{ "id": 3738804, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD T. TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Taylor", "decision_date": "2004-01-30", "docket_number": "No. 4-02-0408", "first_page": "1064", "last_page": "1083", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "345 Ill. App. 3d 1064" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "345 Ill. App. 3d 305", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3738977 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308-10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/345/0305-01" ] }, { "cite": "686 N.E.2d 584", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "586", "parenthetical": "a postsentencing motion allows \"the trial court the opportunity to review a defendant's contention of sentencing error and save the delay and expense inherent in appeal if they are meritorious\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "177 Ill. 2d 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 317111 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "394", "parenthetical": "a postsentencing motion allows \"the trial court the opportunity to review a defendant's contention of sentencing error and save the delay and expense inherent in appeal if they are meritorious\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/177/0389-01" ] }, { "cite": "788 N.E.2d 1169", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1173" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "338 Ill. App. 3d 379", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 25341 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/338/0379-01" ] }, { "cite": "800 N.E.2d 168", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "172-73", "parenthetical": "concluding that the trial court's failure to strictly comply with Rule 605(a) did not require remand under the particular circumstances of that case, in which the defendant did not challenge his sentence on appeal" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 Ill. App. 3d 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3777793 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338", "parenthetical": "concluding that the trial court's failure to strictly comply with Rule 605(a) did not require remand under the particular circumstances of that case, in which the defendant did not challenge his sentence on appeal" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/344/0334-01" ] }, { "cite": "690 N.E.2d 995", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "998" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821423 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "652 N.E.2d 275", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "166 Ill. 2d 204", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 198894 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "210" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/166/0204-01" ] }, { "cite": "785 N.E.2d 138", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 Ill. App. 3d 122", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 894476 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/337/0122-01" ] }, { "cite": "736 N.E.2d 1092", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1124" }, { "page": "1125" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "192 Ill. 2d 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 453257 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "396" }, { "page": "397" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/192/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "546 N.E.2d 553", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "555" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 Ill. 2d 370", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5569773 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/131/0370-01" ] }, { "cite": "795 N.E.2d 231", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "238" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "206 Ill. 2d 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1578235 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/206/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "737 N.E.2d 230", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "245" }, { "page": "245" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "193 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 963704 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "26" }, { "page": "27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/193/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "401 U.S. 222", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11712077 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "226" }, { "page": "5" }, { "page": "646" }, { "page": "225" }, { "page": "4" }, { "page": "645-46" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/401/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 U.S. 231", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6183056 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "238" }, { "page": "94" }, { "page": "2129" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/447/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 U.S. 477", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6187603 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "487", "parenthetical": "holding that any statements a defendant makes to police after invoking his right to counsel but before he has had access to counsel are not admissible at trial" }, { "page": "388", "parenthetical": "holding that any statements a defendant makes to police after invoking his right to counsel but before he has had access to counsel are not admissible at trial" }, { "page": "1886", "parenthetical": "holding that any statements a defendant makes to police after invoking his right to counsel but before he has had access to counsel are not admissible at trial" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/451/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 U.S. 404", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6185062 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "407" }, { "page": "225-26" }, { "page": "2181-82" }, { "page": "408" }, { "page": "226" }, { "page": "2182" }, { "page": "408" }, { "page": "226" }, { "page": "2182" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/447/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 U.S. 610", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6181032 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/426/0610-01" ] }, { "cite": "792 N.E.2d 1163", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1202" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "205 Ill. 2d 52", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1302618 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/205/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "791 N.E.2d 134", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "143" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 Ill. App. 3d 443", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2469283 