{ "id": 3950094, "name": "In re MARRIAGE OF BARBARA SLINGERLAND, Petitioner-Appellant, and JOHNATHAN SLINGERLAND, Respondent (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "In re Marriage of Slingerland", "decision_date": "2004-04-08", "docket_number": "No. 2-03-0714", "first_page": "707", "last_page": "713", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "347 Ill. App. 3d 707" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "206 Ill. App. 3d 626", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2559976 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "637", "parenthetical": "attorney's failure to appear was direct contempt regardless of his reasons for not attending because trial judge had told him the previous day that his appearance was expected and that she would not grant a continuance" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/206/0626-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 Ill. 2d 539", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3167414 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "542" }, { "page": "544" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/111/0539-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 Ill. App. 3d 1071", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1156777 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1081" }, { "page": "1081", "parenthetical": "admission of indirect contempt allows trial judge to punish party for direct contempt" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/278/1071-01" ] }, { "cite": "239 Ill. App. 3d 851", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5149167 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "854" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/239/0851-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 Ill. 2d 297", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 783182 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "306" }, { "page": "306" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/161/0297-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 Ill. App. 3d 971", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2549530 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "977" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/208/0971-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 Ill. App. 3d 711", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 910220 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "717" }, { "page": "717" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/297/0711-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 Ill. App. 3d 946", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 894540 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "949" }, { "page": "949" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/337/0946-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 Ill. 2d 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 147575 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "368" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/173/0348-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 584, "char_count": 11895, "ocr_confidence": 0.723, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.367314936401901e-08, "percentile": 0.4816213223241973 }, "sha256": "72b8d497b9f813f602f8f55fb37213490f370a420446286249f06f297638a0f5", "simhash": "1:3a4fc62611866ea0", "word_count": 1967 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:28:47.759631+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "HUTCHINSON and CALLUM, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "In re MARRIAGE OF BARBARA SLINGERLAND, Petitioner-Appellant, and JOHNATHAN SLINGERLAND, Respondent (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McLAREN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPetitioner, Barbara Slingerland, appeals the trial court\u2019s order finding her in direct criminal contempt of court. She argues that her behavior constituted, at most, indirect criminal contempt. We disagree and affirm.\nThe marriage of petitioner and respondent, Johnathan Slingerland, was dissolved in January 2001. In July 2002, respondent requested that petitioner be held in indirect civil contempt for violating various provisions of the dissolution judgment. Petitioner filed a response to the pleading as well as additional petitions. In December 2002, respondent moved to terminate maintenance. A hearing on these issues began on December 18, 2002, and continued on February 26, 2003. Both petitioner and respondent are attorneys and appeared pro se. At the latter hearing, while respondent was testifying in rebuttal about days that petitioner allegedly denied him visitation with their children, the following exchange took place:\n\u201cMRS. SLINGERLAND: Objection, there\u2019s no petition on file with regard to this. Now we\u2019re talking about days that we don\u2019t even have petitions on file for.\nTHE COURT: Ms. Slingerland, it took awhile to get to court. I\u2019m not going to go into whose fault it was or wasn\u2019t that we got to court. Since this is subsequent to his filing of the petition, I am going to let him introduce anything until today\u2019s date. So, if this has been an ongoing activity, you may testify, Mr. Slingerland.\nMRS. SLINGERLAND: That\u2019s it.\nTHE COURT: Mrs. Slingerland, sit down.\nMRS. SLINGERLAND: No, I\u2019m not going to. This is totally unfair.\nTHE COURT: Mrs. Slingerland\u2014\nMRS. SLINGERLAND: No, it\u2019s not fair.