{ "id": 3739161, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTHONY W. BARTIMO, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Bartimo", "decision_date": "2004-01-15", "docket_number": "No. 4-03-0351", "first_page": "1100", "last_page": "1116", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "345 Ill. App. 3d 1100" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "677 N.E.2d 875", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "891" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "175 Ill. 2d 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 295778 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "327" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/175/0294-01" ] }, { "cite": "710 N.E.2d 163", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 Ill. App. 3d 628", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d 60", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1034204 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "67" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/332/0060-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1382, "char_count": 34798, "ocr_confidence": 0.738, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0029652358824583e-07, "percentile": 0.5394250784505197 }, "sha256": "20c376c8ffd0cadd30912883c9042fd9500f017700bfbbf048007ef97d3cf656", "simhash": "1:aef9783a3fce9d84", "word_count": 5789 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:40:04.128176+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "APPLETON, J., concurs." ], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTHONY W. BARTIMO, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE TURNER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn March 2002, the State charged defendant, Anthony W. Bartimo, with unlawful possession of a controlled substance, unlawful use of a weapon, and unlawful possession of cannabis. In July 2002, defendant filed a motion to suppress, which the trial court denied. In January 2003, the trial court found defendant guilty of unlawful use of a weapon and unlawful possession of cannabis. The court denied defendant\u2019s posttrial motion and sentenced him to 24 months\u2019 probation on each offense.\nOn appeal, defendant argues (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, (2) he was wrongfully convicted of unlawful use of a weapon, and (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nIn March 2002, the State charged defendant by information with (1) unlawful possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2002)), alleging he knowingly possessed less than 15 grams of a substance containing cocaine; (2) unlawful use of a weapon (720 ILCS 5/24 \u2014 1(a)(4) (West 2002)), alleging he knowingly possessed in a vehicle a 9-millimeter handgun; and (3) unlawful possession of cannabis (720 ILCS 550/4(c) (West 2002)), alleging he knowingly possessed more than 10 grams but less than 30 grams of a substance containing cannabis.\nIn July 2002, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, alleging he was illegally seized by an officer for an expired license plate when the plates were valid as evidenced by a temporary sticker. In August 2002, the State dismissed the unlawful-possession-of-a-substance-containing-cocaine charge. In September 2002, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. Defendant testified he was driving his car on March 11, 2002, at about 11 p.m. He testified his license plates expired on November 30, 2001, but the \u201cyellow \u2018T\u2019 sticker\u201d extended them for 120 days. He received a new set of license plates a \u201cfew days prior to being stopped,\u201d and they were in the backseat of the car when the officer pulled him over. The State moved for a directed finding on defendant\u2019s motion, which the trial court denied.\nThe State called Woodford County deputy sheriff Shawn Trent, who testified he observed a black Audi on March 11, 2002, and he ran the registration plate on the vehicle. A dispatcher advised him the registration expired in November 2001. Prior to stopping the vehicle, Deputy Trent observed a November 2001 sticker on the back of the license plate. He then stopped the vehicle to investigate the status of the plates. After shining his spotlight on defendant\u2019s vehicle, he noticed a temporary registration sticker. At the time of the stop, he was unaware of how long a \u201cT\u201d sticker was valid. The trial court found Deputy Trent had a \u201cgood-faith basis\u201d to stop the vehicle because of the expired plates and denied defendant\u2019s motion.