{ "id": 3948728, "name": "In re JORDAN V., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Edward Velez, Respondent-Appellant).-In re DUSTIN B. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Lora Velez, Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Velez", "decision_date": "2004-04-22", "docket_number": "Nos. 4-03-0828, 4-03-0829 cons.", "first_page": "1057", "last_page": "1069", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "347 Ill. App. 3d 1057" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "699 N.E.2d 167", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "173-74" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 Ill. App. 3d 617", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1073728 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "626" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/298/0617-01" ] }, { "cite": "711 N.E.2d 478", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "482" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 Ill. App. 3d 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1208027 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "180" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/305/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "721 N.E.2d 1202", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1207" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 Ill. App. 3d 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 349548 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "499" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/309/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "730 N.E.2d 637", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "641" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 Ill. App. 3d 1020", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 186537 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1025" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/313/1020-01" ] }, { "cite": "577 N.E.2d 1375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1387" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "218 Ill. App. 3d 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8498928 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "461" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/218/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "752 N.E.2d 1030", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1050" }, { "page": "1050" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351282 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "216-17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "745 N.E.2d 1233", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1241" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "195 Ill. 2d 291", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 725379 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "304" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/195/0291-01" ] }, { "cite": "740 N.E.2d 404", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "411" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 Ill. App. 3d 650", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1026064 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "658" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/317/0650-01" ] }, { "cite": "752 N.E.2d 1112", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1122" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 405", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351263 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0405-01" ] }, { "cite": "777 N.E.2d 930", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "942" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 476", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1476994 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0476-01" ] }, { "cite": "784 N.E.2d 219", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "223" }, { "page": "225" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "203 Ill. 2d 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 799398 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "60" }, { "page": "63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/203/0053-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1152, "char_count": 30313, "ocr_confidence": 0.734, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.4033266686372354e-08, "percentile": 0.33968737173479996 }, "sha256": "48de1aa2df2ef72e0a899f31b0caae6092f547e96f5e99c551968264e6df3099", "simhash": "1:cbe291123b8f5cc9", "word_count": 4961 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:28:47.759631+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "KNECHT, EJ., and McCULLOUGH, J, concur." ], "parties": [ "In re JORDAN V., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Edward Velez, Respondent-Appellant).\u2014In re DUSTIN B. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Lora Velez, Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn October 2002, the State filed its third supplemental petition, seeking to terminate the parental rights of respondents, Edward and Lora Velez, as to their children, Dustin B. (born November 25, 1993), Brooke H. (born January 22, 1995), and Jordan V (born November 2, 1997). Following January and February 2003 hearings, the trial court found respondents unfit. After an April 2003 hearing, the court found it was in the children\u2019s best interest that respondents\u2019 parental rights be terminated.