{ "id": 3832367, "name": "THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LATRONICA ASPHALT AND GRADING, INC., Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "City of Chicago v. Latronica Asphalt & Grading, Inc.", "decision_date": "2004-02-17", "docket_number": "No. 1-02-2524", "first_page": "264", "last_page": "277", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "346 Ill. App. 3d 264" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "584 N.E.2d 257", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "the appellate court did not consider the merits of the defendant's section 2 - 615 motion to dismiss where the trial court based its dismissal of plaintiffs complaint solely on the statute of limitations defense raised in the defendant's section 2 - 619 motion" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "222 Ill. App. 3d 559", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5261578 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "565", "parenthetical": "the appellate court did not consider the merits of the defendant's section 2 - 615 motion to dismiss where the trial court based its dismissal of plaintiffs complaint solely on the statute of limitations defense raised in the defendant's section 2 - 619 motion" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/222/0559-01" ] }, { "cite": "710 N.E.2d 861", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "the appellate court declined to rule on the merits of defendant's section 2 - 619 motion to dismiss because the trial court's dismissal ruling was limited to the defendant's section 2 - 615 motion" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 Ill. App. 3d 906", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 564580 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "922", "parenthetical": "the appellate court declined to rule on the merits of defendant's section 2 - 619 motion to dismiss because the trial court's dismissal ruling was limited to the defendant's section 2 - 615 motion" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/304/0906-01" ] }, { "cite": "696 N.E.2d 303", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "182 Ill. 2d 471", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 864534 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/182/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "452 N.E.2d 804", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 Ill. App. 3d 1043", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3520583 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1052" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/116/1043-01" ] }, { "cite": "630 N.E.2d 830", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780277 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "665 N.E.2d 1199", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "172 Ill. 2d 325", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 55986 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/172/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 Ill. 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2742918 ], "year": 1879, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/92/0225-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 N.E. 488", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1926, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 Ill. 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5174366 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1926, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "331" }, { "page": "331" }, { "page": "333" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/322/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "27 Ill. App. 559", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 4956523 ], "year": 1888, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/27/0559-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 Ill. App. 3d 1007", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 35410 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/294/1007-01" ] }, { "cite": "790 N.E.2d 882", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 Ill. App. 3d 119", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2468781 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/339/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 N.E. 59", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1906, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "224 Ill. 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3332523 ], "year": 1906, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/224/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "320 Ill. App. 645", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 4977079 ], "year": 1943, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "651" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/320/0645-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 N.E.2d 181", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 Ill. 2d 555", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3073886 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/78/0555-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 N.E.2d 670", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "58 Ill. App. 3d 879", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5624634 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "889" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/58/0879-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 