\nIn January 2003, defendant\u2019s bench trial commenced. Deputy Trent testified to the expired license plate and his stop of defendant\u2019s vehicle. Upon approaching the vehicle, Trent noticed a \u201chard-cased shotgun or rifle case protruding from the trunk\u201d and an unzipped soft-sided shotgun or rifle case on the floorboard of the backseat. Trent then asked defendant for identification and he presented a traffic citation in lieu of his license. Trent returned to his squad car and checked defendant\u2019s license.\nUpon returning to defendant\u2019s car, Trent noticed defendant with his hand \u201cbehind the passenger seat,\u201d which he later removed. Deputy Trent then asked defendant if he had any weapons in the vehicle. Trent stated defendant appeared \u201cnervous\u201d and advised him that he had a rifle in the trunk. When asked if he had other firearms in his vehicle, defendant responded \u201cNo.\u201d When Deputy Trent asked for defendant\u2019s consent to search the vehicle, defendant \u201cdid not respond.\u201d Trent again asked defendant if he had any weapons in the vehicle. Appearing nervous, defendant reached toward \u201cthe center console passenger seat area like he was going to grab an object.\u201d Trent again asked him about any other weapons, and defendant stated \u201che had a pistol in the laundry basket on the passenger seat next to him.\u201d Trent then ordered defendant out of the car to \u201cget him away from the pistol\u201d and for officer safety. Trent began searching defendant, who \u201creached down towards his waistband consistent with producing a weapon,\u201d and Trent handcuffed him. A frisk of defendant for weapons turned up a \u201cwooden dugout,\u201d a \u201cone-hitter pipe,\u201d and a \u201c[Blaggie of cannabis\u201d in his pants pocket. Trent searched the car and found cannabis and an unloaded 9-millimeter pistol in a nylon holster and \u201can ammunition pouch in the front of the holster with a loaded magazine\u201d in another laundry basket in the rear seat. Trent also found a rifle in a case protruding from the car\u2019s trunk area.\nDefendant testified he uses his 9-millimeter handgun for target shooting, and he had targets and other similar items in his car when he was stopped. He stated he placed the handgun \u201call the way to the bottom of the [laundry] basket,\u201d and it was unloaded and in a closed holster. He testified he could not have accessed the gun from the driver\u2019s seat. When the officer returned to his car, defendant had his hand behind the passenger seat looking for his license plates. Defendant stated the holster did not completely cover the gun. He also admitted owning the marijuana on his person and in his car.\nFollowing closing arguments, the trial court found defendant guilty of unlawful use of a weapon and unlawful possession of cannabis. In February 2003, defendant filed a posttrial motion for a new trial, alleging, inter alia, the State failed to prove him guilty of unlawful use of a weapon beyond a reasonable doubt and he received ineffective assistance of counsel. In March 2003, the trial court denied the motion. Thereafter, the court sentenced defendant to 24 months\u2019 probation on each offense along with various fines. This appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Motion To Suppress\nDefendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We disagree.\n1. Standard of Review and Burden of Proof\nIn reviewing a motion to suppress on appeal, mixed questions of law and fact are presented. People v. Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d 165, 175, 784 N.E.2d 799, 805 (2003). A trial court\u2019s assessment of witness credibility and factual determinations will be reversed only if manifestly erroneous. People v. Anthony, 198 Ill. 2d 194, 200-01, 761 N.E.2d 1188, 1191 (2001). However, the ultimate determination of whether the evidence is suppressed is entitled to de novo review. See People v. Crane, 195 Ill. 2d 42, 51, 743 N.E.2d 555, 562 (2001).\nOn a motion to suppress evidence, the defendant has the burden of proving the search and seizure were unlawful (725 ILCS 5/114 \u2014 12 (West 2002)). \u201cHowever, once the defendant makes a prima facie showing of an illegal search and seizure, the burden shifts to the State to produce evidence justifying the intrusion.\u201d People v. Ortiz, 317 Ill. App. 3d 212, 220, 738 N.E.2d 1011, 1018 (2000).\nDefendant argues the trial court misapplied the evidentiary burden. We disagree. Defendant testified in support of his motion to suppress. After defense counsel indicated no further evidence would be presented, the State moved for a directed finding. The trial court denied the motion, and the State went forward with its evidence to establish the officer was justified in his intrusion. Defendant\u2019s claim that the trial court incorrectly understood the burden has no support in the record. The court commented on defendant\u2019s burden in the context of his motion to suppress evidence and consistent with the burden required of the movant in that instance. Further, defendant\u2019s claim that his motion for a directed verdict at the close of his presentation of evidence may have been successful if the court had understood the burden is meritless because it was the State that moved for a directed finding. Thus, we find no error.