to the construction; and (3) Bette had been aware of other substantial improvements he had made to the building and had not objected, despite the fact that the cost of those improvements was over $1,000.\nMichael Suhadolnik, Construx\u2019s chief executive officer, testified that \u201cprobably near the end\u201d of the construction project, he spoke via telephone with Bette, who he knew owned the building, and they discussed the project \u201cto some extent.\u201d During the conversation, Suhadolnik commented on Construx\u2019s response following the May 1999 inspection, and Bette thanked him. He then told her that he \u201choped everything was going to be taken care of,\u201d and she responded that it would be. Suhadolnik \u201cfelt that it was a good phone call.\u201d He acknowledged that in a prior affidavit, he stated that the telephone call with Bette took place after Shipley failed to pay Construx.\nClutter testified that during a March 2001 interview with Shipley, Shipley stated that toward the end of the construction project, he talked with Bette about the construction. During that conversation, Bette did not object to the construction project. Shipley also told Clutter that during the construction project, Bette visited the building often and \u201ckept herself aware of what was going on.\u201d\nSharp testified that in August 1999, he spoke with Bette and told her that he was concerned that Construx had not been paid for the construction project. Bette told Sharp that she and Shipley \u201cwere trying to work out some things\u201d and \u201cthey would take care of it.\u201d Sharp thought Bette meant that she would pay for the construction project. A few days later, Sharp received a handwritten note from Bette, stating, in pertinent part, that the \u201c[b]uilding[s] are in [tjrust and [Bette] take[s] care of them.\u201d Sharp thought the quoted language in the note meant that Bette would take care of the payment due Construx.\nWilliam Shomidie, Construx\u2019s chief financial officer, testified that the bill Construx sent to Shipley was dated July 15, 1999. He acknowledged that Construx never sent Bette a bill for the construction project.\nBette testified on her own behalf that she did not authorize Shipley to enter into the May 1999 agreement with Construx. She denied telling Sharp that she would pay for the construction project. When Bette told Sharp that she \u201cwould take care of it,\u201d she meant that she would see her lawyer. Bette thought that she talked with Suhadolnik after the construction was completed. She also denied telling Suhadolnik that she would pay for the construction project. Bette further stated that Finley\u2019s testimony was not truthful.\nDavid Gold, who rented the third commercial unit in the building, testified that after the Kaisermans and Shipley entered into the contract, Bette did not visit the building as often.\nAfter considering the evidence and counsel\u2019s arguments, the trial court took the matter under advisement and allowed the parties to submit posttrial briefs. In October 2002, both parties did so, and the Kaisermans later filed a reply brief. In November 2002, the court found in Construx\u2019s favor, stating, in pertinent part, as follows:\n\u201cIt is clear that under the law in Illinois, the [Kaisermans] had an ownership interest in the property in question at the time [Construx] was doing the construction called for under the agreement it had with [Shipley], Based on the testimony at trial, the [c]ourt is convinced that [Bette] knew of the construction taking place, permitted that construction^] and at no time objected to the improvements being made.\u201d\nIn December 2002, the Kaisermans filed a motion to reconsider or vacate the court\u2019s order, which the court later denied. In January 2003, the court entered a written judgment in foreclosure and sale, finding that the Kaisermans owed Construx $67,598.08, which included $50,587 for the construction project, $16,604.28 in interest, and $406.80 in court costs.\nThis appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Bette\u2019s Status Under the Act\nThe Kaisermans first argue that Bette was not an \u201cowner\u201d of the property under section 1 of the Act (770 ILCS 60/1 (West 1998)). Instead, they contend that pursuant to the doctrine of equitable conversion, Bette was a lienholder or incumbrancer. The Kaisermans thus claim that under section 16 of the Act (770 ILCS 60/16 (West 1998)), they were responsible only for the reasonable value of the improvements to the property, as opposed to the full contract price. We disagree.