{ "id": 3739117, "name": "JANICE MORES-HARVEY, Appellee, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Bob Evans Restaurant, Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "Mores-Harvey v. Industrial Commission", "decision_date": "2004-02-06", "docket_number": "No. 3-03-0081WC", "first_page": "1034", "last_page": "1042", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "345 Ill. App. 3d 1034" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "78 Ill. 2d 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3075322 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332-35" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/78/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 Ill. App. 3d 238", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3609337 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "242", "parenthetical": "unexplained falls result from a neutral origin" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/153/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "143 Ill. 2d 542", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5591947 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "552-53" }, { "page": "552" }, { "page": "552" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/143/0542-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 Ill. App. 3d 438", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1281373 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444-45" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/326/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "26 Ill. 2d 110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5357338 ], "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114", "parenthetical": "snow and ice; \"an employee who falls on a parking lot provided by his employer while proceeding to work, we believe, is subjected to hazards to which the general public is not exposed\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/26/0110-01" ] }, { "cite": "41 Ill. 2d 429", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2853008 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "431", "parenthetical": "injury arose out of and in the course of employment where the claimant injured his hand after he slipped and fell in snowy and icy company parking lot after he had parked his car in the lot because \"[h]is presence in the lot was due entirely to his employment\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/41/0429-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 Ill. 2d 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3092587 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "217", "parenthetical": "injury arose out of and in the course of employment where employee slipped on ice while walking from employer's parking lot through gate to plant grounds because injury resulted from a risk incident to employment" }, { "page": "216", "parenthetical": "\"where the claimant's injury was sustained as a result of the condition of the employer's premises, this court has consistently approved an award of compensation\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/91/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 Ill. 2d 478", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5569918 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "483-84" }, { "page": "484" }, { "page": "484" }, { "page": "484" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/131/0478-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 Ill. App. 3d 812", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 894492 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "815" }, { "page": "815-17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/337/0812-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 Ill. 2d 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3111555 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "106" }, { "page": "107" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/95/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1477030 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "194" }, { "page": "194" }, { "page": "194" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 Ill. App. 3d 1050", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 79557 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1054" }, { "page": "1054-55" }, { "page": "1054" }, { "page": "1054" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/327/1050-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 Ill. 2d 52", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5567377 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "58" }, { "page": "57" }, { "page": "61" }, { "page": "62" }, { "page": "62" }, { "page": "62" }, { "page": "62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/129/0052-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 791, "char_count": 20308, "ocr_confidence": 0.739, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.497341544922815e-08, "percentile": 0.399685657349135 }, "sha256": "d237d594f99284f6fbd94ea4ecad6723a80a418ea9520db50e00ed0654f59da2", "simhash": "1:c7edb58a31ab68fd", "word_count": 3378 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:40:04.128176+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "McCULLOUGH, PM., and HOFFMAN, HOLDRIDGE, and GOLDENHERSH, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "JANICE MORES-HARVEY, Appellee, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Bob