{ "id": 3832614, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JESSIE GRAY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Gray", "decision_date": "2004-03-26", "docket_number": "No. 2-02-1318", "first_page": "989", "last_page": "996", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "346 Ill. App. 3d 989" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "207 Ill. 2d 305", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 974995 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "329" }, { "page": "329" }, { "page": "329" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/207/0305-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 Ill. App. 3d 439", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3106999 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444-45" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/97/0439-01" ] }, { "cite": "54 Ill. App. 3d 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3402060 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "80" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/54/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 Ill. App. 3d 470", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 132334 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "472-73" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/321/0470-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 Ill. App. 3d 548", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1599197 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "551", "parenthetical": "jury-instruction issue reviewed de novo to the extent it involved issue of statutory construction" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/336/0548-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 Ill. App. 3d 221", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 126334 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "224-25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/322/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "288 Ill. App. 3d 12", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1596997 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "18" }, { "page": "16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/288/0012-01" ] }, { "cite": "303 Ill. App. 3d 269", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 511382 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "273" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/303/0269-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 Ill. App. 3d 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5372532 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "45", "parenthetical": "\" 'What is possession?' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/261/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 Ill. 2d 27", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3254843 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "39-40" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/136/0027-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 Ill. App. 3d 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 75320 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "314" }, { "page": "314" }, { "page": "315" }, { "page": "313", "parenthetical": "jury requested that court \"clarify\" term" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/279/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 Ill. 2d 217", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 781322 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "228-29" }, { "page": "229" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/159/0217-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821413 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "101-02" }, { "page": "102" }, { "page": "101-02" }, { "page": "101-02" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0087-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 662, "char_count": 15374, "ocr_confidence": 0.747, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.219223760643113e-08, "percentile": 0.5101295480933444 }, "sha256": "9d1c78453e8e3a97a2f0f13b46ced3fd6f14de75dbc0291dcc15724d373f5313", "simhash": "1:db093783762d9d53", "word_count": 2632 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:44:33.584383+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JESSIE GRAY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KAPALA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial, defendant, Jessie Gray, was convicted of aggravated robbery (720 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 5(a) (West 2002)). He was sentenced to 14 years\u2019 imprisonment. He appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in answering the jury\u2019s request for clarification of a phrase in the issues instruction for aggravated robbery (Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 14.20 (4th ed. 2000)). We determine that the court properly answered the jury\u2019s request, and thus we affirm.\nWe begin by presenting the evidence that is relevant to the issues on appeal. On April 30, 2002, about 8 p.m., Joseph Wesley and Jordan Hatley were walking toward a convenience store. As they walked, they were accosted by defendant, whom they did not previously know. Defendant stood in front of them with his hand under the football jersey that he was wearing. He swore at them and told them that he would kill them if they were members of the \u201cGD\u201d gang, which they were not. In light of defendant\u2019s erratic behavior and the smell of his breath, Wesley and Hatley knew that he was drunk.