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "454" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/339/0443-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "686 N.E.2d 367", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 Ill. App. 3d 763", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1725091 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "771" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/292/0763-01" ] }, { "cite": "787 N.E.2d 369", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "375" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 Ill. App. 3d 798", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 894537 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "804" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/337/0798-01" ] }, { "cite": "738 N.E.2d 906", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "919" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "193 Ill. 2d 272", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 963716 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/193/0272-01" ] }, { "cite": "752 N.E.2d 410", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "425" }, { "page": "425" }, { "page": "425" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351233 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "259" }, { "page": "259" }, { "page": "260" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0236-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1568, "char_count": 46128, "ocr_confidence": 0.709, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.8553635741978013e-07, "percentile": 0.724115575850175 }, "sha256": "06b6c29b375af25cdd2352508db585518bf2a8400af5adf8faa972878988a9f8", "simhash": "1:32e6c9ae074e8354", "word_count": 7988 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:40:04.128176+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "KNECHT, RJ., and MYERSCOUGH, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD T. TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn April 2002, a jury convicted defendant, Richard T. Taylor, of criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 13(a)(2) (West 2000)) for committing an act of sexual penetration on the victim, N.C., by placing his fingers in her vagina while she was unable to give consent because she was asleep. The trial court later sentenced him to seven years in prison.\nDefendant appeals, arguing that (1) the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) he was denied a fair trial when the trial court admitted evidence that he had refused to make a tape-recorded statement for the police; (3) he was denied a fair trial when the prosecutor referred to him as a \u201cpredator\u201d during closing argument; and (4) the court failed to properly admonish him regarding his appeal rights in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 605(a) (210 Ill. 2d R. 605(a)). We affirm and remand with directions.\nI. BACKGROUND\nAt defendant\u2019s April 2002 jury trial, N.C. testified that in September 2001, she and her son, Gabriel, moved into a house at 621 N. 13th Street in Quincy. Gabriel\u2019s father was defendant\u2019s son, Rick Taylor. Although N.C. and Rick were no longer romantically involved, defendant and his wife, Diane Taylor, maintained a relationship with N.C. and Gabriel. Defendant and Diane often took care of Gabriel when N.C. worked nights, and defendant stopped by frequently to help N.C. with household repairs, such as installing a ceiling fan and a lock on the front door. Diane and N.C. worked at the same local bar.\nIn October 2001, N.C. was romantically involved with Tony Magliochetti. At that time, Tony was attending college in Macomb. On weekends, he would often return to Quincy and stay with N.C. for the weekend.\nOn Friday night, October 12, 2001, N.C. did not expect that Tony would be visiting, but occasionally he came to Quincy even though he had not initially planned to do so. N.C. was scheduled to work from 4 until 10 p.m., and Gabriel was staying with a friend in the neighborhood. N.C. had planned to pick up both Gabriel and his friend after work so they could spend the night at her house. However, N.C. had to work later than planned, and when she arrived to pick up Gabriel and his friend, they were asleep. N.C. and Gabriel\u2019s friend\u2019s mother decided to leave the boys where they were.\nN.C. returned home, and then around 11 p.m., she went to a birthday party at another friend\u2019s house. N.C. had two glasses of beer at the party and went home around 1:30 a.m. When N.C. arrived home, she locked the front door and turned off the lights. She then went into her bedroom and closed the door. She went to bed wearing only a big sweatshirt.\nN.C. was later awakened by the feeling of someone\u2019s fingers inside her vagina and one of her legs being pushed so as to spread her legs apart. She then felt a mouth on her vagina. She reached down and felt the head of the person in bed with her. When N.C. realized the hair did not feel like Tony\u2019s (a short \u201cbuzz\u201d cut), she jumped out of bed. She then saw defendant sit up, and she started screaming at him to get out. However, defendant just sat there. As N.C. continued to scream, defendant got up and left the bedroom, closing the door behind him. N.C. picked up her cordless phone and got back under the covers. Defendant then walked back into the bedroom and pulled the covers off of the bed. N.C. thought he was going to kill her and started screaming again for him to get out. Defendant said, \u201cI\u2019m drunk,\u201d and then left. After she heard defendant leave, she went to the front door and locked it. Then she got back in bed and called her sister, Susan Moore. She was upset and crying, and she told Susan that defendant came into her room.\nApproximately five minutes after she got off the phone, Susan arrived at N.C.\u2019s house. Susan called their cousin, Chad, and then the police. When asked why she did not call the police herself, N.C. replied, \u201c[bjecause I didn\u2019t know what I should do first, because it was going to affect so many people.\u201d She recalled that the incident occurred around 4 a.m.\nAbout 15 minutes later, Quincy police officer Gabe Vanderbol arrived. N.C. was not immediately able to talk with him because she was embarrassed and scared. After she told him what happened, Vanderbol drove N.C. and Susan to the hospital. They arrived at the hospital shortly after 5 a.m.\nN.C. further testified that a couple of nights before the incident, defendant telephoned her and told her that he had left a surprise for her in her mailbox. She did not retrieve it that night. The next morning, he called again and asked if she had received the package, and she said she had not. He then told her it contained edible underwear. N.C. felt embarrassed and did not know what to say. Defendant said it was \u201cjust a joke.\u201d N.C. later retrieved the package and put it in a kitchen drawer without opening it. She never discussed with defendant her feelings about receiving the underwear because she wanted it to be forgotten. She acknowledged that the day after receiving the package, she went with defendant to buy a computer desk, which he then set up at her house.