{ "id": 3833150, "name": "KENNETH PINESCHI, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROCK RIVER WATER RECLAMATION DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Pineschi v. Rock River Water Reclamation District", "decision_date": "2004-03-09", "docket_number": "No. 2-02-1337", "first_page": "719", "last_page": "727", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "346 Ill. App. 3d 719" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "311 Ill. App. 3d 753", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 415400 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "759-60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/311/0753-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 Ill. 549", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2620016 ], "year": 1949, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "554" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/403/0549-01" ] }, { "cite": "20 L. Ed. 557", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "case_ids": [ 1134186 ], "year": 1872, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/80/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 U.S. 256", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 377275 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1946, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/328/0256-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 U.S. 84", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6165384 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/369/0084-01" ] }, { "cite": "482 U.S. 304", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6212935 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "318" }, { "page": "266" }, { "page": "2387-88" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/482/0304-01" ] }, { "cite": "694 F.2d 476", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1487320 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "483-85" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/694/0476-01" ] }, { "cite": "704 F.2d 943", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1854998 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "949" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/704/0943-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 Ill. App. 3d 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5798850 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "325" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/221/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "271 Ill. App. 3d 616", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 249123 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "628" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/271/0616-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 Ill. 2d 375", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 147638 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/173/0375-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 Ill. App. 3d 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1281388 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/326/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "252 Ill. 591", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3440220 ], "year": 1911, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "604" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/252/0591-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 Ill. 2d 548", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5481086 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "554-55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/81/0548-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 Ill. App. 3d 163", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 257142 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/301/0163-01" ] }, { "cite": "238 Ill. App. 3d 834", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5154259 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "838" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/238/0834-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1477026 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109", "parenthetical": "acknowledging that strict compliance with statutes governing service of process on public entities is required" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 Ill. App. 3d 117", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2183345 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "127" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/328/0117-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 Ill. 2d 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5542740 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "220-21" }, { "page": "221" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/114/0209-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1004, "char_count": 21335, "ocr_confidence": 0.74, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.2517320620208356e-08, "percentile": 0.26929407853508064 }, "sha256": "3c34d6bfa96978d5549f06beae04803f975437739845d678f2e09efd5576a364", "simhash": "1:b61f3e347bce166e", "word_count": 3457 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:44:33.584383+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "KENNETH PINESCHI, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROCK RIVER WATER RECLAMATION DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HUTCHINSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, the Rock River Water Reclamation District, appeals the trial court\u2019s denial of its action under section 2 \u2014 1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1401 (West 2000)) to vacate a default judgment in favor of plaintiff, Kenneth Pineschi. We affirm.