{ "id": 3949491, "name": "YOLANDA WEBB, as Special Adm'r of the Estate of Ashley Webb, a Minor, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MOUNT SINAI HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL CENTER OF CHICAGO, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Webb v. Mount Sinai Hospital & Medical Center of Chicago, Inc.", "decision_date": "2004-03-29", "docket_number": "No. 1-03-0936", "first_page": "817", "last_page": "828", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "347 Ill. App. 3d 817" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "226 Ill. App. 3d 147", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5239427 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/226/0147-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 Ill. App. 3d 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 521034 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "336", "parenthetical": "finding that a moving party is not entitled to summary judgment based on the opposing party's failure to file a counteraffidavit where the moving party's affidavit is contradicted by documents attached to the complaint" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/287/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 Ill. App. 3d 652", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3589719 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "658" }, { "page": "657" }, { "page": "654-55" }, { "page": "655, 658" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/176/0652-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 Ill. App. 3d 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2467654 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "256" }, { "page": "256" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/199/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 Ill. App. 3d 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5282176 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/217/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 Ill. App. 3d 111", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2432051 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/178/0111-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 Ill. App. 3d 49", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 25382 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "53-54" }, { "page": "54" }, { "page": "57" }, { "page": "57" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/338/0049-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 Ill. App. 3d 741", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3474409 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "748" }, { "page": "748" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/342/0741-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 Ill. App. 3d 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5372431 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "557" }, { "page": "557" }, { "page": "557" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/261/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "298 Ill. App. 3d 396", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1073658 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "404" }, { "page": "402" }, { "page": "406" }, { "page": "406" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/298/0396-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3126692 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 Ill. 2d 29", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 778592 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "40" }, { "page": "42" }, { "page": "41-42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/157/0029-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 960, "char_count": 26007, "ocr_confidence": 0.747, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.34926638853131e-07, "percentile": 0.6329913442830064 }, "sha256": "c76e5949cfe6c3d27efd55d3e8b10a435a1a49255ec754fe48a1af05648693e6", "simhash": "1:9eaf15ba3bcc0d5a", "word_count": 4039 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:28:47.759631+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "O\u2019MALLEY, EJ., and GORDON, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "YOLANDA WEBB, as Special Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Ashley Webb, a Minor, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MOUNT SINAI HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL CENTER OF CHICAGO, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McBRIDE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn this case we consider the propriety of the trial court\u2019s determination that documents withheld from discovery by defendants were not privileged under that part of the Code of Civil Procedure commonly known as the Medical Studies Act (735 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 2101 et seq. (West 2000)) (the Act). In response to plaintiff\u2019s discovery requests, defendants claimed that certain documents were privileged because they were part of an internal peer-review conducted by the risk management committee at Mount Sinai Hospital and Medical Center of Chicago, Inc. (Mt. Sinai). After an in camera review of the documents and consideration of the affidavits, briefs, and arguments offered by the parties, the trial court found that the documents were not privileged and ordered that defendants produce them. Defendants asked the trial court to reconsider its decision. The trial court denied that motion and found defendants in contempt of court for their failure to produce the documents. The trial court additionally fined defendants $50. Payment of the fine was stayed pending disposition of appeal.