\nLora and Edward appealed separately, but this court consolidated their appeals. In No. 4 \u2014 03\u20140828, Edward argues only that the trial court erred by changing the permanency goal in May 1999 to substitute care pending court determination on termination of parental rights. In No. 4 \u2014 03\u20140829, Lora argues that (1) the court\u2019s unfitness finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence; and (2) the court erred by changing the permanency goal in October 2002 to substitute care pending court determination on termination of parental rights. We affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nIn September 1996, the State filed a petition alleging that Dustin B. and Brooke H. were neglected minors in that Lora provided inadequate supervision, thus creating an environment injurious to their welfare. 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 3(1)0\u00bb) (West 1996).\nIn October 1996, Lora and Jason Hartman, Dustin B. and Brooke H.\u2019s biological father, stipulated to the State\u2019s neglect allegation, and the trial court adjudicated Dustin B. and Brooke H. neglected. Following a November 1996 dispositional hearing, the trial court made them wards of the court and appointed the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) as their guardian. In May 1997, Hartman surrendered his parental rights as to Dustin B. and Brooke H.\nIn February 1998, the State took Jordan V into protective custody and filed a petition, alleging that Jordan V was (1) neglected in that Lora and Edward (a) exposed him to the risk of physical injury (count I) and (b) had \u201cfailed to correct the conditions which resulted in a prior adjudication of parental unfitness\u201d (count III) (705 ILCS 405/2\u2014 3(l)(b) (West Supp. 1997)); and (2) abused in that Lora and Edward created a substantial risk of physical injury to Jordan V. by other than accidental means, which would likely cause impairment of Jordan V\u2019s emotional health or bodily functions or both (count II) (705 ILCS 405/ 2 \u2014 3(2)(ii) (West Supp. 1997)).\nFollowing a May 1998 hearing, the trial court adjudicated Jordan V an abused and neglected minor. After a June 1998 dispositional hearing, the court adjudicated Jordan V a ward of the court and placed him in the custody and guardianship of DCFS. Lora appealed, and this court affirmed. In re J.V., 4 \u2014 98\u20140454 (November 3, 1998) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).\nIn May 1999, the State filed a supplemental petition to terminate Lora and Edward\u2019s parental rights, alleging that they had failed to make reasonable progress toward the children\u2019s return within nine months of the adjudication of neglect (750 ILCS 50/l(D)(m) (West 1998)). The trial court conducted a hearing on the State\u2019s termination petition on eight separate dates spanning seven months. On March 1, 2000, the court entered an order finding Lora and Edward unfit based on the grounds alleged.\nFollowing a best-interest hearing in March and September 2000, the trial court (1) vacated its March 1, 2000, unfitness findings and (2) continued the case for an adjudicatory hearing on parental fitness. In December 2000, the court ordered the State to file a second supplemental termination petition, alleging that Lora and Edward had failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the children\u2019s removal (750 ILCS 50/l(D)(m) (West 2000)). The court then recused itself and reassigned the case.\nIn January 2001, the State filed its second supplemental petition, seeking to terminate Lora and Edward\u2019s parental rights, alleging, in pertinent part, that they failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the children\u2019s removal. In February 2001, the trial court conducted a permanency-review hearing and set a permanency goal of \u201csubstitute care pending court determination on termination of parental rights because a motion for termination of parental rights is pending.\u201d Edward appealed the February 2001 permanency order, and this court dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. In re J.V., 4 \u2014 01\u20140166 (July 26, 2001) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). In March 2001, Lora and Edward filed motions to dismiss the State\u2019s second supplemental termination petition, and in June 2001, the court denied those motions. However, in July 2001, the court dismissed the State\u2019s May 1999 and January 2001 termination petitions.\nIn October 2002, the State filed its third supplemental petition, seeking to terminate Lora and Edward\u2019s parental rights, alleging that they had failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of the children within any nine-month period after the end of the initial nine-month period following the neglect and abuse adjudications (750 ILCS 50/l(D)(m)(iii) (West 2000)). The petition specified the nine-month period as being from January 11, 2002, to October 10, 2002.\nIn January and February 2003, the trial court conducted a hearing on the State\u2019s third supplemental termination petition. We review the evidence presented at that hearing only to the extent necessary to put the parties\u2019 arguments in context.\nLutheran Social Services caseworker Christina Smith testified that she took over Lora and Edward\u2019s case in February 2002. At that time, Lora and Edward were participating in individual and couples counseling with Mary Martin. DCFS specified no other services that it wanted them to engage in at that time.\nIn February 2002, Smith met with Edward for a previously scheduled visit at his and Lora\u2019s home. Lora was scheduled to attend the visit, but she was not there. When Smith asked Edward about missed counseling sessions, he provided a few reasons for missing sessions, \u201cone being transportation and another being basically time and there [were] just a few times that he possibly forgot.