{ "id": 3832765, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEANNIE M. WARD, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Ward", "decision_date": "2004-02-20", "docket_number": "No. 3-02-0398", "first_page": "482", "last_page": "486", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "346 Ill. App. 3d 482" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "786 N.E.2d 139", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "203 Ill. 2d 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 799384 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/203/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "792 N.E.2d 511", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 Ill. App. 3d 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5574927 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/341/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "788 N.E.2d 297", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 Ill. App. 3d 1121", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 894471 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/337/1121-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 505, "char_count": 9540, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.151704976865557e-08, "percentile": 0.38235819926181025 }, "sha256": "9d8677cd67218f25f4fbfd2cb7088cd1f948734e2986d22777e155964c1ffbb2", "simhash": "1:88ee38cb276e8334", "word_count": 1537 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:44:33.584383+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEANNIE M. WARD, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BARRY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial, the defendant was found guilty of distributing harmful material to a minor (720 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 21(a) (West 2000)). She was sentenced to serve one year\u2019s conditional discharge and four weekends in the Grundy County jail. On appeal, the defendant argues that the State failed to prove the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm.\nBACKGROUND\nThe events at issue took place during the evening of December 27, 2001, in Coal City. The defendant testified that she had a relationship with Richard Jurzak for about a year. After the relationship ended, the defendant told Richard that she would return photographs of the defendant and Richard that were sexual in nature.\nJessica and Breanna Jurzak are Richard\u2019s daughters by another woman. On the evening in question, Breanna was 10 years old and Jessica was 12 years old. Jessica stated that she and Breanna were in the garage of her father\u2019s home when the defendant entered. The defendant placed an envelope addressed to Richard on a bench in the garage. She asked Jessica to give the envelope to Richard. The envelope was sealed with tape.\nThe envelope is included in the record. In the upper left corner of the envelope, \u201cJ. Jurzak\u201d is written in the return address position. Richard\u2019s name and address are written in the addressee\u2019s position. In the upper right corner is an uncancelled first-class postage stamp.\nThe defendant testified that she wrote \u201cJ. Jurzak\u201d in the return address position of the envelope. She said that during their relationship Richard had referred to her as \u201cJeannie Jurzak,\u201d although they had not been married. The defendant also knew Jessica to be Richard\u2019s minor child. The defendant had placed , a letter to Richard and the sexually explicit photographs in the envelope.\nThe defendant alleged that she did not leave the envelope in Jessica\u2019s possession. The defendant said that she gave the envelope to Tammy Reynolds with instructions for Reynolds to give the envelope to Richard. Reynolds did not testify.\nJessica stated that she opened the envelope because she thought the name \u201cJ. Jurzak\u201d in the return address position referred to one of her relatives. After Jessica opened the envelope, she viewed the sexually explicit photographs. Jessica\u2019s mother, Heather Jurzak, contacted the police and the defendant was charged.\nAfter the presentation of the evidence, the trial judge stated that he believed Jessica\u2019s testimony and disbelieved the defendant\u2019s testimony regarding how the envelope came into Jessica\u2019s possession. The judge found the defendant guilty and imposed sentence. The defendant appealed.\nANALYSIS\nThe defendant submits that the State failed to prove the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, she contends that the State failed to prove that she had the requisite mental state to commit the crime.\nWhen analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and consider whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Barham, 337 Ill. App. 3d 1121, 788 N.E.2d 297 (2003).\nThe offense of distribution of harmful material to a minor contains the following elements: \u201cA person who *** knowingly distributes *** any harmful material to a child, is guilty\u201d of the offense. 720 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 21(a) (West 2000). \u201cDistribute means to transfer possession ***.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 21(b)(3) (West 2000). \u201cKnowingly, as used in this section[,] means having knowledge of the contents of the subject matter ***.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 21(b)(4) (West 2000). According to this court\u2019s research, our analysis of the elements of this offense is a matter of first impression in Illinois.\nThe cardinal rule of statutory construction is to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature. The best indication of the legislature\u2019s intent is the language of the statute. Such language should be given its plain or ordinary and popularly understood meaning. People v. Hamalainen, 341 Ill. App. 3d 205, 792 N.E.2d 511 (2003). We may not read exceptions, limitations, or conditions into a statute\u2019s language. People ex rel. Sherman v. Cryns, 203 Ill. 2d 264, 786 N.E.2d 139 (2003).