N.E.2d 824", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5469983 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "21-22" }, { "page": "6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/86/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "647 N.E.2d 1035", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "269 Ill. App. 3d 1013", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 365857 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1019" }, { "page": "1019" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/269/1013-01" ] }, { "cite": "633 N.E.2d 985", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "261 Ill. App. 3d 651", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5372352 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "661" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/261/0651-01" ] }, { "cite": "786 N.E.2d 202", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 619", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "765 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 Ill. App. 3d 948", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 79520 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "959" }, { "page": "959" }, { "page": "958-59" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/327/0948-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 N.E.2d 526", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "privately owned establishment for prostitution" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 Ill. 2d 423", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2990941 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427", "parenthetical": "privately owned establishment for prostitution" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/75/0423-01" ] }, { "cite": "767 N.E.2d 314", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "privately owned site of coal tar gas plant" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58941 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "100-02", "parenthetical": "privately owned site of coal tar gas plant" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "485 N.E.2d 1076", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3127156 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "152-53" }, { "page": "152" }, { "page": "153" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "795 N.E.2d 990", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "993" }, { "page": "993" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 Ill. App. 3d 842", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3473525 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "845" }, { "page": "844-45" }, { "page": "845" }, { "page": "845" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/342/0842-01" ] }, { "cite": "546 N.E.2d 580", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 Ill. 2d 428", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5569862 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "472" }, { "page": "475-76" }, { "page": "474" }, { "page": "474" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/131/0428-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 N.E.2d 874", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 Ill. 2d 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3113801 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "459" }, { "page": "460" }, { "page": "459" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/96/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "777 N.E.2d 603", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 Ill. App. 3d 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 521921 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "93" }, { "page": "93" }, { "page": "93" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/334/0090-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1203, "char_count": 31085, "ocr_confidence": 0.742, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.8327104553008254e-08, "percentile": 0.36256843545704787 }, "sha256": "08fa89b3d7d31e89140b9f8a3b19371305287e3432c5d7abcea9b6597c6f3993", "simhash": "1:8df946a37dd4a541", "word_count": 5196 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:44:33.584383+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LATRONICA ASPHALT AND GRADING, INC., Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McBRIDE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff-appellant, City of Chicago (City), filed a complaint against defendant-appellee, Latronica Asphalt & Grading, Inc. (Latronica), which sought damages in connection with the City\u2019s cleanup of illegal waste disposed of on a lot in the City of Chicago (the Site). Latronica filed a motion to dismiss which sought to strike the complaint on the ground that the alleged dumping by Latronica occurred more than five years prior to the filing of the complaint and the claim was therefore barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court subsequently denied the City\u2019s motion to reconsider. The trial court granted Latronica\u2019s motion. The City appeals from those rulings.