\n2. The Traffic Stop\nThe fourth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees \u201c[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.\u201d U.S. Const., amend. IV Similarly, the Illinois Constitution affords citizens \u201cthe right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers[,J and other possessions against unreasonable searches, [and] seizures.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 6. Our supreme court has interpreted the search and seizure clause of section 6 in a manner consistent with the United States Supreme Court\u2019s fourth amendment jurisprudence. People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220, 224, 789 N.E.2d 260, 264 (2003).\nWhen a police officer observes a driver commit a traffic violation, the officer is justified in briefly detaining the driver to investigate the violation. People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 433, 752 N.E.2d 1078, 1084 (2001). A temporary detention of an individual during a vehicle stop constitutes a seizure of his person within the fourth amendment, even if the stop is brief and for a limited purpose. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89, 95, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996). \u201cAn automobile stop is thus subject to the constitutional imperative that it not be \u2018unreasonable\u2019 under the circumstances. As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.\u201d Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 145 L. Ed. 2d at 95, 116 S. Ct. at 1772.\n\u201cBecause a traffic stop is more analogous to a Terry investigative stop (see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968)) than to a formal arrest, the reasonableness of a traffic stop is analyzed under Terry principles. [Citation.] A Terry analysis involves a dual inquiry: \u2018(1) \u201cwhether the officer\u2019s action was justified at its inception,\u201d and (2) \u201cwhether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.\u201d \u2019 Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 228, [789 N.E.2d at 266,] quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 905, 88 S. Ct. at 1879.\u201d People v. Bunch, 207 Ill. 2d 7, 13-14, 796 N.E.2d 1024, 1029 (2003).\nIn the case sub judice, defendant acknowledges Deputy Trent had probable cause to initiate the traffic stop. Deputy Trent received the dispatcher\u2019s report that the license plates on defendant\u2019s car were expired. According to section 3 \u2014 413(f) of the Illinois Vehicle Code, \u201c[n]o person shall operate a vehicle *** upon which is displayed an Illinois registration plate, platest,] or registration stickers after the termination of the registration period for which issued or after the expiration date.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 413(f) (West 2002). Thus, the initial stop of defendant\u2019s car was justified.\n3. Defendant\u2019s Arrest\nUnder the second prong of the Terry analysis, the length of the detention and the manner in which it was carried out are considered. Bunch, 207 Ill. 2d at 14, 796 N.E.2d at 1029. The United States Supreme Court has stated \u201can investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.\u201d Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 238, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325 (1983) (plurality opinion). Upon initiating a minor traffic stop, a police officer may briefly detain the driver to request his driver\u2019s license and determine its validity and, under certain circumstances, conduct a speedy warrant check. Ortiz, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 220, 738 N.E.2d at 1018. Once a check of a driver\u2019s license and any warrant information is completed, \u201cif no farther suspicion is aroused, the traffic stop must cease and the individual should no longer be detained.\u201d Ortiz, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 220, 738 N.E.2d at 1018. The police officer should then issue a warning ticket or citation and allow the driver to continue on his way. See People v. Koutsakis, 272 Ill. App. 3d 159, 164, 649 N.E.2d 605, 609 (1995).