Evans Restaurant, Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CALLUM\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nI. INTRODUCTION\nClaimant, Janice Mores-Harvey, filed an application for adjustment of claim under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2002)) for injuries she sustained when she slipped and fell on employer\u2019s, Bob Evans Restaurant\u2019s, parking lot. Following a hearing on claimant\u2019s section 19(b) petition (820 ILCS 305/19(b) (West 2002)), the arbitrator awarded claimant 15Ar weeks\u2019 temporary total disability benefits and $18,230.82 in medical expenses. Employer appealed, and the Industrial Commission (Commission) reversed, finding that claimant failed to prove that she suffered accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of her employment with employer. Claimant appealed, and the circuit court reversed and reinstated the arbitrator\u2019s decision. Employer now appeals.\nII. BACKGROUND\nClaimant worked as a waitress for employer. On December 17, 1997, at about 6 or 7 a.m., claimant drove to work to begin her 6 a.m. to 2 p.m. shift. She parked her car behind employer\u2019s restaurant in the parking lot that surrounds the building. As she exited her car, claimant put one foot down and slipped and fell on ice, hit her head on the car door, and landed on her back. She testified that it had snowed and was very cold outside, and employer\u2019s parking lot had not been shoveled.\nClaimant walked into the restaurant and informed her manager that she had an accident in the parking lot. The manager, Jennifer Kuder, told claimant that she had been unsuccessful in her attempts to contact a snow-removal service. Claimant worked her entire shift that day.\nEmployer\u2019s restaurant is located on the corner of McDonough and Larkin Roads in Joliet. Claimant testified that the restaurant is surrounded by a parking lot. There is no parking on McDonough Street, which runs adjacent to the restaurant\u2019s entrance. Claimant routinely parked her car in employer\u2019s lot behind the restaurant. Employees were directed to park on either the side or back of the parking lot so that customers could park in the front. The lot is not lit. Although no one at employer told claimant that she had to use the restaurant\u2019s lot, claimant testified that there was no other place to park. Claimant understood that employer maintained the lot.\nThe arbitrator awarded claimant 154/7 weeks\u2019 temporary total disability benefits and $18,230 in medical expenses. Employer appealed, arguing that claimant failed to prove that she sustained injuries arising out of and in the course of her employment with employer. On review, the Commission reversed the arbitrator\u2019s decision. Relying on Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 129 Ill. 2d 52 (1989), the Commission found that claimant\u2019s fall resulted from the natural accumulation of snow and ice on a lot intended for the use of employees and customers alike. The record did not support a finding that there was a defect in the parking lot surface. Because the accumulation was a natural hazard to which the general public was equally exposed in all parking areas of employer\u2019s restaurant, claimant\u2019s claim for compensation was denied.\nOne commissioner dissented, arguing that claimant was at an increased risk when she slipped and fell because the snow and ice constituted a defect on employer\u2019s lot. Employer\u2019s failure to remove the defect on the lot increased the risk of injury faced by claimant because she was required to use the lot to get to work. Furthermore, the dissenting commissioner indicated that claimant faced an increased risk because she arrived at work at 6 a.m. while it was still dark, and the lot was unlit and unplowed. Unlike the general public, claimant could not choose a parking spot closest to the restaurant door.\nClaimant appealed, and the circuit court reversed the Commission\u2019s decision and reinstated the arbitrator\u2019s award. The court found that the Commission based its ruling in part on its finding that the ice accumulation was a natural accumulation. The court reasoned that such a finding was a negligence law concept that had no bearing in workers\u2019 compensation matters. Characterizing the issue as whether the claimant was placed at a greater risk than the general public because of her employment, the court found that she was and that the Commission applied the wrong legal standard. Additionally, the court found that the Commission\u2019s finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Employer timely appealed.\nIII. ANALYSIS\nEmployer argues that the Commission\u2019s decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, as claimant\u2019s injuries did not arise out of her employment. The determination of whether a claimant\u2019s injury arose out of or in the course of the claimant\u2019s employment is a question of fact for the Commission to resolve, and its determination will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Homerding v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 327 Ill. App. 3d 1050, 1054 (2002).\nTo obtain compensation under the Act, a claimant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she suffered a disabling injury that arose out of and in the course of the claimant\u2019s employment. 