\nN.C. also acknowledged that about one year earlier, on the dance floor at a wedding reception, defendant had said something about going back to a hotel with him. N.C. believed he was joking.\nN.C. further testified that during the October 13, 2001, incident, she never gave defendant consent to touch her or penetrate her. She did not consent to defendant\u2019s entering her house that morning. N.C. denied giving defendant a key to her house. However, she did not know with certainty that he did not have one. She also denied (1) ever offering any physical or sexual contact to defendant, and (2) having an intimate physical relationship with him.\nN.C. further denied knowing as far back as the wedding reception that defendant had personal feelings toward her. She never made any sexual advances toward defendant. She acknowledged that she did not feel threatened by defendant prior to the incident.\nN.C. knew that Diane was out of town on the weekend of the incident, but she denied that she had agreed to meet defendant after work on Friday night to go dancing at Backwaters, an after-hours club. N.C. did not remember having a conversation with defendant about a week earlier, during which he offered to have sex with her and she replied that she would keep that in mind. She had no plans to go dancing with defendant on that Friday night; she had told defendant that she had arranged to take Gabriel and his friend home with her that night.\nVanderbol testified that around 5:05 a.m. on October 13, 2001, he was dispatched to N.C.\u2019s house. Susan answered the door, and Vanderbol was not initially able to talk to N.C. When Vanderbol spoke with N.C., she was \u201cvisibly distraught\u201d and \u201cupset about something.\u201d He further described N.C. as follows: \u201cShe was crying, there were tears that I could see rolling down her face. She \u2014 I asked her if, you know, what was the matter, and she then began to cry very loudly and started taking in deep breaths in order to \u2014 while she was crying.\u201d After two or three minutes, she was able to talk to Vanderbol about what had happened. At times she had difficulty composing herself to answer his questions. After they talked, he transported N.C. and Susan to the emergency room.\nLater that morning, Vanderbol interviewed defendant at the police station. Vanderbol read defendant his rights, and defendant acknowledged that he understood them and agreed to talk with Vanderbol. When Vanderbol asked defendant if he had gone anywhere in the early morning hours, defendant said that he had been drinking at the Elks Lodge and then went straight home. When Vanderbol asked him how much he had had to drink, defendant said \u201ctoo much.\u201d (Vanderbol detected a \u201cstrong odor of alcoholic beverage\u201d on defendant.) After Vanderbol told defendant that he had information indicating that defendant had not gone straight home, defendant admitted that he had gone to N.C.\u2019s house.\nDefendant told Vanderbol that N.C.\u2019s front door was shut but not locked, and he only had to push it and it opened. He did not have a key. Once inside, he yelled for N.C. but did not hear a response. He went into Gabriel\u2019s room and found that Gabriel was not there. He then went into N.C.\u2019s room and yelled her name again. (He did not indicate to Vanderbol whether she responded.) The room was very dark. He made his way over to the bed and could feel that N.C. was lying on it. He shook N.C., and she did not wake up. He then got underneath the comforter and kissed N.C. on the belly, put his finger inside her vagina, and kissed her vagina. He acknowledged that he had to spread N.C.\u2019s legs apart. When Vanderbol asked him if he had licked her vagina, he said that he had only kissed it. After he kissed N.C. on the vagina, she woke up and told him that he had to leave. He acknowledged that he returned to the bedroom and pulled the covers off of N.C. \u201cto apologize.\u201d He said to N.C., \u201cI\u2019m sorry, I am drunk, I\u2019m drunk.\u201d\nVanderbol further testified that defendant \u201cstated that the whole incident was stupid and that it should not have happened. He stated that he thought that he was going to lose his job and his wife over the incident and that he was drunk and that it should not have happened.\u201d Defendant did not (1) say anything to Vanderbol about how he and N.C. had prearranged this encounter, (2) comment on any intimate relationship between them, or (3) say that N.C. had been making sexual advances or leading him on. At the end of the interview, defendant said to Vanderbol, \u201cShe\u2019s really pretty, isn\u2019t she?\u201d\nDefendant testified that after N.C. moved into her 13th Street house, he visited two to three times a week, mainly to do repairs. Most of the time when he stopped by N.C.\u2019s house, she would be wearing a T-shirt and cutoff shorts. On one occasion, she wore a T-shirt that said \u201cyou do me, and then you can do me again.\u201d Defendant further testified as follows regarding that occasion:\n\u201cA. *** I asked her at that time if, how her mother felt about her wearing that type of T-shirt. And she had informed me that her mother doesn\u2019t understand. She wouldn\u2019t even know what that meant. And then I told her that, well, I sure know what it means.\nQ. And what was her reaction to that?\nA. She just kind of looked at me and smiled and then went on.\nQ. Did you have other conversations with her?\nA. Yes. ***\nAs she was leaving, I was still there putting the light in. *** I told her at that time that I was not \u2014 that I was serious about what I said about the T-shirt to her, and she looked at me as she was going out the door and said she\u2019d keep that in mind. Then she left.\nQ. And did you have other conversations with her of a sexual nature?\nA. We had talked one time \u2014 I mean, we had talked several times about it. I mean, I told her probably four or five times on different occasions that I would do her, and that was [sic] my words.\nQ. And based upon what you observed from her, did she understand what you said?\nA. Yeah, she just smiled at me on three or four of the occasions. One time she did make the comment that, you know, that would be crazy. And I said, yes, but I\u2019m crazy for you. And then she just smiled at me, and that was it.\u201d\nDefendant stated that this kind of conduct occurred between them for about a year prior to the week of October 6, 2001. N.C. never told him that she was not interested in him. Defendant also testified that the way N.C. dressed was \u201cnot necessarily arousing\u201d but he considered it \u201cas possibly coming on to me\u201d or creating a \u201ccoming-on mood.\u201d\nDefendant further testified that he put the edible underwear in N.C.\u2019s mailbox on a Sunday and called N.C. that night and told her he had left something for her. When he called her Monday morning, she said that \u201cshe better get it out of there because she didn\u2019t want the mailman to think that she left them in there for him.