{ "id": 3738874, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JACKIE DAVIS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Davis", "decision_date": "2004-01-07", "docket_number": "No. 1-01-1966", "first_page": "901", "last_page": "912", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "345 Ill. App. 3d 901" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "564 N.E.2d 784", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 Ill. 2d 189", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5574383 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "193-96" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/139/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "532 N.E.2d 543", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "177 Ill. App. 3d 663", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3621882 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "669" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/177/0663-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 N.E.2d 86", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 Ill. App. 3d 405", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3513742 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/168/0405-01" ] }, { "cite": "521 N.E.2d 1172", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 Ill. App. 3d 397", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3513408 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "404" }, { "page": "404" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/168/0397-01" ] }, { "cite": "731 N.E.2d 823", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 Ill. App. 3d 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 140315 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397-98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/314/0389-01" ] }, { "cite": "544 N.E.2d 357", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 Ill. 2d 123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5567019 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "175" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/129/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 N.E.2d 1351", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 Ill. 2d 182", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5555073 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "200-01" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/125/0182-01" ] }, { "cite": "704 N.E.2d 982", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "noting that one relevant circumstance is whether there was a pattern of strikes against African-American venire members" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 Ill. App. 3d 966", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 257197 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "971-72", "parenthetical": "noting that one relevant circumstance is whether there was a pattern of strikes against African-American venire members" }, { "page": "990", "parenthetical": "Rathje, J., specially concurring in part and dissenting in part" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/301/0966-01" ] }, { "cite": "645 N.E.2d 414", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that defense counsel's undisputed, on-the-record statements about the race of an excluded venireperson may be considered when determining whether defendant properly preserved the record for review of Batson claim" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "268 Ill. App. 3d 857", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 381910 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "865-66", "parenthetical": "holding that defense counsel's undisputed, on-the-record statements about the race of an excluded venireperson may be considered when determining whether defendant properly preserved the record for review of Batson claim" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/268/0857-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 Md. 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Md.", "case_ids": [ 2075870 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "84-87", "parenthetical": "and cases cited therein" }, { "page": "1283-85", "parenthetical": "and cases cited therein" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/md/313/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "567 N.E.2d 899", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "903-04", "parenthetical": "and cases cited therein" }, { "page": "903-04" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "409 Mass. 461", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 3892767 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "465-67", "parenthetical": "and cases cited therein" }, { "page": "465-67" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/409/0461-01" ] }, { "cite": "519 N.E.2d 703", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "finding that defendant established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination under Batson where the prosecution used a peremptory challenge to exclude the only African-American in the venire" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "166 Ill. App. 3d 123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5069304 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "127", "parenthetical": "finding that defendant established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination