{ "id": 3833214, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JAMES V. CROFT, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Croft", "decision_date": "2004-03-09", "docket_number": "No. 2-02-0889", "first_page": "669", "last_page": "676", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "346 Ill. App. 3d 669" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "443 U.S. 47", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6179718 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "49-52" }, { "page": "360-63" }, { "page": "2639-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/443/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "203 Ill. 2d 165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 799408 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "181" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/203/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 Ill. App. 3d 940", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 75278 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "945-46" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/279/0940-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 Ill. 2d 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 29936 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109" }, { "page": "109" }, { "page": "109" }, { "page": "106" }, { "page": "106" }, { "page": "110" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/198/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 Ill. App. 3d 786", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 980667 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "792" }, { "page": "792" }, { "page": "792" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/315/0786-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 Ill. App. 3d 169", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 126389 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/322/0169-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 Ill. App. 3d 1049", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1209129 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1052" }, { "page": "1053" }, { "page": "1053" }, { "page": "1055" }, { "page": "1055" }, { "page": "1055" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/331/1049-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 Ill. App. 3d 567", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3719430 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "578", "parenthetical": "police are not performing a community caretaking function when they are specifically investigating reports of criminal activity" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/343/0567-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 Ill. App. 3d 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 456132 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/291/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 Ill. App. 3d 1001", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 132365 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1004" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/321/1001-01" ] }, { "cite": "207 Ill. 2d 515", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 975003 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "522" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/207/0515-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 Ill. App. 3d 25", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 173502 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/307/0025-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 Ill. App. 3d 144", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1209128 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "149" }, { "page": "151" }, { "page": "151" }, { "page": "152-53" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/331/0144-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "22" }, { "page": "906-07" }, { "page": "1880" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 828, "char_count": 17389, "ocr_confidence": 0.761, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0204893301981604e-07, "percentile": 0.5451006989210568 }, "sha256": "6a525fcb8ef2fd252421f7e6dbeb68d2fed81413ba7da5ffb5b6cd5af6d3e20d", "simhash": "1:0b79b4bc13c87cc1", "word_count": 2797 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:44:33.584383+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JAMES V. CROFT, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BOWMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, James V Croft, was charged with the unlawful possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2002)), a Class 4 felony. Defendant filed a motion to quash his arrest and suppress the evidence, asserting that it was obtained through an illegal seizure. The trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion, and the State timely appealed. We affirm.\nThe facts are undisputed. On July 15, 2002, Officer Anthony Row was on patrol, in uniform, in a marked squad car. Accompanying Row was his friend, Brad Gardner, a police officer from Iowa who was neither in uniform nor acting in an official capacity. At 11:15 p.m., Officer Row observed defendant pushing his bicycle up a hill in a residential neighborhood. Defendant, wearing dark pants and no shirt, walked his bicycle because it did not have a light. Officer Row passed defendant in his squad car, turned around, and parked in the street. He then exited the vehicle and waited for defendant to approach. Although the red lights were not activated, the car was partially obstructing traffic. When defendant was within speaking distance, Officer Row identified himself, informed defendant of several complaints of theft and vandalism in the area, and asked for identification. Defendant was not carrying tangible identification, but provided his name and date of birth. Defendant felt that it was his duty to comply with the officer\u2019s request.