\nWe state the following background facts. On September 4, 2001, the City filed a four-count complaint against Latronica which alleged unpermitted disposal of waste (count I), statutory public nuisance (count II), common law public nuisance (count III), and recovery of costs (count IV). Specifically, the complaint alleged that the City obtained ownership of the Site as of December 30, 1999, and that prior to that time, the Site was owned by a trust and was operated by several individuals, including John'Christopher, a federal government informant in \u201cOperation Silver Shovel,\u201d a public corruption investigation conducted by the United States Attorney. During the period of Christopher\u2019s ownership and control, the Site was operated by Marlboro, Inc., a company owned by Christopher. At no time was a permit ever issued by the City making the Site a permitted dump site.\nAccording to \u201cload tickets\u201d and \u201cinvoices\u201d produced by Marlboro, the complaint alleged, Latronica disposed of construction debris and other waste on the Site \u201c(including asphalt, concrete, dirt, and mixed materials) from Latronica jobsites during the period of at least August 4, 1992, through at least September 2, 1993.\u201d Over this period, the City alleged that Latronica disposed of at least 2,498 cubic yards of construction debris and other waste at the Site. It further claimed that Latronica\u2019s disposal of waste on the Site contributed to a massive buildup of illegal waste there.\nThe complaint alleged that the City had begun cleanup at the Site which would require the removal of approximately 663,500 cubic yards of waste at the estimated total cost of nearly $24 million. The City claimed that the illegal waste disposed of at the Site constituted a common law and statutory public nuisance, and a threat to the \u201cpublic health, safety, welfare, and the environment.\u201d In count I, the complaint specifically alleged that \u201cmounds of waste [from the Site] caused dust, dirt, and other materials to become airborne and to spread to the nearby community.\u201d The City claimed that the illegal dumping by Latronica violated section 11 \u2014 4\u20141500 of the Chicago Municipal Code. Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 11 \u2014 4\u20141500 (amended January 12, 1995). It further claimed that it was entitled to recover the cleanup costs under the cost recovery provision of the same code. In sum, the City sought total damages in the amount of $106,889 which represented Latronica\u2019s portion of the City\u2019s cleanup expenditures.\nOn January 18, 2002, Latronica filed an amended motion to dismiss under sections 2 \u2014 615 and 2 \u2014 619 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615, 2 \u2014 619 (West 2000). Latronica\u2019s basis for the section 2 \u2014 619 motion was that the alleged dumping occurred between August 4, 1992, through November 2, 1993, dates that were more than five years prior to the filing of the City\u2019s complaint on September 4, 2001, and the City\u2019s lawsuit was therefore barred by the statute of limitations.\nOn March 28, 2002, the trial court granted Latronica\u2019s amended motion to dismiss based on the five-year limitations period set forth in section 13 \u2014 205 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 205 (West 2000). The court found that section 13 \u2014 205 \u201c[did] not exclude\u201d the City and that the claims were time barred because the dumping ceased in 1993 and the complaint was not filed until 2001. Although, as noted above, Latronica also filed a motion to dismiss under section 2 \u2014 615 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, the trial court did not address any of the arguments raised in that motion. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615 (West 2000).\nA motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619 is a method of disposing of issues of law and easily proved issues of fact at the outset of the case. Fox Associates, Inc. v. Robert Half International, Inc., 334 Ill. App. 3d 90, 93, 777 N.E.2d 603 (2002). Well-pled facts in the complaint are admitted; however, legal conclusions and facts unsupported by specific allegations are not. Fox Associates, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 93. We review a trial court\u2019s granting of a section 2 \u2014 619 motion to dismiss de novo. Fox Associates, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 93.\nThe five-year statute of limitations in section 13 \u2014 205 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure provides the following, in relevant part:\n\u201cFive year limitation. *** [A]ctions on unwritten contracts, expressed or implied, or on awards of arbitration, or to recover damages for an injury done to property, real or personal, or to recover the possession of personal property or damages for the detention or conversion thereto, and all civil actions not otherwise provided for, shall be commenced within 5 years next after the cause of action accrued.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 205 (West 2000).