{ "id": 3949964, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES COKLEY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Cokley", "decision_date": "2004-03-12", "docket_number": "No. 1-02-0701", "first_page": "292", "last_page": "303", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "347 Ill. App. 3d 292" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "702 N.E.2d 299", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "302", "parenthetical": "case may be remanded for retrial only if prosecution at first trial presented evidence sufficient to sustain conviction beyond reasonable doubt" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 Ill. App. 3d 944", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 221441 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "949", "parenthetical": "case may be remanded for retrial only if prosecution at first trial presented evidence sufficient to sustain conviction beyond reasonable doubt" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/299/0944-01" ] }, { "cite": "565 N.E.2d 975", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "979-80", "parenthetical": "\"The double jeopardy clause precludes the State from retrying a defendant once a reviewing court has determined that the evidence introduced at trial was legally insufficient to convict\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 Ill. 2d 163", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3238477 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "173-74", "parenthetical": "\"The double jeopardy clause precludes the State from retrying a defendant once a reviewing court has determined that the evidence introduced at trial was legally insufficient to convict\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/141/0163-01" ] }, { "cite": "488 N.E.2d 949", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "961" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 514", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3126394 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "536-37" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "716 N.E.2d 312", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "316", "parenthetical": "where defendant does not receive effective assistance of counsel but evidence is sufficient to convict, proper remedy is to reverse defendant's conviction and remand for new trial." }, { "page": "316" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 Ill. App. 3d 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1336021 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "356", "parenthetical": "where defendant does not receive effective assistance of counsel but evidence is sufficient to convict, proper remedy is to reverse defendant's conviction and remand for new trial." }, { "page": "356" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/306/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "747 N.E.2d 1081", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1091" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 Ill. App. 3d 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 132358 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "533" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/321/0523-01" ] }, { "cite": "271 N.E.2d 37", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "43" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 Ill. 2d 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2906557 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/48/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "422 U.S. 590", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9639 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/422/0590-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 U.S. 265", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6165142 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/365/0265-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 U.S. 471", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 450611 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484-85" }, { "page": "453-54" }, { "page": "416" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/371/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "773 N.E.2d 59", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "64" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 Ill. App. 3d 425", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1033920 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/332/0425-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 N.E.2d 343", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "35 Ill. App. 3d 725", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5304611 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/35/0725-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 N.E.2d 680", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "after issuing stop order, police received anonymous phone call that defendant was one of two men \"wanted for numerous robberies\" and learned via internal check that defendant was wanted for aggravated battery" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "16 Ill. App. 3d 252", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2519269 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "after issuing stop order, police received anonymous phone call that defendant was one of two men \"wanted for numerous robberies\" and learned via internal check that defendant was wanted for aggravated battery" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/16/0252-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 N.E.2d 1003", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "patrol officer who recognized defendant and stopped defendant's car in accordance with stop order following gas station robbery saw gun in plain view on rear