820 ILCS 305/2 (West 2002); Baggett v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 201 Ill. 2d 187, 194 (2002). An injury \u201carises out of\u2019 one\u2019s employment if it originates from a risk connected with, or incidental to, the employment and involves a causal connection between the employment and the accidental injury. Baggett, 201 Ill. 2d at 194. A risk is incidental to the employment where it belongs to or is connected with what an employee has to do in fulfilling his or her duties. Caterpillar Tractor, 129 Ill. 2d at 58.\nAn injury occurs \u201cin the course of\u2019 employment when it occurs during employment and at a place where the claimant may reasonably perform employment duties, and while a claimant fulfills those duties or engages in some incidental employment duties. Baggett, 201 Ill. 2d at 194. Accidental injuries sustained on an employer\u2019s premises within a reasonable time before and after work are generally deemed to arise in the course of the employment. Caterpillar Tractor, 129 Ill. 2d at 57; Boyle v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 95 Ill. 2d 103, 106 (1983). However, when an employee slips and falls at a point off of the employer\u2019s premises while traveling to or from work, the resulting injuries do not arise out of and in the course of the claimant\u2019s employment and are not compensable under the Act. Joiner v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 337 Ill. App. 3d 812, 815 (2003); Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 131 Ill. 2d 478, 483-84 (1989). While the distinction between on- and off-premises injuries has been described as arbitrary, it has also been noted that its advantages include that it is logical and easily administered. Doyle, 95 Ill. 2d at 107.\nThere have developed two exceptions to this \u201cgeneral premises rule.\u201d Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 131 Ill. 2d at 484. First, recovery has been permitted where the employee has sustained injuries in a parking lot \u201cprovided by and under the control of\u2019 an employer. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 131 Ill. 2d at 484. Second, recovery has been permitted for off-premises injuries when \u201cthe employee\u2019s presence at the place where the accident occurred was required in the performance of his duties and the employee is exposed to a risk common to the general public to a greater degree than other persons.\u201d Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 131 Ill. 2d at 484.\nTurning to the parking lot exception, slips or falls on an employer-provided lot when hazardous conditions are present are generally compensable. See Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 91 Ill. 2d 210, 217 (1982) (injury arose out of and in the course of employment where employee slipped on ice while walking from employer\u2019s parking lot through gate to plant grounds because injury resulted from a risk incident to employment); Hiram Walker & Sons v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 41 Ill. 2d 429, 431 (1968) (injury arose out of and in the course of employment where the claimant injured his hand after he slipped and fell in snowy and icy company parking lot after he had parked his car in the lot because \u201c[h]is presence in the lot was due entirely to his employment\u201d); De Hoyos v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 26 Ill. 2d 110, 114 (1962) (snow and ice; \u201can employee who falls on a parking lot provided by his employer while proceeding to work, we believe, is subjected to hazards to which the general public is not exposed\u201d). The rationale for awarding compensation is that the employer-provided parking lot is considered part of the employer\u2019s premises. See 1 L. Larson, Larson\u2019s Workers\u2019 Compensation Law \u00a7\u00a7 13.04(2)(a), (2)(b), at 13 \u2014 40 through 13 \u2014 41 (2002) (practically all jurisdictions consider parking lots owned or maintained by the employer as part of the employer\u2019s premises; once the parking lot is considered, part of the employer\u2019s premises, \u201ccompensation coverage attaches to any injury that would be compensable on the main premises\u201d).\nEmployer questions the utility of the foregoing cases given the supreme court\u2019s Caterpillar Tractor decision. In that case, the claimant was injured on his way to the employee parking lot after his shift. Immediately in front of the employer\u2019s building was a sidewalk with a curb running along its edge. A blacktop driveway next to the curb was part of the company premises and was used both by employees and the general public to pick up employees. The claimant stepped off of the curb and onto the driveway. His right foot landed half on the cement incline and half on the driveway, and the claimant twisted his ankle.\nThe supreme court first considered whether the claimant\u2019s injury resulted from the condition of the employer\u2019s premises. It noted that the claimant did not trip, slip, or fall. The court concluded that the claimant\u2019s injury did not result from the condition of the employer\u2019s premises because there was no evidence that the curb was either hazardous or defective. Caterpillar Tractor, 129 Ill. 2d at 61. Next, the court considered whether the claimant was subjected to a greater degree of risk than the general public because of his employment. It found that curbs and the risks that are inherent in traversing them confront all members of the public. Rejecting the claimant\u2019s argument that he regularly crossed the curb to reach his car, the court found that there was nothing in the record to distinguish this curb from any other curb. Accordingly, the court held that the Commission\u2019s finding that the claimant\u2019s injury arose out of his employment was contrary to the evidence. Caterpillar Tractor, 129 Ill. 2d at 62.