\nOn July 28, 2000, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants, two additional doctors, and another medical facility, seeking damages under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act (740 ILCS 180/0.01 et seq. (West 2000)) and the Illinois Survival Act (755 ILCS 5/27 \u2014 6 (West 2000)). The complaint alleged that Ashley Webb was admitted to Mt. Sinai on July 28, 1998, \u201cas an in-patient to rule out hepatitis and treatment for dehydration.\u201d Williams was one of her treating physicians. Ashley Webb died at Mt. Sinai on July 29, 1998. The complaint alleged her death was due to defendants\u2019 negligence. The case was removed to the federal district court, where the claims against all defendants except Mt. Sinai and Williams were dismissed. Finding that it lacked jurisdiction over the claims, the district court remanded the case to the circuit court.\nDuring discovery, plaintiff served interrogatories and requests to produce on defendants. In response to several inquiries, defendants explained that they possessed certain documents responsive to the requests but that those documents were privileged under the Act. The documents at issue in this appeal are a \u201cPatient Safety Digest Professional Peer Review Occurrence Summary\u201d (Occurrence Summary) authored by Lori Notowitz, R.N., M.J., the former director of risk management at Mt. Sinai, and four memoranda \u201cfrom\u201d Notowitz \u201cto\u201d the risk management committee (collectively the memoranda). The memoranda summarized her interviews with four doctors, including Williams. Two of the memoranda were dated August 4, 1998. The other two were dated July 29, 1998.\nUpon receiving defendants\u2019 objections, plaintiff filed a \u201cMotion for Ruling on Defendants\u2019 Medical Studies and Work Product Objections,\u201d requesting in camera review of the documents. Rather than immediately offering the documents for in camera review, defendants offered the affidavit of Notowitz. According to the affidavit, in July and August 1998, Notowitz was the director of risk management for Mt. Sinai. Part of her duties was \u201cto improve patient care and safety\u201d at Mt. Sinai \u201cthrough risk management techniques, which included, among other things, [her] participation in peer review committees.\u201d She was also responsible \u201cfor loss prevention and managing claims\u201d and was \u201cin the decision-making chain in settling claims against\u201d Mt. Sinai. She was also a member of the risk management committee, which \u201cwas a peer review committee composed largely of physicians, including the President of the Medical Staff.\u201d The purpose of the committee \u201cwas to review patient care incidents and related systems issues in an effort to improve patient safety, the quality of patient care, and to reduce morbidity and mortality.\u201d Notowitz prepared the documents at issue in this case and interviewed the various doctors mentioned in those documents \u201cat the specific direction of the Risk Management Committee *** only after that Committee had received a report of Ashley Webb\u2019s death less than 24 hours after her admission to the Hospital and after that Committee had undertaken a formal review of that occurrence.\u201d The documents were \u201cutilized solely for the purposes of the investigation of the Risk Management Committee ***. They were presented solely to the Risk Management Committee ***. They were utilized solely for peer review, patient safety, and quality improvement purposes.\u201d They were kept separate from any litigation files and were not shared with Mt. Sinai\u2019s attorneys.\nIn reply, plaintiff claimed that defendants\u2019 affidavit was insufficient to show that the privilege applied. Specifically, plaintiff complained that the evidence failed to show \u201cwhen the \u2018peer review\u2019 or \u2018quality improvement committee\u2019 first met to begin investigating Ashley Webb\u2019s death.\u201d The trial court ordered defendants to file supplemental affidavits and provide the documents for in camera review.\nNotowitz\u2019s second affidavit added that \u201c[pjatient care incidents requiring review by the Risk [M]anagement Committee were brought to the attention of the Committee by a variety of sources, including individual Committee members and department peer review committees\u201d and that \u201cwhere an event occurred between scheduled meetings of the Risk Management Committee, the Chairman of that committee had the authority to initiate an investigation and review of the occurrence\u201d on behalf of the committee. On July 29, 1998, after being notified of Ashley Webb\u2019s death, the chairman of the risk management committee instructed Notowitz \u201cto initiate an investigation and review of the occurrence\u201d on behalf of the committee. The memoranda documenting Notowitz\u2019s interviews with doctors Perkins, Chaparro, Williams, and Ojo were prepared to \u201cutilize in the preparation\u201d of the Occurrence Summary. \u201cThe memoranda themselves were not distributed to members of the risk management committee. In fact, they were shared with nobody.