seat" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 Ill. App. 3d 929", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3174861 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "patrol officer who recognized defendant and stopped defendant's car in accordance with stop order following gas station robbery saw gun in plain view on rear seat" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/88/0929-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 N.E.2d 135", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "victims of attempted murder and armed robbery identified defendant after viewing about 400 photographs in police collection" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 Ill. App. 3d 1017", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3202500 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "victims of attempted murder and armed robbery identified defendant after viewing about 400 photographs in police collection" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/84/1017-01" ] }, { "cite": "479 N.E.2d 1121", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"entirety of the record,\" including defendant's suspicious actions, information from anonymous tip and confidential informant, and advisory from neighboring police department that defendant was wanted for investigation constituted probable cause to arrest" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "134 Ill. App. 3d 262", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3636697 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"entirety of the record,\" including defendant's suspicious actions, information from anonymous tip and confidential informant, and advisory from neighboring police department that defendant was wanted for investigation constituted probable cause to arrest" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/134/0262-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 N.E.2d 350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "355" }, { "page": "355" }, { "page": "356" }, { "page": "356" }, { "page": "356" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "516 N.E.2d 491", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "495" }, { "page": "495" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "163 Ill. App. 3d 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3547478 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86" }, { "page": "87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/163/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 U.S. 213", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6187462 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233" }, { "page": "545" }, { "page": "2329" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/462/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 U.S. 31", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6179569 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "36", "parenthetical": "\"We have made clear that the kinds and degree of proof and the procedural requirements necessary for a conviction are not prerequisites to a valid arrest\"" }, { "page": "349", "parenthetical": "\"We have made clear that the kinds and degree of proof and the procedural requirements necessary for a conviction are not prerequisites to a valid arrest\"" }, { "page": "2631", "parenthetical": "\"We have made clear that the kinds and degree of proof and the procedural requirements necessary for a conviction are not prerequisites to a valid arrest\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/443/0031-01" ] }, { "cite": "598 N.E.2d 984", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "997" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 Ill. App. 3d 153", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5203846 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "173" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/231/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 U.S. 200", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1531819 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/442/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 N.E.2d 275", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278" }, { "page": "278" }, { "page": "279" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3106533 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7" }, { "page": "7" }, { "page": "10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/94/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "728 N.E.2d 695", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "702" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 Ill. App. 3d 920", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 411685 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "925" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/312/0920-01" ] }, { "cite": "750 N.E.2d 745", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "749-50" }, { "page": "750" }, { "page": "752" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 Ill. App. 3d 607", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 126373 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "610-11" }, { "page": "611" }, { "page": "613-14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/322/0607-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 12, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "694" }, { "page": "698" }, { "page": "2068" }, { "page": "688" }, { "page": "693" }, { "page": "2064" }, { "page": "694" }, { "page": "698" }, { "page": "2068" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1168, "char_count": 28250, "ocr_confidence": 0.767, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.061447019797991e-08, "percentile": 0.3175839595281424 }, "sha256": "9ebde262a531fde8b6685a3c949d021025958e9393322f48facf9e26c8e2b86c", "simhash": "1:0aad15ee7f4e1d40", "word_count": 