under Batson where the prosecution used a peremptory challenge to exclude the only African-American in the venire" }, { "page": "127" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/166/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "651 N.E.2d 608", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "272 Ill. App. 3d 1047", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 251177 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1057" }, { "page": "1058" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/272/1047-01" ] }, { "cite": "547 N.E.2d 124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 Ill. 2d 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5588559 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "173" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/132/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "670 N.E.2d 638", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "173 Ill. 2d 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 147596 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "71" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/173/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "794 N.E.2d 314", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "206 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1578284 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/206/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "588 N.E.2d 1126", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "146 Ill. 2d 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5597251 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "425" }, { "page": "429-30", "parenthetical": "holding that defense counsel's on-the-record statement as to the number of strikes used to exclude African-American venirepersons represented evidence establishing the number of strikes, where the State failed to offer any evidence objecting to or correcting the statement" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/146/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "499 U.S. 400", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11319062 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/499/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "579 N.E.2d 336", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 Ill. 2d 108", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5592162 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "151-52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/144/0108-01" ] }, { "cite": "675 N.E.2d 141", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 Ill. App. 3d 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1544402 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "74" }, { "page": "74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/286/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "736 N.E.2d 975", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "192 Ill. 2d 307", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 453252 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323" }, { "page": "323-24" }, { "page": "323" }, { "page": "323-24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/192/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 U.S. 79", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12787 ], "weight": 24, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "89" }, { "page": "83" }, { "page": "1719" }, { "page": "97" }, { "page": "88" }, { "page": "1723" }, { "page": "96" }, { "page": "87-88" }, { "page": "1723" }, { "page": "97" }, { "page": "88" }, { "page": "1723" }, { "page": "98" }, { "page": "88" }, { "page": "1723" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/476/0079-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1121, "char_count": 27004, "ocr_confidence": 0.717, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.016727852336495e-08, "percentile": 0.5036762761072171 }, "sha256": "de2dbe5663d8b4a531e3e2f5233600e4420971c4b4c71df2718e03ebe29dba4c", "simhash": "1:0bca2d56ee8631f1", "word_count": 4375 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:40:04.128176+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "SOUTH and KARNEZIS, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JACKIE DAVIS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HALL\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn February 2, 2001, following a jury trial, defendant, Jackie Davis, also know as \u201cLittle Jack,\u201d was convicted of second-degree murder. On April 6, 2001, after denying defendant\u2019s motion for a new trial, the circuit court sentenced defendant to 18 years\u2019 imprisonment in the Illinois Department of Corrections. After defendant\u2019s motion to reconsider sentence was denied, he filed his timely notice of appeal on April 10, 2001.\nOn appeal, defendant contends that: (1) the State unconstitutionally exercised a peremptory challenge to exclude the only African-American venireperson in violation of the principles set forth in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986); (2) the circuit court erred by admitting Amos Ward\u2019s handwritten statement as substantive evidence pursuant to section 115 \u2014 10.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 10.1 (West 1998)); (3) he was denied a fair trial because the prosecutor made numerous improper and prejudicial remarks during closing argument; and (4) the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to 18 years\u2019 imprisonment. For the reasons that follow, we remand with directions.