\u201d Notowitz maintained minutes of all of the meetings of the risk management committee, but she was unaware of what became of those minutes after she left Mt. Sinai and \u201crelinquished control of them to [her] successor.\u201d She did not recall the date of the meeting of the risk management committee in which she discussed her findings and recommendations in relation to Ashley Webb. She remembered, however, that, a meeting had occurred.\nAfter reviewing the affidavits and the documents, the trial court concluded that the documents were not privileged under the Act. The court explained:\n\u201cInspection of the actual documents undoubtedly reveals that their purpose encompassed \u2018an effort to improve patient safety, the quality of patient care, and to reduce morbidity and mortality.\u2019 However, this inspection also reveals that the processes of peer-review and quality improvement were not the sole purpose of their generation. Each of the documents authored by Notowitz clearly anticipates litigation. The Peer Review Occurrence Summary advises the Risk Management Committee that \u2018the risk of litigation is high.\u2019 Each memo pertaining to an interview begins, \u2018You have asked me to review the care of Ashley Webb to identify any issues of liability or potential patient safety.\u2019 Regardless as to whether these documents were ever used in a peer-review process, such statements indicate that they were, at least in part, created to render legal opinions or weigh potential liability risk. Thus, since they were not generated specifically for peer-review, these documents are not protected by the privilege allowed by the Illinois Medical Studies Act.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nDefendants filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court\u2019s order. Alternatively, defendants sought an amended order limiting production to redacted documents or a contempt order that would allow defendants to appeal the trial court\u2019s order.\nAfter plaintiff filed her response to defendants\u2019 motion for reconsideration, the trial court granted defendants\u2019 request for additional time to file a supplemental affidavit. Specifically the trial court instructed defendants that in order to reconsider its findings, the trial court sought information regarding Notowitz\u2019s use of the phrases \u201cliability\u201d and \u201clitigation\u201d in the documents and proof that \u201cthe peer review took place.\u201d\nIn her third affidavit, Notowitz corrected a previous erroneous statement that the president of the medical staff was chairman of the risk management committee and indicated that the chairman was the vice president of medical affairs at Mt. Sinai. Notowitz explained that the only functions of the risk management committee were \u201cpeer review and patient safety.\u201d The committee \u201cdid not review or evaluate liability issues or exposure to possible future litigation\u201d in this or any other case \u201cbecause other Hospital committees were charged specifically with addressing those issues.\u201d The committee had authorized its chairman to act on its behalf and \u201cinitiate investigation and review of an occurrence\u201d when such an occurrence happened between regularly scheduled committee meetings. On \u201c7/28/98,\u201d Notowitz informed the chairman of Ashley Webb\u2019s death, and the chairman instructed her \u201cto initiate an investigation and review of the occurrence\u201d on behalf of the committee. The full committee did not meet before Notowitz began her investigation.\nWith regard to the references in the memoranda to issues of liability Notowitz explained:\n\u201cInsofar as [the memoranda] contain introductory language suggesting that I was to review the care of Ashley Webb to identify \u2018any issues of liability,\u2019 that language was included at the specific instruction of Hospital counsel as being necessary to preserve the materials as privileged. Notwithstanding that language, however, I did not conduct these interviews or prepare these memoranda or Exhibit A for the purpose of evaluating potential liability risk or weighing exposure in possible future litigation. Nor die] the Risk Management Committee review the care of Ashley Webb for the purpose of evaluating potential liability risk or weighing exposure in possible future litigation.\u201d\nAt a hearing on October 17, 2002, defendants requested an evidentiary hearing on the motion to reconsider. The trial court denied that request finding that defendants had indicated that they had provided the court with everything it needed. The trial court, however, offered defendants the opportunity to bring Notowitz into court to give a sworn oral statement. Defendants elected not to bring Notowitz into court because of the expense of doing so.\nOn February 26, 2003, the trial court denied defendants\u2019 motion for reconsideration. The trial court found that the affidavits of Notowitz were \u201cinsufficient to establish that the documents she authored were privileged\u201d under the Act and emphasized that \u201c [defendants [had] been given ample opportunity to provide the information necessary for this Court to make the conclusion as a matter of law that the at-issue documents are privileged under the Medical Studies Act,\u201d but failed to do so. Although finding defendants in contempt and imposing \u201ca penalty of $50.00 upon them,\u201d the trial court did not find defendants\u2019 refusal to produce the documents \u201ccontemptuous.