4599 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:28:47.759631+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "O\u2019MARA FROSSARD, EJ., and FITZGERALD SMITH, J, concur." ], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES COKLEY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GALLAGHER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial, defendant James Cokley was convicted of residential burglary and possession of a controlled substance and was sentenced to eight years and one year in prison, respectively, with those sentences to be served concurrently. On appeal, defendant contends that: (1) his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move for separate trials on the two charges against defendant; (2) trial counsel also was ineffective in failing to file a motion to quash defendant\u2019s arrest and suppress evidence because defendant was arrested without a warrant and police lacked probable cause to arrest him; and (3) the trial court excluded relevant testimony that supported defendant\u2019s alibi and his claim that his inculpatory statement was coerced. Based on our resolution of the second issue, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for retrial.\nThe State charged defendant with committing a residential burglary on February 12, 2001, and with possessing heroin on March 18, 2001. Defendant was tried simultaneously on both counts. At trial, Henry Barsch, a Chicago police officer whose duties then included crime pattern investigation and monitoring narcotics activity, testified that on February 12, 2001, he arrived home at his condominium at 3720 West 111th Street in Chicago. Barsch left home at about noon, leaving his weapon on a desk and locking the door behind him. When Barsch returned at about 2:30 p.m., he noticed that his gun was gone and subsequently discovered that a leather jacket, about $120 in cash and some of his wife\u2019s jewelry also were missing. Barsch observed pry marks on the door to his unit and on the building\u2019s back door.\nBarsch testified that on March 18, 2001, he and a partner were performing surveillance on 8755 South Crandon in response to a stop order for defendant relating to the burglary of Barsch\u2019s residence. Barsch explained that a stop order alerts officers to hold an individual for questioning regarding an offense should that person be stopped for another reason. A license plate check of a maroon Toyota Camry parked on the street in front of 8755 South Crandon indicated that the car was registered to defendant at that address.\nBarsch testified that defendant left 8755 South Crandon and retrieved a Crown Royal bag from the Camry. Barsch and other officers approached defendant, took the bag from him and found that it contained what was later stipulated to be .4 grams of heroin. On cross-examination, Barsch testified that his district did not include 8755 South Crandon but that his surveillance was in response to the stop order for defendant. Chicago police officer Katalinic testified that after he and other officers recovered the Crown Royal bag from defendant, defendant was arrested and taken to the 4th District police station.\nSuzanne Deane testified that she lived in a second-floor condominium at the back of Barsch\u2019s building. On February 12, 2001, Deane was sitting in her living room near a sliding glass door to her balcony, which overlooked the parking lot. She saw a man drive a maroon Toyota Camry into the lot and back the car into a parking space. Deane identified defendant in court as the driver and sole occupant of the Camry.\nDeane testified that defendant got out of the car and looked up at the building\u2019s top floors. Defendant walked toward the building; however, Deane could not see if he entered the building because the building entrance is directly under her balcony. Deane also did not see defendant leave the building but noted at about 2:30 or 3 p.m. that the maroon Camry was gone. About one week later, Deane identified defendant in a six-picture police photo array. She also selected defendant in a six-man police lineup the day after his drug arrest.\nOn cross-examination, Deane stated that during her preliminary hearing testimony, she did not describe the maroon car as a Camry. She said defendant arrived at her building between 1:45 and 2:15 p.m. She did not see anything in defendant\u2019s hands. On redirect examination, Deane said that defendant wore an overcoat that extended past his knees. Deane said she was not asked at the preliminary hearing what type of car defendant was driving.\nChicago police detective Susan Joyce testified that no usable fingerprints were recovered from Barsch\u2019s residence. Detective Joyce interviewed Deane on February 15 and again on February 27, when Deane identified defendant in a photo array. The detective testified that as a result of Deane\u2019s identification, an investigative alert was issued, which informed officers that defendant was wanted for questioning in the residential burglary investigation.\nDetective Joyce interrogated defendant after he appeared in the March 19 lineup. She informed defendant of his Miranda rights, which defendant indicated that he understood, and told him he had been positively identified in the lineup. Defendant then admitted to the burglary, stating that he and a man he called Kiki drove to 3720 West 111th Street in his Toyota because Kiki intended to commit a burglary there. Defendant and Kiki entered the building after prying open the building\u2019s back door. Kiki entered a unit on an upper floor and remained there for about 20 minutes while defendant acted as a lookout on the first floor. Defendant said Kiki returned with a leather bag containing a gun and some jewelry and Kiki gave him $100.