{ "id": 3832863, "name": "MICHAEL YACCINO, Plaintiff, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant and Cross-Plaintiff-Appellant (Intergovernmental Risk Management Agency, Defendant and Cross-Defendant-Appellee; Guadalupe Alba et al., Defendants); MICHAEL YACCINO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. INTERGOVERNMENTAL RISK MANAGEMENT AGENCY et al., Defendants-Appellants (Guadalupe Alba et al., Defendants)", "name_abbreviation": "Yaccino v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance", "decision_date": "2004-02-05", "docket_number": "Nos. 2-02-1247, 2-02-1248 cons.", "first_page": "431", "last_page": "442", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "346 Ill. App. 3d 431" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "105 Ill. 2d 537", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3142403 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "543" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/105/0537-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 252", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801341 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "256" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0252-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 514", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259086 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 Ill. App. 3d 970", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 570853 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "978-79" }, { "page": "978-79" }, { "page": "980" }, { "page": "982" }, { "page": "983" }, { "page": "983" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/325/0970-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 Ill. 2d 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4820940 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "102" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/154/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "282 Ill. App. 3d 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 159528 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "241" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/282/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 Ill. App. 3d 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1527807 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "386" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/319/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 Ill. 2d 246", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5542703 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "251-52" }, { "page": "251-52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/114/0246-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 Ill. App. 3d 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5214426 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "421" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/229/0413-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 876, "char_count": 27560, "ocr_confidence": 0.757, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.591356421208395e-08, "percentile": 0.44974069916817544 }, "sha256": "e9aafab1c12695e1e1da5497c942bbea7fd2a4323f6cc633fb9d49087f341f6b", "simhash": "1:db220f7a35058a89", "word_count": 4350 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:44:33.584383+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "MICHAEL YACCINO, Plaintiff, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant and Cross-Plaintiff-Appellant (Intergovernmental Risk Management Agency, Defendant and Cross-Defendant-Appellee; Guadalupe Alba et al., Defendants). \u2014 MICHAEL YACCINO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. INTERGOVERNMENTAL RISK MANAGEMENT AGENCY et al., Defendants-Appellants (Guadalupe Alba et al., Defendants)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CALLUM\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Michael Yaccino, sought a declaratory judgment (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 701 (West 2002)) specifying whether defendant and cross-plaintiff-appellant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company\u2019s (State Farm\u2019s) and defendant and cross-defendant-appellee, Intergovernmental Risk Management Agency\u2019s (IRMA\u2019s) uninsured motorist coverages were primary or excess. State Farm filed a cross-claim against IRMA, seeking a declaration that IRMA\u2019s uninsured motorist coverage was primary and that State Farm\u2019s was excess. Upon cross-motions for summary judgment (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1005 (West 2002)) on State Farm\u2019s cross-claim and on part of plaintiffs complaint, the trial court found that State Farm\u2019s coverage was primary and IRMA\u2019s was excess, and it granted IRMA and the City of West Chicago\u2019s motion. In appeal number 2 \u2014 02\u20141247, State Farm appeals that order.