\nTHE COURT: Bailiff, would you keep Mrs. Slingerland? Mrs. Slingerland, ma\u2019am, we\u2019re going to continue with this hearing.\nMRS. SLINGERLAND: I\u2019m not even prepared for any of this.\nTHE COURT: Mrs. Slingerland, have a seat there. Mrs. Slingerland, come forward. You want to go sit in the jail, Mrs. Slingerland?\nMRS. SLINGERLAND: Yeah, I\u2019m tired, I\u2019ve had it with everything that these judges do.\nTHE COURT: Mrs. Slingerland, come forward.\nMRS. SLINGERLAND: This is not fair. Nothing has ever been fair in this case. I have had it up to here. No.\nTHE COURT: Mrs. Slingerland, I want you to come forward, please.\nMRS. SLINGERLAND: You don\u2019t know what I\u2019ve been through in this case, Judge.\nTHE COURT: Mrs. Slingerland, come forward.\nMRS. SLINGERLAND: You don\u2019t know what I\u2019ve been through with him after 20 years. Read his psychological report. He\u2019s a control freak and a jerk and then I have had to deal with Judge Pemberton and now, I can\u2019t, I don\u2019t trust any of you people. I don\u2019t trust you and I have good reasons not to trust you.\nTHE COURT: Mrs. Slingerland, this is a court of law. You are an attorney. You\u2019re licensed to practice law in the State of Illinois. You know what you\u2014\nMRS. SLINGERLAND: This is my kids. This is my life.\nTHE COURT: I have five children of my own. I understand parenthood. All right. We\u2019re going to do this by the rules. Now, if you, I\u2019ve started this proceeding, I\u2019m going to finish this. If you wish to sit there in that chair and hear what Mr. Slingerland has to say, I suggest you do it. I\u2019m not going to allow you to have any more demonstrations. At that point I\u2019m going to either kick you out or hold you in contempt.\nMRS. SLINGERLAND: I would rather be out. Nothing fair is ever going to happen here.\nTHE COURT: Mrs. Slingerland, we\u2019re going to finish this today. I would strongly recommend that you sit in court. We\u2019re not going to continue this. If you wish to have a couple minutes to compose yourself\u2014\nMRS. SLINGERLAND: I will.\nTHE COURT: We\u2019ll recess for five minutes.\n(At which time recess was held)\nTHE COURT: Mr. Slingerland, you may get back on the stand. We\u2019re back on the record. We\u2019ve been gone about 10, 15 minutes. Bailiff, is Ms. Slingerland here?\nBAILIFF BROOKS: She\u2019s in the parking lot, sir. You want me to go get her?\nBAILIFF BROOKS: She took off.\nTHE COURT: Okay, for the record we should show that Ms. Slingerland, after confrontation in court we gave her ten minutes to compose herself, she left. At this point even though she\u2019s not present, Mr. Slingerland, I am going to let you as briefly as you can finish up your case in chief and that way I\u2019ll have everything, and what I\u2019m going to do with Mrs. Slingerland remains to be seen.\u201d\nOn April 23, 2003, the trial court entered an order finding petitioner in direct criminal contempt of court for \u201cher conduct at the February 26, 2003 hearing.\u201d Before sentencing petitioner, the trial court asked her why she had left the hearing. Petitioner replied that she was upset because she felt that the proceedings had been unfair, and she thought her presence was superfluous. The trial court sentenced petitioner to seven days\u2019 imprisonment. Petitioner timely appealed, and this court granted her motion to stay the sentence during the appeal.\nOn appeal, petitioner argues that her failure to return after the recess was not punishable as direct criminal contempt. Contempt can be either civil or criminal and either direct or indirect. A civil contempt sanction is coercive and seeks to compel future compliance with a court order, whereas a criminal contempt sanction punishes a party for past conduct. People v. Warren, 173 Ill. 2d 348, 368 (1996). Criminal contempt is conduct that is calculated to embarrass or obstruct a court in the administration of justice or lessen the court\u2019s authority or dignity. In re Marriage of Oleksy, 337 Ill. App. 3d 946, 949 (2003). Before citing an individual with criminal contempt, the judge must find that the contemptuous conduct was willful. People v. Smeathers, 297 Ill. App. 3d 711, 717 (1998). A contemptuous state of mind may be inferred from the conduct itself and the surrounding circumstances. Smeathers, 297 Ill. App. 3d at 717. Petitioner does not dispute that only criminal contempt is at issue in this case, but argues that her conduct constituted, at most, indirect criminal contempt.\nIndirect contempt arises from conduct that occurred outside of the judge\u2019s presence (In re Marriage of Ruchala, 208 Ill. App. 3d 971, 977 (1991)), whereas direct contempt arises from conduct that occurred in the judge\u2019s presence, making all elements of the offense within the judge\u2019s personal knowledge (People v. Simac, 161 Ill. 2d 297, 306 (1994)). While a trial court can punish direct contempt summarily, indirect contempt requires the due process rights of notice, opportunity to answer, and a hearing. People v. Kaeding, 239 Ill. App. 3d 851, 854 (1993). However, if the acts constituting indirect contempt are admitted to in open court, the conduct is punishable as direct contempt. In re Marriage of Marshall, 278 Ill. App. 3d 1071, 1081 (1996). We will not reverse the trial court\u2019s finding of direct criminal contempt unless there is insufficient evidence to support the finding or the trial judge considered facts outside of his personal knowledge. Simac, 161 Ill. 2d at 306.