\nSection 1 of the Act provides, in pertinent part, as follows:\n\u201cAny person who shall by any contract or contracts, express or implied, or partly expressed or implied, with the owner of a lot or tract of land, or with one whom the owner has authorized or knowingly permitted to contract, to improve the lot or tract of land *** has a lien upon the whole of such lot or tract of land.\u201d 770 ILCS 60/1 (West 1998).\nThat section also provides that a mechanic\u2019s lien \u201cextends to an estate in fee, for life, for years, or any other estate or any right of redemption, or other interest which the owner may have in the lot or tract of land at the time of making such contract or may subsequently acquire.\u201d 770 ILCS 60/1 (West 1998). Section 16 of the Act provides, in pertinent part, as follows:\n\u201cNo incumbrance upon land, created before or after the making of the contract under the provisions of this act, shall operate upon the building erected, or materials furnished until a hen in favor of the persons having done work or furnished material shall have been satisfied, and upon questions arising between incumbrancers and lien creditors, all previous incumbrances shall be preferred to the extent of the value of the land at the time of making of the contract, and the lien creditor shall be preferred to the value of the improvements erected on said premises.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 770 ILCS 60/16 (West 1998).\nIn this case, the importance of these sections is the following. If (1) Bette is treated as an \u201cowner\u201d of the property under section 1 of the Act, and (2) she knowingly permitted or authorized the construction to take place, then the Kaisermans\u2019 interest in the property was subject to the full amount of Construx\u2019s mechanic\u2019s lien, which reflected the contract price. On the other hand, under the Kaiser-mans\u2019 theory, if Bette is treated as an lienholder under section 16 of the Act, the Kaisermans\u2019 interest in the property was subject only to an amount reflecting the reasonable value of the improvements to the property.\n1. Our Supreme Court\u2019s Decisions in Hickox, Henderson, and Paulsen\nOur decision is controlled by our supreme court\u2019s decisions concerning mechanic\u2019s liens in Hickox v. Greenwood, 94 Ill. 266 (1880), Henderson v. Connelly, 123 Ill. 98, 14 N.E. 1 (1887), and Paulsen v. Manske, 126 Ill. 72, 18 N.E. 275 (1888), which we must follow.\nIn Hickox, the supreme court addressed and rejected the same argument the Kaisermans now raise on appeal. Virgil Hickox, the owner of certain property, entered into an installment land sale contract with David Peat, the purchaser. Peat later entered into a contract with a builder to build a house on the property without Hick-ox\u2019s knowledge. Hickox, 94 Ill. at 267. The builder completed the work and later filed a petition to enforce a lien. Hickox, 94 Ill. at 268. The trial court directed Peat to pay the amount owed on the mechanic\u2019s lien, and on his failure to do so, ordered the house and property to be sold for the payment of the lien and other costs. On appeal, the builder, relying on what is now section 16 of the Act, argued that Hickox\u2019s interest in the property, as the owner-seller, was in the nature of a lien or incumbrance. The supreme court expressly rejected this argument, holding that Hickox\u2019s interest in the property did not constitute a mere hen or incumbrance. Hickox, 94 Ill. at 268. Thus, contrary to the Kaisermans\u2019 claim, Bette\u2019s interest in the property did not constitute a hen or incumbrance.\nIn Henderson, Charles and WS. Henderson, the owners of certain property, entered into an installment land sale contract with John Sharp, the purchaser. Henderson, 123 Ill. at 100, 14 N.E. at 2. The contract contemplated that Sharp would build a house on the property and the Hendersons would advance a certain amount of money to assist him. Sharp later entered into a contract with a builder to perform certain work on the house. The builder performed the work and later filed a petition to enforce a hen. At some later point, Sharp defaulted on the installment contract, and the Hendersons took possession of the property. Henderson, 123 Ill. at 101, 14 N.E. at 2. The trial court entered an order requiring the Hendersons and Sharp to pay the builder the amount he was entitled to on the hen. Henderson, 123 Ill. at 99-100, 14 N.E. at 1.\nOn the Hendersons\u2019 appeal, the supreme court reaffirmed its decision in Hickox but concluded that Hickox was factually distinguishable. The Henderson court noted that in Hickox, the seller \u201cdid not authorize or in any manner empower the purchaser to erect a building on the premises.\u201d Henderson, 123 Ill. at 102, 14 N.E. at 3. \u201cUnder such circumstances, of course[,] the hen of the mechanic would only attach to such title as the purchaser held.