\nFACTUAL BACKGROUND\nDefendant\u2019s conviction arose from the fatal shooting of Vincent Ruffin. Evidence was presented that a little after midnight on August 12, 1998, Ruffin, Arki Clark, and Thomas Lake were standing together in a vacant lot near 5th Avenue and Whipple Street in Chicago, Illinois, when they were approached by defendant and a second individual, nicknamed \u201cTone Bone.\u201d Ruffin was a member of the New Breed street gang, Clark was a member of the Four Corner Hustlers, and Lake was a member of the Gangster Disciples. Evidence was presented that defendant was a member of the Gangster Disciples. Defendant, who was dressed in black pants and a black hooded sweatshirt, approached the group from an alley gangway. Tone Bone was also dressed in black clothing.\nDefendant walked up to Ruffin and the two engaged in an increasingly heated argument regarding money and/or the sale of drugs in the vacant lot. After about five minutes of arguing, Ruffin asked defendant whether he was \u201cstrapped,\u201d meaning did defendant have a gun. Defendant responded that he was not \u201cstrapped\u201d and then raised his arms and patted himself down to show Ruffin that he did not have a gun on his person. After approximately another four or five minutes of arguing, defendant pulled a small revolver from his waistband and shot Ruffin twice.\nDoctor Mitra Kalelkar, a Cook County assistant chief medical examiner, testified that she performed an autopsy on Ruffin\u2019s body. The doctor testified that Ruffin sustained a through-and-through gunshot wound to his neck and a second gunshot wound to the abdomen. The doctor testified that Ruffin\u2019s cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds and his manner of death was homicide.\nLake testified that after the shooting, he ran about two blocks to a hotel where he called the police and reported the incident. Afterwards Lake got into his car with Clark to look for defendant. At about 2 a.m., on August 13, 1998, Lake and Clark were stopped by the police for driving erratically. The police found a gun in Lake\u2019s car. Lake and Clark were taken to the police station, where they both gave statements regarding the shooting and identified defendant from a photograph as the shooter.\nAmos Ward, defendant\u2019s cousin, testified at trial that at approximately 9:15 p.m., on August 11, 1998, he was sitting on his front porch when defendant rode up on a bicycle. Defendant wanted to borrow some clothes. Ward testified that he could not remember the type or color of clothing he lent defendant. Defendant departed Ward\u2019s house with the borrowed clothing, leaving his bicycle behind. Sometime after midnight, defendant returned to Ward\u2019s house, retrieved his bicycle and left. Ward also testified that after the shooting incident he gave a written statement to the police and gave testimony before the grand jury.\nWard\u2019s written statement and a transcript of his grand jury testimony were both published to the jury. Ward\u2019s written statement and grand jury testimony were substantially different from his trial testimony.\nAccording to Ward\u2019s grand jury testimony, on August 11, 1998, at about 9:15 p.m., he was sitting on his front porch when defendant rode up on a bicycle. Defendant wanted to borrow some clothing, which was unusual. Defendant borrowed two pairs of dark blue jeans and then left on his bike. Ward testified that the next time he saw defendant was early the next morning on August 12, 1998, at about 12:30 a.m. A white, four-door Chevy with tinted windows dropped defendant off in front of Ward\u2019s house. Defendant told Ward that he wanted to speak with him in private. Ward and defendant then went to the basement of Ward\u2019s house, where defendant made a telephone call to his girlfriend Trina. Defendant asked Trina to go to Sacramento Boulevard and 5th Avenue to see if the police or an ambulance was in the area. Ward stated that after defendant hung up the telephone, he and defendant went outside and walked around the corner. Defendant wanted to tell his fellow gang members about the shooting so they could be on the lookout for any retaliation from rival gang members from the New Breed gang. Ward stated that defendant was a member of the Gangster Disciples street gang. According to Ward, defendant stated that on the night of the shooting he had gotten into an argument with Ruffin, who was a member of the New Breed street gang, about selling drugs in New Breed territory. Defendant stated that during the course of the argument when he informed Ruffin that neither he nor his partner had guns, Ruffin began acting tougher and threatened to retrieve a gun saying, \u201cafter I go down the street when I come back I\u2019m going to come back shooting..\u201d Defendant stated that he then pulled out a .38-caliber handgun and fired twice. Defendant said that he knew he hit Ruffin at least one time. Defendant ran from the scene after shooting Ruffin and afterwards gave his gun to an individual named \u201cGreg.\u201d According to Ward, after defendant told him about the shooting incident, defendant made a second telephone call and shortly thereafter Trina arrived at the house in a red Altima and picked up defendant.