{ "id": 3832570, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MAURICE DURGAN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Durgan", "decision_date": "2004-03-30", "docket_number": "No. 4-02-0907", "first_page": "1121", "last_page": "1143", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "346 Ill. App. 3d 1121" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "653 N.E.2d 977", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "984", "parenthetical": "noting that the record on direct appeal of a criminal case rarely contains any explanation of the tactics of trial counsel, and holding that, if those tactics are to be the subject of scrutiny, a record should be developed in which they can effectively be reviewed" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "274 Ill. App. 3d 46", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 291584 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "56", "parenthetical": "noting that the record on direct appeal of a criminal case rarely contains any explanation of the tactics of trial counsel, and holding that, if those tactics are to be the subject of scrutiny, a record should be developed in which they can effectively be reviewed" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/274/0046-01" ] }, { "cite": "762 N.E.2d 1127", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1138", "parenthetical": "reaffirming Kunze and declining to address on direct appeal whether trial counsel's failure to make an offer of proof constituted ineffective assistance of counsel" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 Ill. App. 3d 300", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 79567 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "312", "parenthetical": "reaffirming Kunze and declining to address on direct appeal whether trial counsel's failure to make an offer of proof constituted ineffective assistance of counsel" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/327/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "784 N.E.2d 438", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441", "parenthetical": "in which this court reaffirmed our decision in Kunze and declined to address on direct appeal whether trial counsel's failure to request a certain jury instruction constituted ineffective assistance" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 Ill. App. 3d 548", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1599197 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "552", "parenthetical": "in which this court reaffirmed our decision in Kunze and declined to address on direct appeal whether trial counsel's failure to request a certain jury instruction constituted ineffective assistance" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/336/0548-01" ] }, { "cite": "709 N.E.2d 969", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "975" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 Ill. App. 3d 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 564598 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/304/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "6 F.3d 468", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 10510357 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "473" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/6/0468-01" ] }, { "cite": "538 U.S. 500", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9031093 ], "weight": 9, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "500" }, { "page": "719-22" }, { "page": "1693-95" }, { "page": "504-05" }, { "page": "720" }, { "page": "1694" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/538/0500-01" ] }, { "cite": "550 N.E.2d 284", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "296" }, { "page": "296" }, { "page": "296" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "193 Ill. App. 3d 708", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2496987 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "726" }, { "page": "725" }, { "page": "725-26" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/193/0708-01" ] }, { "cite": "701 N.E.2d 1063", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1079" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209962 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397-98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 12, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687" }, { "page": "693" }, { "page": "2064" }, { "page": "689" }, { "page": "694-95" }, { "page": "2065" }, { "page": "694" }, { "page": "698" }, { "page": "2068" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "785 N.E.2d 863", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "870, 871" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 Ill. App. 3d 940", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1599238 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "947-48, 949-50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/336/0940-01" ] }, { "cite": "604 N.E.2d 877", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "901" }, { "page": "900-01" }, { "page": "901" }, { "page": "903" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 Ill. 2d 274", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5602841 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323" }, { "page": "321-22" }, { "page": "322" }, { "page": "326" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/152/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.E.2d 909", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "911" }, { "page": "912-13" }, { "page": "915" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 Ill. App. 3d 798", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2897753 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "800" }, { "page": "801-02" }, { "page": "805" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/45/0798-01" ] }, { "cite": "660 N.E.2d 901", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "909-10", "parenthetical": "\"Plain error marked by 'fundamental [unjfairness' occurs only in situations which 'reveal breakdowns in the adversary system,' as distinguished from 'typical trial mistakes.' [Citation.]\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 909174 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17", "parenthetical": "\"Plain error marked by 'fundamental [unjfairness' occurs only in situations which 'reveal breakdowns in the adversary system,' as distinguished from 'typical trial mistakes.' [Citation.]\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/169/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "520 U.S. 461", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11652245 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "467" }, { "page": "727" }, { "page": "1549" }, { "page": "467" }, { "page": "727" }, { "page": "1549" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/520/0461-01" ] }, { "cite": "535 U.S. 625", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 353467 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "631-32" }, { "page": "868" }, { "page": "1785" }, { "page": "631" }, { "page": "868" }, { "page": "1785" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/535/0625-01" ] }, { "cite": "788 N.E.2d 1117", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1124" }, { "page": "1124" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "203 Ill. 2d 335", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 799372 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348" }, { "page": "348" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/203/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "590 N.E.2d 1010", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1013", "parenthetical": "Baggies of cannabis were admissible despite police officer's unclear and inconsistent testimony as to the number of Baggies recovered and processed as evidence" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "227 Ill. App. 3d 144", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5793498 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147-48", "parenthetical": "Baggies of cannabis were admissible despite police officer's unclear and inconsistent testimony as to the number of Baggies recovered and processed as evidence" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/227/0144-01" ] }, { "cite": "679 N.E.2d 419", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "287 Ill. App. 3d 878", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 520940 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "882" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/287/0878-01" ] }, { "cite": "756 N.E.2d 234", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "241" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 Ill. App. 3d 876", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 256313 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "882" }, { "page": "882" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/324/0876-01" ] }, { "cite": "786 N.E.2d 563", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "567" }, { "page": "567" }, { "page": "567" }, { "page": "567" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 Ill. App. 3d 477", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 894474 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "481" }, { "page": "481-82" }, { "page": "482" }, { "page": "481" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/337/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "792 N.E.2d 1163", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1202", "parenthetical": "when a party procures or invites the admission of evidence, he cannot challenge on appeal the admission of that evidence" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "205 Ill. 2d 52", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1302618 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114", "parenthetical": "when a party procures or invites the admission of evidence, he cannot challenge on appeal the admission of that evidence" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/205/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 N.E.2d 416", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 Ill. 2d 220", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2834315 ], "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "226" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/31/0220-01" ] }, { "cite": "570 N.E.2d 320", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "324" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 Ill. 2d 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5591993 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/143/0011-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 N.E.2d 513", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "516" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 Ill. App. 2d 185", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1594802 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "192" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/109/0185-01" ] }, { "cite": "704 N.E.2d 690", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "698" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 Ill. App. 3d 37", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 257154 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "48" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/301/0037-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 N.E.2d 796", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "799" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "19 Ill. App. 3d 766", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2690906 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "770" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/19/0766-01" ] }, { "cite": "760 N.E.2d 1024", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1029" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 Ill. App. 3d 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1281378 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "420" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/326/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 N.E.2d 426", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427" }, { "page": "427" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 Ill. App. 2d 49", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2556438 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "51" }, { "page": "51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/83/0049-01" ] }, { "cite": "800 N.E.2d 436", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444", "parenthetical": "all determining that Raney was distinguishable because it did not involve stipulated evidence" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 Ill. App. 3d 889", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3719401 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "900", "parenthetical": "all determining that Raney was distinguishable because it did not involve stipulated evidence" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/343/0889-01" ] }, { "cite": "756 N.E.2d 338", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339" }, { "page": "340" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 Ill. App. 3d 703", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 256326 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "704-05" }, { "page": "705" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/324/0703-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 N.E.2d 185", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "188", "parenthetical": "finding that the 'stipulation had the effect of eliminating proof which otherwise might have been required'" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "19 Ill. 2d 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2743118 ], "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "315", "parenthetical": "finding that the 'stipulation had the effect of eliminating proof which otherwise might have been required'" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/19/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "803 N.E.2d 138", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "148", "parenthetical": "adhering to DeLuna and Besz" }, { "page": "147-49" }, { "page": "147" }, { "page": "147" }, { "page": "148" }, { "page": "147" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 Ill. App. 3d 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5872541 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "632", "parenthetical": "adhering to DeLuna and Besz" }, { "page": "630-33" }, { "page": "631" }, { "page": "630-31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/345/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "802 N.E.2d 841", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "845-46", "parenthetical": "relying on DeLuna and rejecting the defendant's attempt to recharacterize a foundational argument as a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim" }, { "page": "845" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 Ill. App. 3d 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5873649 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54-55", "parenthetical": "relying on DeLuna and rejecting the defendant's attempt to recharacterize a foundational argument as a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim" }, { "page": "54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/345/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "777 N.E.2d 581", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "598" }, { "page": "598" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 Ill. App. 3d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 521926 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "20" }, { "page": "20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/334/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1711, "char_count": 51794, "ocr_confidence": 0.768, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4246964189715384e-07, "percentile": 0.6497288065829321 }, "sha256": "7bb594e39727b70f02d9e58458106de2d653a324a819bb19e773ff5924d0fe97", "simhash": "1:aef810b836cf9554", "word_count": 8526 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:44:33.584383+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MAURICE DURGAN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn August 2002, a jury convicted defendant, Maurice Durgan, of (1) one count of possession of a substance containing cocaine (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2000)) and (2) one count of possession of more than 1 gram but not more than 15 grams of a substance containing cocaine with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2) (West 2000)). In October 2002, the trial court sentenced him to eight years in prison on the possession-with-intent-to-deliver conviction. (The court did not enter judgment on the other conviction, having determined that it merged into defendant\u2019s conviction for possession with intent to deliver.)