\nUpon subsequent cross-motions for summary judgment addressing the extent of IRMA\u2019s coverage, the trial court found, inter alia, that Officer Michael Beamish was not a necessary party to the litigation, and it granted plaintiffs and State Farm\u2019s motions and denied IRMA and West Chicago\u2019s motion. In appeal number 2 \u2014 02\u20141248, IRMA and West Chicago appeal the trial court\u2019s finding that Officer Beamish was not a necessary party.\nWe affirm in appeal number 2 \u2014 02\u20141247, and we dismiss appeal number 2 \u2014 02\u20141248 as moot.\nI. BACKGROUND\nIn his complaint, plaintiff alleged that, on December 18, 1999, he occupied a police vehicle that was stopped facing south off of Route 59 in West Chicago. The police vehicle was owned by West Chicago and insured by IRMA. Codefendant Guadalupe Alba was driving a vehicle owned by codefendant Veronica Flores. The vehicle operated by Alba, which was traveling south on Route 59, left the roadway and struck the police vehicle occupied by plaintiff, resulting in personal injuries to plaintiff. The Alba vehicle was uninsured.\nState Farm had issued to plaintiff an automobile insurance policy. The policy provides, in relevant part:\n\u201cUNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE \u2014 COVERAGE U You have this coverage if \u2018U\u2019 appears in the \u2018Coverages-\u2019 space on the declarations page.\nWe will pay damages for bodily injury an insured is legally entitled to collect from the owner or driver of an uninsured motor vehicle. The bodily injury must be sustained by an insured and caused by accident arising out of the operation, maintenance or use of an uninsured motor vehicle.\nUNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE \u2014 COVERAGE Ul (Damages for Bodily Injury or Property Damage Caused by Uninsured Motor Vehicles)\nYou have this coverage if \u2018Ul\u2019 appears in the \u2018Coverages\u2019 space on the declarations page.\nWe will pay damages for:\n1. bodily injury an insured is legally entitled to collect from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle; and\n2. property damage an insured is legally entitled to collect:\na. as the result of actual physical contact of an uninsured motor vehicle with your car or a newly acquired car, and\nb. if the owner or operator of the at-fault uninsured motor vehicle is identified.\nThe bodily injury must be sustained by an insured. The bodily injury or property damage must be caused by accident arising out of the operation, maintenance or use of an uninsured motor vehicle.\nIf There Is Other Uninsured Motor Vehicle Coverage \u2014 Coverages U and Ul\n1. If uninsured motor vehicle coverage for bodily injury is available to an insured from more than one policy provided by us or any other insurer, the total limit of liability available from all policies provided by all insurers shall not exceed the limit of liability of the single policy providing the highest limit of liability. This is the most that will be paid regardless of the number of policies involved, persons covered, claims made, vehicles insured, premiums paid or vehicles involved in the accident.\n2. Subject to item 1 above, any coverage applicable under this policy shall apply:\na. on a primary basis if the insured sustains bodily\ninjury while occupying your car, or while not occupying a motor vehicle or trailer.\nb. on an excess basis if the insured sustains bodily injury while occupying a vehicle not owned by or leased to you, your spouse or any relative.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nIRMA, a pool of self-insured municipalities, had issued to West Chicago a coverage document effective January 1, 1999, through December 31, 1999. Section IV of the \u201cBusiness Auto Coverage Form\u201d of the IRMA document, which is entitled \u201cBusiness Auto Conditions,\u201d provides in relevant part:\n\u201c5. Other Insurance\na. For any covered \u2018auto\u2019 you own, this Coverage Form provides primary coverage. For any covered \u2018auto\u2019 you don\u2019t own, the coverage provided by this Coverage Form is excess over any other collectible insurance.\nd. When this Coverage Form and any other insurance policy covers on the same basis, either excess or primary, we will pay only our share. Our share is the proportion that the Limit of Coverage of our Coverage Form bears to the total of the limits of all the Coverage Forms and insurance policies covering on the same basis.\u201d\nA section entitled \u201cIllinois Uninsured Motorists Coverage\u201d (uninsured motorist amendment), which amends the \u201cBusiness Auto Coverage Part,\u201d provides in relevant part:\n\u201cA. Coverage\n1. We will pay all sums the \u2018Member\u2019 is legally entitled to recover as compensatory damages from the owner or driver of an \u2018uninsured motor vehicle.