\nSlurring his words, defendant told Wesley and Hatley that he had a pistol. He walked three or four feet away, turned his back, and acted as if he were taking something out of his jersey and putting it behind a tree. Wesley thought that defendant may have put down his gun. Defendant returned to Wesley and Hatley, took off his jersey, and placed it onto a car. Wesley could see that defendant had no gun at that point. Defendant asked for money, but Hatley told him to go home. Defendant threw a punch at Hatley, who was bigger than defendant, and Hatley blocked the punch. Defendant turned to Wesley, who was smaller than defendant, and demanded the chain that Wesley was wearing. Wesley tried to run, but defendant blocked his path. Wesley took off his chain and threw it onto defendant\u2019s jersey. Wesley and Hatley ran to Wesley\u2019s house and called the police. When the police apprehended defendant, he had his jersey and Wesley\u2019s chain. He had no weapon.\nIn instructing the jury, the trial court stated as follows:\n\u201cTo sustain the charge of aggravated robbery, the State must prove the following propositions: The first proposition: That the Defendant knowingly took property from the person or the presence of Joseph Wesley and, second proposition, that the Defendant did so by the use of force or by threatening the imminent use of force, and third proposition, that the Defendant did so while indicating verbally or by his actions to the victim that he was at that time armed with a gun.\u201d (Emphasis added.) See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 14.20 (4th ed. 2000).\nDuring its deliberations, the jury sent a note to the trial court: \u201cWe want clarification on \u2018at that time.\u2019 Does this mean \u2018any time during the incident\u2019 or \u2018at the exact time the chain was handed over\u2019?\u201d Defense counsel argued that \u201cat that time\u201d means \u201c[at] that instant.\u201d However, the trial court noted People v. Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d 87 (1998), in which the supreme court\n\u201ctalked about armed robbery, but [held] that although the required force or threat of force may either precede or be contemporaneous with the taking of the victim\u2019s property, use of a dangerous weapon at [any] point in a robbery will constitute armed robbery so long as it reasonably can be said to be part of a single occurrence. Sufficient force exists when the force used is part of a series of events that constitute a single incident or occurrence.\u201d\nSee Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d at 101-02. The trial court reasoned that \u201c[c]ertainly the same has got to be said for an aggravated robbery.\u201d Thus, over defendant\u2019s objection, the court instructed the jury as follows:\n\u201cThe required force or threat of force must either procede [sic] or be contemporaneous with the taking of the victim\u2019s property. Indicating verbally or by actions to the victim that the person was armed with a gun can constitute aggravated robbery so long as it reasonably can be said to be part of a single occurance [sic].\u201d\nShortly thereafter, the jury submitted a second note, raising two questions:\n\u201c1. Is \u2018procede\u2019 intended to be precede or proceed?\n2. Does contemporaneous mean \u2018within the time frame of taking of the victim\u2019s property\u2019?\u201d\nAs to the first question, the trial court instructed the jury that \u201cthe word used in the prior response should be \u2018precede.\u2019 \u201d As to the second, the court agreed with the State\u2019s contention that the question was \u201cvery similar to the last question.\u201d In any event, over defendant\u2019s objection, the court instructed the jury that \u201ccontemporaneous as it applies to the use of force means that the force may be used as part of a series of events constituting a single incident.\u201d See Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d at 102.\nUltimately, the jury convicted defendant of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him and denied his posttrial and post-sentencing motions. Defendant timely appealed.\nOn appeal, defendant asserts that the trial court erred in answering the jury\u2019s request for clarification of \u201cat that time.\u201d To resolve that issue, we must address two questions. First, we must determine whether the court erred in defining the phrase at all. Second, we must determine whether the court\u2019s definition was correct. We will address each question in turn.\nGenerally, a trial court has a duty to answer when a jury raises (1) an explicit question (2) on a point of law (3) about which the jury indicates doubt or confusion. People v. Childs, 159 Ill. 2d 217, 228-29 (1994); People v. Landwer, 279 Ill. App. 3d 306, 314 (1996). Nevertheless; the court should refuse to answer if an answer would express the court\u2019s opinion on the evidence or would probably direct a verdict. People v. Reid, 136 Ill. 2d 27, 39-40 (1990). The court\u2019s decision to answer or refrain from answering will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Landwer, 279 Ill. App. 3d at 314.