\nDefendant appeals, arguing that (1) the stipulated testimony of a forensic chemist was inadequate to establish that (a) an adequate foundation existed for the chemist\u2019s testimony and (b) the chemist tested all of the individually wrapped packets of cocaine found in defendant\u2019s possession; (2) the State did not establish a proper chain of custody for the seized cocaine; (3) the trial court erred by (a) replacing a sick juror with an alternate juror after the jury began deliberating and (b) relying on evidence outside the record in denying his post-trial motion; (4) the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; and (5) he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We disagree and affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nIn February 2001, the State charged defendant with (1) one count of possession of a substance containing cocaine (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2000)) and (2) one count of possession of more than 1 gram but not more than 15 grams of a substance containing cocaine with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2) (West 2000)).\nFollowing an October 2001 trial, a jury convicted defendant of both charges. In November 2001, defendant filed a motion for a new trial. At a January 2002 hearing on that motion, defense counsel argued facts from a different case. The trial court then sua sponte found that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance and granted defendant\u2019s motion for a new trial.\nAt the start of defendant\u2019s August 2002 retrial, the bailiff informed the trial court that one of the jurors (referred to in the record only as Mr. Gilpin) had been sick the previous night. The bailiff instructed Gilpin to let the court know if he felt sick, and the court proceeded with defendant\u2019s trial.\nDanville police officer Troy Wasson testified that he had (1) been an officer since 1996, (2) attended five training seminars on drug enforcement, and (3) been involved in at least 50 drug cases. Around 3 p.m. on December 15, 2000, he went to an apartment located at 915 Redden Court in Danville to execute a search warrant. While Wasson and other officers waited outside the apartment for the \u201ctarget person\u201d (an individual other than defendant) to arrive, Wasson saw defendant standing either just outside or in the front doorway. When the officers approached the apartment to begin the search, defendant yelled \u201cpolice\u201d and went inside the apartment. Officers arrested defendant and six other individuals as they left the apartment through its back door and later took them to the Danville public safety building. Officers searched the apartment and found cannabis and cocaine.\nWhen Wasson arrived at the public safety building, Danville police officer John Thompson handed him a clear plastic bag that contained individual packages (plastic Baggie corners that were tied off) containing a substance that the officers suspected was crack cocaine. (Thompson found the plastic bag in a trash can near where defendant had been sitting in the \u201cbook-in\u201d area prior to being searched.) Although Wasson initially testified that the plastic bag contained 19 individually wrapped packages, he later testified that it contained either 18 or 19 individually wrapped packages. Wasson secured the plastic bag containing the individually wrapped packages and later handed it to Danville police officer Ron Soderstrom, who processed it as evidence. Wasson denied tampering with the plastic bag.\nWasson opined that the individually wrapped packages were intended for sale. He explained that based on his training and experience, \u201ca normal user or addict of crack cocaine wouldn\u2019t carry that amount of crack cocaine on them.\u201d Wasson stated that he would not change his opinion if the larger plastic Baggie contained 18 individually wrapped Baggies, not 19.\nThompson testified that after officers transported defendant to the public safety building, Thompson sat him on the floor beside a bench, where three other individuals were handcuffed. Thompson and a correctional officer then escorted the individuals, including defendant, one by one to another room and searched them. Thompson then searched the book-in area. At the top of the trash in a trash can that was located about SVa feet from where defendant had been sitting, Thompson found a clear plastic bag that contained several individually wrapped packages of an \u201coff-white[,] rock-like substance.\u201d Thompson took the bag as evidence and gave it to Wasson. He had the bag for only a couple of minutes, just long enough to walk up one flight of stairs and hand it to Wasson. Thompson denied counting the individual packages or tampering with the plastic bag.\nSoderstrom testified (through the trial court\u2019s admission of a transcript of his testimony at defendant\u2019s first trial) that when items are recovered, officers immediately label them with the time, location, and the name of the officer who recovered them. On the day Wasson gave him the plastic bag, Soderstrom weighed it, filled out an inventory tag describing the bag and its contents, and placed the plastic bag in a paper bag. He then labeled the paper bag with the December 15, 2000, recovery date, the police report number, his and Wasson\u2019s badge numbers, sealed it, initialed the label, and placed the paper bag in an evidence locker. Soderstrom placed the key to that evidence locker, along with a yellow duplicate inventory tag, in another locker, to which only the evidence officer had access. He identified People\u2019s exhibit No. 1 as the paper bag that contained the clear plastic bag containing individually wrapped packages. Soderstrom explained that he recognized his handwriting on the property tag and recalled filling out that tag for that specific piece of evidence on December 15, 2000.\nDanville police officer Larry Thomason, the evidence officer, testified that when an officer recovers an item, he places it in an appropriate-sized container and seals the container. The officer places various identifying markings on the container and attaches a property tag (1) indicating the police report number, the name of the officer, and the offense and (2) describing the contents of the container. The officer then places the container in an evidence locker and puts the locker key in another locker, to which only Thomason and his assistant have access.\nThomason identified People\u2019s exhibit No. 1 as the paper bag that contained the clear plastic bag containing , individually wrapped packages. He also identified a white form with a red sticker on it that was attached to exhibit No. 1 as the inventory tag. A yellow duplicate of that inventory tag was attached to the locker key for the locker in which People\u2019s exhibit No. 1 had been stored. On December 19, 2000, Thomason retrieved the paper bag (People\u2019s exhibit No. 1) from the evidence locker, took it to the evidence room, and placed it in a storage bin. When he retrieved the paper bag, it was sealed, and the white inventory tag was attached to it with staples. Thomason entered the information from the inventory tag into a computer program that tracked the evidence\u2019s whereabouts. On December 27, 2000, he wrote the date and his initials on the paper bag and sent it to the Illinois State Police crime laboratory by certified mail. When Thomason placed it in the mail, the paper bag was still sealed. On February 1, 2001, he picked up the bag from the crime laboratory and returned it to the original storage area in the public safety building. When Thomason picked up the bag, it was sealed with blue tape from the laboratory. Thomason denied opening the paper bag or tampering with it.\nThe testimony of Kristin Stiefvater, an Illinois State Police forensic chemist, was presented via a stipulation that the parties agreed upon and the trial court accepted. That stipulation, which the prosecutor read to the jury, provided as follows:\n\u201c[Stiefvater] would testify that she is a trained, experienced forensic scientist in the Springfield [c]rime [l]aboratoiy.\nThat on December 28th, 2000, she received People\u2019s [e]xhibit [No.] 1 in a sealed condition.\nThat she tested the contents of People\u2019s [exhibit No.] 1.\nThat she determined People\u2019s [exhibit No.] 1 to contain 18 plastic [B]aggies.\nContents of the plastic [B]aggies contained 1.8 grams of off-white chunk substance, being the net weight of chunky substance, cocaine being present as the base[,] in her opinion, based upon her training and testing and experience.\nThat after testing People\u2019s [e]xhibit [No.] 1 and its contents[,] she resealed it and returned it to [Thomason] in a sealed condition.\u201d\nDanville police officer Mike Cox testified that on the evening of December 15, 2000, he interviewed defendant at the public safety building. After waiving his Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966)), defendant told Cox that earlier that day, he had been at 915 Redden Court to \u201cchill[ ]out\u201d and do \u201ca little gambling.