\u201d Henderson, 123 Ill. at 102, 14 N.E. at 3. In contrast, the Hendersons had authorized Sharp to build a house on the property. The Henderson court thus held that the mechanic\u2019s lien could attach to the Hendersons\u2019 interest in the property. In so holding, the court stated, in pertinent part, as follows:\n\u201cIf, therefore, the Hendersons authorized and empowered Sharp, the purchaser, to cause a building to be erected on property where the legal title was in them, upon what ground can they now, after the labor has been expended and materials furnished, claim that the mechanic who furnished the labor and materials which they, by contract, authorized, shall look alone to the title held by the purchaser? Certainly no principle of equity or fair dealing would sanction a precedent of that character.\u201d Henderson, 123 Ill. at 103, 14 N.E. at 3.\nIn Paulsen, 126 Ill. at 75, 18 N.E. at 276, the supreme court reaffirmed its decisions in Hickox and Henderson, and held that an \u201c \u2018owner of [a] lot or piece of land,\u2019 \u201d as that phrase is used in section 1 of the Act, means the \u201cowner of any interest or estate in such lot or land.\u201d The court also held that when the seller of property under such a contract agrees and authorizes the purchaser under that contract to make improvements to the property, the seller\u2019s interest in the property is subject to the mechanic\u2019s lien. Paulsen, 126 Ill. at 78, 18 N.E. at 277. The court reasoned that under such circumstances, the owner-seller \u201ccan not [sic] be permitted to receive the benefit and escape the liability of the mechanic\u2019s lien attaching to their [sic] interest.\u201d Paulsen, 126 Ill. at 78, 18 N.E. at 277.\nOur supreme court\u2019s holdings in Hickox, Henderson, and Paulsen constitute that court\u2019s latest holdings regarding (1) whether a seller of property under an installment contract is considered a lienholder or incumbrancer under section 16 of the Act, as opposed to an owner under section 1; and (2) the circumstances under which the interest of such an owner-seller is subject to a mechanic\u2019s lien.\n2. Our Supreme Court\u2019s Decision in Shay\nThe Kaisermans contend that the supreme court repudiated its holdings in Hickox and Henderson when it decided Shay v. Penrose, 25 Ill. 2d 447, 185 N.E.2d 218 (1962). We disagree.\nIn Shay, 25 Ill. 2d at 448, 185 N.E.2d at 219, the supreme court discussed the doctrine of equitable conversion in the context of a partition action. In that case, Carol Shay individually bought six parcels of land during her lifetime. She later entered into installment land sale contracts with separate purchasers of four of those parcels. Thereafter, she died intestate and was survived by her husband and her sister. The husband sought to partition the two unsold parcels of land, and the sister counterclaimed, alleging that the four parcels sold under contract should also be partitioned. Shay, 25 Ill. 2d at 448, 185 N.E.2d at 219. The trial court determined that equitable conversion had occurred when the installment land sale contracts were entered into and thus the four parcels were not subject to partition by Shay\u2019s heirs. Shay, 25 Ill. 2d at 449, 185 N.E.2d at 219. The supreme court affirmed, holding that upon Shay\u2019s death, her husband became entitled to the unpaid balance of the purchase prices. Shay, 25 Ill. 2d at 451, 185 N.E.2d at 220-21. In so holding, the court discussed the doctrine of equitable conversion as follows:\n\u201cEquitable conversion is the treating of land as personalty and personalty as land under certain circumstances. Hence, as between the parties and those claiming through them, when the owner of land enters into a valid and enforceable contract for its sale he continues to hold the legal title, but in trust for the buyer; and the buyer becomes the equitable owner and holds the purchase money in trust for the seller. The conversion takes place at the time of entering into the contract. It stems from the basic equitable principle that equity regards as done that which ought to be done.\u201d Shay, 25 Ill. 2d at 449, 185 N.E.2d at 219-20.\nThe supreme court also noted that it had not consistently applied the doctrine in its prior decisions and traced the inconsistency to language in Chappell v. McKnight, 108 Ill. 570 (1884). The Shay court thus expressly overruled Chappell and those decisions following Chappell to the extent they did not apply the doctrine. The Shay court then explicitly declined the appellant\u2019s request to set forth a \u201cdefinitive rule of application of the doctrine in the several fields where it may be invoked.