\nAt the close of the State\u2019s case, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict on the residential burglary count. Stating that defendant did not contest the drug charge, defense counsel argued that the testimony of Barsch and Deane was insufficient to show that defendant committed residential burglary and that defendant\u2019s purported confession conflicted with Deane\u2019s account that she saw defendant enter the building alone. The trial court denied the defense\u2019s motion for a directed verdict.\nThe defense presented alibi testimony from defendant and Johnny Johnston, his manager at United Parcel Service (UPS) in Hodgkins. Johnston testified that defendant worked as a utility person, cleaning trailers and equipment and performing miscellaneous tasks. Johnston stated that defendant\u2019s February 12, 2001, timecard indicated that defendant began work that day at 5:47 a.m. and took a lunch break from 11:30 a.m. to noon. The last entry on defendant\u2019s timecard showed that defendant started his last task at 2:08 p.m. and ended at 2:30 p.m. Johnston stated that an employee\u2019s user identification and password were needed to make such entries.\nOn cross-examination, Johnston acknowledged that defendant\u2019s timecard showed that an alteration was made to the entry that indicated he finished a job at noon; the card was changed to show that defendant completed a task at 11:30 a.m. Johnston said he did not monitor whether timecard entries corresponded with the work that employee was doing or when the employee finished a job. He said employees could make entries on each other\u2019s timecards if they exchanged passwords. On redirect, defense counsel asked Johnston if employees were penalized for not doing the work indicated on their timecard. The State objected, and the trial court sustained the objection. Counsel asked if defendant was penalized on February 12, 2001, for taking a longer lunch than shown on his timecard. The court again sustained the State\u2019s objection.\nDefendant testified that he lived at 8755 South Crandon. Defendant admitted to possessing heroin on March 18, 2001, and stated that he had served two years of probation for a previous drug conviction. When asked if he \u201cremembered the events of February 12, 2001,\u201d defendant replied \u201cnot really\u201d because it was \u201cjust another day.\u201d Defendant denied participating in the burglary of Barsch\u2019s residence, stating that he was at work at the time. He stated he had never been to 3720 West 111th Street until recently when, at his attorney\u2019s request, defendant drove there from the UPS building to see how long it took to travel between those locations. The trip took about 22 minutes. Defendant said that while working at UPS, he wore a blue shirt, dark blue pants, work boots and safety glasses. He said he created his computer password and no one else knew it.\nDefendant testified that he confessed to the burglary \u201cunder coercion.\u201d He said that after Detective Joyce interviewed him about the burglary, he spoke to a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent whose name he could not recall. Defendant said he did not write out or sign a statement for Detective Joyce but rather that the detective was \u201cfeeding [him] lines\u201d and he \u201cjust kind of agreed with what she was saying.\u201d When asked why he confessed, defendant said he thought he would be charged with a federal crime.\nOn cross-examination, defendant stated that he owned a maroon Toyota Camry. He admitted possessing heroin at the time of his arrest but denied that it was in a Crown Royal bag. Defendant said Detective Joyce and the FBI agent told him certain facts to include in his confession but that he offered other facts on his own. The defense rested.\nThe jury found defendant guilty of residential burglary and possession of a controlled substance. In his motion for a new trial, defendant argued that the trial court prevented him from offering testimony that he believed the officers who took his inculpatory statement were coercive. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion and, after considering factors in aggravation and mitigation, sentenced defendant to eight years in prison for the residential burglary and a concurrent one-year sentence for possession of a controlled substance.\nOn appeal, we first address defendant\u2019s contention that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence. Defendant contends that when police arrested him on March 18 outside his home, the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him. He argues that the officers did not have sufficient evidence to reasonably believe he had committed a crime; rather, via the stop order, they knew only that defendant was seen in the parking lot of Barsch\u2019s building at about the time the burglary occurred. Defendant claims his counsel\u2019s failure to raise this issue at trial was unreasonable and that because the police arrested him without a warrant or probable cause, the heroin, the lineup identification and his inculpatory statement must be suppressed as the fruit of his illegal arrest. Defendant asks this court to reverse his convictions and remand his case for a new trial or, in the alternative, a suppression hearing at which the trial court can consider further evidence on the legality of his arrest.\nThe State responds that because defense counsel did not challenge the circumstances surrounding defendant\u2019s arrest and move to quash the arrest and suppress evidence, prosecutors lacked the opportunity to present in the trial court all of the evidence relevant to the issue of probable cause. Absent such evidence, the State contends, this court cannot determine whether defense counsel\u2019s decision was unreasonable. Nevertheless, the State asserts that Deane\u2019s testimony and the stop order constituted probable cause for the officers to arrest defendant and argues that this court should presume defense counsel\u2019s performance was reasonable and that the decision not to file the motion amounted to trial strategy.