\nSection 7 \u2014 28\u2014440(a) of the Chicago Municipal Code states, in relevant part:\n\u201cNo person shall dump or deposit or cause to be dumped or deposited on any lot or parcel of real estate within the city any garbage, ashes, refuse, trash, miscellaneous waste, manure or other substance that may contain disease germs or may be scattered by the wind, or may decompose, or become filthy, noxious or unhealthful, except at a sanitary landfill site, liquid waste handling facility or transfer station for which a permit has been properly issued pursuant to the provisions of chapter 11 \u2014 4 of this code. Such dumping without a permit is hereby declared to be a nuisance. Any person violating this provision of this chapter will be fined not less than $1,500.00 and not more than $2,500.00 *** In addition to other penalties provided in this section, any person who violates this section shall be hable to the city for three times the amount of all costs and expenses incurred by the city in abating a nuisance.\u201d Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 7 \u2014 28\u2014440(a) (amended July 29, 2003).\nSection 8 \u2014 28\u2014020 of the Chicago Municipal Code states, in relevant part:\n\u201cAny person who causes the city or its agents to incur costs in order to provide necessary services as the result of such person\u2019s violation of any federal, state or local law, or such person\u2019s failure to correct conditions which violate any federal, state or local law when such person was under a legal duty to do so, shall be hable to the city for those costs. This liability shall be collectible in the same manner as any other personal liability.\u201d Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 8 \u2014 28\u2014020 (amended May 17, 2000).\nSection 11 \u2014 4\u20141500 of the Chicago Municipal Code states, in relevant part:\n\u201cNo sohd or liquid waste shall be treated or disposed of within the city of Chicago except in accordance with this chapter. ***\n(e) A transfer station may accept waste for sorting and/or consohdation and for further transfer to a waste disposal, treatment, or handling facility.\nNo persons shall (1) cause or allow the open dumping of any waste, (2) abandon or dispose of any waste upon public property, except in a sanitary landfill approved by the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency and the Commissioner, (3) dispose, treat, abandon or transport any waste, except at a site or facility which meets the requirements of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act and which is permitted pursuant to this chapter.\nDisposal or treatment of any waste without a permit is hereby declared to be a nuisance.\u201d Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 11 \u2014 4\u20141500 (amended January 12, 1995).\nSection 11 \u2014 4\u20141600 of the Chicago Municipal Code states, in relevant part:\n\u201cAny person found in violation of the provisions of Section 11\u2014 4 \u2014 1400 through 11 \u2014 4\u20141590 inclusive shall be subject to a fine of $500.00 for the first offense, $1,000.00 fine for the second and each subsequent offense. Each day such violation shall continue shall constitute separate and distinct offense.\u201d Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 11 \u2014 4\u20141600 (1995).\nUnder the common law, \u201cthe statute of limitations may not be asserted against the State or its county or municipal subdivisions as plaintiffs in actions involving \u2018public rights\u2019 [citation].\u201d City of Shelbyville v. Shelbyville Restorium, Inc., 96 Ill. 2d 457, 459, 451 N.E.2d 874 (1983). This doctrine of governmental immunity from statutes of limitation is supported \u201cby the policy judgment that the public should not suffer as a result of the negligence of its officers and agents in failing to promptly assert causes of action which belong to the public.\u201d Board of Education of City of Chicago v. A, C, & S, Inc., 131 Ill. 2d 428, 472, 546 N.E.2d 580 (1989). The doctrine emerges from the Latin maxim \u201cnullum tempus occurit regi\u201d (hereinafter nullum tempus), which translates to \u201ctime does not run against the King.\u201d Shelbyville, 96 Ill. 2d at 460.\nWhether the immunity doctrine applies depends on:\n\u201c[W]hether the right the governmental unit seeks to assert \u2018is in fact a right belonging to the general public, or whether it belongs only to the government or to some small and distinct subsection of the public at large.\u2019 [Citation.] Courts should consider who would benefit by the government\u2019s action and who would lose by its inaction. [Citation.] Three factors must be addressed when determining whether a governmental entity is asserting a public or private right: (1) the effect of the interest on the public; (2) the obligation of the governmental entity to act on behalf of the public; and (3) the extent to which public funds must be expended. [Citations.]\u201d People ex rel. Department of Labor v. Tri State Tours, Inc., 342 Ill. App. 3d 842, 845, 795 N.E.2d 990, 993 (2003).\nHowever, when the entity is acting in a private capacity, its claim may be subject to a limitations defense. Tri State Tours, 342 Ill. App. 3d at 844-45, 795 N.E.2d at 993. Further, \u201cit is well established that where a statute of limitations does \u2018expressly include the State, county, municipality, or other governmental agencies,\u2019 common law governmental limitations immunity will not bar a limitations defense predicated on that statute. [Citations.]\u201d County of Du Page v. Graham, Anderson, Probst & White, Inc., 109 Ill. 2d 143, 152-53, 485 N.E.2d 1076 (1985).