\u201d Defendant admitted that when officers arrested him and took him to the book-in area, he had a \u201creal skinny, rolled up blunt\u201d in his jacket pocket and a \u201cfew bags\u201d of crack cocaine hidden in his underwear. While sitting in the book-in area, he threw the cocaine in a nearby trash can. He told Cox that he used cocaine \u201cevery blue moon\u201d and the cocaine he threw in the trash can was for his personal use. Specifically, defendant used the cocaine to make a \u201cpremo blunt.\u201d Cox explained that (1) a \u201cblunt\u201d is made by cutting a cigar lengthwise, removing the inner tobacco and replacing it with cannabis, and then rolling the outer tobacco leaves back together so that it looks like a thinner cigar; and (2) a \u201cpremo\u201d blunt is one that has been laced with cocaine.\nOn this evidence, the State rested, and defendant presented no witnesses. After the trial court instructed the jury, it asked Gilpin if he was well enough to participate in deliberations. Gilpin responded that he felt well enough, and at 11:45 a.m., the court instructed the jury to leave the courtroom and begin deliberations. The court also asked the alternate juror (referred to in the record only as Ms. Lewis) to stay in the courtroom. The following discussion then took place outside the jury\u2019s presence:\n\u201cTHE COURT: Okay. Ms. Lewis, normally I would discharge you completely from further service since we have the other 12 that are going back to begin deliberations. What I\u2019d like to do, however, in your particular case[,] is I\u2019m going to release you, but I\u2019m going to ask that you still not talk with anyone about the case. Leave your notebook here. There is the remote possibility that we would then reenlist your services if[,] for some reason[,] Mr. Gilpin cannot make it through deliberations.\nAll right. So although you\u2019ll be released to leave and, in fact, if\u2014 what we could do is since we\u2019re going to be probably ordering lunch if you want to wait here we\u2019ll get lunch for you as well. And you\u2019re welcome to have that lunch. You can\u2019t eat with the rest of the jurors or anything like that, but we can put you somewhere else.\nMS. LEWIS: Okay.\nTHE COURT: We\u2019ll just ask that you not talk with anyone about the case or discuss the case in any way until we know whether they are able to reach a verdict and whether Mr. Gilpin is going to be able to complete his service, because if he\u2019s not[,] then there is that possibility that you would have to go in and begin [sic] part of deliberations.\nAny other instructions that counsel wishes for Ms. Lewis?\n[PROSECUTOR]: Just that she leave with the clerk some way of contacting her if we need her.\nTHE COURT: We need a telephone number, cell phone number, something.\nMS. LEWIS: I don\u2019t have a telephone. I live in Georgetown, so I\u2019ll stay here.\nTHE COURT: If you\u2019ll leave your telephone number[,] then when the clerk\u2014\nMS. LEWIS: I can just go home you mean?\nTHE COURT: Sure.\nMS. LEWIS: Okay. Okay.\nTHE COURT: You\u2019re welcome to wait here till lunch is delivered and have lunch, if you wish, or you\u2019re welcome to take it with you and then go home, but it\u2019s just a little unusual. Mr. Gilpin said he\u2019s indicated he was sick all last evening. And if there is the possibility that he\u2019s not going to be able to complete service then we would need you. So I\u2019m not going to discharge you completely from any possible service.\nOkay. Anything else for Ms. Lewis?\n[PROSECUTOR]: No, your Honor.\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No, your Honor.\nTHE COURT: Okay.\u201d\nLewis then left the courtroom.\nAt 12:30 p.m., 45 minutes after the jury left the courtroom to begin deliberations, the trial court was informed that Gilpin was too ill to continue serving as a juror. The following discussion then took place outside the jury\u2019s presence:\n\u201c[THE COURT]: We\u2019ve retained [Lewis]. She is still available. She\u2019s been isolated and separated from the other jurors, but is immediately available to take Mr. Gilpin\u2019s place.\nAfter discussions *** with the attorneys, [prosecutor], do you have any objection to replacing Mr. Gilpin with the alternate, Ms. Lewis?\n[PROSECUTOR]: No, your Honor.\nTHE COURT: And [defense counsel], any objection?\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No, I don\u2019t, your Honor.\u201d\nThe court then excused Gilpin as a juror and replaced him with Lewis.\nAfter deliberating between 4 and 4V2 hours, the jury convicted defendant of both charges, and the trial court entered judgment only on the conviction for possession of more than 1 gram but not more than 15 grams of a substance containing cocaine with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(e)(2) (West 2000)). The court later sentenced defendant as stated.\nThis appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. The Adequacy of the Forensic Chemist\u2019s Stipulated Testimony\n1. Foundation for Stiefvater\u2019s Expert Opinion\nDefendant first argues that the State failed to provide an adequate foundation for Stiefvater\u2019s expert opinion that the substance found in defendant\u2019s possession contained cocaine. Specifically, he contends that Stiefvater\u2019s stipulated testimony did not show (1) what tests Stiefvater performed on the substance; (2) whether those tests were \u201ccommonly used in the area of forensic chemistry\u201d; (3) how Stiefvater recorded her findings; and (4) whether the equipment she used in testing the substance was functioning properly. Defendant further claims that because his argument attacks the sufficiency of the evidence, his argument is not subject to forfeiture. We disagree.\nInitially, we reject defendant\u2019s attempt to couch his foundational argument as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. In People v. DeLuna, 334 Ill. App. 3d 1, 20, 777 N.E.2d 581, 598 (2002), the First District held that an attack as to the proper foundation for expert testimony bears on the admissibility of the evidence rather than the sufficiency of the evidence to convict. The First District explained as follows:\n\u201cArguably, sufficiency involves absence of proof of a basic element of the crime. Defendant here is not challenging the lack of proof as to the existence of an element of the crime, since [the expert] testified to the identity of the controlled substance. The challenge is to the failure to lay a proper foundation for the proof of that element. This goes to a determination of its admissibility, rather than sufficiency of the evidence presented.\u201d DeLuna, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 20, 777 N.E.2d at 598.\nWe agree with DeLuna and thus reject defendant\u2019s attempt to recharacterize his foundational argument as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. See People v. Besz, 345 Ill. App. 3d 50, 54-55, 802 N.E.2d 841, 845-46 (2003) (relying on DeLuna and rejecting the defendant\u2019s attempt to recharacterize a foundational argument as a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim); see also People v. Hill, 345 Ill. App. 3d 620, 632, 803 N.E.2d 138, 148 (2003) (adhering to DeLuna and Besz).\nIn Hill, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 630-33, 803 N.E.2d at 147-49, the First District recently addressed a defendant\u2019s foundational challenge to expert testimony to which the defendant stipulated. The court held that a defendant who stipulates to an expert\u2019s opinion at trial forfeits his right to challenge on appeal the foundation for the expert\u2019s opinion. Hill, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 630, 803 N.E.2d at 147. In so holding, the court reasoned that a defendant forfeits any issue as to the impropriety of evidence if he procures, invites, or acquiesces in the admission of that evidence. Hill, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 631, 803 N.E.2d at 147. The Hill court also stated, in pertinent part, as follows:\n\u201c[S]everal characteristics unique to stipulations further support our holding. First, had [the] defendant made a timely objection at trial and not agreed to the State\u2019s stipulation, the trial court could have addressed this foundational issue and the State could have corrected the deficiency. [Citation.] By presenting the chemist\u2019s testimony through a stipulation, in a brief and summary fashion, the result was to remove from the case any issue concerning the expert\u2019s testimony. [Citation.] See also People v. Polk, 19 Ill. 2d 310, 315, 167 N.E.2d 185, 188 (1960) (finding that the \u2018stipulation had the effect of eliminating proof which otherwise might have been required\u2019). Additionally, the State likely would not have agreed to the stipulated testimony, thereby foregoing the opportunity to place the expert on the witness stand and ask him to describe in detail the number and type of tests performed on the substance, if the stipulation was not intended to eliminate the need for defending his testimony against a challenge by defendant. [Citation.] Further, we assume that defense counsel, by agreeing to the stipulation, decided to forego the opportunity to cross-examine the expert to focus on other theories and aspects of the defense.