\nIn this case, the defendant acknowledges that the materials in the envelope were harmful. The defendant, however, contends that she did not knowingly distribute the harmful materials to Jessica.\nAs aforesaid, under the statute, \u201c [distribute means to transfer possession.\u201d However, \u201cpossession\u201d is not defined by the statute, so we give this term its plain or ordinary and popularly understood meaning. See Hamalainen, 341 Ill. App. 3d 205, 792 N.E.2d 511.\nAccording to the Random House Dictionary of the English Language, second edition, the word \u201cpossession\u201d is defined as \u201cactual holding or occupancy, either with or without rights of ownership.\u201d Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1509 (2d ed. 1987). Black\u2019s Law Dictionary, seventh edition, defines \u201cpossession\u201d as follows:\n\u201c1. The fact of having or holding property in one\u2019s power; the exercise of dominion over property. 2. The right under which one may exercise control over something to the exclusion of all others; the continuing exercise of a claim to the exclusive use of a material object.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1183 (7th ed. 1999).\nThe evidence at trial showed beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant transferred the envelope and its contents to Jessica with instructions to give the envelope to Richard. After this act, Jessica had and held power and dominion over the envelope and its contents. Thus, the defendant distributed the envelope and its contents to a minor, as defined by the statute.\nThe defendant knew the contents of the subject matter of the photographs. Therefore, the defendant\u2019s distribution of harmful materials to Jessica was done \u201cknowingly,\u201d as that term is defined in the statute. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we hold that a rational trier of fact could have found that the State proved the elements of distribution of harmful material to a minor beyond a reasonable doubt.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Grundy County circuit court\u2019s judgment of conviction.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BARRY" }, { "text": "JUSTICE SCHMIDT,\nspecially concurring:\nI concur in the judgment, but write separately because I do not totally agree with the analysis.\nI believe that the inclusion of the second definition of \u201cpossession\u201d from Black\u2019s Law Dictionary is inappropriate. That definition reads, \u201cThe right under which one may exercise control over something to the exclusion of all others; the continuing exercise of a claim to the exclusive use of a material object.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1183 (7th ed. 1999).\nWith all due respect to the fine folks at Black\u2019s Law Dictionary, this is the only place I have seen the word \u201cpossession\u201d defined as above. This definition implies ownership. I am unaware of any section of the criminal law that requires possession to include ownership.\nIf \u201cpossession\u201d is \u201cthe right to exercise control over something to the exclusion of all others,\u201d then a \u201cmule\u201d who knowingly agrees to take drugs from Mr. A and deliver them to Mr. B does not have \u201cpossession\u201d of the drugs.\nWhat actually occurred here was a bailment. The defendant (bailor) transferred the envelope and its contents to Jessica (bailee) with instructions to deliver it to her father. Other than the confusion caused by the second definition under Black\u2019s Law Dictionary, there can be no question that this involved a transfer of possession.\nI am aware that Justice Barry includes that second definition out of a sense of duty to be complete. However, since that definition is contrary to the common understanding of the term \u201cpossession,\u201d I would not include it. If, as the dissent suggests, that definition is correct, it would stand the law of possession in Illinois on its head.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "JUSTICE SCHMIDT," }, { "text": "JUSTICE LYTTON,\ndissenting:\nI dissent. Under the second Black\u2019s Law Dictionary definition quoted by the majority, there is a requirement that Jessica \u201ccontinu[e]\u201d to \u201cexercise *** a claim to the exclusive use of a material object.\u201d 346 Ill. App. 3d at 485. Although Jessica exercised some control over the sealed envelope, it is difficult for me to conclude that her control was \u201cto the exclusion of all others\u201d or that she exercised a continuing claim to its exclusive use.\nThe majority attempts to rationalize Jessica\u2019s \u201ccontrol\u201d but merely restates the dictionary definition as if it were a recitation of supporting facts. Instead of giving us a factual basis for its legal conclusion, the majority simply cites a legal conclusion, i.e., \u201cJessica exercised control over the envelope and its contents.\u201d This is a meaningless repetition of the legal requirements of the statute as defined by Black\u2019s. The majority gives us nothing but a legal conclusion to affirm this conviction.\nI would reverse, finding that the statutory requirements were not met in this case.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE LYTTON," } ], "attorneys": [ "Stephen Omolecki, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.", "Sheldon R. Sobol, State\u2019s Attorney, of Morris (Lawrence M. Bauer and Terry A. Mertel, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEANNIE M. WARD, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3 \u2014 02\u20140398\nOpinion filed February 20, 2004.\nSCHMIDT, J., specially concurring.\nLYTTON, J., dissenting.\nStephen Omolecki, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nSheldon R. Sobol, State\u2019s Attorney, of Morris (Lawrence M. Bauer and Terry A. Mertel, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0482-01", "first_page_order": 500, "last_page_order": 504 }