\u201d He sent N.C. the edible underwear \u201cjust to get her reaction from previous conversations that [they] had\u201d about \u201csexual advances.\u201d After that incident, N.C. did not exhibit any fear of defendant or have an out-of-the-ordinary reaction to him.\nOn Thursday, October 11, 2001, defendant and N.C. went to WalMart to buy a computer table. While they were putting the desk together, defendant \u201ctold her that I was going to come by Friday night, and we would go late-night dancing at the new club after she got off work.\u201d When asked what her response was, defendant testified, \u201cOnly thing she said is, we are?\u201d\nOn Friday, October 12, 2001, defendant went home after work and showered. Around 5 or 5:30 p.m., he went to Jim\u2019s bar, where he met his friend, Gene Johnson. About an hour later, Johnson and defendant left Jim\u2019s and dropped defendant\u2019s car off at his home. Then they took Johnson\u2019s car to the Elk\u2019s Lodge. They had a few beers and left between 9:30 and 10 p.m. Johnson dropped off defendant at home.\nAround 11 p.m., defendant left his home to go by N.C.\u2019s and see if she was home from work. When he got to her house, he did not see her car and proceeded to the \u201cSixth and J Tavern.\u201d He stayed at the tavern, drinking beer, until it closed at 1 a.m. He then drove to Backwaters\u2019 parking lot and looked for N.C.\u2019s car, but he did not find it. He drove back to N.C.\u2019s house and saw that her car was there.\nDefendant walked up to the front door and found it unlocked. He was not surprised by this, because he thought N.C. knew he was going to come by. He knocked on the door and then went into the house. Once inside, he said, \u201c[N.C.], are you home?\u201d but did not hear any reply. The lights were off, although some light was coming from Gabriel\u2019s room. He was not expecting Gabriel to be there, but did not think it was strange that light was coming from his room because Gabriel\u2019s night-lights were often left on all the time. Defendant then knocked on N.C.\u2019s bedroom door, opened it, and entered the room. There was no reply from N.C. to his knock. He believed they had prearranged to meet there. He walked toward the bed and said, \u201cAre you in here, [N.C.]?\u201d He then reached down and felt her on the bed. He shook her a little bit and said, \u201cAre you ready for me, [N.C.]?\u201d N.C. did not respond. Defendant pulled the covers away from the pillow that was between N.C.\u2019s legs, and said, \u201c[N.C.], we\u2019re going to have to remove this pillow first.\u201d Then he grabbed her right knee, and started to push it up to pull the pillow out from between her legs. When he did that, her left leg also moved, and he removed the pillow. He bent over and kissed the inside of her left thigh and then raised up and said, \u201cAre you ready for me? Are you ready for me now, [N.C.]?\u201d She replied, \u201cYes, that feels good.\u201d Then he put his hand between her legs and rubbed her vagina. Then he bent over and kissed the inside of her leg again and started moving his way up between her legs. He continued rubbing her vaginal area, and N.C. started \u201chumping\u201d his hand. He put his head under the covers and started to kiss her belly. He then felt her hand on his shoulder, pushing him down toward her vagina. He resisted, and she put her hand on his head and said, \u201cMore. That feels good.\u201d He then put his finger inside N.C.\u2019s vagina. After she put her hand on his head, she suddenly moved away and said, \u201cJust go home,\u201d in a regular tone of voice. Defendant was \u201ckind of startled\u201d and sat on the side of the bed. He said, \u201cWhat\u2019s wrong, [N.C.]?,\u201d and N.C. said, \u201cJust please leave.\u201d He said, \u201cI don\u2019t understand. You told me to go ahead.\u201d She said \u201cJust please go home.\u201d Defendant left the bedroom and shut the door. He then left the house, but returned within 5 or 10 minutes because he wanted to talk to N.C. to see what the problem was. Defendant went back into the bedroom where there were still no lights on and pulled the covers back. He said, \u201c[N.C.], can we talk about this?\u201d N.C. then got out of the bed with the covers wrapped around her and told defendant to \u201cget the fuck out.\u201d Defendant testified that he \u201ctold her I was sorry. I was drunk. I was sorry, but she told me to do it. Then I left.\u201d\nDefendant further testified that at the time, he did not know that there was anything criminally wrong with what he was doing. He did not believe that he did anything to which N.C. did not consent. He estimated that he was at N.C.\u2019s house between 1:30 and 1:45 a.m. on October 13, 2001. Defendant acknowledged that he had developed a sexual attraction to N.C.\nDefendant also testified that he had only had three or four hours of sleep before Vanderbol questioned him. Defendant did not recall telling Vanderbol that N.C. \u201cwoke up\u201d after he kissed her vagina. Defendant acknowledged that during the interview, he initially told Vanderbol that he did not return to the bedroom the second time. Later during the interview, he told Vanderbol that he went back to apologize. He also acknowledged that he did not tell Vanderbol that (1) he had made arrangements with N.C. to go dancing on Friday night; (2) he had sent her edible underwear; (3) she had said, \u201cYes, that feels good\u201d; (4) she started humping his hand and pushed on his shoulder; (5) that she responded, \u201cMore, that feels good\u201d; and (6) he went back into the bedroom to find out why N.C. had changed her mind about him. He further acknowledged that he did not tell Vanderbol that when he went back into the bedroom, he told N.C., \u201cYou told me to do it.\u201d When asked why he did not tell Vanderbol that (1) he felt this was consensual and planned, (2) his relationship with N.C. had been growing, and (3) he felt he did nothing wrong, defendant responded that Vanderbol did not ask him that question. Defendant also acknowledged saying, \u201cShe\u2019s really pretty, isn\u2019t she?\u201d\nSusan testified that she received a call from N.C. around 4:30 a.m. on October 13, 2001. At first N.C. was whispering, but then she started crying and Susan could not understand what she was saying. The call lasted about 30 seconds. She heard N.C. say, \u201cDick came in my room.\u201d Susan left work immediately and went to N.C.\u2019s house, which was only 5 to 10 minutes away. When she knocked on the front door, which was locked, N.C. let her in. N.C. was shaking and crying. Susan attempted to embrace her, but N.C. put her hands up, pushed Susan away, and backed up against a wall. At this point, she was crying loudly. After a few minutes, N.C. was able to talk to Susan. After their conversation, Susan called their cousin, Chad, who is close to both Susan and N.C., and asked him to come over. Then she called the police.\nTony testified that during fall 2001, he returned to Quincy on many weekends. When he arrived in the early morning hours, he stayed at N.C.