\nAssistant State\u2019s Attorney Adam Monreal testified that he interviewed defendant and took his handwritten, five-page statement. The statement was published to the jury. According to defendant\u2019s statement, on August 12, 1998, at around midnight, he approached Ruffin, who was standing with two other men in the area of 5th Avenue near Sacramento Boulevard. Defendant stated that he confronted Ruffin because he wanted to know why Ruffin had disrespected him and his godmother. Defendant stated that as he and Ruffin argued, Ruffin told him to \u201cget the f \u2014 k out of here before [I] kill (your] bit-h a-s.\u201d Ruffin then asked defendant if he had a gun, and defendant responded that he was not carrying a gun. Defendant and Ruffin continued to argue whereupon Ruffin went to his car and told defendant that he \u201cwould kill his bit-h a-s.\u201d When Ruffin returned from his car, defendant and Ruffin continued arguing, face-to-face. Ruffin\u2019s two associates were standing near Ruffin. When Ruffin put his hands down by his waist, defendant pulled a handgun from his waistband and shot Ruffin twice. After shooting Ruffin, defendant ran from the scene, threw his handgun in an alley, and went to his godmother\u2019s house located around the corner in order to warn her about Ruffin\u2019s friends. Defendant then left his godmother\u2019s house and went over to his cousin Amos Ward\u2019s house. After leaving Ward\u2019s house, defendant went to his grandmother\u2019s house. Defendant stated that after the shooting, he laid low for five months.\nThe parties then stipulated that the partially deformed bullet recovered from Ruffin\u2019s body was a \u201c380, 357 caliber bullet exhibiting six Ians and grooves with a left hand twist.\u201d The State rested after the exhibits were admitted into evidence. After the circuit court denied defense counsel\u2019s motion for a directed verdict, the defense rested without presenting any evidence.\nAt the close of the evidence and after closing arguments, the jury deliberated for two days and thereafter returned a verdict finding defendant guilty of second-degree murder. Defendant was subsequently sentenced to 18 years\u2019 imprisonment in the Illinois Department of Corrections. Defendant now brings this direct appeal.\nANALYSIS\nI. Batson Claim\nDefendant, who is African-American, first contends that the trial court erred in finding that he failed to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986), after the court allowed the prosecutor to exercise a peremptory challenge to remove the only African-American from the venire. Defendant maintains that the trial court\u2019s determination that he failed to establish a prima facie case of a Batson violation was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We agree.\nIn Batson, the United States Supreme Court held that, in a criminal case, the fourteenth amendment\u2019s equal protection clause prohibits a prosecutor from using a peremptory challenge to exclude a prospective juror solely on the basis of his or her race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 83, 106 S. Ct. at 1719. Under Batson, the equal protection clause is violated when the facts show that the State excluded an African-American venireperson on the assumption that he or she will be biased in favor of defendant simply because of their shared race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 88, 106 S. Ct. at 1723.\nThe Batson Court provided a three-step process for evaluating claims of discrimination in jury selection. First, the defendant must meet his burden of making a prima facie showing that the State exercised its peremptory challenge on the basis of race. People v. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d 307, 323, 736 N.E.2d 975 (2000). If aprima facie case is made, the burden then shifts to the State to articulate a race-neutral explanation for excusing the venireperson. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d at 323-24. Once the State articulates its reasons for excusing the venireperson in question, the process moves to the third step, where the trial court must determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of establishing purposeful discrimination. At the third step, the trial court considers the reasons provided by the State as well as claims by the defendant that the proffered reasons are pretextual. People v. Pecor, 286 Ill. App. 3d 71, 74, 675 N.E.2d 141 (1996).\nUnder Batson, in order to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination in jury selection, a defendant was required to first show that he was a member of a cognizable racial group and that the prosecutor had exercised peremptory challenges to exclude venirepersons of defendant\u2019s race. Second, defendant was entitled to rely on the fact that peremptory challenges can be used to facilitate discrimination in jury selection. And finally, defendant was required to show that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raised an inference that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to exclude certain venirepersons on account of their race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 87-88, 106 S. Ct. at 1723; People v. Edwards, 144 Ill. 2d 108, 151-52, 579 N.E.2d 336 (1991).