\nIn this case, Deputy Trent testified he stopped defendant\u2019s car for the expired license plates and did not notice the temporary registration sticker until he shined his spotlight on the car. Defendant argues Deputy Trent\u2019s reason for stopping him then no longer existed and further intrusion was unnecessary and unwarranted. We find the circumstances warranted Deputy Trent\u2019s approach to defendant\u2019s car and the resulting questions put forth to defendant.\nIn People v. Bradley, 292 Ill. App. 3d 208, 209, 685 N.E.2d 426, 427 (1997), an officer stopped the defendant\u2019s car, which had no license plates and a \u201clicense-applied-for (LAF) sticker with an unreadable expiration date.\u201d The officer approached the car and determined the LAF sticker on the rear windshield was valid. Bradley, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 209, 685 N.E.2d at 427. Upon granting the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, the trial court found that once the officer determined the LAF sticker was valid, the purpose of the stop was complete and the officer \u201ccould do nothing more than explain to defendant the reason he had been stopped.\u201d Bradley, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 210, 685 N.E.2d at 427.\nOn appeal, the State argued that after the officer had properly stopped the defendant to check the validity of the LAF sticker, he could then approach the defendant and request to see his driver\u2019s license. Bradley, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 210, 685 N.E.2d at 427. This court held that once the officer determined the LAF sticker was valid, the officer \u201ccould then approach defendant, explain to him why he had been stopped, and ask defendant to produce his driver\u2019s license.\u201d Bradley, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 211, 685 N.E.2d at 428.\nIn People v. Adams, 225 Ill. App. 3d 815, 816, 587 N.E.2d 592, 593 (1992), an officer initiated a traffic stop of the defendant\u2019s car for not having any visible registration plates. The officer shined his spotlight on the vehicle and noticed a valid license-applied-for slip in the rear window. Adams, 225 Ill. App. 3d at 816, 587 N.E.2d at 593-94. The officer went to the defendant\u2019s car to explain the reason for the stop, and later events led to the defendant\u2019s driving under the influence (DUI) arrest. Adams, 225 Ill. App. 3d at 817, 587 N.E.2d at 594.\nOn appeal, the defendant argued that once the officer determined the LAF form was valid, no justification existed to detain him further and arrest him for DUI. Adams, 225 Ill. App. 3d at 817, 587 N.E.2d at 594. This court held that it\n\u201cnaturally follows that once it was determined that defendant had a valid license-applied-for form displayed, the officer would approach the defendant, explain the reason for the stop, apologize, and advise defendant he was free to leave. In so doing, any observations the officer made may form the basis of probable cause to arrest the defendant for a reason totally unrelated to the stop.\u201d Adams, 225 Ill. App. 3d at 819, 587 N.E.2d at 595.\nIn this case, Deputy Trent observed the temporary sticker after he stopped the car. Defendant argues the officer\u2019s suspicion was allayed and no further intrusion was justified. However, Deputy Trent was not required to drive away and leave defendant wondering why the stop had been initiated in the first place. Instead, Trent could approach defendant\u2019s vehicle to further inspect the \u201cT\u201d sticker, explain the reason for the stop, apologize, and advise defendant he was free to leave.\nMoreover, the fact that Deputy Trent did not know the length of the temporary sticker\u2019s validity is of no consequence. Deputy Trent stopped defendant for having expired plates on his car. Upon further inspection after the stop, Trent noticed the temporary sticker. His incorrect belief as to the sticker\u2019s validity did not prohibit him from then approaching defendant\u2019s car. Thus, as Deputy Trent\u2019s suspicions concerning the purpose of the stop had not been fully answered, his approach of defendant\u2019s car to ask for a driver\u2019s license was reasonable.\nDefendant does not challenge the officer\u2019s actions after he approached the car and engaged defendant in conversation. Instead, defendant argues Trent had no basis for further intrusion upon seeing the temporary renewal sticker. As we have found the further intrusion valid, we need not analyze the later search of defendant\u2019s person and vehicle.