\u2019s house. He explained that he worked at a liquor store and on busy nights his shift did not end until 1 a.m. The work schedule was posted on Fridays. Sometime after he got the work schedule on Friday, October 12, 2001, he told N.C. he was working Saturday night, October 13.\nDiane testified that when she visited N.C.\u2019s house, the front door was unlocked. She acknowledged that she never went to N.C.\u2019s house at 4 a.m.\nOn this evidence, the jury convicted defendant of criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 13(a)(2) (West 2000)), and the trial court later sentenced him as stated. This appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Sufficiency of the Evidence\nDefendant first argues that the State failed to prove him guilty of criminal sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, he contends that the State failed to show that he knew that N.C. was unable to give consent. We disagree.\nIn reviewing a claim that the evidence was insufficient to support a defendant\u2019s conviction, \u201cthe question is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State.\u201d People v. Ortiz, 196 Ill. 2d 236, 259, 752 N.E.2d 410, 425 (2001). In making that assessment, this court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact with regard to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. People v. Kotlarz, 193 Ill. 2d 272, 298, 738 N.E.2d 906, 919 (2000). Despite our deference to the trier of fact, we will reverse a conviction where the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable doubt of the defendant\u2019s guilt. Ortiz, 196 Ill. 2d at 259, 752 N.E.2d at 425.\nUnder section 12 \u2014 13 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code), a person commits criminal sexual assault when he \u201ccommits an act of sexual penetration and the accused knew that the victim was unable to understand the nature of the act or was unable to give knowing consent.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 13(a)(2) (West 2000).\nSection 4 \u2014 5 of the Code defines knowledge, in pertinent part, as follows:\n\u201cA person knows, or acts knowingly or with knowledge of:\n(a) The nature or attendant circumstances of his conduct, described by the statute defining the offense, when he is consciously aware that his conduct is of such nature or that such circumstances exist. Knowledge of a material fact includes awareness of the substantial probability that such fact exists.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 5 (West 2000).\n\u201cThe knowledge element of a crime rarely can be proved by direct evidence\u201d (People v. Marcotte, 337 Ill. App. 3d 798, 804, 787 N.E.2d 369, 375 (2003), citing People v. Sanchez, 292 Ill. App. 3d 763, 771, 686 N.E.2d 367, 373 (1997)), and thus is ordinarily proved circumstantially (Ortiz, 196 Ill. 2d at 260, 752 N.E.2d at 425).\nIn this case, the following evidence supports the jury\u2019s finding that defendant knew that N.C. was asleep and thus unable to give knowing consent to the acts of sexual penetration that defendant engaged in with N.C.: (1) when defendant entered the house, the lights were off; (2) when he called N.C.\u2019s name, she did not respond; (3) N.C.\u2019s bedroom was dark, and defendant saw that she was in bed; (4) N.C. did not respond when defendant called her name upon entering the bedroom; (5) N.C. did not respond when defendant shook her and asked her if she was ready for him; (6) N.C. did not respond when defendant moved her leg and moved the pillow that was between her legs; (7) N.C. testified that she was asleep and awakened by the feeling of someone\u2019s fingers inside her vagina and one of her legs being pushed; and (8) defendant told Vanderbol that N.C. \u201cwoke up\u201d after he kissed her vagina. We hold that the jury was entitled to conclude from this evidence that defendant knew that N.C. was asleep (or, at the very least, that it was substantially probable that she was) when he engaged in the acts of sexual penetration. Accordingly, we further hold that the State proved defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\nIn so holding, we strongly reject defendant\u2019s contention that N.C.\u2019s alleged failure to discourage his sexual interest in her somehow constituted consent for him to commit a sexual act upon her while she was asleep. No evidence showed that N.C. had agreed to a sexual rendezvous at her home that night. Moreover, defendant\u2019s \u201cshe-asked-for-it\u201d defense harkens back to an era we have long since passed in which the victim was put on trial.\nB. Testimony Regarding Defendant\u2019s Request for an Attorney and Refusal To Make a Tape-Recorded Statement\nDefendant next argues that he was denied a fair trial when the trial court allowed testimony that after he waived his Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966)) and was interviewed by Vanderbol, he invoked his right to counsel and refused to make a tape-recorded statement. We disagree.\n1. Background\nPrior to trial and before a different judge (Judge Dennis Cash-man), the State filed a motion in limine, seeking to admit evidence that defendant had refused Vanderbol\u2019s request to make a tape-recorded statement. The trial court denied the State\u2019s motion; however, in doing so the court indicated that the State would be allowed to present such evidence if defendant challenged Vanderbol\u2019s' testimony at trial.\nAt trial, during the State\u2019s cross-examination of defendant, the following colloquy occurred:\n\u201cQ. After Investigator Vanderbol walked you through what had occurred in that bedroom in [N.C.\u2019s] home, you made some comments to him about how you felt about this, didn\u2019t you[?]\nA. I\u2019m not sure of the question.\nQ. Well, let me put it to you this way. In fact, one of the things you said to Investigator Vanderbol was that the whole incident was . very stupid and that you should not have done that.\nA. I did make that statement, yes.\u201d\nShortly thereafter, during redirect examination, defense counsel asked the following questions and received the following answers from defendant:\n\u201cQ. *** [D]id [Vanderbol], during this 30-minute interview, did [he] ever bring up any panties or anything like that?\nA. The \u2014 Officer Vanderbol, when he questioned me, told me what I did.\nQ. And so when [the prosecutor], on his question to you, said when [Vanderbol], and I quote, walked you through this interview, that\u2019s exactly what he did.\nA. That\u2019s correct.\nQ. And you answered the questions that he asked of you; is that right?\nA. Yes.\nQ. And then the interview was terminated?\nA. That\u2019s correct.\nQ. You\u2019re not claiming you weren\u2019t read your rights, are you?\nA. No, I was read my rights.\nQ. And, as far as [Vanderbol] was concerned, at the time of the interrogation, did [Vanderbol] ask you if you remembered everything that happened?\nA. Yes, he did.\nQ. And did you tell him you remembered everything that happened?\nA. No, I didn\u2019t.\nQ. You told him \u2014 what did you tell him?\nA. At that time I was unclear and unsure of everything.\nQ. Why was that?