{ "id": 3833443, "name": "In re MARRIAGE OF DAVID L. ARMSTRONG, Petitioner-Appellant, and NANCY J. ARMSTRONG, Respondent-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "In re Marriage of Armstrong", "decision_date": "2004-03-04", "docket_number": "No. 4-03-0510", "first_page": "818", "last_page": "823", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "346 Ill. App. 3d 818" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "508 N.E.2d 531", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "534" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 Ill. App. 3d 798", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3464326 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "801-02" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/155/0798-01" ] }, { "cite": "796 N.E.2d 191", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 Ill. App. 3d 643", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3474158 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/342/0643-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 N.E.2d 640", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "642" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "36 Ill. App. 3d 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2630325 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "184" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/36/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "669 N.E.2d 726", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "729" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 Ill. App. 3d 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 182722 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "370" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/283/0366-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 511, "char_count": 10291, "ocr_confidence": 0.777, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.093613628115732e-08, "percentile": 0.4265630930606379 }, "sha256": "73265b2a32d54675177f37579143965daeb1ea3744a1d7da9b7911bfaf18ce09", "simhash": "1:c5e6c04ca909e5b6", "word_count": 1684 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:44:33.584383+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re MARRIAGE OF DAVID L. ARMSTRONG, Petitioner-Appellant, and NANCY J. ARMSTRONG, Respondent-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE APPLETON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn September 2002, petitioner, David L. Armstrong, filed a petition to modify his child support payments to his former wife, respondent Nancy J. Armstrong., In April 2003, the trial court heard arguments on David\u2019s petition. After taking the matter under advisement, the court denied his petition, ruling \u201cno substantial change in circumstances [had been demonstrated] justifying a modification of [petitioner's child support from May of 2000 to [May 2003].\u201d\nDavid appeals the trial court\u2019s decision, arguing the court erred in not finding a substantial change in circumstances and in not modifying his child support payments. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nThe marriage of David and Nancy Armstrong was dissolved in July 1997. The trial court awarded David and Nancy joint custody of their three children. Nancy received residential custody, and David received reasonable visitation rights. The court ordered David to pay $1,250 per month in child support based on a marital settlement agreement. The record fails to provide information on the parties\u2019 respective incomes at that time but through admission in David\u2019s brief, we know his gross income at that time was over $90,000 per year.\nIn February 1999, Nancy filed a petition to modify the judgment. She asked the trial court to increase the amount of child support David then paid. Nancy filed a financial affidavit in March 1999 stating that her net monthly income, including the $1,250 per month in child support she received from David, was $2,445. David filed a financial affidavit in July 1999 stating that his net monthly income was $5,208. The parties stipulated that David\u2019s child support payments should be increased to $1,603 per month. In July 1999, the court entered an order increasing support to $1,603 per month based on the parties\u2019 agreement.\nIn April 2000, David filed his own petition to modify the judgment, which was heard in May 2000. A May 2000 docket entry shows the trial court denied the petition. In June 2000, the parties agreed to modify paragraph 7 of the dissolution judgment (child support) for 1999 only.\nAccording to the court\u2019s May 2003 memorandum opinion and order, David testified that he voluntarily left his job with Papa John\u2019s Pizza in March 2000 to invest in and work for a company called Pizza Magia. His $25,000 investment in that business came from his parents. He had worked for Papa John\u2019s Pizza for eight years and was the vice president of operations. His gross income from that employment was approximately $90,000 per year. At Pizza Magia, his annual gross income would have been only $60,000, but David testified to expecting opportunities for greater growth and increased income. After hearing the evidence presented, the court denied David\u2019s petition, finding that he had not changed jobs in good faith. David did not appeal the court\u2019s May 2000 order denying the modification.\nIn September 2002, David filed another petition to modify the judgment, which was heard in April 2003. David testified that he was involuntarily terminated from Pizza Magia in September 2002 because the other investors made a $50,000 capital demand that he could not meet. In December 2002, he began working for Quality Dining, Inc., as a district manager. He testified that his salary at Quality Dining, Inc., was a \u201clittle bit higher\u201d than it had been at Pizza Magia. According to an earnings statement introduced as an exhibit by David, he grossed $16,665.39 in the first three months of 2003 working for Quality Dining, Inc. This figure included an automobile allowance of $150, which he received biweekly. At that rate, his gross salary would total $66,661.56 per year.\nAt the same hearing, Nancy testified that she grossed $13,000 per year working for Mahomet High School. This was an increase from her income of $3,400 per year in 2000. (The record is not clear if $3,400 was Nancy\u2019s gross or net income in 2000.) However, Nancy testified that the children\u2019s expenses were greater than they had been three years earlier.