\u2019 The damages must result from \u2018bodily injury\u2019 sustained by the \u2018Member\u2019 caused by an'\u2018accident.\u2019 The owner\u2019s or driver\u2019s liability for these damages must result from the ownership, maintenance or use of the \u2018uninsured motor vehicle.\u2019 \u201d\nA \u201cmember\u201d is defined as \u201cAnyone *** \u2018occupying\u2019 a covered \u2018auto.\u2019 \u201d A section entitled \u201cChanges in Conditions\u201d in the uninsured motorist amendment provides, in relevant part:\n\u201cThe CONDITIONS are changed for UNINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE as follows:\n1. OTHER INSURANCE is replaced by the following:\nFor any covered \u2018auto\u2019 you own, this Coverage Form provides primary coverage. For any covered \u2018auto\u2019 you don\u2019t own, the coverage provided by this Coverage Form is excess over any other collectible primary uninsured motorists coverage.\nIf this Coverage Form and any other insurance policy providing similar coverage apply to the same \u2018accident,\u2019 the maximum limit of coverage under all Coverage Forms or insurance policies shall be the highest applicable limit of coverage under any one Coverage Form or policy.\nWhen this Coverage Form and any other insurance policy cover on the same basis, either excess or primary, we will pay only our share. Our share is the proportion that the Limit of Coverage of our Coverage Form bears to the total of the limits of all the Coverage Forms and insurance policies covering on the same basis.\u201d\n\u201cAmendment #10,\u201d also called the \u201cOther Insurance Amendment,\u201d amends the \u201cBusiness Auto Coverage Form.\u201d It provides:\n\u201cSection IV \u2014 #5 Other Insurance wording of the Business Auto Coverage Form is replaced by the following:\nThis self-insurance pool (IRMA) shall not cover a loss which is insured by a commercial insurance policy, except on an excess basis. The placement of commercial insurance by a Member, either as a Named Insured or as an Additional Insured, shall not cause this self-insurance pool (IRMA) to he construed as providing concurrent primary coverage to the \u2018Member\u2019.\nThis self-insurance pool shall always be deemed excess over commercial insurance, whether primary, excess, pro rata, contingent or any other basis. Since we shall always be deemed excess, we shall have no duty to defend any claim or suit where a commercial insurer has a duty to defend. If a commercial insurer shall refuse to defend a \u2018Member\u2019s\u2019 claim or suit, we will undertake the defense and be entitled to the \u2018Member\u2019s\u2019 rights against such insurer. Since we shall always he excess over commercial insurance, we shall pay only our share of the amount of a \u2018Member\u2019s\u2019 loss, if any, that exceeds the sum of:\n(i) the total amount that commercial insurance would pay for such loss in the absence of this self-insurance pool; and\n(ii) the total amount of such \u2018Member\u2019s\u2019 deductible (and any self-insurance).\nA commercial insurer shall have no claim or rights against this self-insurance pool. The foregoing is subject to the coverage document terms and Member Aggregate limits.\u201d\nOn July 12, 2002, the trial court granted summary judgment for IRMA and West Chicago on part of plaintiffs complaint and on State Farm\u2019s cross-claim against IRMA. Relying on Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. of Illinois v. James J. Benes & Associates, Inc., 229 Ill. App. 3d 413 (1992), and Antiporek v. Village of Hillside, 114 Ill. 2d 246 (1986), the trial court found that State Farm\u2019s coverage was primary and IRMA\u2019s was excess because IRMA does not constitute a private insurance carrier. The court did not rule upon the extent of IRMA\u2019s excess coverage.\n. Subsequently, State Farm, IRMA, West Chicago, and plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the issue of the extent of IRMA\u2019s uninsured motorist coverage. In their motion, IRMA and West Chicago alleged that Officer Michael Beamish was a necessary party to the action. On October 15, 2002, the trial court granted plaintiffs and State Farm\u2019s motions for summary judgment and denied IRMA and West Chicago\u2019s motion for summary judgment. It found that IRMA\u2019s policy provid\u00e9s $1 million in uninsured motorist coverage per accident and that Officer Beamish was not a necessary party to the litigation.