\u201d She also asked him about the presence of unauthorized persons during visits with the children. He responded that one of those people was a friend and \u201cmaybe the other two lived across the street from them.\u201d Edward did not respond to Smith\u2019s questions about his relationship with Lora. On financial matters, Edward told Smith that he and Lora were behind on the power bill and owed the power company approximately $430. He also said that creditors were calling.\nAt the end of February or in early March 2002, the decision was made to discontinue Lora and Edward\u2019s unsupervised visits with the children (they had been having three per week). That decision was based on several concerns that arose after Smith\u2019s February 2002 visit with Edward. Specifically, Smith was concerned about the following: (1) Lora had not been home the night before the visit, and Edward did not know where she was; (2) unauthorized people were attending the children\u2019s visits; (3) financial matters; and (4) missed counseling sessions. Smith opined that Lora and Edward\u2019s financial matters were relevant because of the need to maintain a stable household for the children\u2019s safety and security.\nOn March 4, 2002, Smith met with Edward\u2019s counselor and the children\u2019s counselor to discuss the case. It was decided that if Edward and Lora attended four consecutive couples counseling sessions, Lutheran Social Services would reinstate an unsupervised weekly visit. Smith informed Lora and Edward of this decision by telephone and letter.\nOn March 13, 2002, Smith met with Lora and Edward and discussed the aforementioned areas of concern. Lora explained that on the night she was not at home, she was at a friend\u2019s house doing laundry, and Edward could have reached her on her cellular phone. Lora said her friend\u2019s name was Phillip, but she did not know his last name. She also said that she spends the night at someone else\u2019s house about five times per month. Lora also stated that she and Edward were not a couple. When Smith asked Edward about the relationship, Edward did not answer her. Smith explained that Lutheran Social Services works with parents that are separated or together; however, they need to know the status of the couple\u2019s relationship to provide appropriate services. After this meeting, it was Smith\u2019s understanding that Lora and Edward were not a couple. Lora and Edward also told Smith that they had missed counseling sessions due to car problems. Lutheran Social Services also then began transporting the children to their counseling sessions so as to ease the burden on Lora and Edward. (At this time, Lora and Edward lived in Champaign with their infant daughter, Briana; and Dustin B., Brooke H., and Jordan V lived with foster parents in Loda.)\nSmith met with Lora and Edward again on April 4, 2002. They told her that the outstanding power bill was still about $400. They also had to make new car payments totaling approximately $990 over the next six weeks, and thereafter would have a $175 car payment every two weeks. They said that the car payment would not be a problem. Lora also said that they were looking for a second car so that she would have another car to drive if she became bored with the new one. Edward did not have a valid driver\u2019s license at the time. They did not attend counseling that week because they forgot.\nOn May 15, 2002, Smith attempted to telephone Lora and Edward and learned that their home telephone had been disconnected. She later reached them on a cellular phone and met with them on May 17, 2002. Edward was working at Famous Dave\u2019s restaurant. Lora told Smith that she and Edward were separated. When Smith asked Edward where he was living, he said that he lived \u201chere, there[,] and everywhere.\u201d He also told Smith that correspondence could still be sent to him at their home address, where he sometimes stayed. Lora said that she was applying for work. At that time, they had two supervised visits with the children per week. An unsupervised visit had not been implemented because they had failed to attend four consecutive counseling sessions.\nSmith spoke with Lora on June 24, 2002, by telephone. Lora told Smith that they had stopped paying rent because the landlord refused to respond to their complaints about an electrical fire and a mole they had caught in a mousetrap. Lora was concerned that they would be evicted and told Smith that they had found another apartment in Champaign for $495 per month. They were saving for that apartment, and Edward had taken a second job. Lora asked Smith what they needed to do to have unsupervised visits with the children, and Smith told her that they would have to attend four consecutive counseling sessions.\nOn July 9, 2002, Smith met with Lora and Edward at their new apartment in Champaign. Edward was still working full-time at Famous Dave\u2019s and had taken a second full-time job with a roofing company. Lora and Edward said that they still had outstanding bills. They both had failed to attend counseling. Lora stated that she might not attend that day because they were moving and packing.\nSmith was present at a July 10, 2002, visit with all three children at Lora and Edward\u2019s home. The children played and interacted with both parents. However, Edward appeared to be the primary caregiver. Lora received a telephone call during the visit and spent 20 minutes in another room on the phone. Except for the telephone call, Lora and Edward appeared to engage equally with the children. Smith\u2019s notes stated as follows: \u201cDad was a disciplinarian, played with the children, toted Briana around, and fixed supper. Mom either sat on the couch or told Dad to take care of things.