\nIn the instant case, section 13 \u2014 205 does not expressly include the state, county, municipality, or any other governmental agency within its purview. As a result, if the City is asserting a \u201cpublic right\u201d in the instant action, the trial court\u2019s dismissal order based on the limitations defense was improper. If, however, the City was acting in a private capacity, the statute of limitations may be asserted against it. Therefore, we must decide whether the City\u2019s action asserts a \u201cpublic right\u201d or a private one.\nThe City claims that there are two reasons its action asserts public rights: (1) the complaint is a public nuisance action which, by definition, is predicated upon a public right; (2) even if the claim were not properly pled as a nuisance action, the case satisfies the three factors noted above for asserting a public right. In response, Latronica argues that the doctrine of nullum tempus does not apply because the allegations at issue involve municipal ordinance violations and a tort claim, which do not involve a public right. Without citation to any authority, Latronica also suggests that the issue before this court does not involve the assertion of a public right because \u201c[t]here [was] no attempt by the [C]ity to plead specific facts to allege damage to public property.\u201d However, this assertion, without more, does not resolve the issue and, in any event, the City was not required to plead specific facts to allege damage to public property. A common law public nuisance is actionable even if the claim is premised on a nuisance present on private property. See Donaldson v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 199 Ill. 2d 63, 100-02, 767 N.E.2d 314 (2002) (privately owned site of coal tar gas plant); City of Chicago v. Cecola, 75 Ill. 2d 423, 427, 389 N.E.2d 526 (1979) (privately owned establishment for prostitution).\nIn Young v. Bryco Arms, 327 Ill. App. 3d 948, 959, 765 N.E.2d 1 (2001), appeal allowed, 201 Ill. 2d 619, 786 N.E.2d 202 (2002), this court stated:\n\u201cA sufficient pleading for a public nuisance cause of action consists of facts alleging a right common to the general public, a transgression of those rights by the defendant and resulting damages. [Citations.] Pleading requirements are not strenuous because common law public nuisance eludes precise definition and depends on the peculiar facts of each case.\u201d Young, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 959.\nSee also Gilmore v. Stanmar, Inc., 261 Ill. App. 3d 651, 661, 633 N.E.2d 985 (1994).\nIn People ex rel. Burris v. C.J.R. Processing, Inc., 269 Ill. App. 3d 1013, 1019, 647 N.E.2d 1035 (1995), the court, citing Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc., 86 Ill. 2d 1, 21-22, 426 N.E.2d 824 (1981), defined a common law public nuisance as \u201can act or failure to act which injures the safety, health or morals of the public, or which causes substantial public annoyance, inconvenience or injury.\u201d It further observed:\n\u201cThe Criminal Jurisprudence Act defines public nuisances in pertinent part:\n\u2018It is a public nuisance:\n1. To cause or allow *** any offal, filth, or noisome substance to be collected, deposited or to remain in any place, to the prejudice of others.\n8. To *** use any building or other place for the exercise of any trade, employment or manufacture, which, by occasioning noxious exhalations, offensive smells or otherwise, is offensive or dangerous to the health of individuals, or of the public.\u2019 740 ILCS 55/221(1), (8) (West 1992).\u201d Burris, 269 Ill. App. 3d at 1019.\nIn the. instant case, the complaint, paragraph 7, alleged that Latronica disposed of \u201cconstruction debris and other waste on the Site (including asphalt, concrete, dirt, and mixed materials) from Latronica jobsites during the period of at least August 4, 1992, through at least November 2, 1993.\u201d Paragraph 7 further alleged that during the time period, \u201cLatronica disposed of at least 2,498 cubic yards of construction debris and other waste at the Site.\u201d In paragraph 10, the complaint stated that, \u201c[d]ue to the illegal waste that has been disposed of and allowed to remain on the Site, the site constitutes a public nuisance and a threat to the public health, safety and welfare and the environment.\u201d\nIn count I of the complaint, for unpermitted disposal of waste in violation of section 11 \u2014 4\u20141500 of the Chicago Municipal Code, paragraph 13 alleged:\n\u201cLatronica disposed of substantial amounts of waste on the site, including asphalt, concrete, dirt, and demolition debris. Latronica\u2019s disposal of waste on the site contributed to the creation of mounds of waste spread over the 20-acre site. The mounds of waste caused dust, dirt, and other materials to become airborne and to spread to the nearby community.\u201d\nIn count II of the complaint, for statutory public nuisance in violation of sections 11 \u2014 4\u20141500 and 7 \u2014 28\u2014440 of the Chicago Municipal Code, paragraph 23 alleged:\n\u201cThis count is brought seeking damages *** necessary to abate the nuisance at the Site, which Latronica contributed to creating and maintaining by disposing of construction debris and other waste at the Site, as well as fines for violations of the Municipal Code.