\nOn June 27, 2002, plaintiff filed a six-count complaint alleging the following. Plaintiff owns a house and lot at 6263 Vicksburg Road in Rockford\u2019s Vicksburg subdivision. On July 7, 2001, defendant\u2019s agents performed maintenance on the subdivision\u2019s sewer system. The work altered the flow of water and caused black water and fecal matter to back up onto plaintiffs lot and into the basement of his home. As a result of the flooding, plaintiff and his family had to evacuate their home for several days and spent $11,168.22 on alternative housing and repairing the damage. The complaint sought this amount plus attorney fees and costs.\nThe complaint advanced six theories of recovery. Count I alleged that defendant was negligent in cleaning out the sewer from the higher-pitched north manhole to the lower-pitched south manhole and in fading to guard against the flooding. Count II sounded in trespass. Count III claimed that defendant created a nuisance and asked the trial court to enjoin defendant from discharging materials onto plaintiffs property. Count IV sought damages under section 19 of the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District Act (the Act) (70 ILCS 2605/19 (West 2000)). Counts V and VI alleged a taking of plaintiffs property and sought compensation under, respectively, the fifth amendment to the federal constitution (U.S. Const., amend. V) and article I, section 15, of the state constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 15).\nA summons signed June 27, 2002, informed defendant that it was required to answer the complaint by July 23, 2002, or a default judgment would enter against it. The retrun of service stated that a deputy sheriff served the \u201cSanitation District of Rockford a/k/a Rock River Water Reclamation Dist\u201d by delivering a copy of the complaint and summons to Eileen Loney, defendant\u2019s agent, at 9:40 a.m. on July 1, 2002, at 3333 Kishwaukee Street. The return described Loney as a 52-year-old white female.\nDefendant did not answer the complaint by July 23, 2002. On August 1, 2002, after a hearing, the trial court awarded plaintiff a default judgment of $12,523.25. We note that the record contains no transcript of the hearing. On August 23, 2002, plaintiff mailed defendant a copy of the judgment.\nOn September 18, 2002, defendant filed its \u201cMotion to Vacate Default Judgment.\u201d The motion to vacate asserted that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment because defendant was not properly served. Alternatively, the motion sought discretionary relief under section 2 \u2014 1401 of the Code. Attached to the motion were the affidavits of Eileen Loney and Kirk Gullikson.\nLoney\u2019s affidavit, signed September 16, 2002, stated as follows. Defendant is a separate municipal corporation and is \u201cnot formally known as the Sanitary or Sanitation District of Rockford.\u201d As defendant\u2019s executive services coordinator, Loney accepts service of mortgage foreclosures and summonses on defendant. Her office is located at 3333 Kishwaukee Street in Rockford. She is a Caucasian female and was born on July 11, 1938. Loney did not recall receiving a summons or complaint on July 1, 2002, in this case. A check of defendant\u2019s computer records did not reveal that a summons or complaint had been received. Under standard office procedure, had Loney received such a document, it would have been \u201cput on the computer\u201d and forwarded to defendant\u2019s claims company. Loney did recall that, at the end of August 2002, she received a copy of the August 1, 2002, judgment and forwarded it to the claims company.\nGullikson\u2019s affidavit stated as follows. He is a machine operator for defendant. On the morning of July 7, 2001, Gullikson and Lee Smith went to plaintiffs home \u201cdue to a complaint of a sewer main back up.\u201d The sewer was serviced by a street manhole north of the house, and the sewer main ran from there south to a manhole within a park area. The development was new and the street had not yet been paved. Plaintiff complained that he had \u201cwater around the floor drain.\u201d Gullikson inspected the north manhole and discovered that water had accumulated, meaning that the line was blocked downstream. After checking the manhole in the park south of plaintiffs property, Gullikson saw that the line there had minimal water flow and no accumulated water. Gullikson concluded that the block in the sewer main line was between the two manholes.\nGuflikson\u2019s affidavit further stated that the standard procedure to clear the type of block he found was to use a \u201cVactor water jet\u201d from a manhole that the \u201cVactor truck\u201d can reach. Because only the north manhole was so accessible, Gullikson used it and inserted the water jet nozzle into the sewer main. Clearing the main sewer line with the water jet was the \u201cproper technology\u201d for this type of task, and Gullikson would use it again under the same circumstances. Defendant\u2019s only alternative would have been to excavate the line, dig up the sewer, and physically replace it.