\nNonetheless, we note the officer, upon initially approaching the vehicle, noticed a gun case protruding from the trunk and an unzipped soft-sided gun case on the backseat floorboard. The officer asked for defendant\u2019s identification and was presented a traffic citation instead of defendant\u2019s license. The officer returned to his squad car, checked defendant\u2019s license, and upon returning to defendant\u2019s car noticed defendant with his hand behind the passenger\u2019s seat. The officer thought defendant appeared nervous and asked defendant if he had any weapons in the vehicle. Defendant responded \u201cno\u201d but failed to respond to the officer\u2019s request to search the vehicle. When the officer again asked if defendant had any weapons in the vehicle, defendant admitted he had a pistol in the laundry basket on the passenger\u2019s seat next to him. Thus, the intrusion leading to the discovery of the weapon was justified based upon the officer\u2019s observations, the officer\u2019s legitimate questions posed to defendant based upon the officer\u2019s observations, and defendant\u2019s actions and responses.\n4. Hearsay Testimony\nDefendant next argues the trial court erred in admitting Deputy Trent\u2019s alleged hearsay testimony. During the motion to suppress, defense counsel asked Deputy Trent whether a temporary sticker was good for 120 days. Trent stated he was unaware at the time of the stop, but after the arrest he \u201ctalked to somebody with the Secretary of State\u2019s office, and they advised the temporary [sticker] was good for 90 days.\u201d Defense counsel moved to strike, but the trial court overruled the objection.\n\u201cHearsay evidence is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, and is generally inadmissible unless it falls within a recognized exception.\u201d People v. Cloutier, 178 Ill. 2d 141, 154, 687 N.E.2d 930, 936 (1997). The State argues Deputy Trent\u2019s statement was not presented to establish that temporary stickers were valid for 90 days and thus does not constitute hearsay, but instead shows Trent\u2019s state of mind. We agree with defendant that what the Secretary of State\u2019s office told Trent is irrelevant. However, based upon our discussion in the preceding section, we disagree it prejudiced defendant and find its admission into evidence harmless error. Moreover, the trial court is presumed to consider only proper evidence. People v. Todd, 154 Ill. 2d 57, 69, 607 N.E.2d 1189, 1195 (1992). The record does not indicate the trial court relied on this testimony in making its ultimate determination on the motion to suppress, and we find Deputy Trent\u2019s testimony harmless and without prejudice to defendant.\n5. License Renewal Sticker\nDefendant argues the trial court\u2019s failure to determine the correct period of time for a valid temporary renewal sticker resulted in an abuse of discretion in its ruling on his motion to suppress. We disagree.\nThe length of time a license renewal sticker is valid is irrelevant to the question of whether Deputy Trent could approach defendant after stopping him for an expired license plate and later discovering the renewal sticker. If Trent had known the renewal sticker was valid for 120 days, he could still have walked up to defendant\u2019s car, explained his error, and allowed him to be on his way. Defendant\u2019s due process concerns are therefore unfounded.\nB. Unlawful Use of a Weapon\n1. Sufficiency of the Evidence\nDefendant argues the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict him of unlawful use of a weapon. We disagree.\nWhen reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, in a criminal case, the relevant inquiry is whether, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Pollock, 202 Ill. 2d 189, 217, 780 N.E.2d 669, 685 (2002). It is the responsibility of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight given to their testimony, to resolve conflicts in the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from that evidence. People v. Ortiz, 196 Ill. 2d 236, 259, 752 N.E.2d 410, 425 (2001). A court of review will not overturn the verdict of the fact finder \u201cunless the proof is so improbable or unsatisfactory that there exists a reasonable doubt of the defendant\u2019s guilt.\u201d People v. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d 336, 353, 747 N.E.2d 339, 349 (2001).\n\u201cA person commits the offense of unlawful use of weapons when he knowingly:\n(4) Carries or possesses in any vehicle or concealed on or about his person *** any pistol, revolver, stun gun or taser or other firearm, except that this subsection (a)(4) does not apply to or affect transportation of weapons that meet one of the following conditions:\n(i) are broken down in a non[ ]functioning state; or\n(ii) are not immediately accessible; or\n(iii) are unloaded and enclosed in a case, firearm carrying box, shipping box, or other container by a person who has been issued a currently valid Firearm Owner\u2019s Identification CardU\u201d 720 ILCS 5/24 \u2014 1(a)(4) (West 2002).