\u201d Shay, 25 Ill. 2d at 450, 185 N.E.2d at 220. In so doing, the court stated as follows: \u201cThe issue here presented is devolution of title at the death of the seller[,] and we concern ourselves in this opinion only with that issue.\u201d Shay, 25 Ill. 2d at 450, 185 N.E.2d at 220.\nContrary to the Kaisermans\u2019 contention, the Shay decision did not abrogate Hiekox, Henderson, or Paulsen. As stated above, the Shay court limited its decision to the issue then before it, which did not involve whether the interest of a seller under an installment land sale contract was subject to a mechanic\u2019s lien. In addition, neither Hiekox, Henderson, nor Paulsen was among those decisions that the Shay court expressly overruled.\nIf the doctrine of equitable conversion had no limitations, we might be inclined to agree that the supreme court\u2019s decision in Shay repudiated the underlying premise of Hiekox, Henderson, and Paulsen. However, that is simply not the case. \u201cThe doctrine of equitable conversion is a fiction, and its application is limited to the extent necessary to accomplish equity.\u201d City of Chicago v. Salinger, 384 Ill. 515, 520, 52 N.E.2d 184, 187 (1943); see also Cox v. Supreme Savings & Loan Ass\u2019n, 126 Ill. App. 2d 293, 295, 262 N.E.2d 74, 76 (1970) (the doctrine was designed to accomplish the parties\u2019 intent and ensure justice where technical rules of law might prevent it). Thus, the doctrine does not apply where it interferes with other equitable considerations or violates the intentions of the parties of the sales contract. Eade v. Brownlee, 29 Ill. 2d 214, 217, 193 N.E.2d 786, 788 (1963). Similarly, the doctrine does not apply if it would circumvent or avoid established principles of law and public policy. Letsos v. Century 21-New West Realty, 285 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 1068, 675 N.E.2d 217, 226 (1996).\nBecause (1) we are bound by Hickox, Henderson, and Paulsen, (2) the supreme court\u2019s decision in Shay did not abrogate them, and (3) the doctrine of equitable conversion does not supersede those holdings, we reject the Kaisermans\u2019 argument that Bette was a lienholder under section 16 of the Act (770 ILCS 60/16 (West 1998)), as opposed to an owner under section 1 (770 ILCS 60/1 (West 1998)).\nB. The Kaisermans\u2019 Equal Protection Claim\nThe Kaisermans also argue that section 16 of the Act (770 ILCS 60/16 (West 1998)), as applied, violates the equal protection clauses of the United States (U.S. Const., amend. XTV) and Illinois Constitutions (111. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 2). Specifically, they contend that as construed by Construx, section 16 provides that all previous incumbrancers, except installment land sale contract sellers, \u201cshall be preferred,\u201d thus treating owner-seller lienholders differently from other lienholders with no rational basis. The Kaisermans\u2019 argument is premised on their assertion that a seller under an installment land sale contract is a lienholder, which we earlier rejected. Thus, we need not address this argument.\nC. The Trial Court\u2019s Finding That Bette Knowingly Permitted the Construction To Take Place\nLast, the Kaisermans argue that the trial court\u2019s finding that Bette knowingly permitted the construction to take place was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.\nSection 1 of the Act provides, in pertinent part, as follows:\n\u201cAny person who shall by any contract or contracts, express or implied, or partly expressed or implied, with the owner of a lot or tract of land, or with one whom the owner has authorized or knowingly permitted to contract, to improve the lot or tract of land *** is known under this Act as a contractor, and has a lien upon the whole of such lot or tract of land *** for the amount due to him for such material, fixtures, apparatus, machinery, services or labor, and interest at the rate of 10% per annum from the date the same is due.\u201d 770 ILCS 60/1 (West 1998).\nThus, a contract for improvements must either have been made with the owner of the property or with one whom the owner has authorized or knowingly permitted to have done the work. The owner is presumed \u201cto have \u2018knowingly permitted\u2019 the improvements where he knew and failed to protest or accepted the benefits of the improvements.\u201d Miller v. Reed, 13 Ill. App. 3d 1074, 1077, 302 N.E.2d 131, 133 (1973).