\u201d\nIn count III of the complaint, for common law public nuisance, paragraph 30 alleged:\n\u201cLatronica\u2019s illegal disposal of waste on the Site has resulted in the creation of an unreasonable and substantial annoyance, inconvenience, and danger to the citizens of Chicago in a variety of ways, including but not limited to the following:\nA. Waste disposed of on the Site becoming airborne and scattered onto the public way and nearby properties;\nB. Waste disposed of on the Site may harbor rats or other vermin;\nC. Waste disposed of on the site could migrate onto adjacent properties through runoff from the site.\u201d\nFinally, the complaint claimed that the conduct of Latronica caused the City to expend money damages for the task of removing the waste illegally disposed of at the Site. We find not only are these allegations sufficient to state common law and statutory public nuisance causes of action, but we also conclude the complaint alleges sufficient facts predicated upon a public right. Specifically, the allegations consist of facts asserting the effect the interest has on the public, the obligation of the governmental entity to act on behalf of the public, and the extent to which public funds have been expended. Tri State Tours, 342 Ill. App. 3d at 845.\nThere is no question that the City\u2019s cleanup of the Site affects the interests of the general public. As noted by the City, \u201cby cleaning up the Site, the City is eliminating a blight to the surrounding community, as well as potential health risks to those who live, work, or travel in the city each day.\u201d In A, C, & S, the supreme court held that the abatement of asbestos in public school buildings amounted to a public right because of the health concern involved. A, C, & S, 131 Ill. 2d at 475-76. Similarly, in this case, the illegal dumping of waste could create a danger to the public health. The presence of debris and airborne toxins could prove hazardous to the community. Therefore, the City\u2019s cleanup of the Site affects the interests of the public.\nSecond, the City is authorized and obligated by law to clean up the Site. Section 7 \u2014 28\u2014020 of the Chicago Municipal Code requires that whenever \u201cany nuisance shall be found on any premises within the city, the commissioner of buildings or commissioner of the environment is hereby authorized *** to cause the same to be summarily abated.\u201d Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 7 \u2014 28\u2014020 (amended December 11, 1991). This section expressly grants the City authority to summarily abate any nuisance.\nSeveral provisions in section 2 \u2014 30\u2014030 of the Chicago Municipal Code obligate the City to act on the public\u2019s behalf to abate nuisances. Section 2 \u2014 30\u2014030(1) states that the commissioner of the environment shall have the duty to \u201csupervise the execution of and implement all laws, ordinances, rules and regulations pertaining to environmental protection and control.\u201d Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 2\u2014 30 \u2014 030(1) (amended May 14, 1997). The commissioner is further obliged to \u201cinstitute necessary proceedings to prosecute violations of Chapter 11 \u2014 4 and to compel the prevention and abatement of *** pollution, *** and nuisances arising therefrom.\u201d Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 2 \u2014 30\u2014030(4) (amended May 14, 1997). Specifically, the commissioner, under section 2 \u2014 30\u2014030(19), is required to \u201cinitiate proceedings to bring about the summary abatement of pollution sources which pose an imminent and serious threat to public health and welfare of the people or which constitute a public nuisance.\u201d Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 2 \u2014 30\u2014030(19) (amended May 14, 1997). These sections impose a duty upon the City to bring about the abatement of pollution sources which pose an imminent danger to the public or which constitute a public nuisance. Because of Latronica\u2019s inaction, the City was obliged to act on behalf of the public and to clean up waste disposed of at the Site. Tri State Tours, 342 Ill. App. 3d at 845.\nFinally, there is no doubt that the City expended significant public revenues on cleanup costs at the Site. Paragraph 9 of the complaint stated that the estimated total cost of the cleanup was $24 million. The complaint further alleged that more than $106,889 was attributable to the waste dumped by Latronica. For the reasons above, we conclude the complaint alleges sufficient facts predicated upon a public right.\nLatronica contends that only a private right has been asserted because the complaint involved the rights of the people of Chicago and not all people of the state. In support of its argument, Latronica relies upon language in Chicago Park District v. Kenroy, Inc., 58 Ill. App. 3d 879, 889, 374 N.E.2d 670 (1978), rev\u2019d in part, 78 Ill. 2d 555, 42 N.E.2d 181 (1980), which states: \u201cAs used in the present context, \u2018public rights\u2019 are those rights belonging to all of the people of the State alike; \u2018private rights\u2019 are those rights limited to some local subdivision or municipality, such as a city or village. [Citations.]\u201d\nWhile we acknowledge this language, we follow the more recent supreme court language in A, C, & S, which states, \u201cthe governmental body need not be asserting an interest affecting everyone in the State in order for it to qualify as a public right.