\nIn appeal number 2 \u2014 02\u20141247, State Farm appeals the trial court\u2019s July 12, 2002, order denying its summary judgment motion and granting IRMA and West Chicago\u2019s motion. In appeal number 2 \u2014 02\u20141248, IRMA and West Chicago appeal the court\u2019s October 15, 2002, order denying IRMA and West Chicago\u2019s motion for summary judgment and granting State Farm\u2019s and plaintiffs motions.\nII. STANDARD OF REVIEW\nSummary judgment is appropriate only where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits show that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Alamo Rent A Car, Inc., 319 Ill. App. 3d 382, 386 (2000). The construction of terms contained in an insurance policy is a question of law appropriate for summary judgment disposition. Continental Casualty Co. v. McDowell & Colantoni, Ltd., 282 Ill. App. 3d 236, 241 (1996). Summary judgment orders are reviewed de novo. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 102 (1992).\nIII. ANALYSIS\nA. Appeal Number 2 \u2014 02\u20141247\nIn appeal number 2 \u2014 02\u20141247, State Farm argues that IRMA\u2019s coverage is primary and that State Farm\u2019s coverage is excess. It contends that the \u201cother coverage\u201d clause in its policy should be read to include IRMA\u2019s form of self-insurance. State Farm then suggests that certain provisions in the IRMA document be interpreted as providing primary coverage. IRMA responds that, as it provides a form of self-insurance, the \u201cother coverage\u201d clause in the State Farm policy is inapplicable and therefore State Farm\u2019s policy provides primary coverage to Yaccino.\nWe examine first the uninsured motorist provisions in State Farm\u2019s policy. The \u201cother coverage\u201d provision provides as follows:\n\u201cIf There Is Other Uninsured Motor Vehicle Coverage \u2014 Coverages UandUl\n1. If uninsured motor vehicle coverage for bodily injury is available to an insured from more than one pohcy provided by us or any other insurer, the total hmit of liability available from ah pohcies provided by all insurers shall not exceed the hmit of liability of the single pohcy providing the highest hmit of liability. This is the most that will be paid regardless of the number of pohcies involved, persons covered, claims made, vehicles insured, premiums paid or vehicles involved in the accident.\n2. Subject to item 1 above, any coverage applicable under this pohcy shah apply:\na. on a primary basis if the insured sustains bodily injury while occupying your car, or while not occupying a motor vehicle or trailer.\nb. on an excess basis if the insured sustains bodily injury while occupying a vehicle not owned by or leased to you, your spouse or any relative.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nState Farm argues that, regardless of whether IRMA\u2019s coverage is insurance or not, clause 2.b. in the foregoing provision applies and State Farm provides excess uninsured motorist coverage for Yaccino\u2019s claim. We disagree with State Farm\u2019s interpretation of the provision. The provision clearly addresses cases where there is other uninsured motor vehicle coverage. The first paragraph of that provision explains that \u201cother coverage\u201d means coverage that is available from other insurers. It then discusses the total limit of liability. The second paragraph of the provision addresses when State Farm\u2019s coverage will be primary and when it is excess, subject to paragraph 1. State Farm essentially suggests that we read the second paragraph in a vacuum and ignore the preceding paragraph\u2019s definition of other uninsured coverage. We decline to read the paragraph in this way and choose instead to read it in the context of the entire provision, which addresses other uninsured coverage. Accordingly, reading the provision as a whole, it is clear to. us that paragraph 2 is operative only if the other uninsured coverage is provided by a policy issued by an insurer. Thus, we must determine if IRMA constitutes an insurer.\nRelying on Antiporek and Aetna, as did the trial court, IRMA maintains that self-insurance is not insurance and thus State Farm\u2019s \u201cother coverage\u201d clause is not operative. In those cases, as we discuss below, the courts relied on the distinction between commercial insurance and self-insurance and the public policy interest in protecting public funds.\nIn Antiporek, the supreme court held that membership in IRMA amounts to pooled self-insurance of governmental entities that share risks and costs of civil liabilities and does not operate as waiver of municipal tort immunity. Antiporek, 114 Ill. 2d at 251-52. In that case, the plaintiff sued a municipality that was a member of IRMA, alleging negligence when her daughter was injured while sledding on property owned and maintained by the municipality. The village raised immunity as an affirmative defense.