\nA. Because [Vanderbol] was just \u2014 he was directing me in questioning me and telling me what I had done. He didn\u2019t ask me if I had done it. He told me this is what I had done.\u201d\nThe prosecutor then requested a conference outside the jury\u2019s presence. The court granted that request, and the prosecutor renewed his motion to allow evidence that defendant had declined to make a recorded statement for police. The prosecutor argued that defendant \u201copened the door\u201d by implying on redirect that Vanderbol put words in his mouth. The following excerpt of the prosecutor\u2019s argument fairly summarizes his position:\n\u201c[F]rom experience I can tell you, Judge, here\u2019s what commonly happens: We get a note back from the jury. Okay. And that note is, is there any videotape? Is there any audiotape of this interview? Because [defense counsel], I guarantee you, would, should, and will get up and dispute the credibility of Investigator Vanderbol relative to his client about what was said in that interview. And I simply am entitled to have that jury not assume or speculate that the reason it wasn\u2019t taped is because we didn\u2019t want it taped. The cure to the problem is this: To instruct the jury that the defendant\u2019s invocation of his constitutional right is appropriate and the police cannot continue to question him. You are not to consider that in any way in this case.\u201d\nDefense counsel argued that the evidence would make it appear that defendant invoked his right to counsel because he had something to hide.\nThe trial court granted the State\u2019s motion and stated, in pertinent part, as follows:\n\u201cI have read thoroughly Judge Cashman\u2019s, the transcript of Judge Cashman\u2019s ruling. First off, I don\u2019t have any qualms or quibble with Judge Cashman\u2019s *** ruling. I believe that I would have ruled in the same circumstance. Yet in the same respect, Judge Cashman also admonished in as strong a term as possible, and as I recall, at least twice and possibly three times during that ruling, that if the door was opened by the defense, that if there was any inquiry in this process, then the State would be allowed to go into this and correctly so. Certainly, the State cannot lever the door open, if you will. The term, the phrase used, and I\u2019m going to assume that it was used by [the prosecutor] in his [c]ross[e]xamination, \u2018walk you through,\u2019 was used in a totally and completely different context than it was used by [defense counsel] in his [r]edirect. In using that term, I believe that the door was opened and that, as discussed here, the State should be \u2014 should be allowed to inquire.\u201d\nBack in the courtroom, the following colloquy then occurred between the prosecutor and defendant during re-cross-examination:\n\u201cQ. After you had discussed the event you have already referred to with [Vanderbol], he asked you if you would consent to having that interview taped, didn\u2019t he?\nA. Yes.\nQ. And, in fact, you told him you would agree to have that interview taped, correct?\nA. Yes.\nQ. And at that point in time, you asked [Vanderbol] whether or not you were going to be placed under arrest, correct?\nA. That is correct.\nQ. In fact, at that point in time he told you that you were going to be placed under arrest, correct?\nA. Yes.\nQ. Then, at that point, you told him that you wanted to talk with a lawyer, correct?\nA. Yes.\nQ. And, at that point in time, all questioning, all discussions with [Vanderbol], stopped, correct?\nA. That is correct.\u201d\nThe trial court then admonished the jury to draw no inference adverse to defendant by virtue of his having exercised his right to speak to an attorney.\n2. Analysis\nWe reject defendant\u2019s contention that he was deprived of a fair trial as a result of the above-quoted colloquy between the prosecutor and him.\nA trial court has discretion to decide whether evidence is relevant, and we will not reverse that decision absent a clear abuse of discretion that results in prejudice to defendant. People v. Green, 339 Ill. App. 3d 443, 454, 791 N.E.2d 134, 143 (2003). The trial court may reject evidence on grounds of irrelevancy if the evidence has little probative value due to its remoteness or uncertainty, or if its probative value is outweighed by its possibly unfair prejudicial nature. People v. Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d 52, 114-15, 792 N.E.2d 1163, 1202 (2001).\nDefendant correctly asserts that under Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91, 96 S. Ct. 2240 (1976), the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits impeachment of a testifying defendant based on the defendant\u2019s silence following Miranda warnings. Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 407, 65 L. Ed. 2d 222, 225-26, 100 S. Ct. 2180, 2181-82 (1980); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 487, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378, 388, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 1886 (1981) (holding that any statements a defendant makes to police after invoking his right to counsel but before he has had access to counsel are not admissible at trial). The Doyle rule, however, is not without exceptions. For example, Doyle does not bar cross-examination relating to a defendant\u2019s prior inconsistent statements. Anderson, 447 U.S. at 408, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 226, 100 S. Ct. at 2182. \u201cSuch questioning makes no unfair use of silence, because a defendant who voluntarily speaks after receiving Miranda warnings has not been induced to remain silent. As to the subject matter of his statements, the defendant has not remained silent at all.\u201d Anderson, 447 U.S. at 408, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 226, 100 S. Ct. at 2182. Thus, evidence that would ordinarily be inadmissible in the interest of affording a defendant constitutional protections can become admissible as a result of the defendant\u2019s conduct. The Supreme Court in Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238, 65 L. Ed. 2d 86, 94, 100 S. Ct. 2124, 2129 (1980), further discussed that exception to Doyle as follows:\n\u201cIn determining whether a constitutional right has been burdened impermissibly, it also is appropriate to consider the legitimacy of the challenged governmental practice. [Citation.] Attempted impeachment on cross-examination of a defendant, the practice at issue here, may enhance the reliability of the criminal process. Use of such impeachment on cross-examination allows prosecutors to test the credibility of witnesses by asking them to explain prior inconsistent statements and acts. A defendant may decide not to take the witness stand because of the risk of cross-examination. But this is a choice of litigation tactics. Once a defendant decides to testify, \u2018[t]he interests of the other party and regard for the function of courts of justice to ascertain the truth become relevant, and prevail in the balance of considerations determining the scope and limits of the privilege against self-incrimination.\u2019 [Citation.]