\nAfter checking to see how much of the hose had been inserted into the sewer main, Gullikson activated the water jet. The water in the manhole receded, showing that the main had been cleared. However, plaintiff complained that more water had entered his basement during the operation. Gullikson and Smith went to plaintiffs basement. There was some water, but it was \u201cdraining down the floor drain as it should have, indicating that the line had been cleaned successfully.\u201d Gullikson reexamined the south manhole and saw what looked like pieces of drywall or plaster. He concluded that someone had introduced construction debris, causing the sewer main to become blocked.\nAfter receiving the parties\u2019 written arguments, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to vacate the default judgment. Defendant timely appealed. On appeal, defendant does not now assert that the default judgment is void for lack of proper service. Instead, defendant maintains that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to vacate the default judgment. Defendant relies on several considerations that, in its view, entitle it to relief under section 2 \u2014 1401 of the Code. These are that (1) doubts remain that defendant was properly served with the summons and complaint; (2) defendant established a meritorious defense to each of the complaint\u2019s theories of recovery; (3) the Act\u2019s provision for awarding attorney fees must be strictly construed, casting doubt on the trial court\u2019s fee award; and (4) plaintiff did not give defendant fair or timely notice that the default judgment had been entered. We shall discuss these contentions in the context of analyzing whether defendant met the prerequisites for section 2 \u2014 1401 relief.\nPlaintiff has moved to strike defendant\u2019s third argument, relating to the construction of the Act\u2019s provision for attorney fees. Plaintiff asserts that this argument was never raised at the trial level and may not be raised for the first time here. Defendant filed an objection to plaintiffs motion to strike, and we ordered the motion and objection taken with the case. We now deny the motion, as defendant\u2019s argument relates to the general issue of whether the entry of the default judgment was equitable. In any event, as we shall explain, the challenged argument lacks merit.\nTo obtain relief under section 2 \u2014 1401 of the Code, a petitioner must set forth specific factual allegations supporting each of the following elements: (1) the existence of a meritorious defense or claim; (2) due diligence in presenting this defense or claim to the trial court in the original action; and (3) due diligence in filing the petition for relief under section 2 \u2014 1401. Smith v. Airoom, Inc., 114 Ill. 2d 209, 220-21 (1986); People v. Waters, 328 Ill. App. 3d 117, 127 (2002). Whether to grant the petition is committed to the trial court\u2019s discretion, and the trial court\u2019s decision will be upheld absent an abuse of that discretion. Smith, 114 Ill. 2d at 221. We believe that, although defendant filed the motion to vacate promptly, the trial court could reasonably conclude that (1) defendant did not have a meritorious defense to the suit, and (2) defendant was not duly diligent in the original action. For clarity, we first explain the second conclusion.\nOf the arguments that defendant presents on appeal, only the first relates to whether defendant displayed due diligence in the original lawsuit. This argument is somewhat equivocal. Defendant maintains that circumstances cast doubt on the trial court\u2019s finding that defendant was properly served in the original litigation. However, defendant does not actually assert that the trial court\u2019s finding of proper service was erroneous, and defendant does not ask us to vacate the default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction. Instead, defendant appears to contend only that residual doubt about the efficacy of the service militates in favor of vacating the default judgment.\nWe are hard-pressed to see the logic of defendant\u2019s argument. Either defendant was properly served, as the trial court found, or it was not. There is no middle ground. See Sarkissian v. Chicago Board of Education, 201 Ill. 2d 95, 109 (2002) (acknowledging that strict compliance with statutes governing service of process on public entities is required). If service was satisfactory, then there is no reason to conclude that defendant was diligent in handling plaintiffs lawsuit. Defendant deserves no relief merely because the trial court\u2019s finding that service was proper was based on close evidence rather than overwhelming evidence.\nIn any event, defendant has not convinced us that the issue of proper service was a close one, much less that the trial court erred in finding that service was proper. The return of summons is prima facie proof of proper service; that proof can be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence. Winning Moves, Inc. v. Hi! Baby, Inc., 238 Ill. App. 3d 834, 838 (1992). Here, the return of service states that Eileen Loney, defendant\u2019s agent, was served on July 1, 2002, at 3333 Kishwaukee Street in Rockford. Defendant concedes that Loney is its agent for accepting service of process and that her offices are located at the given address. Defendant, however, notes that the return describes defendant as the \u201cSanitation District of Rockford a/k/a Rock River Water Reclamation District]\u201d even though defendant is an entity separate from the sanitation district. We simply fail to see what difference this formal error makes. Also, defendant stresses that the return gives Loney\u2019s age as 52 even though she was actually 64. Again, this error is not particularly remarkable, and defendant does not explain why it impeaches the return of service. Defendant does not assert that anyone at its offices other than Ms. Loney accepted service or whether, if so, that fact would make any difference.