\nThe plaintiff argued that IRMA is analogous to an insurance company because participants must pay a premium in consideration for indemnification from IRMA on the occurrence of enumerated perils. The supreme court rejected that argument. The court noted that IRMA\u2019s participants have not shifted the risk to for-profit risk takers, but have instead decided to share the risk among themselves. IRMA\u2019s governing documents require supplemental contributions from all members, including those that have submitted no claims. Moreover, because there are no private investors or nongovernmental participants, there is no danger that private persons will receive an unconscionable profit by accepting premiums while asserting immunities to avoid claims. Thus, because the court found that \u201cthe substance of IRMA is pooled self-insurance,\u201d it held that the municipality\u2019s immunities were not waived by its participation in IRMA. Antiporek, 114 Ill. 2d at 251-52.\nIn Aetna, this court considered whether IRMA had the same obligation to contribute to the settlement of a claim as a commercial insurer. Pursuant to its request, a municipality was added as an additional insured under a general contractor\u2019s commercial general liability policy with Aetna. The estate of a deceased employee of the general contractor sued the municipality. Aetna paid for the municipality\u2019s defense. IRMA provided risk management services to the municipality. Aetna sought a declaration that it was entitled to reimbursement from IRMA for one-half of the defense and settlement payments made by Aetna on behalf of the municipality in the underlying suit. IRMA refused.\nThe trial court denied Aetna\u2019s motion for summary judgment and granted IRMA\u2019s cross-motion for summary judgment. Relying on Antiporek, this court affirmed, holding that IRMA is not and should not be treated as a private insurance carrier. Aetna, 229 Ill. App. 3d at 421. We rejected Aetna\u2019s argument that Antiporek was restricted to the issue of a municipality\u2019s waiver of governmental immunity and that IRMA functions as an insurance company for purposes of equitable contribution by providing risk protection. We concluded that Antiporek was not so limited and relied on the distinction the Antiporek court made between commercial insurance and self-insurance and the public policy interest in protecting public funds and property.\nState Farm suggests that Aetna and Antiporek were limited to the issues of tort immunity and equitable contribution. We do not read them in such a limited manner. The Antiporek court\u2019s distinction between commercial insurance and self-insurance and its reliance on the public policy interest in protecting public funds are as valid in this context as they were in the earlier cases.\nNext, State Farm maintains that Chicago Hospital Risk Pooling Program v. Illinois State Medical Inter-Insurance Exchange, 325 Ill. App. 3d 970 (2001), is instructive. In that case, a staff physician of a city hospital was sued for malpractice. Two policies potentially covered the claim: the hospital\u2019s self-insurance coverage with Chicago Hospital Risk Pooling Plan (CHRPP) and the physician\u2019s professional liability policy with Illinois State Medical Inter-Insurance Exchange (ISMIE). ISMIE administered a trust whereby participating nonprofit hospitals pooled certain risks associated with the treatment and care provided to their patients.\nBecause the claim arose from his employment at the hospital, the physician selected CHRPP to respond to this loss, pursuant to Illinois\u2019s selective tender rule. Subsequently, CHRPP sought equitable contribution from ISMIE. ISMIE argued that the insured\u2019s selective tender barred the contribution action. The Appellate Court, First District, noted that an insured has a paramount right under the selective tender rule to choose or knowingly forgo an insurer\u2019s participation in a claim. While it acknowledged that the trust funds are not insurance, the court held that CHRPP provided the same service as traditional carriers and therefore it was bound by the same common law obligations imposed upon such carriers, including the obligation to honor the insured\u2019s decision to forgo other potentially available coverage. Chicago Hospital Risk Pooling Program, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 978-79. Examining the trust agreement, the court further noted that it resembled an insurance contract. Accordingly, it held that CHRPP should be treated the same as a traditional insurer for purposes of applying common-law insurance principles as they relate to coverage issues. Chicago Hospital Risk Pooling Program, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 978-79. Where CHRPP had a concurrent obligation to cover the physician\u2019s risk, the physician had the right to select his CHRPP coverage to the exclusion of his ISMIE coverage. Thus, CHRPP\u2019s status as a risk-pooling trust did not defeat application of the selective tender rule. Chicago Hospital Risk Pooling Program, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 980.