\nWe do not read Caterpillar Tractor as questioning the continuing viability of the earlier parking lot slip-and-fall cases. We note that the Caterpillar Tractor court cited the earlier cases in reviewing the court\u2019s \u201ccontinued adherence to the maxim that an injury is not compensable unless it is causally connected to the employment.\u201d Caterpillar Tractor, 129 Ill. 2d at 62. The court further stated:\n\u201cWhere liability has been imposed, the injury occurred either as a direct result of a hazardous condition on the employer\u2019s premises [citing Hiram Walker & Sons and De Hoyos] or arose from some risk connected with, or incidental to, the employment [citations].\u201d Caterpillar Tractor, 129 Ill. 2d at 62.\nIndeed, without explicitly stating so, the court considered the two premises rule exceptions. It first considered whether the claimant\u2019s injury occurred as a result of the condition of the employer\u2019s premises. After determining that the injury was essentially unexplained because there were no evident defects with the curb, the court turned to the second exception and considered whether the claimant was subjected to a greater degree of risk than the general public because of his employment. It determined that the curb involved in the claimant\u2019s accident was no different than any other curb and therefore the claimant was not exposed to any greater risk than other persons. Caterpil lar Tractor, 129 Ill. 2d at 62. In contrast, here, as in the earlier cases, a hazardous condition was present on the surface of employer\u2019s parking lot \u2014 snow and ice \u2014 that caused the claimant\u2019s injuries.\nEmployer next attempts to distinguish the earlier cases by arguing that there was no indication in those cases that the parking lots were open to the general public. We decline to read the earlier cases in such a limiting way. Whether a parking lot is used primarily by employees or by the general public, the proper inquiry is whether the employer maintains and provides the lot for its employees\u2019 use. If this is the case, then the lot constitutes part of the employer\u2019s premises. The presence of a hazardous condition on the employer\u2019s premises that causes a claimant\u2019s injury supports the finding of a compensable claim. See Archer Daniels Midland Co., 91 Ill. 2d at 216 (\u201cwhere the claimant\u2019s injury was sustained as a result of the condition of the employer\u2019s premises, this court has consistently approved an award of compensation\u201d).\nOur analysis would ordinarily end here. However, in two recent parking lot slip-and-fall cases, this court has analyzed the facts by considering only the second exception to the premises rule. See Homerding, 327 Ill. App. 3d 1050; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 326 Ill. App. 3d 438 (2001). But see Joiner, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 815-17 (2003 decision examining both exceptions).\nIn Homerding, the claimant worked as a nail technician for the employer\u2019s beauty salon. The salon was located in a strip mall. The mall consisted of several stores and two parking lots, one in front of the stores and one at the rear. The salon had a rear entrance that led to the back lot. The parking lots were owned and maintained by the mall, but the employer\u2019s lease obligated the employer to pay a share of the common area costs. The employer\u2019s owner asserted that he had no policy regarding where his employees parked their cars. However, the claimant testified that she had been instructed to park in the rear lot.\nThe claimant arrived at work one morning and parked her car in the back lot. She entered the salon via the back door and began setting up her work station. When she realized that she needed additional supplies that were in her car, the claimant went to her car to retrieve a case. While carrying the case in her left hand, the claimant slipped and fell on some ice about five feet from the employer\u2019s door and injured her wrist.\nFinding that the claimant sustained injuries arising out of and in the course of her employment with the employer, this court reinstated the arbitrator\u2019s award of compensation. Homerding, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 1054-55. We noted that, at the time of the accident, the claimant had already begun her workday. As the claimant fell while working, her injury necessarily arose out of and in the course of her employment. Homerding, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 1054. Additionally, we found that the risk of injury to which the claimant was exposed was greater than that of the general public because the claimant was required to park her car in the rear lot that the employer financially contributed to maintain. But for the demands of her job, the claimant would not have needed to make a second trip to her car and negotiate the ice on the lot. Homerding, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 1054.