\nBatson\u2019s first element was effectively eliminated by the holding in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 113 L. Ed. 2d 411, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991), wherein the Court held that a criminal defendant may bring a Batson claim whether or not defendant and the excused venireperson share the same race. People v. Andrews, 146 Ill. 2d 413, 425, 588 N.E.2d 1126 (1992). Still, the racial identity between a defendant and an excluded venireperson remains a relevant factor in determining whether a prima facie case of discrimination has been established. People v. Harris, 206 Ill. 2d 1, 28, 794 N.E.2d 314 (2002).\nAfter Powers, in order for a defendant to establish aprima facie case of purposeful discrimination by the prosecution in the exercise of its peremptory challenges, defendant must present relevant factors or circumstances which raise an inference that the prosecutor challenged venirepersons on account of their race. Some of the factors generally deemed relevant in establishing a prima facie case of discrimination include: (1) the racial identity between the defendant and the excluded venireperson; (2) a pattern of strikes against African-American venirepersons; (3) a disproportionate use of peremptory challenges against African-American venirepersons; (4) the level of African-American representation in the venire as compared to the jury; (5) the prosecutor\u2019s questions and statements during voir dire examination and while exercising peremptory challenges; (6) whether the excluded African-American venirepersons were a heterogenous group sharing race as their only common characteristic; and (7) the race of the defendant, victim and witnesses. People v. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48, 71, 670 N.E.2d 638 (1996). These examples of the generally recognized relevant factors or circumstances are \u201cmerely illustrative,\u201d and are not all inclusive. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 88, 106 S. Ct. at 1723; People v. Holman, 132 Ill. 2d 128, 173, 547 N.E.2d 124 (1989).\nIn the present case, defendant argues that the shared racial identity between himself and Mr. Summers, and the fact that the prosecutor used a peremptory challenge to remove Summers, who was the only African-American on the venire, were relevant factors or circumstances sufficient to raise an inference that the prosecutor peremptorily challenged Summers on account of his race. We agree. Our review of the evidence in light of the relevant factors defendant presents reveals that defendant established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination under Batson and that the trial court\u2019s ruling to the contrary was against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nThe voir dire examination revealed that Summers had no previous record, no prior jury service, nor was any member of his family ever charged or convicted of a crime. Summers had been employed as a maintenance engineer for 13 years. He was single with two children and had lived at his current address for approximately five years. His adult child attended Harold Washington College and beautician school. Summers stated that he had never served as a juror, did not know any of the parties or witnesses involved in the case, did not know the lawyers, and had never heard or read anything about the case.\nSummers stated that he did not have any family or friends who were associated with law enforcement. Neither Summers nor any member of his family had been a complainant or witness in a criminal case. Summers stated that he had been a victim of auto theft, and had a friend who about 10 years ago testified as a witness in a rape case. Summers asserted that neither of these experiences would prevent him from being fair and impartial. He also maintained that evidence of gang activity and guns would not prevent him from being fair and impartial. Summers stated that he would follow the law, he would base his verdict on the evidence, and he would have no problem rendering either a guilty or not guilty verdict.\nNothing in the voir dire examination of Summers reveals any basis for excluding him from the jury panel. A review of the record reveals that Summers had substantially the same characteristics as the other accepted members of the venire, except for his race. This court has previously determined that the selection of Caucasian jurors and the exclusion of even a single African-American juror sharing common characteristics raises an inference that the African-American juror was excluded solely on the basis of race. People v. Holmes, 272 Ill. App. 3d 1047, 1057, 651 N.E.2d 608 (1995). This state of the record raises an inference that the prosecutor used his peremptory challenge to exclude Summers on account of his race. Absent some reasonable ground, apparent on the record, for exercising a peremptory challenge, the record raises an inference that the challenge was exercised for a racially discriminatory purpose. As a result, defendant has established a prima facie case of discrimination under Batson. See People v. Parker, 166 Ill. App. 3d 123, 127, 519 N.E.2d 703 (1988) (finding that defendant established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination under Batson where the prosecution used a peremptory challenge to exclude the only African-American in the venire); Commonwealth v. Harris, 409 Mass. 461, 465-67, 567 N.E.2d 899, 903-04 (1991) (and cases cited therein); Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50, 84-87, 542 A.2d 1267, 1283-85 (1988) (and cases cited therein).