\u201d\nOn September 19, 2002, Smith met with Lora and Edward at their home. Edward told her that they were a couple and things were going well. When she asked Lora about the status of their relationship, she said, \u201cDidn\u2019t you hear what he said?\u201d Lora informed Smith that she had quit her job at Precision Maintenance due to scheduling issues. She was then employed by \u201cPhotog.\u201d She did not have pay stubs to prove her employment because she was paid in cash by Precision Maintenance and had not yet received pay from Photog. Her mother or Edward watched Briana when she worked.\nOn October 8, 2002, Smith attended a meeting requested by Lora, along with Steve Holcomb (the supervisor of foster-care caseworkers at Lutheran Social Services) and Lutheran Social Services clinical therapist Sarah Moutoux. Lora told Smith that counseling was going to be discontinued because they had no more issues to work on. Lutheran Social Services believed that counseling had not been successfully completed. Smith acknowledged that with the exception of individual and couples counseling, Lora and Edward successfully completed all services.\nMoutoux testified that she counseled Lora and Edward from June 2002 until October 2002. In June 2002, Lora was late for two scheduled sessions and missed two sessions entirely. She missed one session because she had had an emotional meeting with her landlord, and the other because she and Edward were packing their household belongings. Also in June 2002, Edward missed three scheduled sessions \u2014 one because he was called to work early and one due to illness. Moutoux could not recall the reason that Edward cancelled a third session.\nIn July 2002, Lora was late for two scheduled sessions. In addition, on July 9, 2002, she called Moutoux 40 minutes after her session was scheduled to start and stated that she would not be attending because she had just moved and was unpacking. Also in July 2002, Edward\u2019s counseling case was closed, pursuant to Lutheran Social Service\u2019s policy of closing cases after two consecutive \u201cno-shows\u201d or two \u201cno-shows\u201d in a five-week period (a \u201cno show\u201d was defined as a failure to appear without cancelling in advance). At the end of July, however, Edward\u2019s case was reopened and he signed an attendance contract with Lutheran Social Services. On August 19, 2002, Moutoux sent Edward a letter stating that he had missed an appointment and reminding him of the next one.\nLora telephoned Moutoux just before her August 6, 2002, counseling session was scheduled to begin and explained that she could not attend because she did not have child care for Briana. No appointments were scheduled between August 13 and September 10, 2002. Lora also missed sessions on September 10 and 17, 2002, due to childcare difficulties.\nMoutoux did not formally establish any counseling goals with Lora. They discussed topics, including her relationship with Edward, the DCFS case, her employment situation, and parenting issues. Moutoux considered Lora\u2019s sporadic attendance at counseling to be a problem because consistent attendance is necessary to establish a therapeutic relationship and address goals. A September 23, 2002, report showed that Moutoux discussed with Lora the ways in which Lora and Edward\u2019s relationship impacted their children. At that point in time, Lora had not provided a \u201cclear explanation\u201d of their relationship and was generally not forthcoming about the relationship.\nBetween July 1, 2002, and September 23, 2002, Edward attended four counseling sessions and missed six. Two of those he attended were only half-hour sessions, due to changes in his work schedule and Moutoux\u2019s availability. Moutoux\u2019s counseling progress report dated September 24, 2002, stated that Edward \u201cfirmly maintained]\u201d that there was nothing he needed or wanted to work on and declined to discuss issues relating to his marriage. He felt that case-management personnel and the court should not pry into or interfere with his marriage because it was a private matter between him and Lora. When Moutoux brought up each of the issues identified in his counseling referral, he stated that he felt he had already made progress in that area or it was not something that was a problem for him at the time.\nLora\u2019s mother called Moutoux to cancel Lora\u2019s September 25, 2002, counseling appointment. Moutoux met with Edward on September 30, 2002. On October 1, 2002, Lora attended her session but was late.\nOn October 8, 2002, Moutoux conducted a final, joint session with Lora and Edward. They brought Briana to the session. Moutoux told them that she believed they needed to work on relationship issues, such as communication skills, conflict resolution, parenting issues, and financial issues. Lora and Edward did not feel they needed to work on these issues. Moutoux closed the case. She explained that she could not force them to discuss issues they were unwilling to address and counseling under such circumstances would be nonproductive.\nMoutoux acknowledged that Lora and Edward were willing to talk about child-care issues, financial issues, and parenting issues. However, in general, they did not discuss their issues with her in a full and forthright manner, and their reticence impeded their progress. In one session, Lora was upset that Moutoux questioned her about spending $300 on a camcorder. Lora felt that how they spent their money was a private matter. She told Moutoux that she bought the camera to record visits with the children so she would have a remembrance of them if her parental rights were terminated.