\nFinally, although Loney stated that she did not recall receiving the summons and that a check of the office computer did not reveal that the summons and complaint were received, these assertions do not clearly and convincingly rebut the prima facie case that the return of service made. A person\u2019s mere testimony that she was not served is insufficient to overcome the presumption of service. Freund Equipment, Inc. v. Fox, 301 Ill. App. 3d 163, 166 (1998). A fortiori, Loney\u2019s statement that she did not remember being served is hardly compelling. Finally, that the transaction was not recorded on defendant\u2019s computer is far from clear and convincing evidence that defendant was not duly served with process.\nTaken separately or cumulatively, defendant\u2019s attacks on the service of process in the original action are not persuasive. Thus, defendant failed to rebut the presumption that it was properly served in the original action. Accepting as we must the finding that defendant was duly served with plaintiff\u2019s complaint, we must conclude that defendant did not show that its failure to appear or answer resulted from anything other than a lack of due diligence. This lack of diligence in the original action was a sufficient reason for the trial court to deny defendant relief under section 2 \u2014 1401 of the Code.\nWe also hold that, contrary to defendant\u2019s second contention on appeal, defendant did not establish a meritorious defense to the underlying action. Defendant recognizes that, excluding the complaint\u2019s conelusional reference to nuisance, plaintiff relied on four theories of recovery: (1) negligence; (2) trespass; (3) the Act; and (4) a taking under the federal and state constitutions. Illinois takings law appears to track federal takings law insofar as pertinent here, so we will treat these two grounds as a single theory of recovery. Defendant asserts that Gullikson\u2019s affidavit and the case law disclose a meritorious defense against each theory of recovery.\nWe agree with defendant that Gullikson\u2019s affidavit raises a fair question of whether defendant was negligent. Also, the law is clear that, absent proof of negligence, plaintiff could recover for trespass only if he established that defendant\u2019s agents knew to a substantial certainty that their actions would result in the entry of the foul matter onto plaintiff\u2019s property. See Dial v. City of O\u2019Fallon, 81 Ill. 2d 548, 554-55 (1980). Plaintiffs complaint does not allege any such knowledge or any facts that would compel an inference of such knowledge. Thus, defendant has alleged the existence of a meritorious defense to the negligence and trespass counts of plaintiffs complaint.\nHowever, we do not believe that defendant has established that it has a meritorious defense to either the count of the complaint based on section 19 of the Act or the counts based on the takings clauses. Section 19 provides:\n\u201cEvery sanitary district shall be liable for all damages to real estate within or without such district which shall be overflowed or otherwise damaged by reason of the construction, enlargement or use of any channel, ditch, drain, outlet or other improvement under the provisions of this act ***. And in case judgment is rendered against such district for damage, the plaintiff shall also recover his reasonable attorneys\u2019 fees to be taxed as costs of suit: Provided, however, it shall appear on the hearing of plaintiffs motion to tax such attorney\u2019s [sic] fees, that the plaintiff notified the trustees of such district, in writing, at least 60 days before suit was commenced ***.\u201d 70 ILCS 2605/19 (West 2000).\nTo recover under this section, a plaintiff need not prove that the defendant district was negligent. Jones v. Sanitary District of Chicago, 252 Ill. 591, 604 (1911). Defendant concedes that plaintiffs real estate was damaged by the overflow from defendant\u2019s sewer, which is a \u201cchannel\u201d or \u201cother improvement.\u201d However, defendant maintains that section 19 does not apply because the damage resulted from the repair of the sewer and not its \u201cconstruction, enlargement or use.\u201d 70 ILCS 2605/19 (West 2000). We are unpersuaded by defendant\u2019s distinction. When defendant\u2019s agents cleared the sewer main by pumping water into it, restoring the flow of water, they were \u201cusing\u201d the sewer system and were also restoring it to its full normal \u201cuse.\u201d To accept defendant\u2019s reading of section 19 of the Act would arbitrarily deny a landowner the right to recover for harm that is essentially indistinguishable from other harm that is compensable. We presume that the legislature did not intend inconvenience, injustice, or absurdity, and we will favor an interpretation that renders a statute reasonable and sensible over one that makes the statute illogical or absurd. Garcia v. Nelson, 326 Ill. App. 3d 33, 38 (2001). Accordingly, we will not construe the Act so narrowly as to effect the arbitrary preference that defendant\u2019s construction would create.