\u201d A, C, & S, 131 Ill. 2d at 474. This position is supported by this court\u2019s recent reasoning in Young, cited above. In Young, the court, relying upon section 821B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, stated, \u201cit is not necessary that the entire community be affected by a public nuisance, so long as the nuisance will interfere with those who come in contact with it in the exercise of a public right or it otherwise affects the interests of the community at large.\u201d Young, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 958-59, citing Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 821B, Comment g (1979).\nIn count I, paragraph 13, the complaint alleged that \u201cmounds of waste caused dust, dirt, and other materials to become airborne and to spread to the nearby community.\u201d In count III, paragraph 30 A, the complaint alleged that, among other things, Latronica\u2019s illegal disposal of waste at the Site resulted in danger to the citizens of Chicago, because \u201c[w]aste disposed of on the Site [became] airborne and scattered onto the public way and nearby properties.\u201d We find that these allegations satisfy the requirements set forth in Young and section 82 IB of the Restatement (Second) of Torts because they allege that the nuisance will interfere with those who come in contact with it in the exercise of a public right.\nLatronica also claims that because the City admitted in its brief that it intended to convey the property to a developer, \u201cthe right that the City is asserting is a private right and is subject to the applicable statute of limitations.\u201d In support of this position, Latronica relies upon People v. Hale, 320 Ill. App. 645, 651 (1943), quoting Brown v. Trustees of Schools, 224 Ill. 184, 186, 79 N.E. 59 (1906), which held: \u201c W the state becomes a partner with individuals, or engages in business, it divests itself of its sovereign character and is subject to the statute [of limitations].\u2019 \u201d In the instant case, the \u201cadmission\u201d by the City specifically stated that \u201cthe City obtained ownership of the Site in order to clean [it] up *** prior to conveying it to a developer at no cost.\u201d Beyond this statement in the City\u2019s brief, there are no allegations in the complaint nor is there evidence in the record that the City became a partner with individuals or engaged in any business other than conveying the Site to a developer at no charge. As a result, we reject Latronica\u2019s argument that the statute of limitations at issue applies to the City on this ground.\nLatronica also claims that nullum tempus does not apply under these facts because the Site has been 85% to 90% cleaned up and, thus, the City\u2019s contention that imminent danger of waste on the Site becoming airborne is no longer a threat. In our view, whether the Site was cleaned up is irrelevant to the question of whether the City is afforded immunity from the statute of limitations. Latronica offers no authority in support of this argument and we therefore reject it. The failure to comply with Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) (210 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7)) and provide the reviewing court with relevant authority \u201cwaives an issue on appeal.\u201d Roe v. Jewish Children\u2019s Bureau of Chicago, 339 Ill. App. 3d 119, 125, 790 N.E.2d 882 (2003).\nLatronica also asserts that the City\u2019s complaint does not assert a public right because the alleged dumping occurred on private property during the period of 1992 and 1993. But as the City points out, the City can bring a common law public nuisance action based on improper waste disposal on private property. See Village of Wilsonville, 86 Ill. 2d at 6.\nFurther, we are not persuaded by any of the authority relied upon by Latronica in support of its argument that nullum tempus does not apply. Latronica cites Namur v. Habitat Co., 294 Ill. App. 3d 1007 (1998), and City of Chicago v. Enright, 27 Ill. App. 559 (1888), for the proposition that statutes of limitations can \u201cbe asserted against a municipality where it attempts to seek the enforcement of a penally or an ordinance violation.\u201d We note that Namur is easily distinguishable because the plaintiff in that case was not a government plaintiff and nullum tempus applies only to government plaintiffs. Shelbyville, 96 Ill. 2d at 459. As a result, Namur is inapposite.\nAs the City points out, Enright involved an action against the defendants to enforce a $200 penalty imposed by an ordinance that required the defendants, who were engaged in the business of selling liquor, to obtain a license before doing so. While the case did involve the question of whether a statute of limitations found in the criminal code applied, Enright did not involve an action for public nuisance or the nullum tempus doctrine. Enright is not instructive here.\nLatronica also relies upon the following language in People ex rel. City of Chicago v. Commercial Union Fire Insurance Co., 322 Ill. 326, 331, 153 N.E. 488 (1926): \u201cIt is recognized that when acting in a private capacity a municipality may be subject to the lapse of time.\u201d Based on this language, Latronica concludes that the City in the instant case is improperly attempting to assert a local ordinance that does not create a public right. In Commercial Union, however, the court also recognized the general rule that \u201c[t]ime does not run against the People in respect to the exercise of their governmental rights and powers.