\nAddressing whether CHRPP could state a cause of action for equitable contribution against ISMIE, the court noted that a \u201ctrue\u201d self-insured does not share an identity of insurable interests and risks with a traditional insurance carrier because it has chosen to retain its risk rather than shift any of that risk to a commercial carrier. Therefore, there can be no equitable contribution from or to the commercial carrier. Chicago Hospital Risk Pooling Program, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 982. However, distinguishing Aetna and other cases, the court found significant the presence of an \u201cother insurance\u201d clause in the CHRPP document. Chicago Hospital Risk Pooling Program, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 983. This indicated to the court that CHRPP sought to share the risk of loss with a commercial carrier when they had coincidental coverage, and therefore to transform its coverage into something other than pure self-insurance. Accordingly, the court held that CHRPP\u2019s status as a risk-pooling trust did not defeat its cause of action for contribution. Chicago Hospital Risk Pooling Trust, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 983.\nState Farm maintains that, because the IRMA coverage document resembles an insurance contract, this court should utilize the analysis in Chicago Hospital Risk Pooling Trust and hold that IRMA be treated like a commercial insurer. We disagree. We believe that the public policy considerations discussed in Antiporek and Aetna, as we discussed above, are determinative. Such considerations were not present in Chicago Hospital Risk Pooling Trust because the hospitals, although nonprofit institutions, were not public entities and, therefore, there was no risk that public funds would be expended to pay claims.\nHaving determined that IRMA should not be treated as an insurer for purposes of giving effect to the \u201cother coverage\u201d clause in State Farm\u2019s policy, we must turn to the policy\u2019s uninsured coverage provisions. The section that describes the coverages labeled \u201cU\u201d and \u201cUl\u201d provides that State Farm\u2019s policy will pay damages for bodily injury and property damage that an insured is entitled to collect from the owner or operator of an uninsured vehicle. Therefore, as is apparent from this language, where the \u201cother coverage\u201d clause in State Farm\u2019s policy is not operative, State Farm provides primary coverage.\nWe turn next to the IRMA document\u2019s uninsured motorist provisions. Three provisions are relevant: one in the main document \u2014 the business auto coverage provision \u2014 and two amendments that modify the main document provision. The business auto coverage provision states that IRMA provides primary coverage for any member-owned auto. Two amendments modify this provision: (1) the uninsured motorist amendment, which addresses only uninsured motorist coverage and states, as does the business auto coverage provision, that IRMA provides primary coverage for any member-owned auto; and (2) amendment No. 10, which provides that IRMA\u2019s coverage \u201cshall always be deemed excess over commercial insurance.\u201d State Farm argues that the amendments conflict and that the only way they can be reconciled is to read the uninsured motorist amendment as controlling for uninsured motorist coverage because it specifically addresses such coverage. We disagree.\nState Farm\u2019s argument is based on the assumption that one amendment necessarily completely trumps the other. In the absence of policy language to that effect, we do not read the provisions as State Farm suggests. Essentially, State Farm\u2019s reading of IRMA\u2019s document renders amendment No. 10 superfluous in all uninsured motorist cases. There is no language in the IRMA document indicating to us that it should be read in such a limited way. We conclude that amendment No. 10 does not directly conflict with the uninsured motorist amendment because it states that, in cases where there is other \u201ccommercial insurance,\u201d IRMA\u2019s coverage shall \u201calways\u201d be deemed excess. We read the word \u201calways\u201d to include uninsured motorist scenarios otherwise addressed by the uninsured motorist amendment. Thus, read together, the uninsured motorist amendment and amendment No. 10 provide that, in uninsured motorist cases where there is other commercial insurance, as is the case here, IRMA\u2019s coverage is excess. In an uninsured motorist scenario, for example, where there is other noncommercial insurance, amendment No. 10 would not apply, and the uninsured motorist amendment\u2019s provision that IRMA provides primary coverage would control. We believe that this reading of the IRMA document is the only reasonable interpretation because it gives full effect to both amendments.