\nAfter taking the matter under advisement, the trial court denied David\u2019s petition in May 2003. In its memorandum opinion and order, the court explained its decision as follows:\n\u201cThe [c]ourt finds that there has been no substantial change in circumstances justifying a modification of [petitioner's child support from May of 2000 to date. In May of 2000[,] [petitioner was making $60,000.00 per year as part owner of Pizza Magia with no expectation of any bonuses. No evidence was presented of any other employment benefits at that time. At the present time[,] the [petitioner is employed as a district manager for Quality Dining, Inc. He makes $66,661.56 per year plus a bi[ ]weekly car allowance of $150.00. Respondent was making $3,400.00 per year in May of 2000 and now makes $13,000.00 per year. The increased income of the [petitioner substantially offsets the increased income of the [r]espondent, particularly when combined with the greater expenses presently for the three minor children. The [c]ourt further finds that both current spouses have the ability to earn substantial income. Accordingly, the motion to modify filed by the [petitioner should be denied.\u201d\nThis appeal followed!\nII. ANALYSIS\nOn appeal, David argues that the trial court erred (1) by not finding a substantial change in circumstances and (2) by determining whether a substantial change in circumstances occurred before deciding if David\u2019s change of employment was made in good faith. Nancy responds that the court did not abuse its discretion in finding that David failed to prove a substantial change in circumstances between May 2000 and May 2003.\nThe trial court found David failed to show that a substantial change in circumstances occurred between May 2000 and May 2003. The trial court\u2019s determination whether a substantial change in circumstances occurred is one of fact and will not be disturbed unless it is found to be against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Marriage of Barnard, 283 Ill. App. 3d 366, 370, 669 N.E.2d 726, 729 (1996).\nIt is difficult to determine if David\u2019s argument is that the court erred (1) in not finding a substantial change in circumstances between the circumstances present at the time of the original judgment, July 1997, and those in May 2003 or (2) in not finding a substantial change in circumstances between the circumstances between May 2000 and May 2003. To the extent David argues the former, he is wrong. \u201cThe issue on a petition for modification of child support is whether there has been a material[,i.e., substantial,] change in the circumstances of the parties since the previous order.\u201d Nordstrom v. Nordstrom, 36 Ill. App. 3d 181, 184, 343 N.E.2d 640, 642 (1976).\nIn many cases, the previous order will be the original judgment. However, that is not true here. David seeks to have this court test whether there has been a substantial change in his income using as a beginning point the July 1999 order, when he was earning an annual gross income of $90,000. That order, which denied him relief based on the court\u2019s finding that his change in employment was in bad faith, cannot be the benchmark for determining the existence of changed circumstances.\nThe order finding that David was not entitled to a reduction because of his bad faith, which order was not appealed, is res judicata. As such, bis reduction in income from $90,000 per annum to $60,000 is of no effect. That David subsequently lost his employment at Pizza Magia does not absolve him of the bad faith previously found. Had the bad-faith, voluntary termination of his position at Papa Johns not occurred, we must assume he would still be earning the larger salary.\nIn this determination, we are mindful of our recent decision in In re Marriage of Spent, 342 Ill. App. 3d 643, 796 N.E.2d 191 (2003), where we found that the denial of a petition to terminate joint custody was not a custodial judgment that would begin anew the two-year period before which custody could not be modified absent compliance with section 610(a) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/610(a) (West 2000)). Likewise, David\u2019s unsuccessful attempt to show changed circumstances as to his income from the time he left the employ of Papa John\u2019s cannot be used to establish a benchmark against which his income should now be compared. While future adjustments of support are not precluded under these circumstances, they cannot automatically be based on a reduction from David\u2019s Papa John\u2019s Pizza salary.\nBecause the trial court compared the correct two periods in time, we next consider whether the court\u2019s finding that David failed to show a substantial change in circumstances between May 2000 and May 2003 was against the manifest weight of the evidence. After examining the trial court\u2019s memorandum opinion and order and David\u2019s earnings statement that he introduced as petitioner\u2019s exhibit No. 1, we conclude that the court did not err in finding David made $66,661.56 per year at his new employment. While an increase from $60,000 to $66,661.56 is a change in circumstances, as was the increased income of Nancy, we cannot find that the court\u2019s determination that a substantial change in circumstances had not occurred was against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nLikewise, the trial court committed no error by determining whether a substantial change in circumstances occurred before deciding whether his latest change in employment was made in good faith. Only after determining the threshold issue of whether a substantial change in circumstances has occurred can a court consider modifying a child support order. Fedun v. Kuczek, 155 Ill. App. 3d 798, 801-02, 508 N.E.2d 531, 534 (1987).\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s determination.\nAffirmed.\nMcCULLOUGH and MYERSCOUGH, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE APPLETON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Arthur M. Lerner (argued), of Lerner & Kirchner, of Champaign, for appellant.", "Craig R. Hunt (argued), of Allen & Korkowski & Associates, of Rantoul, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re MARRIAGE OF DAVID L. ARMSTRONG, Petitioner-Appellant, and NANCY J. ARMSTRONG, Respondent-Appellee.\nFourth District\nNo. 4 \u2014 03\u20140510\nArgued January 27, 2004.\nOpinion filed March 4, 2004.\nArthur M. Lerner (argued), of Lerner & Kirchner, of Champaign, for appellant.\nCraig R. Hunt (argued), of Allen & Korkowski & Associates, of Rantoul, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0818-01", "first_page_order": 836, "last_page_order": 841 }