\nThus, impeachment follows the defendant\u2019s own decision to cast aside his cloak of silence and advances the truth-finding function of the criminal trial.\u201d\nIn Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 28 L. Ed. 2d 1, 5, 91 S. Ct. 643, 646 (1971), the Court held that a statement taken in violation of Miranda may be used to impeach a defendant\u2019s credibility. In concluding that such impeachment did not violate the fifth amendment, the Court wrote as follows:\n\u201cEvery criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so. But that privilege cannot be construed to include the right to commit perjury. [Citations.] Having voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was under an obligation to speak truthfully and accurately, and the prosecution here did no more than utilize the traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary process.\u201d Harris, 401 U.S. at 225, 28 L. Ed. 2d at 4, 91 S. Ct. at 645-46.\nWe conclude that in this case, the challenged governmental process was legitimate and did not impermissibly burden defendant\u2019s constitutional right to remain silent. In the State\u2019s case in chief, it was not permitted to use the evidence that defendant invoked his right to counsel, and its use of that evidence upon re-cross-examination of defendant was not to show defendant\u2019s guilt. Instead, the State sought to counter defendant\u2019s attempt to cast his interview with Vanderbol in what the State \u2014 and the trial court \u2014 considered to be a false light. If the State had not been permitted to show that defendant had declined the opportunity to make a recorded statement, defendant could have suggested in closing argument \u2014 and the jury might have concluded\u2014 that Vanderbol\u2019s interviewing techniques were coercive. The jury would thus have been left with a false impression of Vanderbol\u2019s interviewing tactics. The State\u2019s effort to present the truth to the jury of the interaction between defendant and Vanderbol was, in the particular circumstances of this case, a legitimate goal consistent with the truth-seeking process of trial.\nDefendant nonetheless contends that the evidence that he declined to make a recorded statement after he submitted to questioning is not probative of what occurred in the interview that had just concluded. We disagree. If the jury (1) believed defendant\u2019s claim that Vanderbol had put words in his mouth in the first interview, and (2) did not know that defendant had been offered the opportunity to set the record straight by making a recorded statement of his version of events, the jury would likely give more credence to defendant\u2019s trial testimony and less to Vanderbol\u2019s. On the other hand, the evidence that Vanderbol had offered defendant the opportunity to put his statement on tape shows that Vanderbol was willing to allow defendant\u2019s words to speak for themselves on the record, thus diminishing any suspicion that Vanderbol had attempted to unfairly characterize defendant\u2019s statements.\nIn light of the need to balance defendant\u2019s privilege against self-incrimination against the legitimate truth-seeking function of the trial process, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence that by invoking his right to counsel, defendant gave up the opportunity to make a recorded statement. In so holding, we recognize that any reference at trial to a defendant\u2019s invoking his right to counsel risks endangering his right against self-incrimination. We thus emphasize that our holding is limited to the circumstances of this unique case \u2014 namely, that (1) defendant opened the door to this evidence after having been cautioned in advance by the trial court; (2) defendant\u2019s declining to make a recorded statement was inextricably linked to his request for counsel; (3) the trial court carefully considered the issues and minimized the prejudicial effect of the evidence by admonishing the jury; and (4) the State did not refer to the evidence again at any point in the proceedings.\nC. The Prosecutor\u2019s Remarks During Closing Argument\nDefendant next argues that he was denied a fair trial when the prosecutor referred to him as a \u201cpredator\u201d during closing argument. Specifically, he contends that the prosecutor drew an unjustified inference from the evidence when he made the following remarks:\n\u201cI think that it\u2019s important that we understand, that we think about the kind of predator who, in this situation we\u2019re dealing with, it\u2019s important for us to understand how predators like this select their victims. Now, their tools, their weapons, their weapons of choice are not guns or knives or axes. They are trust, and they are position. They get close to their victims by disarming them. They compromise them. And the way they do that is through that trust and through their position, good deeds, family relationships, until they\u2019re in position to do what they want or think that they can. Now, people like [N.C.] often times suffer in silence because they know instinctively that there are no good options in situations like this. There are only bad and worse choices. And don\u2019t think for a moment that predators like this don\u2019t understand that.\u201d\nBecause defendant failed to object to the prosecutor\u2019s remarks at trial, he did not properly preserve this issue for review. People v. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 1, 26, 737 N.E.2d 230, 245 (2000). Thus, defendant has forfeited this issue on appeal unless the plain error rule applies. Errors not properly preserved for review may be reviewed as plain errors if the evidence is closely balanced or the error is of such magnitude that the defendant has been denied a fair trial. People v. Graham, 206 Ill. 2d 465, 475, 795 N.E.2d 231, 238 (2003); see 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a). Not only do we conclude the record shows no plain error, we conclude that the prosecutor\u2019s comments were not error at all. See Williams, 193 Ill. 2d at 27, 737 N.E.2d at 245 (\u201cBefore invoking the plain error exception, however, \u2018it is appropriate to determine whether error occurred at all.\u2019 People v. Wade, 131 Ill. 2d 370, 376[, 546 N.E.2d 553, 555] (1989)\u201d).\nProsecutors are afforded wide latitude in closing argument. A prosecutor may comment on the evidence and draw all legitimate inferences deducible therefrom, even if they are unfavorable to the defendant. People v. Simms, 192 Ill. 2d 348, 396, 736 N.E.2d 1092, 1124 (2000); People v. Toney, 337 Ill. App. 3d 122, 147, 785 N.E.2d 138, 159 (2003). In reviewing a challenge to remarks made by the prosecutor during closing argument, the comments must be considered in the context of the parties\u2019 closing arguments as a whole. Moreover, the reviewing court must indulge in every reasonable presumption that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in determining the propriety of the remarks. Simms, 192 Ill. 2d at 397, 736 N.E.2d at 1125.