\nHowever, defendant replies that aside from Deane\u2019s testimony identifying him in the parking lot, no evidence linked him to the burglary of Barsch\u2019s residence. He asserts that because Deane\u2019s testimony does not establish probable cause for his arrest, a reasonable probability existed that a motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence would have been successful, thus leaving no evidence to support either conviction.\nTo demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), a defendant must show that counsel\u2019s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant such that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Proof that the defendant was prejudiced by counsel\u2019s deficient performance requires an affirmative showing of a \u201creasonable probability that, but for counsel\u2019s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.\u201d Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. Counsel\u2019s decision not to file a motion to quash a defendant\u2019s arrest and suppress evidence does not automatically constitute incompetence because such a decision is traditionally viewed as one of trial strategy, and a defendant must overcome the strong presumption that counsel\u2019s actions were the result of that strategy and not an indication of incompetence. People v. Little, 322 Ill. App. 3d 607, 610-11, 750 N.E.2d 745, 749-50 (2001); see also People v. Rodriguez, 312 Ill. App. 3d 920, 925, 728 N.E.2d 695, 702 (2000). To support a conclusion that defense counsel was ineffective in failing to file a motion to quash and suppress, a defendant must show that a reasonable probability exists that the motion would have been granted and also that the outcome of the trial would have been different had the trial court granted the motion. Little, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 611, 750 N.E.2d at 750.\nProbable cause exists if a police officer has knowledge of facts which would lead a reasonable person to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person arrested committed the offense. People v. Moody, 94 Ill. 2d 1, 7, 445 N.E.2d 275, 278 (1983), citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 n.9, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824, 833 n.9, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 2254 n.9 (1979). While this standard requires more than mere suspicion, an arresting officer is not required to possess evidence sufficient to convict. Moody, 94 Ill. 2d at 7, 445 N.E.2d at 278; People v. Aguinaga, 231 Ill. App. 3d 153, 173, 598 N.E.2d 984, 997 (1992); see also Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36, 61 L. Ed. 2d 343, 349, 99 S. Ct. 2627, 2631 (1979) (\u201cWe have made clear that the kinds and degree of proof and the procedural requirements necessary for a conviction are not prerequisites to a valid arrest\u201d). Whether probable cause exists is a commonsense, practical determination to be made upon examination of the totality of the circumstances presented. IIlinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 545, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2329 (1983). Moreover, \u201c[t]he inquiry must focus on what was done and known by the police, not on what was believed, what the facts objectively viewed add up to, not what the officer on the scene believed they added up to.\u201d Moody, 94 Ill. 2d at 10, 445 N.E.2d at 279.\nIn the instant case, defendant was the subject of a stop order resulting from Deane\u2019s identification of defendant in a police photo array and Deane\u2019s statement to police that she saw defendant in the parking lot of the building where the residential burglary occurred during the approximate time of the offense. The State contends that the totality of the evidence presented supported a finding of probable cause and argues that the stop order was \u201chighly probative of probable cause,\u201d citing People v. Spicer, 163 Ill. App. 3d 81, 516 N.E.2d 491 (1987). However, while the presence of a stop order is relevant to an analysis of whether probable cause existed to arrest, Spicer does not stand for the proposition that such an investigative alert, without more, is sufficient to support a finding of probable cause. In Spicer, police issued a stop order for the defendant, and the defendant contested the legality of his arrest because police entered his home without a warrant, without consent and lacking exigent circumstances. Spicer, 163 Ill. App. 3d at 86, 516 N.E.2d at 495. However, the defendant conceded that probable cause existed for his arrest, making Spicer of dubious value to a determination of the weight of a stop order in establishing probable cause. Spicer, 163 Ill. App. 3d at 87, 516 N.E.2d at 495.\nDefendant calls our attention to an appellate court decision explicitly holding that a stop order, in and of itself, is not dispositive of whether probable cause exists to support an arrest. In People v. Simpson, 129 in. App. 3d 822, 828-29, 473 N.E.2d 350, 355 (1984), police issued a stop order for the defendant following the victim\u2019s death from a gunshot wound. About two months later, after the defendant was arrested for shoplifting and questioned about the homicide, he confessed to shooting the victim. Simpson, 129 Ill. App. 3d at 829, 473 N.E.2d at 355. On appeal, the defendant argued that he was not arrested on the basis of a warrant but only after police issued an internal stop order. Simpson, 129 Ill. App. 3d at 830, 473 N.E.2d at 356. This court upheld the trial court\u2019s finding that probable cause existed to arrest the defendant based on a police officer\u2019s testimony that the defendant had threatened the victim with death or serious bodily harm, as well as the fact that the defendant gave police a false name and birth date when he was arrested for shoplifting. Simpson, 129 Ill. App. 3d at 830, 473 N.E.2d at 356. However, the appellate court noted that the trial court correctly concluded that \u201cthe officers\u2019 reliance upon a police stop order was not dispositive of whether probable cause supported the defendant\u2019s arrest for homicide.