\nAfter defendant identified himself, Officer Row asked where he was headed. According to Officer Row, there had been several thefts and vandalism in the area between July 10 and 15, 2002, and it \u201cjust seemed strange\u201d seeing defendant push a bicycle while in dark pants at 11:15 p.m. Defendant replied that he was going to see his girlfriend, Tina Fowler, and that he had been working on the roof of her parents\u2019 home. Officer Row, who had moved into the neighborhood in February 2002, \u201cknew that she lived in that area\u201d and that work was being done on the roof. However, Officer Row did not recognize defendant and had not seen him in the area before. Officer Row testified that he \u201cwas stopping [defendant] to make sure that there was [sic] nothing else going to happen.\u201d\nOfficer Row radioed the sheriff\u2019s department for defendant\u2019s criminal history and any outstanding warrants. While Officer Row was waiting for this information, Officer Hefei arrived in another squad car and parked on the other side of the street. According to Officer Row, when an officer effects a stop \u201cof any kind,\u201d another officer automatically deploys to that area. During this time, Officer Row commented on defendant\u2019s tattoo. The tattoo, located on defendant\u2019s back, was a picture of Anamosa State Penitentiary. Officer Row had previously worked at that prison and stated that it was \u201ca very nice tattoo.\u201d Officer Row testified that he initially saw the tattoo when his car\u2019s headlights illuminated defendant\u2019s bare back, although the tattoo was not the reason he initiated contact with defendant.\nAfter waiting approximately 5 to 10 minutes, Officer Row was informed that defendant had no outstanding warrants. Officer Row did receive an \u201cofficer safety alert\u201d due to defendant\u2019s previous convictions of assault, theft, and possession of drugs. According to Officer Row, \u201cwhenever a criminal history comes back with drugs,\u201d the dispatcher relays an officer safety alert, or \u201c10-61,\u201d which is code for \u201cisolate yourself.\u201d Officer Row then turned off his portable radio and remained outside with defendant, while Officer Hefei closed his car door and received information from the sheriffs department.\nNext, Officer Row asked defendant for consent to do a pat-down search of his person to ensure that he did not have any weapons or burglary tools. Defendant agreed, tinned around, and raised his arms. A pat-down of defendant\u2019s pockets and socks revealed neither weapons nor burglary tools. Officer Row then noticed that defendant was carrying a tan, transparent shopping bag, which was open at the top. Defendant testified that the transparent bag was hanging from his bike\u2019s handlebars and contained a white paper bag. Officer Row asked defendant what was in the white paper bag, and defendant replied that it contained dirty socks. Officer Hefei asked defendant if he could search the bag. According to defendant, he said \u201cyeah\u201d and began removing it from his handlebars. Defendant testified that Officer Hefei then reached over, grabbed the bag, and started looking through it. Defendant agreed to the search because he felt that he \u201chad to,\u201d and because he did not feel that he could walk away. Defendant was subsequently arrested for unlawful possession of a substance containing methamphetamine (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2002)).\nIn its ruling on the motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, the trial court made the following findings. Based on the four previous thefts in the neighborhood, the initial encounter between Officer Row and defendant qualified as a community caretaking encounter. Defendant explained where he was headed, and this explanation was consistent with Officer Row\u2019s observation that people, in fact, had been working on the Fowlers\u2019 roof. However, the community caretaking function ceased at the point where defendant explained his conduct and the check on his information revealed no warrants. In addition, the court found that the officer safety alert did not create a basis for a Terry stop, because there was nothing to indicate that a crime had been or was about to be committed. The court determined that, even if the officer safety alert provided some basis for a pat-down, the issue was \u201cnot really relevant\u201d since the pat-down failed to reveal any weapons. According to the court, \u201cthe encounter should have ended\u201d at that point. However, defendant did not feel free to leave, due to the continued questioning and the presence of two squad cars. Because defendant was illegally detained, his subsequent consent to the search was tainted. Accordingly, the court granted defendant\u2019s motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence.\nThe State argues that the court erred by granting defendant\u2019s motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence. The State does not dispute the trial court\u2019s finding that the initial contact was proper on a community caretaking basis. Instead, the State contends that the circumstances were sufficient to transform the encounter into a Terry stop (see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 906-07, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968)), and that the search of defendant\u2019s bag was reasonable. Defendant counters that the initial encounter was an investigative stop rather than a function of community caretaking, and that Officer Row did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that defendant had committed or was about to commit a crime.