\u201d Commercial Union, 322 Ill. at 331. The court further concluded that the right to have certain insurance premiums reported in that case \u201c[was] a public right.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Commercial Union, 322 Ill. at 333. The decision in Commercial Union does not help Latronica either.\nLatronica additionally relies upon Ramsay v. County of Clinton, 92 Ill. 225 (1879). In Ramsay, the court, with little reasoning, concluded that the statute of limitations applied against the county in an action filed by it to recover certain monies that were fraudulently obtained by the county clerk. We agree with the City that the more recent language set forth in A, C, & S now applies. That is, \u201cthe governmental body need not be asserting an interest affecting everyone in the State in order for it to qualify as a public right.\u201d A, C, & S, 131 Ill. 2d at 474.\nFinally, Latronica relies upon Graham, cited above. Graham, however, is easily distinguishable from this case because the statute of limitations in Graham expressly included governmental entities within its purview. Graham, 109 Ill. 2d at 152. As a result, the court found that the express language of the statute of limitations in Graham abrogated governmental immunity. Graham, 109 Ill. 2d at 153. Graham is therefore distinguishable. For the reasons above, we find that the right asserted here was a public right and that the doctrine of nullum tempus applies.\nLatronica makes the additional argument that the City violated the Illinois public policy against splitting claims by failing to pursue its claims in one proceeding against all parties who allegedly engaged in illegal dumping at the Site. This argument is not persuasive. As made clear by the supreme court in Rein v. David A. Noyes & Co., 172 Ill. 2d 325, 340, 665 N.E.2d 1199 (1996), \u201c[t]he rule against claim splitting *** prohibits a plaintiff from suing for part of a claim in one action and then suing for the remainder in another action.\u201d Here, it is clear that the City has brought all of its claims against Latronica in one lawsuit. Therefore, we reject this argument.\nAlternatively, Latronica argues that the doctrine of laches bars the City\u2019s claim. Our supreme court has held that, \u201c[generally, principles of laches are applied when a party\u2019s failure to timely assert a right has caused prejudice to the adverse party. [Citation.] The two fundamental elements of laches are lack of due diligence by the party asserting the claim and prejudice to the opposing party.\u201d Van Milligan v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners of the Village of Glenview, 158 Ill. 2d 85, 89, 630 N.E.2d 830 (1994). Latronica argues that these two elements have been satisfied in the instant case.\nNevertheless, \u201c[tissues and arguments which were not presented to or considered by the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on review. [Citation.]\u201d Skokie Gold Standard Liquors, Inc. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 116 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 1052, 452 N.E.2d 804 (1983); People v. Wells, 182 Ill. 2d 471, 490, 696 N.E.2d 303 (1998). Because Latronica\u2019s laches argument was not presented to the trial court, it has been waived and we will not address it here.\nFinally, we will not address the merits of Latronica\u2019s section 2 \u2014 615 motion because it was never addressed or even ruled on by the trial court in reaching its decision. See Williams v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 222 Ill. App. 3d 559, 565, 584 N.E.2d 257 (1991) (the appellate court did not consider the merits of the defendant\u2019s section 2 \u2014 615 motion to dismiss where the trial court based its dismissal of plaintiffs complaint solely on the statute of limitations defense raised in the defendant\u2019s section 2 \u2014 619 motion). See also Canel & Hale, Ltd. v. Tobin, 304 Ill. App. 3d 906, 922, 710 N.E.2d 861 (1999) (the appellate court declined to rule on the merits of defendant\u2019s section 2 \u2014 619 motion to dismiss because the trial court\u2019s dismissal ruling was limited to the defendant\u2019s section 2 \u2014 615 motion).\nFor the reasons above, the trial court\u2019s order granting Latronica\u2019s section 2 \u2014 619 motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds is reversed.\nReversed and remanded for further proceedings.\nGORDON and McNULTY, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McBRIDE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Mara S. Georges, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Lawrence Rosenthal, Benna Ruth Solomon, and Jane Elinor Notz, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellant.", "Carey, Filter, White & Boland, of Chicago (Michael J. Murray and Edmund E Boland, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LATRONICA ASPHALT AND GRADING, INC., Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 02\u20142524\nOpinion filed February 17, 2004.\nMara S. Georges, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Lawrence Rosenthal, Benna Ruth Solomon, and Jane Elinor Notz, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellant.\nCarey, Filter, White & Boland, of Chicago (Michael J. Murray and Edmund E Boland, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0264-01", "first_page_order": 282, "last_page_order": 295 }