\u201d Simpson, 129 Ill. App. 3d at 831, 473 N.E.2d at 356.\nLikewise, in other cases analyzing the significance of police stop orders in establishing probable cause, the State has offered evidence other than the stop order to support probable cause findings, and it is particularly noteworthy that the additional proof was primarily elicited at pretrial suppression hearings. See People v. White, 134 Ill. App. 3d 262, 479 N.E.2d 1121 (1985) (\u201centirety of the record,\u201d including defendant\u2019s suspicious actions, information from anonymous tip and confidential informant, and advisory from neighboring police department that defendant was wanted for investigation constituted probable cause to arrest); People v. Richmond, 84 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 406 N.E.2d 135 (1980) (victims of attempted murder and armed robbery identified defendant after viewing about 400 photographs in police collection); People v. Green, 88 Ill. App. 3d 929, 410 N.E.2d 1003 (1980) (patrol officer who recognized defendant and stopped defendant\u2019s car in accordance with stop order following gas station robbery saw gun in plain view on rear seat); People v. Harper, 16 Ill. App. 3d 252, 305 N.E.2d 680 (1973) (after issuing stop order, police received anonymous phone call that defendant was one of two men \u201cwanted for numerous robberies\u201d and learned via internal check that defendant was wanted for aggravated battery). See also People v. Beard, 35 Ill. App. 3d 725, 342 N.E.2d 343 (1976).\nHaving considered that authority and the circumstances of this case, we reject the State\u2019s argument that the stop order, by itself, provided probable cause for defendant\u2019s arrest. We note that no facts were presented as to the internal police procedures that preceded the issuance of the stop order in this case, and in another situation, the facts prompting a police stop order could constitute probable cause to arrest a suspect. However, the particular facts presented to the trial court in this case were insufficient to establish probable cause to arrest defendant.\nTurning to defendant\u2019s ineffective assistance argument, the first prong of Strickland requires a showing that defense counsel\u2019s performance \u201cfell below an objective standard of reasonableness,\u201d and a defendant is required to overcome the strong presumption that the challenged action was the result of sound trial strategy and not the result of incompetence. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064; People v. Spann, 332 Ill. App. 3d 425, 430, 773 N.E.2d 59, 64 (2002). We agree with defendant that in this case, a reasonable probability exists that a motion to quash defendant\u2019s arrest and suppress evidence would have been granted. As discussed above, the stop order alone did not provide police with probable cause to arrest defendant for residential burglary. The basis for the stop order was Deane\u2019s statement to police that she saw defendant in the parking lot of her building at about the time the crime occurred. No testimony was offered that Deane saw defendant carrying items from the building or that prior to defendant\u2019s arrest, he was seen in possession of the items that Barsch reported missing.\nIt is significant that in the cases cited above, the facts were further developed through testimony presented at hearings on defense motions to quash the defendants\u2019 arrests and suppress evidence. The State asserts that in the absence of a suppression hearing in the trial court, the record before this court lacks all of the evidence relevant to a determination of probable cause. While we do not speculate as to the evidence that the State may present on remand or comment on the ultimate success of such a motion, we conclude that, based on the record that we have in this case, a reasonable probability exists that a motion to quash defendant\u2019s arrest and suppress evidence would have been successful.\nTurning to Strickland\u2019s second prong, a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for counsel\u2019s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different; a \u201creasonable probability\u201d is defined as a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. Here, \u2022 defendant was clearly prejudiced by defense counsel\u2019s failure to challenge the circumstances of his arrest. Pursuant to the exclusionary rule, evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search cannot be introduced against the defendant, absent some exception to that rule. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 453-54, 83 S. Ct. 407, 416 (1963). See also Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 5 L. Ed. 2d 551, 81 S. Ct. 534 (1961); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416, 95 S. Ct. 2254 (1975). Therefore, had the trial court granted the motion and found that defendant\u2019s arrest was illegal because the police lacked probable cause, the State would have been barred from introducing evidence flowing from that arrest, namely, the heroin in the Crown Royal bag. See People v. Abrams, 48 Ill. 2d 446, 455, 271 N.E.2d 37, 43 (1971). The State therefore would have lacked any evidence to support a charge of possession of a controlled substance. Likewise, Deane\u2019s identification of defendant in a lineup the day after his arrest, as well as defendant\u2019s inculpatory statement, also could be suppressed, thus eliminating the proof necessary for defendant\u2019s residential burglary conviction. Because the State offered no other evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt, defense counsel\u2019s failure to challenge the circumstances of defendant\u2019s arrest resulted in prejudice to defendant. For those reasons, we find defendant has satisfied both prongs of Strickland and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to quash defendant\u2019s arrest and suppress evidence.