\n\u201cA reviewing court should not overturn a trial court\u2019s findings merely because it does not agree with the lower court or because it might have reached a different conclusion had it been the fact finder. The trial judge, as the trier of fact, is in a position superior to a reviewing court to observe witnesses while testifying, to judge their credibility, and to determine the weight their testimony should receive. Consequently, where the testimony is conflicting in a bench trial, the trial court\u2019s findings will not be disturbed unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. [Citation.] A judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when an opposite conclusion is apparent or when findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on evidence.\u201d Bazydlo v. Volant, 164 Ill. 2d 207, 214-15, 647 N.E.2d 273, 276-77 (1995).\nSee Eychaner v. Gross, 202 Ill. 2d 228, 251, 779 N.E.2d 1115, 1130 (2002) (\u201cIn close cases, where findings of fact depend on the credibility of witnesses, it is particularly true that a reviewing court will defer to the findings of the trial court unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence\u201d); see also Chandler v. Maxwell Manor Nursing Home, Inc., 281 Ill. App. 3d 309, 318, 666 N.E.2d 740, 747 (1996) (in determining whether the trial court\u2019s findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court \u201cmay not reconsider the evidence or reassess the witnesses\u2019 credibility or demeanor\u201d).\nIn this case, the evidence regarding whether Bette authorized or knowingly permitted the construction project was conflicting. Bette testified that (1) after she, Donald, and Herbert entered into the contract to sell the property to Shipley, she \u201cvery rarely\u201d drove by the rear of the building; and (2) she knew nothing about the construction project until after it was completed. In addition, Shipley testified that he did not tell Bette about his agreement with Construx. In contrast, other evidence showed the following: (1) between May and June 1999, Shipley provided Bette with a copy of an appraisal of the property, which indicated that the \u201crear stairwell/fire escape [was] in need of substantial repair or replacement\u201d; (2) on one occasion before the construction was \u201csubstantially completed,\u201d Finley had a conversation with Bette at the rear of the building, during which Bette saw the construction in progress and did not express her disapproval or object; (3) during a March 2001 interview with Clutter, Shipley stated that (a) during the construction project, Bette visited the building often and \u201ckept herself aware of what was going on,\u201d and (b) toward the end of the construction project, Shipley talked with Bette about the construction, and Bette did not object to the construction; and (4) during an August 1999 conversation between Sharp and Bette about his concern that Construx had not been paid for the construction project, Bette stated that she and Shipley \u201cwere trying to work out some things\u201d and \u201cthey would take care of it.\u201d\nWe have carefully reviewed the record in accordance with the appropriate standard of review, and we conclude that the trial court\u2019s finding that Bette knowingly permitted the construction to take place was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nIn so concluding, we note that the Kaisermans make much of the fact that no evidence showed that Bette knowingly permitted the construction at the initiation of the project. The Kaisermans suggest that at the point that Bette knew of the construction project, \u201cno effective action could be taken by [Bette] to protect herself.\u201d We are not persuaded. When Bette first learned of the construction project, she could have then informed both Shipley and Construx that she was neither authorizing nor permitting the construction project to take place.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nAffirmed.\nKNECHT, EJ., and TURNER, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Carl O. Hoffee (argued) and Matthew J. Cate, both of Barber, Segatto, Hoffee & Hines, of Springfield, for appellants.", "Jon Gray Noll (argued), of Noll Law Office, of Springfield, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CONSTRUX OF ILLINOIS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BETTE KAISERMAN, Indiv., as Successor Trustee of the Louis Kaiserman Trust and as Trustee as to an Undivided \u2153 Interest in Parcel I by Reason of Her Being Grantee in Warranty Deed Recorded as Document No. 89H030864, et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nFourth District\nNo. 4-03-0136\nArgued August 13, 2003.\nOpinion filed December 10, 2003.\nCarl O. Hoffee (argued) and Matthew J. Cate, both of Barber, Segatto, Hoffee & Hines, of Springfield, for appellants.\nJon Gray Noll (argued), of Noll Law Office, of Springfield, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0847-01", "first_page_order": 867, "last_page_order": 879 }