\nWe agree with the State that when viewed in context, the prosecutor\u2019s remarks fell within the bounds of proper argument. As the State notes, the prosecutor used the term \u201cpredator\u201d \u201cin the context of explaining that individuals *** who commit these types of crimes are often able to do so because they establish a trust with the victim by their relationship to the victim and by doing good deeds.\u201d The evidence showed that (1) defendant was the grandfather of N.C.\u2019s son, Gabriel; (2) although N.C. and defendant\u2019s son were no longer romantically involved, defendant and Diane maintained a relationship with both N.C. and Gabriel, and defendant stated that he had a \u201cfamily relationship\u201d with N.C.; (3) during several years leading up to the incident, defendant had developed a sexual attraction to N.C., whom he treated as a family member; (4) defendant stopped by N.C.\u2019s residence frequently to help her with household repairs; (5) two days prior to the incident, defendant went with N.C. to Wal-Mart to buy a computer table; and (6) when defendant entered N.C.\u2019s residence during the early morning hours of October 13, 2001, he intended to have a sexual encounter with her. Given the leeway that a prosecutor is afforded in making closing argument, we conclude that the prosecutor\u2019s remarks about defendant being a \u201cpredator\u201d constituted a reasonable inference based on the evidence presented. The prosecutor was thus allowed to not only draw that inference but to argue it to the jury.\nD. The Trial Court\u2019s Failure To Properly Admonish Defendant Under Supreme Court Rule 605(a)\nLast, defendant argues that the trial court failed to properly admonish him regarding his appeal rights, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 605(a) (210 Ill. 2d R. 605(a)). Defendant thus requests that we remand with instructions that the court properly admonish him and allow him to file a postsentencing motion. The State concedes that we should remand, and we accept the State\u2019s concession.\nSupreme Court Rule 605(a) provides that when a defendant has been found guilty and sentenced after pleading not guilty, the trial court shall admonish the defendant regarding his appeal rights. 210 Ill. 2d R. 605(a). Specifically, the rule provides, in pertinent part, that after imposing sentence, the trial court \u201cshall\u201d advise the defendant of the following:\n\u201c[(1)] that prior to taking an appeal, if the defendant seeks to challenge the correctness of the sentence, or any aspect of the sentencing hearing, the defendant must file in the trial court within 30 days of the date on which sentence is imposed a written motion asking to have the trial court reconsider the sentence imposed, or consider any challenges to the sentencing hearing, setting forth in the motion all issues or claims of error regarding the sentence imposed or the sentencing hearing;\n[(2)] that any issue or claim of error regarding the sentence imposed or any aspect of the sentencing hearing not raised in the written motion shall be deemed waived; and\n[(3)] that in order to preserve the right to appeal following the disposition of the motion to reconsider sentence, or any challenges regarding the sentencing hearing, the defendant must file a notice of appeal in the trial court within 30 days from the entry of the order disposing of the defendant\u2019s motion to reconsider sentence or order disposing of any challenges to the sentencing hearing.\u201d 210 Ill. 2d R. 605(a)(3).\nThe supreme court\u2019s rules are not mere technicalities or suggestions. As the supreme court wrote in Bright v. Dicke, 166 Ill. 2d 204, 210, 652 N.E.2d 275, 278 (1995), \u201c[t]he rules of court we have promulgated are not aspirational. They are not suggestions. They have the force of law ***.\u2019\u2019 Thus, trial courts must strictly comply with the admonition requirements of Supreme Court Rule 605. See People v. Jamison, 181 Ill. 2d 24, 30, 690 N.E.2d 995, 998 (1998); but cf. People v. Williams, 344 Ill. App. 3d 334, 338, 800 N.E.2d 168, 172-73 (2003) (concluding that the trial court\u2019s failure to strictly comply with Rule 605(a) did not require remand under the particular circumstances of that case, in which the defendant did not challenge his sentence on appeal). Because this issue involves the trial court\u2019s compliance with a supreme court rule, our review is de novo. People v. Lloyd, 338 Ill. App. 3d 379, 384, 788 N.E.2d 1169, 1173 (2003).\nThe record shows that after sentencing defendant, the trial court admonished him that he had a right to appeal. However, the court failed to admonish defendant as to the requirements necessary to preserve the right to appeal his sentence or any aspect of the sentencing hearing. In particular, the court failed to admonish him that (1) to challenge his sentence or any aspect of the sentencing hearing, he must file in the trial court a motion to reconsider sentence or \u201cconsider any challenges to the sentencing hearing\u201d; and (2) the filing of a postsentencing motion within 30 days of being sentenced was necessary to preserve any sentencing issues for appellate review. Because the court failed to properly admonish defendant in accordance with Rule 605(a), we agree with the parties that we should remand with instructions that the court (1) properly admonish defendant, and (2) allow him to file a motion to reconsider his sentence or \u201cconsider any challenges to the sentencing hearing.\u201d By remanding this case, the trial court will have the first opportunity to review defendant\u2019s claims of sentencing error (including the excessiveness of his seven-year sentence and the propriety of the restitution order) and, if warranted, correct those errors. See People v. Reed, 177 Ill. 2d 389, 394, 686 N.E.2d 584, 586 (1997) (a postsentencing motion allows \u201cthe trial court the opportunity to review a defendant\u2019s contention of sentencing error and save the delay and expense inherent in appeal if they are meritorious\u201d); see also People v. Rathbone, 345 Ill. App. 3d 305, 308-10 (2003), (in which this court recently discussed the importance of the trial court\u2019s having the first opportunity to address a defendant\u2019s sentencing claims).\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment and remand with directions.\nAffirmed and remanded with directions.\nKNECHT, RJ., and MYERSCOUGH, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Rebecca I. Levy (argued), both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Barney S. Bier, State\u2019s Attorney, of Quincy (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Thomas R. Ewick (argued), all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD T. TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4-02-0408\nArgued December 16, 2003.\nOpinion filed January 30, 2004.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Rebecca I. Levy (argued), both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nBarney S. Bier, State\u2019s Attorney, of Quincy (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Thomas R. Ewick (argued), all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1064-01", "first_page_order": 1084, "last_page_order": 1103 }