\nThe State asserts that the proper forum for defendant\u2019s ineffective assistance arguments is a postconviction petition. Defendant replies that this court is well-suited to review his ineffective assistance claim, citing People v. Little, 322 Ill. App. 3d 607, 750 N.E.2d 745 (2001), and he argues that the record contains sufficient facts to determine whether his counsel was ineffective in failing to file a motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence. We agree with Little\u2019\u2019s rejection of the argument that a postconviction proceeding is the best venue to decide a defendant\u2019s ineffective assistance claim:\n\u201cThe trial court\u2019s concern in any postconviction proceeding instituted on defendant\u2019s behalf would involve the same issue confronted by us here, namely, whether defendant\u2019s trial attorney was ineffective for not pursuing a motion to quash and suppress evidence. Any evidentiary hearing on such a postconviction petition would be aimed at determining the reasonableness of counsel\u2019s decision in electing not to pursue a pretrial suppression motion and not, as intimated by the State, conducted for purposes of determining whether the arresting officers acted with sufficient probable cause. Thus, the factual record regarding the information known and relied upon by the arresting officers would be no more developed in a postconviction proceeding than it is here. Additionally, to conclude that defendant should wait to raise his ineffective assistance claim in a collateral proceeding would unfairly subject defendant to the risk of having his contention waived or barred by res judicata.\u201d Little, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 613-14, 750 N.E.2d at 752.\nFor the reasons enunciated in Little, we disagree with the State that defendant\u2019s ineffective assistance claim is best resolved in a subsequent postconviction proceeding.\nDefendant asks this court to remand for a new trial or, in the alternative, for the trial court to hold a suppression hearing on the legality of his arrest. Having considered those forms of relief, we conclude that because defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at trial, the appropriate disposition is to reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial. People v. Smith, 321 Ill. App. 3d 523, 533, 747 N.E.2d 1081, 1091 (2001); People v. Young, 306 Ill. App. 3d 350, 356, 716 N.E.2d 312, 316 (1999) (where defendant does not receive effective assistance of counsel but evidence is sufficient to convict, proper remedy is to reverse defendant\u2019s conviction and remand for new trial.)\nAccordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and this case is remanded for retrial. In light of that relief, we need not consider defendant\u2019s remaining contentions.\nReversed and remanded.\nO\u2019MARA FROSSARD, EJ., and FITZGERALD SMITH, J, concur.\nThe record does not indicate Officer Katalinic\u2019s first name.\nThe Illinois Supreme Court has not faced the issue of the weight of a police stop order or investigative alert in determining probable cause. In People v. King, 109 Ill. 2d 514, 536-37, 488 N.E.2d 949, 961 (1986), although the defendant contended that the stop order in that case was not based on probable cause, the supreme court held the defendant waived that issue by . failing to raise it at the suppression hearing or at trial.\nWe note that defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him. To allay any double jeopardy concerns should the trial court order the suppression of the heroin, the identification of defendant, and his inculpatory statement and grant defendant a new trial, we find that the evidence presented to the trial court in this case was sufficient to convict defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Mink, 141 Ill. 2d 163, 173-74, 565 N.E.2d 975, 979-80 (1990) (\u201cThe double jeopardy clause precludes the State from retrying a defendant once a reviewing court has determined that the evidence introduced at trial was legally insufficient to convict\u201d). See also Young, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 356, 716 N.E.2d at 316; People v. Goff, 299 Ill. App. 3d 944, 949, 702 N.E.2d 299, 302 (1998) (case may be remanded for retrial only if prosecution at first trial presented evidence sufficient to sustain conviction beyond reasonable doubt). However, should the trial court on remand order the suppression of the above-described evidence, the State clearly would require other proof to try defendant again for these offenses.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GALLAGHER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Yasemin Eken, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Mary L. Boland, and Brian J. Boersma, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES COKLEY, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201402\u20140701\nOpinion filed March 12, 2004.\nRehearing denied March 30, 2004.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Yasemin Eken, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Mary L. Boland, and Brian J. Boersma, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0292-01", "first_page_order": 310, "last_page_order": 321 }