\nThe State contends that defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination under Batson because the record does not affirmatively show that Summers was the only possible African-American venireperson. We must reject the State\u2019s contention. At the time Summers underwent his voir dire examination, 8 of 12 jurors had already been empaneled and 3 venirepersons who were ultimately empaneled had already been questioned. Thus, it was reasonably probable that at the time Summers was questioned only one more juror was required.\nAt the Batson hearing, defense counsel argued that Summers was the only possible African-American venireperson that could sit on the jury stating, \u201cJudge, [Summers] answered every question put to him by the Court in exactly the same fashion as every other juror. He\u2019s the only male black that could possibly sit on this jury, apparently the only black that could sit because of the way the judge questions the jurors, having them slide down. We believe this is being done, he\u2019s being excused because he\u2019s black.\u201d The prosecutors never disputed, objected to or corrected defense counsel\u2019s statement that Summers was the only possible African-American that could sit on the jury. And the trial court never corrected defense counsel\u2019s statement in this regard. In fact, the trial court informed defense counsel, \u201c[y]ou made your record.\u201d Under these circumstances, a record was created in accordance with defense counsel\u2019s statement that Summers was the only African-American that could sit on the jury. See People v. Partee, 268 Ill. App. 3d 857, 865-66, 645 N.E.2d 414 (1994) (holding that defense counsel\u2019s undisputed, on-the-record statements about the race of an excluded venireperson may be considered when determining whether defendant properly preserved the record for review of Batson claim); Andrews, 146 Ill. 2d at 429-30 (holding that defense counsel\u2019s on-the-record statement as to the number of strikes used to exclude African-American venirepersons represented evidence establishing the number of strikes, where the State failed to offer any evidence objecting to or correcting the statement).\nThe State also maintains that the mere coincidence that Summers and the unchallenged Caucasian jurors shared certain characteristics does not establish purposeful discrimination because Summers may have possessed an additional trait that caused the prosecutor to excuse him. In other words, the State asserts in essence that there could have been race-neutral reasons which accounted for the exclusion. Any such proffered reasons, however, are irrelevant at this first stage of the Batson analysis, because at this stage, the issue is not whether there were any legitimate race-neutral reasons for the exclusion but, rather, whether defendant established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination under Batson. Holmes, 272 Ill. App. 3d at 1058.\nThe State next contends that the dismissal of one African-American venireperson does not constitute a pattern of strikes against African-American venirepersons. Under Batson, a pattern of discrimination in the State\u2019s use of peremptory challenges is one of the relevant factors or circumstances a trial court may consider in determining whether a defendant has established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. See People v. Edwards, 301 Ill. App. 3d 966, 971-72, 704 N.E.2d 982 (1998) (noting that one relevant circumstance is whether there was a pattern of strikes against African-American venire members). However, in cases where there was only one African-American in a venire and that venireperson had been peremptorily challenged by the State, this court, along with reviewing courts in other jurisdictions, has held that a \u201cpattern of strikes\u201d was not the exclusive basis on which a defendant could establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination under Batson. See Parker, 166 Ill. App. 3d at 127; Harris, 409 Mass, at 465-67, 567 N.E.2d at 903-04.\nIn cases such as this one, where there is only one African-American in the venire, it would be virtually impossible for a defendant to provide evidence of a pattern of discriminatory strikes in the State\u2019s use of peremptory challenges. See Edwards, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 990 (Rathje, J., specially concurring in part and dissenting in part). If the absence of a \u201cpattern of strikes\u201d were enough, in and of itself, to defeat the establishment of a prima facie case of discrimination under Batson, this would effectively enable a prosecutor to exercise at least one peremptory challenge in a discriminatory manner. Such a possibility is untenable in light of the fact that pursuant to Batson and its progeny, the exclusion of just one venireperson on account of race is unconstitutional and requires reversal of the conviction. See People v. McDonald, 125 Ill. 2d 182, 200-01, 530 N.E.2d 1351 (1988); People v. Harris, 129 Ill. 2d 123, 175, 544 N.E.2d 357 (1989). Therefore, in the context of this venire, in which there was only one African-American venireperson, a \u201cpattern of strikes\u201d was an irrelevant factor in determining whether defendant established a prima facie case of discrimination under Batson.