\nThe defendant has the burden of proving he falls within the exceptions set forth in section 24 \u2014 1(a)(4) by a preponderance of the evidence. People v. Martinez, 285 Ill. App. 3d 881, 884, 674 N.E.2d 944, 947 (1996). \u201cAccessibility refers to the proximity of the weapon to the defendant and the capability of the defendant to reach the weapon. In other words, a weapon is \u2018immediately accessible\u2019 if it is within \u2018easy reach\u2019 of the defendant.\u201d People v. Shields, 337 Ill. App. 3d 1063, 1064, 787 N.E.2d 342, 343 (2003), citing Martinez, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 884, 674 N.E.2d at 947.\nIn this case, Deputy Trent testified he found the holstered pistol in a laundry basket in the backseat of defendant\u2019s car. He stated the defendant\u2019s vehicle was \u201cnot a large car\u201d and a front seat occupant could \u201cprobably touch that basket\u201d in the backseat if he reached back. Deputy Trent located the pistol at the bottom of the laundry basket under clothes and paper targets. Defendant testified he placed the gun \u201call the way to the bottom of the basket,\u201d and he believed \u201c[t]here was no way [he] could have accessed the gun from the driver\u2019s seat.\u201d The trial court determined that defendant could have easily grabbed the basket or pulled it to him to gain access to the weapon. Thus, the court found the weapon was immediately accessible.\nIn People v. Smith, 71 Ill. 2d 95, 99, 374 N.E.2d 472, 473 (1978), a jury convicted the defendant of unlawful use of weapons. The supreme court affirmed his conviction, finding a gun in a locked glove compartment was immediately accessible to the driver even though the defendant claimed he had no key and could not access the glove compartment while driving. Smith, 71 Ill. 2d at 100, 374 N.E.2d at 474. In People v. Bolling, 181 Ill. App. 3d 845, 850, 537 N.E.2d 1100, 1103 (1989), the appellate court affirmed the defendant\u2019s unlawful use of weapons conviction, finding the driver could have easily retrieved his handgun from a zippered athletic bag located in the rear seat of his car.\nWe find the evidence in this case was sufficient to allow the trial court to find the pistol was immediately accessible to defendant. The trial court, as the finder of fact, has the responsibility to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, and in viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, we hold the trial court could have found the weapon was immediately accessible beyond a reasonable doubt.\nWe need not address the merits of our colleague\u2019s dissent because defendant did not argue his gun was enclosed in a case, but he instead argued the gun\u2019s placement in a holster at the bottom of a laundry basket filled with clothes rendered it inaccessible. The trial court rejected this argument, and the State presented sufficient evidence to support the court\u2019s finding beyond a reasonable doubt.\n2. Statutory Interpretation\nDefendant argues the trial court misinterpreted the unlawful use of weapons statute and its \u201ccase\u201d or \u201cother container\u201d exceptions, requiring reversal of his conviction. We disagree.\nFirst, defendant sets forth a hypothetical regarding enclosing a handgun in a Tupperware container in the passenger seat versus the same gun in a holster in a cardboard box in the backseat. However, we need not analyze defendant\u2019s hypothetical because the trial court had ample evidence before it to conclude the holstered gun, with parts of the gun exposed, was immediately accessible and not enclosed in a case.\nSecond, defendant appears to ask this court to insert the word \u201clocked\u201d into section 24 \u2014 1 (a) (4) (iii) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Criminal Code) (720 ILCS 5/24 \u2014 l(a)(4)(iii) (West 2002)) to promote highway safety. Defendant maintains a proper construction of the statute would require guns to be unloaded and enclosed in a locked case, firearm carrying box, shipping box, or other locked container. However, defendant\u2019s argument is unavailing and irrelevant to his case on appeal considering his weapon was not enclosed in a locked case or container.\nMoreover, courts \u201ccannot read words into a statute that are not there.\u201d Chicago Tribune Co. v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 332 Ill. App. 3d 60, 67, 773 N.E.2d 674, 680 (2002). Further, \u201c [u]nder the doctrine of separation of powers, courts may not legislate, rewrite[,] or extend legislation. If the statute as enacted seems to operate in certain cases unjustly or inappropriately, the appeal must be to the General Assembly, and not to the court.