\u201d Hill, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 632, 803 N.E.2d at 148.\nWe fully agree with the Hill court\u2019s holding and reasoning. We further note that by stipulating to a fact \u2014 for example, as in this case, that the substance tested was cocaine \u2014 the parties dispense with the need to further stipulate to the foundation underlying that fact. In other words, because a stipulation is a substitute for the witness\u2019s actual testimony, all of those matters that the witness could have and should have testified about are encompassed by the stipulation. Thus, if a defendant and the State agree to stipulate that the forensic chemist tested a substance and determined its weight and content, they eliminate any issue as to that expert\u2019s testimony, such as (1) the expert\u2019s qualifications, (2) what tests she performed on the substance, (3) whether the tests actually performed were of a type generally accepted and relied upon in the field, and (4) whether the equipment used to perform the tests was functioning properly when the tests were performed. We note, however, that by stipulating to a witness\u2019s testimony, the parties do not stipulate to matters that are not necessarily implicated by the stipulation. For instance, in this case, where the stipulation was meant to take the place of the forensic chemist\u2019s testimony, the stipulation did not encompass the chain of custody up to the time the forensic chemist received People\u2019s exhibit No. 1.\nAccordingly, under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that because defendant stipulated to Stiefvater\u2019s expert testimony that the substance contained 1.8 grams of cocaine, he cannot challenge on appeal the foundation for Stiefvater\u2019s testimony.\nIn so concluding, we note that although stipulations are to be encouraged, clarity and precision of thought should be encouraged as well. These goals can be obtained by ensuring that the stipulation to which the parties agree is both accurate and complete. For example, in this case, it would have been better practice if the trial court had taken the following steps:\n(1) The court should have assured that the stipulation explicitly stated that (a) Stiefvater received People\u2019s exhibit No. 1, which contained 18 individually wrapped packages containing an off-white chunky substance; (b) Stiefvater tested all 18 packages; and (c) Stiefvater\u2019s testing determined that the 18 packages contained a total of 1.8 grams of cocaine.\n(2) The court should have required the stipulation to be reduced to writing and then required the parties to agree to the written stipulation. If necessary, the court itself should have written the stipulation.\n(3) To avoid any uncertainties as to the scope of the stipulation, the court should have made clear on the record exactly what the stipulation encompassed and what it did not encompass. In particular, the court should have noted that the stipulation eliminated any issue as to Stiefvater\u2019s testimony but did not address any chain-of-custody issue.\n(4) Finally, the court should have informed the jury that the parties agreed upon a stipulation, and then the court should have read the stipulation to the jury.\nWe further note that defendant\u2019s reliance on People v. Raney, 324 Ill. App. 3d 703, 756 N.E.2d 338 (2001), is misplaced. In that case, the appellate court concluded that the State failed to establish a proper foundation for the admission of the results from a gas chromatography mass spectrometer machine used to test the substance in a drug-possession-with-intent-to-deliver case. Based on that deficiency, the appellate court reversed the defendant\u2019s conviction. Raney, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 704-05, 756 N.E.2d at 339. However, the forensic chemist in Raney actually testified at trial. In addition, defense counsel in Raney repeatedly challenged the foundation at trial. Raney, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 705, 756 N.E.2d at 340. Thus, Raney is simply not applicable to this case, where the parties stipulated to the forensic chemist\u2019s testimony. See Hill, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 630-31, 803 N.E.2d at 147; Besz, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 54, 802 N.E.2d at 845; see also People v. Washington, 343 Ill. App. 3d 889, 900, 800 N.E.2d 436, 444 (2003) (all determining that Raney was distinguishable because it did not involve stipulated evidence).\nAs a final matter, we reject defendant\u2019s reliance on People v. Ortega, 83 Ill. App. 2d 49, 226 N.E.2d 426 (1967), to support his assertion that the stipulation was required to include \u201cthe same foundational requirements as would be required had Stiefvater actually testified.\u201d In support of that proposition, he specifically cites the following from Ortega:\n\u201c[W]e have been impressed by numerous instances in recent years of the demonstrated nonchalance and inattention to detail on the part of prosecutors when introducing by stipulation the part of the State\u2019s case having to do with the chain of possession and chemical content of the substance seized in narcotics cases. The expedience of resorting to such a stipulation we do not doubt, but we cannot permit this informality of procedure to render the proof any less exact or complete than would be the case if the witnesses were to testify.\u201d Ortega, 83 Ill. App. 2d at 51, 226 N.E.2d at 427.\nFirst, we note that Ortega did not involve a defendant\u2019s foundational challenge to an expert\u2019s testimony. Instead, it addressed whether a stipulation was sufficient when it stated that a substance \u201c \u2018purported] to be\u2019 \u201d heroin, rather than that it \u201cwas \u2018found to be\u2019 \u201d heroin. Ortega, 83 Ill. App. 2d at 51, 226 N.E.2d at 427. Further, to the extent Ortega can be construed as holding that when parties stipulate to a forensic chemist\u2019s testimony as to the weight and content of a tested substance, the stipulation must explicitly include the same foundational elements as when the chemist actually testifies, we expressly reject it and decline to follow it.\nAccepting defendant\u2019s proposition and holding that a forensic chemist\u2019s stipulated expert opinion must include every foundational element required when a chemist testified at trial would serve no purpose other than to discourage stipulations, which we refuse to do. In this regard, we reiterate what this court wrote in People v. Calvert, 326 Ill. App. 3d 414, 420, 760 N.E.2d 1024, 1029 (2001):\n\u201cA stipulation is \u2018an agreement between parties or their attorneys with respect to business before a court\u2019 (People v. Buford, 19 Ill. App. 3d 766, 770, 312 N.E.2d 796, 799 (1974)), and courts look with favor upon stipulations because \u2018 \u201cthey tend to promote disposition of cases, simplification of issues[,] and the saving of expense to litigants\u201d \u2019 (People v. Coleman, 301 Ill. App. 3d 37, 48, 704 N.E.2d 690, 698 (1998), quoting In re Estate of Moss, 109 Ill. App. 2d 185, 192, 248 N.E.2d 513, 516 (1969)).\u201d\n2. The Testing of All Individually Wrapped Packages\nDefendant also argues that Stiefvater\u2019s stipulated testimony was insufficient to prove that she tested the contents of all 18 individually wrapped packages. We disagree.\n\u201c \u2018A stipulation is to be given its natural and ordinary meaning.\u2019 \u201d People v. Horton, 143 Ill. 2d 11, 21, 570 N.E.2d 320, 324 (1991), quoting People v. Joe, 31 Ill. 2d 220, 226, 201 N.E.2d 416, 419 (1964). In this case, StiefVater\u2019s stipulated testimony provided that (1) Stiefvater received People\u2019s exhibit No. 1 (which was the clear plastic bag containing the individually wrapped packages) in a sealed condition; (2) she determined that People\u2019s exhibit No. 1 contained 18 plastic Baggies; (3) she tested the contents of People\u2019s exhibit No. 1; and (4) the contents of the plastic Baggies contained \u201c1.8 grams of off-white chunk substance, being the net weight of chunky substance, cocaine being present as the base.\u201d Giving the stipulation its natural and ordinary meaning, we conclude that it adequately shows that Stiefvater tested all 18 of the individually wrapped packages.