\nWhen the facts are not in dispute, as in this case, our review of a trial court\u2019s determination on a motion to suppress evidence is de novo. People v. Avant, 331 Ill. App. 3d 144, 149 (2001).\nTheoretically, there are three tiers of lawful police-citizen encounters: (1) an arrest supported by probable cause; (2) a Terry stop or brief seizure of a person that must be supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity; and (3) an encounter commonly referred to as the community caretaking or public safety function, which involves no coercion or detention and thus does not constitute a \u201cseizure.\u201d People v. Leifker, 307 Ill. App. 3d 25, 28 (1999). Community caretaking is a label that describes consensual police-citizen encounters that typically involve the safety of the public. People v. Harris, 207 Ill. 2d 515, 522 (2003). An encounter is a function of community caretaking when an officer initiates it to check on an individual\u2019s well-being, without initial thought of criminal activity. People v. Simac, 321 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 1004 (2001). This function is totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence of a violation of a criminal statute. City of Highland Park v. Lee, 291 Ill. App. 3d 48, 52 (1997).\nIn the present case, we are not convinced that Officer Row\u2019s initial contact with defendant fell within the community caretaking function. Rather, Officer Row\u2019s testimony revealed that the purpose behind the encounter was investigative. Four thefts and two incidents of vandalism were reported the week before the encounter. According to Officer Row, seeing defendant push a bicycle while in dark pants at 11:15 p.m. \u201cjust seemed strange\u201d and was \u201cnot a normal occurrence in that neighborhood.\u201d Officer Row subsequently initiated the encounter \u201cto make sure that there was [sic] nothing else going to happen.\u201d\nWhen an officer questions an individual to check on his well-being, without initial thought of criminal activity, he is within the purview of community caretaking. However, Officer Row did not question defendant without initial suspicion of criminal activity. On the contrary, he questioned defendant to investigate his possible involvement in recent instances of theft and vandalism in the neighborhood. See People v. Dent, 343 Ill. App. 3d 567, 578 (2003) (police are not performing a community caretaking function when they are specifically investigating reports of criminal activity). Because Officer Row\u2019s purpose in questioning defendant was not totally divorced from detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence, we cannot say that he was performing community caretaking.\nThe danger of blurring the distinction between community caretaking and an investigative detention becomes apparent when an officer claims to be engaging in community caretaking but is, in reality, investigating reports of criminal activity. For this reason, we decline to extend the label of community caretaking to the facts of this case. To hold otherwise would grant police officers the authority to, in fact, \u201cinvestigate\u201d criminal activity under the guise of community caretaking. Practically speaking, officers would be encouraged to originate contact under this pretense with the hope that the encounter would escalate into a valid Terry stop. In effect, this is an abuse of the community caretaking function. The requirement of reasonable suspicion under Terry is diluted if officers are permitted to \u201cease into\u201d a Terry stop by first engaging in community caretaking.\nThat said, Officer Row\u2019s initial contact with defendant did not implicate the fourth amendment because consensual police questioning, even when it is investigative, does not constitute a seizure. See People v. Smith, 331 Ill. App. 3d 1049, 1052 (2002). A person is seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment when the police have in some way restrained that person\u2019s liberty. Smith, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 1053. The question is whether, in view of all the circumstances, a reasonable person would believe that he was free to leave. Smith, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 1053.\nHere, the State argues that the encounter escalated into a Terry stop after Officer Row received the safety alert. Thus, the State does not dispute that defendant in this case was seized. Instead, the State argues that the stop was valid under Terry, citing the following factors as establishing reasonable suspicion: Officer Row\u2019s intimate knowledge of the community, the recent thefts and vandalism, defendant\u2019s dark dress and tattoo, Officer Row\u2019s failure to recognize defendant as one of the workers in the neighborhood, and the officer safety alert.\nThe fourth amendment offers protection by balancing the public interest in controlling crime and effective law enforcement with an individual\u2019s right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. Avant, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 151. Thus, a limited investigatory or Terry stop is permissible only where there is a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific and articulable facts, that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime. People v. Robinson, 322 Ill. App. 3d 169, 174 (2001). Determining whether the stop was an unreasonable seizure is a two-step process. People v. Sparks, 315 Ill. App. 3d 786, 792 (2000). First, we decide whether the stop was justified at its inception; next, we determine whether the scope of the stop was proportional to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place. Sparks, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 792.