\u2019 \u201d Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 522, 732 N.E.2d 528, 544 (2000), quoting People v. Garner, 147 Ill. 2d 467, 475-76, 590 N.E.2d 470, 474 (1992). Defendant offers no authority to support his request for us to add words to the unlawful use of weapons statute to avoid its alleged \u201cabsurd\u201d construction. Thus, we have no basis to vacate defendant\u2019s conviction.\nC. Assistance of Counsel\nDefendant also argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We disagree.\nClaims of ineffective assistance of counsel are evaluated under the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), which requires a showing that counsel\u2019s performance was deficient and resultant prejudice. To establish deficient performance, the defendant must show his attorney\u2019s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Cloutier, 178 Ill. 2d at 163, 687 N.E.2d at 940, citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. Prejudice is established when there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel\u2019s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Cloutier, 178 Ill. 2d at 163, 687 N.E.2d at 940, citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. A defendant must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland standard, and the failure to satisfy either prong precludes a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Patterson, 192 Ill. 2d 93, 107, 735 N.E.2d 616, 626 (2000).\nDefendant argues his trial counsel failed to establish the 120-day duration of the \u201cT\u201d sticker, which allowed the trial court and prosecutor to assume its duration was 90 days. However, as noted earlier, the duration of a valid \u201cT\u201d sticker did not change the circumstances surrounding the stop.\nDefendant also argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to testimony regarding the discovery of defendant\u2019s new license plates in his car following the stop and the trial court\u2019s later reference to such testimony. Generally, \u201c[a] review of counsel\u2019s competency does not extend to those areas involving the exercise of judgment, discretion, or trial tactics.\u201d People v. Sutton, 229 Ill. App. 3d 960, 967, 594 N.E.2d 752, 756 (1992). Further, \u201cdefense counsel is not required to make losing motions or objections in order to provide effective legal assistance.\u201d People v. Kelley, 304 Ill. App. 3d 628, 636, 710 N.E.2d 163, 170 (1999).\nThe record indicates defense counsel offered objections throughout the proceedings. The making of objections is ordinarily a matter of trial strategy (People v. Pecoraro, 175 Ill. 2d 294, 327, 677 N.E.2d 875, 891 (1997)), and we do not find defense counsel\u2019s representation fell outside the range of reasonable professional assistance. Moreover, we find no prejudice because the trial court did not focus on the newly found license plates but instead determined the stop was justified considering the expired plates and later discovery of the \u201cT\u201d sticker. Therefore, defendant\u2019s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nAffirmed.\nAPPLETON, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE TURNER" }, { "text": "JUSTICE COOK,\ndissenting:\nI agree that defendant\u2019s vehicle was properly stopped because of the apparently expired registration plates. I also agree the officer was not required to immediately walk away from the vehicle when he saw the \u201cT\u201d sticker.\nI disagree, however, that defendant was properly convicted of the offense of unlawful use of a weapon (720 ILCS 5/24 \u2014 1(a)(4) (West 2002)). I would reverse that conviction and vacate that sentence.\nThe evidence is clear that the handgun in question was unloaded, in a snap-closed nylon holster, located in the passenger-side backseat. Section 24 \u2014 1(a)(4) does not apply to weapons that \u201care unloaded and enclosed in a case, firearm carrying box, shipping box, or other container by a person who has been issued a currently valid Firearm Owner\u2019s Identification Card.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/24 \u2014 l(a)(4)(iii) (West 2002). A \u201cholster\u201d is a \u201ccase.\u201d Merriam-Webster\u2019s Collegiate Dictionary 554 (10th ed. 2000). \u201cEnclose\u201d means\n\u201c1 a (1): to close in: SURROUND () (2) to fence off (common land) for individual use b: to hold in: CONFINE.\u201d Merriam-Webster\u2019s Collegiate Dictionary 380 (10th ed. 2000).\n\u201cEnclosed\u201d means \u201cheld in\u201d or \u201cconfined,\u201d such as cattle that are enclosed in a pen. The handgun here was clearly held in or confined in the snap-closed nylon holster, and accordingly there can be no violation of section 24 \u2014 1(a)(4).