\nMoreover, to the extent that the stipulation could be viewed as ambiguous regarding whether Stiefvater tested all 18 packages, defense counsel cured any ambiguity during the following colloquy that took place outside the jury\u2019s presence and after the stipulation was read to the jury:\n\u201c[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: There is \u2014 there is one other matter I wanted to just \u2014 I want to inform the court so the court is aware of it, I have examined a transcript of the lab witness\u2019s testimony, [and it] does appear from the transcript at the previous trial that she had tested all 18\u2014\n[PROSECUTOR]: Yes.\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: \u2014[B]aggies. And so we weren\u2019t \u2014 there had been an attack available in the case law concerning whether this had been selective testing as far as the gram weight of things[,] and I was aware of [that] at the time I made the stipulation.\nTHE COURT: All right. Thank you.\n[PROSECUTOR]: If she had testified[,] I would have brought that out, but\u2014\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes.\u201d\nIn light of defense counsel\u2019s express concession that Stiefvater tested all 18 individually wrapped packages, we conclude that defendant cannot now challenge the stipulation on the ground that it failed to so indicate. See People v. Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d 52, 114, 792 N.E.2d 1163, 1202 (2001) (when a party procures or invites the admission of evidence, he cannot challenge on appeal the admission of that evidence).\nB. Defendant\u2019s Claim That the State Failed To Establish a Proper Chain of Custody\nDefendant also argues that the State failed to establish a proper chain of custody for the admission of People\u2019s exhibit No. 1 (the clear plastic bag containing 18 individually wrapped packages of cocaine) because (1) a discrepancy existed as to the number of individually wrapped packages seized by Thompson and the number tested by Stiefvater and (2) no witness testified as to what inventory number was assigned to People\u2019s exhibit No. 1. We disagree.\nBefore the trial court may admit real evidence at trial, the State must provide an adequate foundation either by way of live testimony or stipulation that establishes that (1) the item sought to be admitted is the actual item involved in the alleged offense and (2) the item\u2019s-condition is substantially unchanged. If an item is not readily identifiable or is susceptible to alteration by tampering or contamination, the State must establish its chain of custody with sufficient completeness to render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged, contaminated, or tampered with. People v. Fox, 337 Ill. App. 3d 477, 481, 786 N.E.2d 563, 567 (2003).\nUnless the defendant produces actual evidence of tampering, substitution, or contamination, the State need only establish a probability that tampering, substitution, or contamination did not occur, and any deficiencies go to the weight rather than the admissibility of the evidence. People v. Herrero, 324 Ill. App. 3d 876, 882, 756 N.E.2d 234, 241 (2001).\nThe purpose of protective measures is to ensure that the substance recovered from the defendant was the same one as the substance tested by the forensic chemist. Fox, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 481-82, 786 N.E.2d at 567. Proof of delivery, presence, and safekeeping demonstrates that reasonable measures were taken to protect the\nevidence. People v. Gibson, 287 Ill. App. 3d 878, 882, 679 N.E.2d 419, 422 (1997). The State is not required to exclude every possibility of tampering, nor does it need to present every individual involved in the chain of custody. Fox, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 482, 786 N.E.2d at 567.\nIn this case, defendant did not produce actual evidence of tampering, substitution, or contamination. Thus, the State had the burden to prove the chain of custody with sufficient completeness to establish a probability that (1) reasonable measures were employed to protect the evidence from the time it was seized and (2) it was improbable the evidence was altered. Fox, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 481, 786 N.E.2d at 567.\nHaving thoroughly reviewed the record, we conclude that the State proved the chain of custody with sufficient completeness to establish a probability that (1) the police used reasonable measures to protect People\u2019s exhibit No. 1 from the time Thompson retrieved it from the trash can until Stiefvater received it and (2) it was improbable that People\u2019s exhibit No. 1 was altered or substituted. In so concluding, we reject defendant\u2019s contention that a discrepancy in the number of individually wrapped packages seized versus the number tested rendered the State\u2019s chain of custody insufficient. Although Wasson initially testified that the clear plastic bag contained 19 individually wrapped packages, he later testified that the total was either 18 or 19. Thus, his final testimony on that issue did not result in a discrepancy as to the number of individually wrapped packages that was fatal to the State\u2019s chain of custody. Instead, any discrepancy simply went to the weight of the evidence. See People v. Carroll, 227 Ill. App. 3d 144, 147-48, 590 N.E.2d 1010, 1013 (1992) (Baggies of cannabis were admissible despite police officer\u2019s unclear and inconsistent testimony as to the number of Baggies recovered and processed as evidence).\nNor do we agree with defendant that the lack of testimony as to the specific inventory number assigned to People\u2019s exhibit No. 1 rendered the State\u2019s chain-of-custody evidence insufficient. In this regard, we note that Soderstrom identified the inventory tag he filled out for People\u2019s exhibit No. 1, which was attached to the paper bag when he placed it in the evidence locker. Further, as earlier stated, Soderstrom identified exhibit No. 1 based on (1) his handwriting on the inventory tag and (2) his recollection of filling out the tag for that particular item of evidence. Thomason also identified People\u2019s exhibit No. 1 and the inventory tag that was still attached to it after it had been sent to, and returned by, Stiefvater. This evidence was sufficient to establish a reasonable probability that the evidence was not altered or substituted. See Herrero, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 882, 756 N.E.2d at 241.\nC. The Trial Court\u2019s Juror-Replacement Procedure\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred by replacing Gilpin with Lewis after the jury began deliberating. Specifically, he contends that the court violated section 115 \u2014 4(g) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 4(g) (West 2000)) and Supreme Court Rule 434(e) (134 Ill. 2d R. 434(e)), both of which provide, in pertinent part, that \u201c[i]f before the final submission of a cause,\u201d a juror dies or is discharged, the trial court shall replace him with an alternate juror. Defendant also asserts that the court compounded its error by failing to (1) ascertain whether Lewis had discussed the case with anyone or formed an opinion and (2) instruct the jury to begin its deliberations anew. Defendant concedes that by fading to raise a timely objection at trial or in his posttrial motion, he has forfeited this issue on appeal. Nonetheless, he urges us to review it under the plain-error rule.\nOur supreme court has addressed the issue of plain error as follows:\n\u201c \u2018 \u201c[B]efore an appellate court can correct an error not raised at trial, there must be (1) \u2018error,\u2019 (2) that is \u2018plain,\u2019 and (3) that \u2018affect[s] substantial rights.\u2019 \u201d [Citation.] \u201cIf all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.\u201d \u2019 \u201d People v. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d 335, 348, 788 N.E.2d 1117, 1124 (2001), quoting United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631-32, 152 L. Ed. 2d 860, 868, 122 S. Ct. 1781, 1785 (2002), quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467, 137 L. Ed. 2d 718, 727, 117 S. Ct. 1544, 1549 (1997).\nSee People v. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d 1, 17, 660 N.E.2d 901, 909-10 (1995) (\u201cPlain error marked by \u2018fundamental [unjfairness\u2019 occurs only in situations which \u2018reveal breakdowns in the adversary system,\u2019 as distinguished from \u2018typical trial mistakes.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d).