\nApplying the aforementioned criteria, we determine that the trial court had a duty to answer the jury\u2019s request. First, as the jury requested a definition of a specific phrase, its request was explicit. See People v. Oden, 261 Ill. App. 3d 41, 45 (1994) (\u201c \u2018What is possession?\u2019 \u201d). Second, a question of a definition of a phrase in a jury instruction is a question of law. Landwer, 279 Ill. App. 3d at 315. Third, in requesting \u201cclarification\u201d of the phrase, the jury demonstrated that it was confused about the issue. See Landwer, 279 Ill. App. 3d at 313 (jury requested that court \u201cclarify\u201d term). Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to answer the jury\u2019s request; indeed, a refusal to answer may have been prejudicial error. See Childs, 159 Ill. 2d at 229.\nDefendant contends that the trial court improperly provided its \u201cinterpretation of the evidence [and] invaded the province of the jury as fact-finder and essentially directed a verdict of guilt.\u201d However, the court simply provided a definition of the phrase; it did not apply that definition to the evidence or instruct the jury on how to do so. Because the court defined the phrase \u201cwithout relating it to any particular fact of the case\u201d (People v. Comage, 303 Ill. App. 3d 269, 273 (1999)), its answer was purely legal. It remained the jury\u2019s task to apply that law to the evidence and to determine defendant\u2019s guilt.\nDefendant further contends that an answer to the jury\u2019s request was precluded by our opinion in People v. Brackett, 288 Ill. App. 3d 12 (1997). There, in rejecting a vagueness challenge to the statute defining aggravated robbery, we stated that \u201c[w]hat constitutes \u2018indicating verbally or by his or her actions to the victim that he or she is presently armed with a firearm\u2019 [(720 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 5(a) (West 2002))] is not capable of precise definition and is a question properly left to be determined by the fact finder on a case-by-case basis.\u201d Brackett, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 18. In that case, however, the defendant argued only that \u201cindicating\u201d is vague. Brackett, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 16. Thus, what we determined is that the definition of \u201cindicating\u201d must be left to the jury; we did not state that the definition of \u201cpresently\u201d (or \u201cat that time,\u201d the equivalent phrase in the issues instruction) must be treated similarly.\nIn sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to answer the jury\u2019s request for a definition of \u201cat that time.\u201d Now, we must determine whether the court provided the correct definition. Needless to say, when a court answers a jury\u2019s question, the court must not misstate the law. People v. Carroll, 322 Ill. App. 3d 221, 224-25 (2001). Whether the court misstated the law is naturally a question of law, and our review is de novo. See People v. Cameron, 336 Ill. App. 3d 548, 551 (2003) (jury-instruction issue reviewed de novo to the extent it involved issue of statutory construction). We conclude that, in applying the principles of armed robbery, the court correctly stated the law of aggravated robbery.\nArmed robbery and aggravated robbery may be committed in various ways. 720 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 2(a), 18 \u2014 5 (West 2002). However, as relevant here, the crimes are extremely similar. Each requires, first, a robbery, i.e., a taking of property \u201cfrom the person or presence of another by the use of force or by threatening the imminent use of force\u201d (720 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 1(a) (West 2002)). See 720 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 2(a), 18 \u2014 5(a) (West 2002). Beyond that, \u201c[t]he elements of the offenses differ in that armed robbery requires that a defendant \u00a3carr[y] on or about his or her person or [be] otherwise armed with a firearm,\u2019 while aggravated robbery requires that a defendant \u00a3indicat[e] verbally or by his or her actions to the victim that he or she is presently armed with a firearm.\u2019 \u201d People v. McDonald, 321 Ill. App. 3d 470, 472-73 (2001), quoting 720 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 2(a)(2) (West Supp. 1999) and 720 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 5(a) (West 1998). Thus, a defendant commits armed robbery by committing robbery while actually armed with a firearm; on the other hand, a defendant commits aggravated robbery by committing robbery while merely indicating that he or she is armed with a firearm, whether he or she is actually armed or not. See 720 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 2(a)(2), 18 \u2014 5(a) (West 2002).\nAs the trial court noted, the Dennis court recognized that a defendant may commit armed robbery even when he or she is not armed with a firearm at the instant of the taking:\n\u201cAlthough the required force or threat of force must either precede or be contemporaneous with the taking of the victim\u2019s property [citations], use of a dangerous weapon at any point in a robbery will constitute armed robbery as long as it reasonably can be said to be a part of a single occurrence [citation]. Sufficient force exists where the force used is part of a series of events that constitute a single incident or occurrence.