\nThe State argues that \u201cBy using this holster which left parts of the gun exposed, the defendant failed to bring himself within the exemption,\u201d citing a definition of \u201ccase\u201d found in the Wildlife Code (520 ILCS 5/1.2b \u2014 1 (West 2002)):\n\u201c [\u2018]Case[\u2019] means a container specifically designed for the purpose of housing a gun or bow and arrow device which completely encloses such gun or bow and arrow device by being zipped, snapped, buckled, tied[,] or otherwise fastened with no portion of the gun or bow and arrow device exposed.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThe legislature chose to employ an unusual definition of \u201cenclosed case\u201d in the Wildlife Code. The legislature, however, did not choose to employ that definition in the Criminal Code.\nThe Criminal Code is broader than the Wildlife Code. The Criminal Code does not just provide an exemption for cases, it provides an exemption for cases, firearm carrying boxes, shipping boxes, and \u201cother container[s].\u201d Even if the words from the Wildlife Code, \u201cno portion of the gun *** exposed,\u201d were held to apply to the word \u201ccase\u201d in section 24 \u2014 1(a)(4), there is no justification for applying them to the word \u201ccontainer.\u201d\nThe words, however, should not even be applied to the word \u201ccase.\u201d The words are simply not contained in or referred to in section 24 \u2014 1(a)(4). As the majority points out:\n\u201c[Cjourts \u2018cannot read words into a statute that are not there.\u2019 Chicago Tribune Co. v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 332 Ill. App. 3d 60, 67, 773 N.E.2d 674, 680 (2002). Further, \u2018 \u201c[u]nder the doctrine of separation of powers, courts may not legislate, rewrite[,] or extend legislation. If the statute as enacted seems to operate in certain cases unjustly or inappropriately, the appeal must be to the General Assembly, and not to the court.\u201d \u2019 Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 522, 732 N.E.2d 528, 544 (2000), quoting People v. Garner, 147 Ill. 2d 467, 475-76, 590 N.E.2d 470, 474 (1992).\u201d 345 Ill. App. 3d at 1112.\nThe proscriptions of a criminal statute must be clearly defined. The statute must provide a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to distinguish between lawful and unlawful conduct so that he or she may act accordingly. People v. Maness, 191 Ill. 2d 478, 483-84, 732 N.E.2d 545, 549 (2000). No one may be required at peril of life, liberty, or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. \u201c \u2018All are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids.\u2019 \u201d City of Chicago v. Morales, 177 Ill. 2d 440, 450, 687 N.E.2d 53, 60 (1997), aff\u2019d, 527 U.S. 41, 144 L. Ed. 2d 67, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999), quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453, 83 L. Ed. 888, 890, 59 S. Ct. 618, 619 (1939). \u201c[T]he statute must provide sufficiently definite standards for law enforcement officers and fact finders that its application does not depend merely on their private conceptions.\u201d People v. Hickman, 163 Ill. 2d 250, 256, 644 N.E.2d 1147, 1150 (1994). It is irrelevant that section 24 \u2014 1(a)(4) would make better sense if the words \u201cwith no portion of the gun exposed\u201d were read into it.\nApparently the State would concede there was no violation here if the holster had been large enough to completely cover the handgun. What sense does that make? The handgun would have been equally accessible if the holster had been larger. Perhaps the State would concede there was no violation if the handgun were contained in a brown paper bag with the top folded shut. Such a handgun would not have any portion exposed, but the State would probably insist that the bag be \u201czipped, snapped, buckled, tied[,] or otherwise fastened.\u201d A paper clip?\nThere is no justification for reading the words of section 24 \u2014 1(a), \u201cenclosed in a case *** or other container,\u201d to include the requirement that no portion of the gun be exposed. The unlawful use of a weapon conviction should be reversed.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE COOK," } ], "attorneys": [ "Harold M. Jennings, of Bloomington, for appellant.", "Michael L. Stroh, State\u2019s Attorney, of Eureka (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and David E. Mannchen, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTHONY W. BARTIMO, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4-03-0351\nOpinion filed January 15, 2004.\nHarold M. Jennings, of Bloomington, for appellant.\nMichael L. Stroh, State\u2019s Attorney, of Eureka (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and David E. Mannchen, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1100-01", "first_page_order": 1120, "last_page_order": 1136 }