\nWe also find that the trial court erred by improperly collapsing stages one and three of the Batson analysis. As previously mentioned, Batson establishes a three-step analysis to determine whether the State used its peremptory challenges to remove venirepersons on the basis of race. First, the defendant must establish a prima facie case of purposeful racial discrimination in jury selection by showing that the State exercised its peremptory challenges to remove members of a cognizable racial group from the venire. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d at 323. Second, if a prima facie case is made, the burden then shifts to the State to articulate a race-neutral explanation for excusing the venireperson. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d at 323-24. Once the State articulates its reasons for excusing the venireperson in question, the process moves to the third step, where the trial court determines whether the defendant has carried his burden of establishing purposeful discrimination. At the third step, the trial court considers the reasons provided by the State as well as claims by the defendant that the proffered reasons are pretextual. Pecor, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 74.\nIn the present case, the trial court improperly collapsed the first and third stages of the Batson analysis by determining that no prima facie case was established based in part upon a finding that the prosecutors were credible. The trial court erred in this regard because it is only at step three, after the State has satisfied its step-two burden of production and articulated its race-neutral reasons for excusing the venireperson in question, that the court is allowed to evaluate the prosecutor\u2019s credibility. See People v. Crockett, 314 Ill. App. 3d 389, 397-98, 731 N.E.2d 823 (2000) (\u201c[t]o allow the court to rely on its own reasons without eliciting any explanations by the State would effectively omit step two of the Batson process and collapse it into step three. Moreover, the elimination of step two would effectively merge step one and step three into a single step since both require evaluations by the court of evidence produced by the defense, contrary to the three-step Batson process structured by the United States Supreme Court [citations]\u201d).\nOn remand, the trial court will accept that a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination has been established and will conduct a Bat-son hearing at which the State is to provide race-neutral explanations for peremptorily challenging Summers. Rubber-stamp approval to offered nonracial explanations should not be given. The prosecution\u2019s explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause, but it may not rebut defendant\u2019s prima facie case by merely denying there was a discriminatoiy motive. See People v. Allen, 168 Ill. App. 3d 397, 404, 521 N.E.2d 1172 (1987), citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 88, 106 S. Ct. at 1723. The prosecutor\u2019s explanation must be \u201c \u2018clear and reasonably specific,\u2019 \u201d it must contain \u201c \u2018 \u201clegitimate reasons\u201d for exercising the challenge! ],\u2019 \u201d and it must be \u201c \u2018related to the particular case to be tried.\u2019 \u201d Allen, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 404, quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 & n.20, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 88 & n.20, 106 S. Ct. at 1724 & n.20.\nII. Conclusion\nIn view of our disposition of this case on the Batson issue, we do not address defendant\u2019s remaining issues at this time. After the Bat-son proceeding on remand has been completed and any supplementary issues briefed, we will announce our judgment on all pending issues. Accordingly, we remand to the circuit court of Cook County with directions to conduct a Batson hearing at which the State is to provide race-neutral explanations for the use of its peremptory challenge against Summers. The circuit court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law which, together with the record of the proceedings, shall be filed with the clerk of this court within 60 days of the filing of this order. We retain jurisdiction for the purpose of reviewing the determination of the circuit court, and the defendant and State will be allowed to submit supplemental briefs addressing this issue in this court. See People v. Buckley, 168 Ill. App. 3d 405, 413, 522 N.E.2d 86 (1987); People v. Jones, 177 Ill. App. 3d 663, 669, 532 N.E.2d 543 (1988); People v. Garrett, 139 Ill. 2d 189, 193-96, 564 N.E.2d 784 (1990).\nRemanded with directions.\nSOUTH and KARNEZIS, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HALL" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Heidi Linn Lambros, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Kenneth McCurry, and Marti Jacobs, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JACKIE DAVIS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1-01-1966\nOpinion filed January 7, 2004.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Heidi Linn Lambros, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Kenneth McCurry, and Marti Jacobs, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0901-01", "first_page_order": 921, "last_page_order": 932 }