\u201d\nOn appeal, defendants contend that the trial court\u2019s finding that the documents were not privileged under the Act was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Defendants claim that the \u201cuncontroverted affidavits of Lori Notowitz *** established that the documents at issue are *** protected.\u201d Specifically, defendants claim that because the plaintiff did not \u201cfile any counteraffidavits or other evidentiary material controverting the well-alleged facts of Ms. Notowitz\u2019s affidavit that were based on her personal knowledge,\u201d we must accept the facts of Notowitz\u2019s affidavits as true. Regardless of our disposition on the merits, defendants argue, the trial court\u2019s contempt order should be vacated because it was sought in good faith as a means of obtaining review of the trial court\u2019s discovery order.\nPlaintiff responds that the trial court\u2019s finding that the documents were not privileged and its order to produce the documents were proper. Plaintiff first argues that Notowitz\u2019s affidavits are inconsistent and need not be accepted as true. Plaintiff next claims that \u201cthe hospital did not produce any credible evidence to show that the hospital actually conducted a peer review.\u201d Specifically, it points to Mt. Sinai\u2019s failures to produce the minutes of the committee meeting related to Ashley Webb\u2019s death and explain why it did not produce them. Plaintiff contends that, based on the evidence, \u201cwe do not know when the purported review took place, i.e., when it began and when it ended, or even if one actually occurred.\u201d Finally, plaintiff argues that the language from the documents, as identified in the trial court\u2019s order, \u201ccontravened the hospital\u2019s contention that these were specifically peer review documents.\u201d Plaintiff discounts Notowitz\u2019s explanation of the litigation language in the memoranda by claiming that the \u201cexcuse implies that the hospital was, at least at that point, trying to create an attorney-client privilege, and that in turn further implies that Notowitz was engaged in a liability investigation, not a peer review investigation.\u201d Plaintiff does not object to defendants\u2019 request that we vacate the contempt order entered against defendants.\nSection 8 \u2014 2101 of the Act provides, in relevant part:\n\u201cAll information, interviews, reports, statements, memoranda, recommendations, letters of reference or other third party confidential assessments of a health care practitioner\u2019s professional competence, or other data of *** committees of licensed or accredited hospitals or their medical staffs, including Patient Care Audit Committees, Medical Care Evaluation Committees, Utilization Review Committees, Credential Committees and Executive Committees, or their designees (but not the medical records pertaining to the patient), used in the course of internal quality control or of medical study for the purpose of reducing morbidity or mortality, or for improving patient care or increasing organ and tissue donation, shall be privileged, strictly confidential and shall be used only for medical research, increasing organ and tissue donation, the evaluation and improvement of quality care, or granting, limiting or revoking staff privileges or agreements for services ***.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 2101 (West 2002).\nThe Act further provides:\n\u201cSuch information, records, reports, statements, notes, memoranda, or other data, shall not be admissible as evidence, nor discoverable in any action of any kind in any court or before any tribunal, board, agency or person. The disclosure of any such information or data, whether proper, or improper, shall not waive or have any effect upon its confidentiality, nondiscoverability, or nonadmissibility.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 2102 (West 2002).\nThe Act\u2019s purpose \u201cis to ensure that members of the medical profession will effectively engage in self-evaluation of their peers in the interest of advancing the quality of health care.\u201d Roach v. Springfield Clinic, 157 Ill. 2d 29, 40 (1993). The Act also serves \u201cto encourage candid and voluntary studies and programs used to improve hospital conditions and patient care or to reduce the rates of death and disease.\u201d Niven v. Siqueira, 109 Ill. 2d 357, 366 (1985). The Act \u201cwas never intended to shield hospitals from potential liability\u201d (Roach, 157 Ill. 2d at 42), and \u201clegal advice is not a goal of the protection offered by the Act\u201d (Chicago Trust Co. v. Cook County Hospital, 298 Ill. App. 3d 396, 404 (1998)).\nThe Act does not protect \u201call information used for internal quality control\u201d (Grandi v. Shah, 261 Ill. App. 3d 551, 557 (1994)); instead, documents \u201cgenerated specifically for the use of a peer-review committee receive protection under the Act\u201d (Chicago Trust Co., 298 Ill. App. 3d at 402). A document that \u201cwas initiated, created, prepared, or generated by a peer-review committee\u201d is privileged under the Act, \u201ceven though it was later disseminated outside the peer-review process.