\nHolcomb testified that in June 2002, he met with Lora at her request. Lora told him that she had attended her first counseling session with Moutoux and asked Holcomb what needed to occur for her to advance toward unsupervised visitation with her children. He responded as follows:\n\u201cI started off by asking her what her current relationship with her husband was. She told me that they were not together but that [Edward] was living with her and was supporting her financially. She compared him to a roommate. I then went on and told her that since technically she was independent, that she would need to obtain employment in order to provide financial security for her and her children once her children were returned home to her. She said that she did not want to obtain employment but would rather stay home with her child Briana. I offered for DCFS to pay day care for Briana while she worked, but she went on to say that only gas station jobs had hours flexible enough to accommodate her need to attend counseling and visitation appointments. She also added that she would not consider fast[-]food or factory jobs. I told her at that point that in order for her to advance toward unsupervised visits with her children, she would need to maintain consistent counseling appointments, visitation with her children, and obtain employment.\u201d\nIn September 2002, Holcomb met with Edward. Edward wanted to know how the case was progressing, and Holcomb told him that it was hampered by Lora\u2019s inconsistent attendance at counseling. Edward said that Lora\u2019s poor attendance was due to a baby-sitting problem. Holcomb suggested that Lora\u2019s mother could baby-sit Briana, and Edward said he would look into that.\nJim Kietzman, the children\u2019s foster father, testified about unsupervised visits that Lora had cancelled in January and February 2002, and the effect that last-minute cancellations or schedule changes had on the children. He also testified about many occasions when Lora was late in arriving to pick up the children for visits or counseling.\nAt the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found Lora and Edward unfit. In a written order, the court specifically found that Lora and Edward (1) had failed to make reasonable progress between January 11, 2002, and October 10, 2002; (2) \u201cneeded to engage in frequent, intense, consistent family therapy with Dustin B., but attended family therapy so sporadically as to render it ineffective\u201d; and (3) attended only 4 of 12 couples therapy sessions, and by March 2002, there was \u201cserious marital discord.\u201d The court also wrote as follows:\n\u201cIn summary, sadly, in the nine-month period cited herein, [Lora and Edward] not only made no reasonable progress, they actually regressed. Whereas they appeared to have made reasonable progress through December, 2001, thereafter the parents chose increasingly not to cooperate with any kind of counseling, even the family counseling involving their sons. They refused to acknowledge any problems within the home even as their relationship was floundering, even as they missed counseling and visits with their children, and even as their financial circumstances threatened their ability to maintain a home. They continued to show little understanding of how threatening the instability of the family was to their children or how their failures to appear promptly or at all for visits upset their children. They continued to refuse help to address the problems affecting their relationship, their finances [,] and their parenting.\u201d\nAt the April 2003 best-interest hearing, the trial court considered the DCFS best-interest report, which showed the following. The children had been living with Jim and Candace Kietzman since June 2000. Candace did not work outside the home and was formerly a special education teacher. All of the children had behavioral problems but had improved since coming into the Kietzmans\u2019 care. Dustin B. and Brooke H. thrived when a strict routine was in place. Candace worked closely with the children\u2019s teachers to address behavioral problems, and Dustin B. and Brooke H. were doing well academically. The Kietzmans wished to adopt the children if Lora and Edward\u2019s parental rights were terminated. DCFS recommended that Lora and Edward\u2019s parental rights be terminated.\nThe trial court found the evidence \u201coverwhelmingly\u201d in favor of terminating Lora and Edward\u2019s parental rights and that no reasonable expectation existed that they would be able to provide a safe, stable home for the children in the foreseeable future. The court thus entered an order terminating respondents\u2019 parental rights.\nThis appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Edward\u2019s Appeal\nEdward argues only that (1) the trial court erred by changing the May 1999 permanency goal to substitute care pending court determination on termination of parental rights; and (2) that error thwarted his attempts at reunification and violated his right to due process. We decline to address Edward\u2019s argument on the merits.