\nPetitioner cites People v. L.A.S., 111 Ill. 2d 539 (1986). In that case, the trial court commenced a hearing to revoke the probation of the respondent, a minor. After the State presented its case, the court recessed for 10 minutes. When the proceedings reconvened, the respondent did not return, and neither her mother nor her attorney knew where she was or why she had left. The respondent was taken into custody later that month, and the trial court summarily found her in direct criminal contempt for failing to return to court after the recess. L.A.S., 111 Ill. 2d at 542. Our supreme court held that such behavior could constitute only indirect criminal contempt because the trial court was unaware of the reasons for her absence, and the absence alone \u201cwas insufficient to establish that she wilfully intended to disrupt the proceedings and embarrass the court.\u201d L.A.S., 111 Ill. 2d at 544. Petitioner argues that in this case the trial court was similarly unaware of the reasons for her absence and therefore could not find her in direct contempt.\nWe note that the trial court held petitioner in contempt for \u201cher conduct at the February 26, 2003 hearing.\u201d Therefore, the contempt finding was not limited to petitioner\u2019s failure to return after the recess. During the hearing, petitioner refused to sit down, refused to approach the bench, repeatedly stated that the proceeding was unfair, and said that she did not trust the trial judge. Such conduct was an affront to the court\u2019s dignity and authority, especially considering that petitioner is an attorney. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of direct criminal contempt.\nEven if the contempt finding was based on only petitioner\u2019s failure to return to the hearing after the recess, we would arrive at the same conclusion. Unlike in L.A.S., where the trial court was unaware of why the minor left the court, in this case petitioner stated that she wanted to leave because she thought that the trial court was treating her unfairly. In fact, petitioner apparently attempted to leave before the recess, at which point the trial judge ordered the bailiff to \u201ckeep Mrs. Slingerland.\u201d The trial judge later allowed petitioner to have a few minutes to compose herself. He clearly indicated that he would not grant a continuance and expected her to return. Even though the trial judge subsequently gave petitioner an opportunity to explain why she did not return, he already had sufficient knowledge of why she left to support the direct contempt finding; petitioner\u2019s contemptuous state of mind was properly inferred from her conduct and the circumstances. Furthermore, in this situation, such knowledge may not have been necessary. See People v. City of East St. Louis, 206 Ill. App. 3d 626, 637 (1990) (attorney\u2019s failure to appear was direct contempt regardless of his reasons for not attending because trial judge had told him the previous day that his appearance was expected and that she would not grant a continuance).\nFinally, we note that even if petitioner\u2019s failure to return constituted only indirect contempt because the trial judge' could not be certain of why she did not return, the conduct was punishable as direct contempt because petitioner admitted during the sentencing hearing that she had left because she was upset and thought that the proceeding was unfair. See Marshall, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 1081 (admission of indirect contempt allows trial judge to punish party for direct contempt).\nPetitioner additionally argues that we should reverse the contempt finding because her absence did not \u201cdisrupt or hinder the Court in the business before it.\u201d However, as the transcript shows, petitioner\u2019s outbursts disrupted the proceedings and hindered respondent from timely finishing his rebuttal testimony. The trial court was also forced to address petitioner\u2019s failure to return. In any event, as previously stated, criminal contempt is conduct that is calculated to embarrass or obstruct a court in the administration of justice or lessen the court\u2019s authority or dignity (Oleksy, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 949), and we have concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court\u2019s contempt finding. That the trial court ultimately concluded the hearing without petitioner does not defeat the ruling.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Ogle County.\nAffirmed.\nHUTCHINSON and CALLUM, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McLAREN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Peter B. Nolte, of Sreenan & Cain, EC., of Rockford, for appellant.", "Deborah E. Ellis, State\u2019s Attorney, of Oregon (Lawrence M. Bauer and Terry A. Mertel, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re MARRIAGE OF BARBARA SLINGERLAND, Petitioner-Appellant, and JOHNATHAN SLINGERLAND, Respondent (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee).\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201403\u20140714\nOpinion filed April 8, 2004.\nPeter B. Nolte, of Sreenan & Cain, EC., of Rockford, for appellant.\nDeborah E. Ellis, State\u2019s Attorney, of Oregon (Lawrence M. Bauer and Terry A. Mertel, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0707-01", "first_page_order": 725, "last_page_order": 731 }