\u201d Chicago Trust Co., 298 Ill. App. 3d at 406. The reverse is not true, however. A document created \u201cin the ordinary course of the hospital\u2019s medical business or for the purpose of rendering legal opinions or to weigh potential liability risk or for later corrective action by the hospital staff\u201d is not privileged \u201ceven though it later was used by a committee in the peer-review process.\u201d Chicago Trust Co., 298 Ill. App. 3d at 406. Our supreme court explained:\n\u201cIf the simple act of furnishing a committee with earlier-acquired information were sufficient to cloak that information with the statutory privilege, a hospital could effectively insulate from disclosure virtually all adverse facts known to its medical staff, with the exception of those matters actually contained in a patient\u2019s records. As a result, it would be substantially more difficult for patients to hold hospitals responsible for their wrongdoing through medical malpractice litigation. So protected, those institutions would have scant incentive for advancing the goal of improved patient care. The purpose of the act would be completely subverted.\u201d Roach, 157 Ill. 2d at 41-42.\nSimilarly, the Act does not \u201cprotect against disclosure of information generated before a peer-review process begins or after it ends.\u201d Ardisana v. Northwest Community Hospital, Inc., 342 Ill. App. 3d 741, 748 (2003). Thus, the hospital committee \u201cmust be engaged in the peer-review process before the statutory privilege is applicable.\u201d Grandi, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 557.\nThe question of whether the Act\u2019s privilege applies is a question of law that is reviewed de novo; however, the question of whether specific materials are part of an internal quality control \u201cis a factual question,\u201d on which defendants bear the burden. Berry v. West Suburban Hospital Medical Center, 338 Ill. App. 3d 49, 53-54 (2003). Similarly, defendants bear the burden of any \u201cfailure to make a more complete record.\u201d Grandi, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 557. The trial court\u2019s factual determination of whether the documents at issue were part of an internal quality control will not be reversed \u201cunless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.\u201d Berry, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 54.\nA decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence \u201cif it is wholly unwarranted by the evidence\u201d (Schleyhahn v. Cole, 178 Ill. App. 3d 111. 117 (1989)), if \u201can opposite conclusion is apparent or *** the trial court\u2019s findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based upon the evidence\u201d (Freese v. Buoy, 217 Ill. App. 3d 234, 244 (1991)), or if \u201cit is clearly evident that the conclusion opposite to the one reached by the trial court was the proper disposition\u201d (Crawford County State Bank v. Marine American National Bank, 199 Ill. App. 3d 236, 256 (1990)). In evaluating the evidence in this case, we recognize that when the facts in an affidavit are uncontradicted, \u201cthey must be taken as true notwithstanding the existence of contrary unsupported allegations.\u201d Flannery v. Lin, 176 Ill. App. 3d 652, 658 (1988). However, a counteraffidavit is not the only means by which an affidavit can be contradicted; an affidavit may be contradicted by other documentary evidence. See, e.g., Rumford v. Countrywide Funding Corp., 287 Ill. App. 3d 330, 336 (1997) (finding that a moving party is not entitled to summary judgment based on the opposing party\u2019s failure to file a counteraffidavit where the moving party\u2019s affidavit is contradicted by documents attached to the complaint). Where there are conflicts or contradictions in the evidence, the trial judge \u201cis in a better position than is the appellate court to weigh the evidence and ascertain the credibility of the witnesses.\u201d Crawford County State Bank, 199 Ill. App. 3d at 256; see also Susan E. Loggans & Associates v. Estate of Magid, 226 Ill. App. 3d 147, 154 (1992).\nAfter our review of Notowitz\u2019s three affidavits and the documents at issue in this appeal, which were provided to us under seal, we do not find that Notowitz\u2019s affidavits are completely uncontradicted, as defendants argue. Instead, we find significant discrepancies in the evidence. In the first affidavit, for instance, Notowitz explained that the four memoranda were \u201cpresented solely to the Risk Management Committee.\u201d Yet, in her second affidavit, she claims that \u201c[t]he memoranda themselves were not distributed to members of the Risk Management Committee.\u201d Moreover, Notowitz explained the purpose of the risk management committee as reviewing patient care incidences \u201cin an effort to improve patient safety, the quality of patient care, and to reduce morbidity and mortality.\u201d Yet, the documents contradict this assertion. Specifically, the memoranda include statements that each was prepared at the request of the risk management committee, in part, \u201cto identify any issues of liability.\u201d Similarly, the Occurrence Summary concludes that \u201cthe risk of litigation is high.