\nIn Wal-Mart Stores, the claimant, an employee at the employer\u2019s store, slipped on ice in the employer\u2019s parking lot on the way to her car and injured her back. The employer maintained only one parking lot, which was used by both employees and customers. Employees were requested, but not required, to park on the south side of the lot so that customers would have better access to the front doors. However, the south side of the lot was not restricted from customer use.\nThe claimant testified that she had left the store at 8:30 p.m. for a meal break. As she walked to her car, her feet came out from underneath her and she hit the ground. On cross-examination, the claimant testified that she had not driven herself to work that day. Rather, a friend was waiting to pick up the claimant in the claimant\u2019s car when the claimant fell in the lot. The friend, who was not a WalMart employee, waited in the car in the section of the lot in which employees were encouraged to park. However, two Wal-Mart employees testified that claimant had told them that she fell in the parking lot of her apartment building.\nThe Commission awarded the claimant compensation, and the circuit court confirmed the decision. On appeal, this court reversed the Commission\u2019s finding. We noted that the entire Wal-Mart parking lot was available for use by both employees and customers and that the claimant had not parked her own car in the lot on the night of her accident. Additionally, the claimant\u2019s friend was not a Wal-Mart employee, and there was no evidence that anyone had asked her to park where she did. We concluded that the claimant\u2019s fall resulted from a hazard to which she and the general public were equally exposed. Accordingly, her injury did not arise out of her employment. Wal-Mart Stores, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 444-45.\nWe find Wal-Mart Stores distinguishable. There, the claimant was not walking to or from her parked car, but was being picked up by a friend. There was no evidence that anyone had asked the claimant\u2019s friend to park where she did. Thus, the claimant was, in a sense, not acting under the employer\u2019s control or restrictions when she left the store to go on break and so could not have faced any risks to a greater extent than those of the general public. In contrast, here, as in Homer ding, claimant parked her car before the start of her shift in an area designated by employer for employee parking. Although the general public was free to park anywhere in the lot, claimant\u2019s choices were restricted. Therefore, claimant\u2019s exposure to risk was necessarily greater than that of the general public.\nWe disagree with employer\u2019s contention that the presence of snow and ice in the entire lot compels the conclusion that claimant did not face any risks to a greater extent than other persons. By restricting where claimant could park her vehicle, the employer exercised control over its employees\u2019 actions. In this way, the employee faced risks to a greater extent than the general public.\nEmployer\u2019s final argument is that this court would be implicitly adopting the positional-risk doctrine if we hold that claimant\u2019s injuries arose out of her employment with employer. The doctrine, which has been rejected by our supreme court (Brady v. Louis Ruffolo & Sons Construction Co., 143 Ill. 2d 542, 552-53 (1991)), states that an injury arises out of the employment if it would not have occurred but for the fact that the conditions or obligations of the employment placed the claimant in the position where he or she was injured by a neutral force. Brady, 143 Ill. 2d at 552. A neutral force is a force neither personal to the claimant nor distinctly associated with the employment. Brady, 143 Ill. 2d at 552. We need not address employer\u2019s argument at length because claimant\u2019s fall resulted from a hazardous condition on employer\u2019s premises. In other words, her fall resulted from an employment-related risk and not a neutral force. See Elliot v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 153 Ill. App. 3d 238, 242 (1987) (unexplained falls result from a neutral origin). Accordingly, the positional-risk doctrine is irrelevant.\nWe conclude that the Commission\u2019s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nIV CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed, and the cause is remanded to the Commission pursuant to Thomas v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 78 Ill. 2d 327, 332-35 (1980).\nAffirmed; cause remanded.\nMcCULLOUGH, PM., and HOFFMAN, HOLDRIDGE, and GOLDENHERSH, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CALLUM" } ], "attorneys": [ "Edward R. Tomkowiak, of Rusin, Patton, Maciorowski & Friedman, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.", "Michael D. Block, of Block & Block, EC., of Joliet, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JANICE MORES-HARVEY, Appellee, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Bob Evans Restaurant, Appellant).\nThird District (Industrial Commission Division)\nNo. 3-03-0081WC\nOpinion filed February 6, 2004.\nEdward R. Tomkowiak, of Rusin, Patton, Maciorowski & Friedman, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.\nMichael D. Block, of Block & Block, EC., of Joliet, for appellee." }, "file_name": "1034-01", "first_page_order": 1054, "last_page_order": 1062 }