\nThis court will take our supreme court at its word and find plain error only in exceptional circumstances in which \u201c \u2018 \u201cthe error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d at 348, 788 N.E.2d at 1124, quoting Cotton, 535 U.S. at 631, 152 L. Ed. 2d at 868, 122 S. Ct. at 1785, quoting Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 727, 117 S. Ct. at 1549. The alleged error in this case falls far short of this standard. In so concluding, we note that (1) Lewis (a) was subject to the same selection procedure as the other jurors, (b) took the same oath as the other jurors, and (c) heard the evidence and was instructed on the law; (2) the trial court explicitly admonished Lewis that (a) it was not completely discharging her as an alternate juror and (b) she should not talk with anyone about the case until the court knew whether Gilpin could complete his service; (3) defense counsel had no objection to, or concern about, the court\u2019s juror-replacement procedure; (4) Lewis had been released for only 45 minutes before being recalled; (5) although the record does not show where Lewis spent those 45 minutes, it does indicate that (a) during that time, she was \u201cisolated and separated from the other jurors\u201d and (b) when Gilpin could not continue, Lewis was \u201cimmediately available\u201d; (6) after Lewis replaced Gilpin, the jury deliberated for almost 4V2 hours before reaching a verdict; and (7) nothing in the record shows that Lewis (a) had impermissible contact with an outsider that prejudiced defendant, (b) was coerced by a jury that had already come to a decision, or (c) was unable or unwilling to render a fair decision.\nWe find support for our decision in People v. Henderson, 45 Ill. App. 3d 798, 359 N.E.2d 909 (1977). In that case, the defendant was tried before a jury of 12 regular and 2 alternate jurors. After instructing the jury, the trial court discharged the two alternate jurors, and the remaining jurors began deliberating. About 2V2 hours after deliberations began, one of the jurors suffered a heart attack. The court stopped deliberations and recalled the two alternate jurors. The court then questioned the alternate jurors about their activities during the 2V2-hour period. The first alternate admitted talking to his wife about the case but stated that his wife expressed no opinion. The first alternate also denied having reached a decision regarding the defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence. The court then recalled the first alternate, and five hours later, the jury returned a guilty verdict. Henderson, 45 Ill. App. 3d at 800, 359 N.E.2d at 911.\nOn appeal, the Henderson court first concluded that the defendant had forfeited his right to challenge the \u201cmere irregularity\u201d of the trial court\u2019s juror-replacement procedure by acquiescing in the court\u2019s actions. Henderson, 45 Ill. App. 3d at 801-02, 359 N.E.2d at 912-13. The court further concluded that the court\u2019s replacement of the sick juror after deliberations had begun did not constitute plain error where the defendant failed to show that he suffered prejudice. Henderson, 45 Ill. App. 3d at 805, 359 N.E.2d at 915. In this regard, the court noted that (1) defense counsel acquiesced to the juror-replacement procedure; (2) the trial court had thoroughly examined the alternate to assure his impartiality prior to replacing the sick juror; (3) the reconstituted jury deliberated for five hours before reaching a verdict; and (4) no evidence showed that the alternate juror could not render a fair decision.\nSimilarly, in this case, nothing in the record indicates that defendant was prejudiced by the trial court\u2019s replacing Gilpin with Lewis. D. The Trial Court\u2019s Reliance on Evidence Outside the Record in Denying Defendant\u2019s Posttrial Motion\nDefendant also argues that the trial court erred by relying on evidence outside the record in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal or a new trial. Specifically, defendant contends that the court improperly relied on Cox\u2019s testimony from his first trial in rejecting his sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, thus denying him due process and entitling him to a remand for a new hearing on his posttrial motion. We are not persuaded.\nIn support of his argument, defendant cites People v. Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d 274, 323, 604 N.E.2d 877, 901 (1992), in which the supreme court concluded that the defendant\u2019s due-process rights were violated because the trial court failed to recall certain testimony in denying the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress his confession. In that case, the trial court expressly based its denial of the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress on its belief that the defendant never testified that he (1) believed he was not free to leave the police station or (2) was denied permission to leave police custody. Contrary to the court\u2019s understanding, the record showed that the defendant in fact testified that he believed he was not free to leave police custody. Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d at 321-22, 604 N.E.2d at 900-01.\nOn appeal, the supreme court concluded that the defendant\u2019s due-process rights were violated because the trial court clearly failed to recall the crux of the defendant\u2019s testimony regarding the decisive issue of whether he was free to leave police custody. The supreme court reasoned that if the trial court had recalled, considered, and believed the defendant\u2019s testimony, that testimony would have supported the defendant\u2019s claim of illegal seizure, and the trial court thus should have suppressed his confession. Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d at 322, 604 N.E.2d at 901. Ultimately, however, the supreme court determined that the error was harmless in light of other evidence that supported a guilty verdict. Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d at 326, 604 N.E.2d at 903.\nIn this case, defendant filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal or a new trial, arguing that the State failed to (1) prove that he had intent to deliver the cocaine and (2) establish a sufficient chain of evidence for People\u2019s exhibit No. 1. At an October 2002 hearing on that motion, defense counsel argued, in part, that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant intended to deliver the cocaine. In that regard, defense counsel argued that the State\u2019s evidence was \u201ca little sparse\u201d because \u201cthere was one officer who had been to a seminar or two who said that he had had training and that apparently [the] number [of individually wrapped packages] made an inference of possession with \u2014 or that the packaging was for sale or distribution.\u201d\nIn denying defendant\u2019s motion, the trial court commented on testimony presented by Cox at defendant\u2019s first trial, not his second trial, which is the subject of this appeal. The court specifically commented on Cox\u2019s testimony, in pertinent part, as follows:\n\u201cThe officer who testified was a 24[-]year officer with the Danville [p]olice [department who *** since 1977 when he began[;] he had been to eveiy narcotics class that had been offered for police officers in the area that he knew of. He had over 500 hours of training, 2 years in the metropolitan enforcement group as an undercover officer, several hundred of his own contact[s] of drug dealers and users on a regular basis in the street, [and] was well-familiar with the process of packaging and selling the rocks. [The cocaine] [Recovered [was] packaged in what were referred to as dime bags. *** So the bottom line, as he put it, was that this had been broken down for sale ***,\u201d\nThe trial court here obviously erred by referring to Cox\u2019s testimony from defendant\u2019s first trial when discussing the sufficiency of the evidence at defendant\u2019s second trial. However, unlike in Mitchell, had the court recalled and considered Wasson\u2019s testimony (as opposed to Cox\u2019s testimony in the first trial), we have no reason to believe that the court\u2019s decision on defendant\u2019s motion would have been different. In this regard, we note the following: (1) although Wasson did not have as much experience in drug enforcement as did Cox, no one questioned his qualifications to give an opinion regarding whether the 1.8 grams of cocaine was packaged and intended for sale; and (2) Wasson opined that based on the amount of cocaine that defendant possessed and the manner in which the cocaine was packaged, the individually wrapped packages were for sale, not personal use. See People v. Abdullah, 336 Ill. App. 3d 940, 947-48, 949-50, 785 N.E.2d 863, 870, 871 (2002) (in ruling on a motion for a judgment of acquittal, the court should look at all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, asking whether a reasonable person could fairly find the defendant guilty; in ruling on a motion for a new trial, the court should consider whether the jury\u2019s verdict was supported by the evidence). Because the court\u2019s decision would not have been different had the court corrected its error and considered Wasson\u2019s testimony, we conclude that defendant was not denied due process. We thus deny defendant\u2019s request to remand this case for a new hearing on his posttrial motion.