\u201d It was not until after the trial court ruled that the documents were not privileged under the Act because of this language that Notowitz attempted to explain the statements. It was not unreasonable for the trial court to give more credit to the statements made in the documents and contemporaneously with the events at issue in this case than to the statements made more than four years later after the trial court ruled that the earlier statements rendered the documents unprivileged. Moreover, the trial court\u2019s finding was not inconsistent with the evidence, which explained that as a part of her duties at Mt. Sinai, Notowitz was responsible \u201cfor loss prevention and managing claims\u201d and was \u201cin the decision-making chain in settling claims against\u201d Mt. Sinai.\nContrary to defendants\u2019 claim, Flannery v. Lin, 176 Ill. App. 3d 652 (1988), was not a case where a \u201cfar weaker factual showing [than presented in this case] was found sufficient\u201d to establish that the privilege applied. In that case, the court found that a \u201ccode blue evaluation report\u201d was privileged because \u201cthe record adequately demonstrate[d] that the code blue evaluation report was part of the hospital\u2019s internal quality control.\u201d Flannery, 176 Ill. App. 3d at 657. The defendant supported its claim of privilege with the affidavits of its director of quality management and manager of medical records. Both affidavits described the code blue evaluation report as a part of the hospital\u2019s quality control review. Flannery, 176 Ill. App. 3d at 654-55. The court\u2019s finding that the documents were privileged was based upon the facts contained in those affidavits, both of which were uncontradicted. Flannery, 176 Ill. App. 3d at 655, 658. As noted above, that was not the case here where Notowitz\u2019s affidavits were internally inconsistent and contradicted by the documentary evidence.\nFurthermore, as the trial court pointed out in this case, there is no indication in the record as to when the risk management committee\u2019s review occurred. While Notowitz claims that her interviews occurred \u201cafter that Committee had undertaken a formal review of that occurrence,\u201d there is no evidence showing that all the memoranda and the occurrence report were completed prior to the close of the committee\u2019s review. Moreover, in her third affidavit, Notowitz claimed that she informed the chairman of the risk management committee of Ashley Webb\u2019s death and initiated the investigation and review of that occurrence on \u201c7/28/99,\u201d a date which conflicts with the one given in her earlier affidavits and appears to be the day before Ashley Webb died. As noted above, the timing of the peer review is a crucial fact because the Act does not protect documents generated before the peer-review process begins or after it ends. See Ardisana, 342 Ill. App. 3d at 748. Without this evidence and in light of the specific words contained in the documents, it was not unreasonable for the trial court to conclude that defendants failed to show that the documents were part of the risk management committee\u2019s peer-review process.\nBased on all the evidence, it is not apparent that an opposite conclusion was warranted. Nor are we convinced that the trial court\u2019s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or contrary to the evidence. The trial court\u2019s decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and we affirm the trial court\u2019s order that the documents be produced. This, however, does not mean that we must affirm the finding of contempt against defendants.\nIt is appropriate for a party to request that a contempt order be entered against it so that party may seek immediate appeal of a trial court\u2019s discovery order. Berry, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 57. In such situations, where the party sought the order in good faith and was not contemptuous of the trial court\u2019s authority, we may vacate the contempt order even when we find that the trial court\u2019s discovery order was proper. Berry, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 57. In this case, the trial court found that defendants\u2019 actions were not contemptuous. Defendants appropriately sought review of a discovery order requiring them to produce documents which they reasonably contended were privileged. Accordingly, we vacate the contempt order entered against defendants.\nAffirmed in part; vacated in part.\nO\u2019MALLEY, EJ., and GORDON, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McBRIDE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Anderson, Bennett & Partners, of Chicago (Patricia J. Foltz, Jason A. Parson, and Diane I. Jennings, of counsel), for appellants.", "Michael W Rathsack, of Chicago (Marina E. Ammendola and Michael W Rathsack, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "YOLANDA WEBB, as Special Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Ashley Webb, a Minor, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MOUNT SINAI HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL CENTER OF CHICAGO, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1\u201403\u20140936\nOpinion filed March 29, 2004.\nAnderson, Bennett & Partners, of Chicago (Patricia J. Foltz, Jason A. Parson, and Diane I. Jennings, of counsel), for appellants.\nMichael W Rathsack, of Chicago (Marina E. Ammendola and Michael W Rathsack, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0817-01", "first_page_order": 835, "last_page_order": 846 }