\nDefendant also contends that it raised a meritorious defense to the award of attorney fees in plaintiff\u2019s suit. Defendant\u2019s argument, the third of the considerations that it raises against the judgment, consists of the observation that section 19 provides for awards of attorney fees (see 70 ILCS 2605/19 (West 2000)), combined with citations to Scholtens v. Schneider, 173 Ill. 2d 375, 384 (1996), and In re Estate of Dyniewicz, 271 Ill. App. 3d 616, 628 (1995). These opinions do state the \u201cAmerican rule\u201d that, absent a specific fee-shifting statute, parties generally must pay their own attorney fees. However, the pertinence of these citations is unclear, as section 19 is undoubtedly a fee-shifting statute and defendant would need to establish that section 19 does not allow plaintiff to recover fees here. Yet defendant does not directly so contend. Instead, defendant seems only to suggest that, for reasons not specified, the statute might not entitle plaintiff to fees in this case. Because defendant\u2019s argument is undeveloped and unsupported by pertinent authority, it is waived. See Holmstrom v. Kunis, 221 Ill. App. 3d 317, 325 (1991). Therefore, we conclude that defendant has not alleged a meritorious defense to the award of attorney fees under section 19 of the Act.\nFurther, defendant has not established a meritorious defense to plaintiff\u2019s claim that he is entitled to recover for the taking of his property. See U.S. Const., amend. V; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 15. Although the Illinois Constitution also requires just compensation when property is \u201cdamaged\u201d for public use (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 15), we note that plaintiff did not plead this theory of recovery. The affidavit attached to plaintiffs complaint states that defendant\u2019s acts caused so much harm that plaintiff and his family were forced to evacuate their home for several days. Nothing in defendant\u2019s motion to vacate rebuts this statement. Thus, we must assume that, as a result of the direct physical invasion of his property, plaintiff was deprived of any use of that property for several days.\nThis deprivation was a taking of plaintiffs property. As one reviewing court has stated, \u201cIf government makes your house uninhabitable, that is a taking of your property even if you retain a clear title.\u201d Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943, 949 (7th Cir. 1983); see also Barbian v. Panagis, 694 F.2d 476, 483-85 (7th Cir. 1982). That is what happened here. Although the deprivation that plaintiff suffered was not permanent, a temporary taking is as subject to just compensation as is a permanent one. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318, 96 L. Ed. 2d 250, 266, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2387-88 (1987).\nDefendant maintains that its actions did not result in a taking because it did not intend to deprive plaintiff of the use of his property. However, it is simply not the law that only intentional appropriations of property are constitutionally actionable. Compensation is required when the noise and disruption from airplane overflights render property essentially unusable (Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84, 7 L. Ed. 2d 585, 82 S. Ct. 531 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 90 L. Ed. 1206, 66 S. Ct. 1062 (1946)) and, especially pertinent here, when the construction or operation of public works results in the deposit of water or earth onto property, thereby destroying or impairing the property\u2019s usefulness (Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Mississippi Canal Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 20 L. Ed. 557 (1872); Horn v. City of Chicago, 403 Ill. 549, 554 (1949); People ex rel. Peters v. O\u2019Connor, 311 Ill. App. 3d 753, 759-60 (2000)).\nIn sum, we hold that, in addition to fading to establish that it acted with due diligence in the original action, defendant did not show the existence of a meritorious defense to the counts of plaintiffs complaint that were based on the Act or on the federal and state constitutional takings clauses. Because defendant faded to establish a necessary element for section 2 \u2014 1401 relief, the trial court\u2019s judgment must be affirmed.\nDefendant\u2019s final argument on appeal is that plaintiff failed to notify defendant promptly that a default judgment had been entered. This establishes only that defendant acted with due diligence after the default judgment was entered. We have already agreed with defendant that it acted with due diligence after the judgment was entered, but this means only that defendant met one of the three prerequisites for section 2 \u2014 1401 relief. Having failed to satisfy the other two prerequisites, defendant was not entitled to the relief it sought. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to vacate the default judgment for plaintiff.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nO\u2019MALLEY, P.J, and KAPALA, J, concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HUTCHINSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael B. Kilgallon, of Kilgallon & Carlson, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Mark A. Rouleau, of Rockford, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "KENNETH PINESCHI, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROCK RIVER WATER RECLAMATION DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2 \u2014 02\u20141337\nOpinion filed March 9, 2004.\nMichael B. Kilgallon, of Kilgallon & Carlson, of Chicago, for appellant.\nMark A. Rouleau, of Rockford, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0719-01", "first_page_order": 737, "last_page_order": 745 }