\nE. Sufficiency of the Evidence\nThe material in this section is nonpublishable under Supreme Court Rule 23 (166 Ill. 2d R. 23).\nF. Defendant\u2019s Claim That He Received Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel\nLast, defendant argues that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Specifically, he contends that his counsel was ineffective in that he (1) should have filed a motion to suppress the seized cocaine and his statements to Cox on the ground that police lacked probable cause to arrest him in the first instance and (2) failed to cross-examine Wasson as to defendant\u2019s intent to deliver.\nIneffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are judged under the now-familiar standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must first demonstrate that his defense counsel\u2019s performance was deficient in that \u201ccounsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the \u2018counsel\u2019 guaranteed the defendant by the [s]ixth [ajmendment.\u201d Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. In so doing, a defendant must overcome the strong presumption that the challenged action or inaction of counsel was the product of sound trial strategy and not of incompetence. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 694-95, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. Second, a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for defense counsel\u2019s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. Both prongs of the Strickland test must be satisfied before a defendant can prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 397-98, 701 N.E.2d 1063, 1079 (1998).\nIn People v. Kunze, 193 Ill. App. 3d 708, 726, 550 N.E.2d 284, 296 (1990), this court held that adjudication of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is often better made in proceedings on a petition for postconviction relief, where a complete record can be made. In Kunze, 193 Ill. App. 3d at 725, 550 N.E.2d at 296, the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim turned on whether the defendant would have testified had he known in advance that the State would use his prior convictions to impeach him. Because nothing in the record permitted such a determination to be made, this court declined to adjudicate the defendant\u2019s claim. Kunze, 193 Ill. App. 3d at 725-26, 550 N.E.2d at 296.\nIn addition, in Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 155 L. Ed. 2d 714, 123 S. Ct. 1690 (2003), the United States Supreme Court provided a thorough analysis regarding why it is preferable that ineffective-assistance claims be considered on collateral review rather than on direct appeal. In that case, the Supreme Court considered the rule of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals requiring that a defendant who is represented by new counsel on appeal raise any ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal if ineffectiveness was evident from the record. Massaro, 538 U.S. at 500, 155 L. Ed. 2d at 719-22, 123 S. Ct. at 1693-95. The Supreme Court rejected that rule, stating, in pertinent part, as follows:\n\u201cWhen an ineffective-assistance claim is brought on direct appeal, appellate counsel and the court must proceed on a trial record not developed precisely for the object of litigating or preserving the claim and thus often incomplete or inadequate for this purpose. Under [Strickland], a defendant claiming ineffective counsel must show that counsel\u2019s actions were not supported by a reasonable strategy and that the error was prejudicial. The evidence introduced at trial, however, will be devoted to issues of guilt or innocence, and the resulting record in many cases will not disclose the facts necessary to decide either prong of the Strickland analysis. If the alleged error is one of commission, the record may reflect the action taken by counsel but not the reasons for it. The appellate court may have no way of knowing whether a seemingly unusual or misguided action by counsel had a sound strategic motive or was taken because the counsel\u2019s alternatives were even worse. See [Guinan v. United States, 6 F.3d 468, 473 (7th Cir. 1993)] (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (\u2018No matter how odd or deficient trial counsel\u2019s performance may seem, that lawyer may have had a reason for acting as he did .... Or it may turn out that counsel\u2019s overall performance was sufficient despite a glaring omission ...\u2019).\u201d Massaro, 538 U.S. at 504-05, 155 L. Ed. 2d at 720, 123 S. Ct. at 1694.\nSee People v. Holloman, 304 Ill. App. 3d 177, 186, 709 N.E.2d 969, 975 (1999) (in which this court declined to address on direct appeal whether trial counsel\u2019s failure to file a motion to suppress evidence constituted ineffective assistance where the record contained nothing to review with respect to the officer\u2019s actions or the defendant\u2019s standing to raise fourth amendment issues).\nSimilarly, in this case, whether defendant suffered prejudice for his trial counsel\u2019s failure to move to suppress evidence arising from defendant\u2019s arrest depends on the likelihood of the motion\u2019s success. However, the record is devoid of factual findings on the issues pertinent to defendant\u2019s claim. Because the record contains nothing to review with respect to the appropriateness of the police officers\u2019 actions surrounding defendant\u2019s arrest, we decline to consider defendant\u2019s argument. In so doing, we note that the argument defendant makes is almost never appropriate on direct appeal because absent a motion to suppress, it is highly unlikely that the State would garner its resources to prove the propriety of the officers\u2019 actions. Thus, in such cases, we cannot be certain that the record contains all of the evidence that could have been presented on the issue.\nThe record also contains nothing to review with respect to (1) why defense counsel chose to cross-examine Wasson in the manner he did or (2) whether counsel\u2019s decision to cross-examine Wasson as he did constituted a sound trial tactic or incompetence. Further, other than two questions that Wasson was asked at defendant\u2019s first trial\u2014 namely, (1) whether a drug user could use 1.8 grams of cocaine in less than one week; and (2) whether a person could buy 1.8 grams of cocaine already packaged in 18 individual packages \u2014 the record does not suggest how Wasson would have answered the questions that defendant claims counsel should have asked. Because the answers to the questions pertinent to defendant\u2019s claim are currently de hors the record, we decline to consider them. Instead, defendant may pursue his claim under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1 through 122 \u2014 8 (West 2002)). See People v. Cameron, 336 Ill. App. 3d 548, 552, 784 N.E.2d 438, 441 (2003) (in which this court reaffirmed our decision in Kunze and declined to address on direct appeal whether trial counsel\u2019s failure to request a certain jury instruction constituted ineffective assistance); People v. Neylon, 327 Ill. App. 3d 300, 312, 762 N.E.2d 1127, 1138 (2002) (reaffirming Kunze and declining to address on direct appeal whether trial counsel\u2019s failure to make an offer of proof constituted ineffective assistance of counsel); In re Carmody, 274 Ill. App. 3d 46, 56, 653 N.E.2d 977, 984 (1995) (noting that the record on direct appeal of a criminal case rarely contains any explanation of the tactics of trial counsel, and holding that, if those tactics are to be the subject of scrutiny, a record should be developed in which they can effectively be reviewed).\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nAffirmed.\nKNECHT, P.J., and MYERSCOUGH, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Shawn O\u2019Toole (argued), both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Frank Young, State\u2019s Attorney, of Danville (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Linda Susan McClain (argued), all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MAURICE DURGAN, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4 \u2014 02\u20140907\nArgued March 9, 2004.\nOpinion filed March 30, 2004.\nRehearing denied April 27, 2004.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Shawn O\u2019Toole (argued), both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nFrank Young, State\u2019s Attorney, of Danville (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Linda Susan McClain (argued), all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1121-01", "first_page_order": 1139, "last_page_order": 1161 }