\u201d Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d at 101-02.\nThese principles have enabled appellate courts to sustain convictions on facts that, though in the context of armed robbery, are fairly similar to the facts here. One example is People v. Stewart, 54 Ill. App. 3d 76 (1977). There, about 1 p.m., the defendants put guns to the victim\u2019s head and ordered him to give them $1,000 by 4 p.m. The defendants left, one of them returned about 3 p.m., and the victim gave him the money. No evidence indicated that the defendant was armed at that point. The appellate court affirmed the defendants\u2019 convictions of armed robbery. Noting the principles that the Dennis court would later recognize, the appellate court held that the interval between the use of the weapons and the taking of the money was not long enough \u201cto preclude these events from constituting a single, uninterrupted and inseparable incident *** to satisfy a conviction for armed robbery.\u201d Stewart, 54 Ill. App. 3d at 80.\nSimilarly, in People v. Talley, 97 Ill. App. 3d 439 (1981), the defendant forced the victim into a bedroom at gunpoint, put his gun in a closet, forced the victim to disrobe, and took a coin purse that was in the victim\u2019s clothing. He argued that he was not guilty of armed robbery because he did not take the purse while he was armed. Citing Stewart, the appellate court disagreed:\n\u201cIt is immaterial that defendant did not have the gun in hand at the time of the taking. The conviction for armed robbery can be sustained if the trier of fact could properly find that the weapon had been displayed to the victim, and thereafter remained accessible to the perpetrator.\u201d Talley, 97 Ill. App. 3d at 444-45.\nThese cases demonstrate that, had defendant here actually had a gun and then actually put it behind the tree before taking Wesley\u2019s chain, he would have been guilty of armed robbery if the entire episode had been a single occurrence. As armed robbery and aggravated robbery \u201care obviously closely related in subject and proximity,\u201d we must presume that they are \u201cgoverned by one spirit and a single policy\u201d (People v. Masterson, 207 Ill. 2d 305, 329 (2003)). Thus, as defendant merely indicated that he had a gun and then merely indicated that he put it behind the tree before taking Wesley\u2019s chain, he must be guilty of aggravated robbery if the entire episode was a single occurrence. As the trial court suggested, there is simply no logical alternative.\nDefendant contends that, rather than the law of armed robbery, the trial court should have adopted the law of armed violence (720 ILCS 5/33A \u2014 2(a) (West 2002)). We summarily reject that assertion. We do not deny that a defendant commits armed violence, like armed robbery, \u201cwhile armed with a dangerous weapon.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/33A\u2014 2(a) (West 2002). Nevertheless, it nearly goes without saying that aggravated robbery is more \u201cclosely related in subject and proximity\u201d (Masterson, 207 Ill. 2d at 329) to armed robbery than to armed violence. Thus, while aggravated robbery and armed robbery \u201care undoubtedly governed by one spirit and a single policy\u201d (Masterson, 207 Ill. 2d at 329), aggravated robbery and armed violence are not.\nWe conclude that the trial court properly applied the principles of armed robbery in the context of aggravated robbery. In this context, although the required force or threat of force must either precede or be contemporaneous with the taking of the victim\u2019s property, the defendant\u2019s indication that he or she is armed with a firearm at any point in a robbery will constitute aggravated robbery as long as it reasonably can be said to be a part of a single occurrence. Sufficient force exists where the force used is part of a series of events that constitute a single incident or occurrence. See Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d at 101-02. Thus, in answering the jury\u2019s request for clarification of \u201cat that time\u201d in the issues instruction for aggravated robbery, the court properly instructed the jury accordingly.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nMcLAREN and BYRNE, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KAPALA" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller and Paul J. Glaser, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Joseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Martin P. Moltz, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), and Sharmila Roy, of Naperville, for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JESSIE GRAY, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2 \u2014 02\u20141318\nOpinion filed March 26, 2004.\nG. Joseph Weller and Paul J. Glaser, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nJoseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Martin P. Moltz, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), and Sharmila Roy, of Naperville, for the People." }, "file_name": "0989-01", "first_page_order": 1007, "last_page_order": 1014 }