\nFor the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court\u2019s July 12, 2002, order granting IRMA and West Chicago\u2019s motion for summary judgment and denying State Farm\u2019s motion.\nB. Appeal Number 2 \u2014 02\u20141248\nIn appeal number 2 \u2014 02\u20141248, IRMA and West Chicago appeal the trial court\u2019s October 15, 2002, order. In that order, the trial court determined that IRMA\u2019s policy provides $1 million in uninsured coverage per accident and that Officer Beamish is not a necessary party. On appeal, IRMA and West Chicago argue solely that Officer Beamish is a necessary party.\nBefore addressing this argument, we must consider whether this appeal should be dismissed as moot. The existence of an actual controversy is a prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction, and courts of review will generally not decide abstract, hypothetical, or moot questions. Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514, 523 (2001). An appeal is considered moot where it presents no actual controversy or where the issues have ceased to exist. Richardson v. Rock Island County Officers Electoral Board, 179 Ill. 2d 252, 256 (1997).\nWe conclude that whether Officer Beamish is a necessary party is moot. In their motion for summary judgment, IRMA and West Chicago argued that the trial court could not decide the extent of excess coverage unless Officer Beamish was made a party to the action. In their response to State Farm\u2019s motion for summary judgment, IRMA and West Chicago again asserted that the trial court could not issue a \u201cbinding\u201d order addressing the coverage limit because a necessary party had not been added to the case. On appeal, IRMA and West Chicago do not challenge the trial court\u2019s ruling that IRMA provides $1 million in uninsured motorist coverage. They argue only that Officer Beamish is a necessary party and request that we vacate that aspect of the trial court\u2019s ruling and remand the cause for further proceedings. Additionally, they now assert that the amount of coverage issue and the necessary party issue are independent. However, IRMA and West Chicago are precluded on appeal from asserting a position inconsistent with one they took in the trial court. See, e.g., Auton v. Logan Landfill, Inc., 105 Ill. 2d 537, 543 (1984). Thus, because IRMA and West Chicago\u2019s request to add Officer Beamish as a necessary party was made in the context of the extent of coverage, and because that coverage issue was resolved by the trial court and has not been appealed, we conclude that IRMA and West Chicago\u2019s appeal is moot. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.\nIV CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons and with respect to appeal number 2 \u2014 02\u20141247, the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed. Appeal number 2 \u2014 02\u20141248 is dismissed.\nNo. 2 \u2014 02\u20141247, Affirmed.\nNo. 2 \u2014 02\u20141248, Appeal dismissed.\nBOWMAN and GILLERAN JOHNSON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CALLUM" } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert W. Rohm and John R. Adams, both of Taylor, Miller, Sprowl, Hoffnagle & Merletti, of Chicago, for appellant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.", "Russell W. Hartigan and Patrick H. O\u2019Connor, both of Hartigan & Cuisinier, P.C., of Chicago, for Intergovernmental Risk Management Agency and City of West Chicago." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MICHAEL YACCINO, Plaintiff, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant and Cross-Plaintiff-Appellant (Intergovernmental Risk Management Agency, Defendant and Cross-Defendant-Appellee; Guadalupe Alba et al., Defendants). \u2014 MICHAEL YACCINO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. INTERGOVERNMENTAL RISK MANAGEMENT AGENCY et al., Defendants-Appellants (Guadalupe Alba et al., Defendants).\nSecond District\nNos. 2 \u2014 02\u20141247, 2 \u2014 02\u20141248 cons.\nOpinion filed February 5, 2004.\nRobert W. Rohm and John R. Adams, both of Taylor, Miller, Sprowl, Hoffnagle & Merletti, of Chicago, for appellant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.\nRussell W. Hartigan and Patrick H. O\u2019Connor, both of Hartigan & Cuisinier, P.C., of Chicago, for Intergovernmental Risk Management Agency and City of West Chicago." }, "file_name": "0431-01", "first_page_order": 449, "last_page_order": 460 }