\nWhether the stop was justified at its inception is an objective consideration. People v. Thomas, 198 Ill. 2d 103, 109 (2001). We ask whether the police action was appropriate based on the facts available to the officer. Thomas, 198 Ill. 2d at 109. An officer\u2019s investigatory \u201cgood faith\u201d is not sufficient to warrant the intrusion. Sparks, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 792. The officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with reasonable inferences therefrom, reasonably warrant the intrusion. Thomas, 198 Ill. 2d at 109.\nIn addition, the determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior. Avant, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 151. In deciding whether there was reasonable suspicion, we consider the totality of the circumstances. Smith, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 1055. While a reasonable suspicion may emerge from seemingly innocent, noncriminal conduct, the question for the court is the degree of suspicion that attaches to the circumstances surrounding a defendant\u2019s actions. Smith, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 1055. The facts are insufficient to support an investigatory detention when they describe \u201c \u2018 \u201ca very large category of presumably innocent travelers, who would be subject to virtually random seizures.\u201d [Citation.]\u2019 \u201d Smith, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 1055, quoting People v. Anaya, 279 Ill. App. 3d 940, 945-46 (1996).\nFurther, an officer\u2019s decision to engage in a brief Terry stop may not be justified on the basis of unparticularized suspicion or on a hunch. People v. Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d 165, 181 (2003). The situation confronting the officer must be so far from the ordinary that any competent officer would be expected to act quickly. Avant, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 152-53.\nIn this case, the facts known to Officer Row simply did not establish an articulable basis to believe that a crime had been, or was about to be, committed. A few days prior to his encounter with defendant, Officer Row was informed that there had been a few incidents of theft and vandalism in that particular neighborhood. However, Officer Row had not personally responded to any of those complaints and had no description of a possible suspect. No evidence suggested that he observed defendant doing anything but walking his bicycle. In fact, nothing about defendant\u2019s activity suggested criminal conduct. At most, Officer Row commented that defendant walking a bicycle at 11:15 p.m. \u201cjust seemed strange\u201d and was \u201cnot a normal occurrence in that neighborhood.\u201d Officer Row further stated that he had not seen defendant in the area before. However, stopping an individual because he looks \u201csuspicious\u201d or is new to the area, without more, is insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 49-52, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 360-63, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 2639-41 (1979). Further, defendant had no outstanding warrants and provided an explanation for his conduct. Defendant\u2019s reason for being in the neighborhood was consistent with Officer Row\u2019s knowledge that work was being done in the area. In short, Officer Row had merely a hunch, not the reasonable suspicion necessary to effect a Terry stop.\nAdditionally, our supreme court has held that an officer lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop in a closer case than the one at bar. In Thomas, an individual was spotted riding his bicycle at 11:30 p.m. while holding a police scanner that permitted him to monitor police radio transmissions. Thomas, 198 Ill. 2d at 106. The officer had previously arrested the individual for drug offenses, had recently learned of his release from prison, and had heard a confidential informant\u2019s tip that the individual was using his bicycle to deliver illegal drugs. Thomas, 198 Ill. 2d at 106. Nevertheless, the court held that the officer\u2019s suspicion was grounded in circumstances that fell short of warranting a stop. Thomas, 198 Ill. 2d at 110.\nIn the present case, it is clear that Officer Row effected the investigatory stop without having the requisite degree of suspicion to support it. Having concluded that Officer Row lacked reasonable suspicion to stop defendant, we need not address whether the officers exceeded the scope of a proper Terry stop. Because defendant\u2019s consent to search was tainted as the product of the illegal detention, the trial court did not err in determining that the evidence against him must be suppressed.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Jo Daviess County.\nAffirmed.\nMCLAREN and GILLERAN JOHNSON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BOWMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Glen R. Weber, State\u2019s Attorney, of Galena (Martin E Moltz and Gregory L. Slovacek, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Frosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "G. Joseph Weller and Mark G. Levine, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JAMES V. CROFT, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 2 \u2014 02\u20140889\nOpinion filed March 9, 2004.\nGlen R. Weber, State\u2019s Attorney, of Galena (Martin E Moltz and Gregory L. Slovacek, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Frosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nG. Joseph Weller and Mark G. Levine, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0669-01", "first_page_order": 687, "last_page_order": 694 }