\nNotably, Edward does not challenge the trial court\u2019s unfitness finding, only the court\u2019s May 1999 permanency order. However, once parental rights have been terminated, this court will not delve into and review the trial court\u2019s preliminary determinations in the respondents\u2019 case. At this point in the proceedings, the only order subject to review is the court\u2019s finding on the termination petition. We acknowledge that consideration of such preliminary orders should be considered on review to the extent that those orders adversely affected respondent\u2019s ability to make reasonable progress, if such evidence was considered by the trial court during the termination proceedings. However, beyond any effect that such interlocutory orders may have had on the ultimate issue before us \u2014 namely, whether the trial court erred by determining that the State proved its termination petition by clear and convincing evidence \u2014 they are irrelevant and not justiciable.\nWe note that our holding does not leave respondents entirely without redress for an improperly entered permanency order. Prior to our supreme court\u2019s holding in In re Curtis B., 203 Ill. 2d 53, 60, 784 N.E.2d 219, 223 (2002), those orders were immediately appealable under section 2 \u2014 28(3) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 28(3) (West 1998)). The right to appeal such orders is now discretionary under Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(5) (166 Ill. 2d R. 306(a)(5)). Curtis B., 203 Ill. 2d at 63, 784 N.E.2d at 225.\nB. Lora\u2019s Appeal\n1. The Trial Court\u2019s Unfitness Finding\nLora first argues that the trial court\u2019s finding that she failed to make reasonable progress toward the children\u2019s return during any nine-month period after the initial nine-month period following the neglect and abuse adjudication was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.\nThe State must prove parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence, and the trial court\u2019s findings must be given great deference because of its superior opportunity to observe the witnesses and evaluate their credibility. We will not reverse a trial court\u2019s finding of parental unfitness unless it was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, meaning that the correctness of the opposite conclusion is clearly evident from a review of the evidence. In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 498, 777 N.E.2d 930, 942 (2002). A finding of parental unfitness may be based on evidence sufficient to support any one statutory ground. In re D.D., 196 Ill. 2d 405, 422, 752 N.E.2d 1112, 1122 (2001).\nSection l(D)(m)(iii) of the Adoption Act (Act) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:\n\u201cThe grounds of unfitness are any *** of the following:\n(m) Failure by a parent *** (iii) to make reasonable progress toward the return of the child to the parent during any 9-month period after the end of the initial 9-month period following the adjudication of neglected or abused minor ***.\u201d 750 ILCS 50/ l(D)(m)(iii) (West 2000).\nReasonable progress \u201cis an objective review of the steps the parent has taken toward the goal of reunification.\u201d In re B.S., 317 Ill. App. 3d 650, 658, 740 N.E.2d 404, 411 (2000), overruled on other grounds in In re R.C., 195 Ill. 2d 291, 304, 745 N.E.2d 1233, 1241 (2001). In In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 216-17, 752 N.E.2d 1030, 1050 (2001), the supreme court discussed the benchmark for measuring a respondent\u2019s progress as follows:\n\u201c[T]he benchmark for measuring a parent\u2019s \u2018progress toward the return of the child\u2019 under section l(D)(m) of the [Act] encompasses the parent\u2019s compliance with the service plans and the court\u2019s directives, in light of the condition which gave rise to the removal of the child, and in light of other conditions which later become known and which would prevent the court from returning custody of the child to the parent.\u201d\nIn In re L.L.S., 218 Ill. App. 3d 444, 461, 577 N.E.2d 1375, 1387 (1991), this court discussed reasonable progress under section l(D)(m) of the Act and held as follows:\n\u201c \u2018Reasonable progress\u2019 *** exists when the [trial] court *** can conclude that *** the court, in the near future, will be able to order the child returned to parental custody. The court will be able to order the child returned to parental custody in the near future because, at that point, the parent will have fully complied with the directives previously given to the parent ***.\u201d (Emphases in original.)\nThe supreme court\u2019s discussion in C.N. regarding the benchmark for measuring a respondent parent\u2019s progress did not alter or call into question this court\u2019s holding in L.L.S. For cases citing the L.L.S. holding approvingly, see In re D.S., 313 Ill. App. 3d 1020, 1025, 730 N.E.2d 637, 641 (2000), In re B.W., 309 Ill. App. 3d 493, 499, 721 N.E.2d 1202, 1207 (1999), In re K.P., 305 Ill. App. 3d 175, 180, 711 N.E.2d 478, 482 (1999), and In re J.G., 298 Ill. App. 3d 617, 626, 699 N.E.2d 167, 173-74 (1998).\nSpecifically, Lora cites the following evidence of her reasonable progress: (1) the children were taken away because of (a) inadequate supervision, and (b) her use of corporal punishment on Dustin B.; (2) the children are no longer left unsupervised, and she no longer uses abusive disciplinary measures; (3) although she was late for, or missed, several scheduled visits with the children, it was due to unreliable transportation; and (4) the \u201ccouples issues\u201d that the trial court emphasized were not previously articulated by the court. We are not persuaded.\nEven if we accept as true Lora\u2019s assertion that she addressed the specific circumstances that led to the children\u2019s removal, we would not conclude that her doing so constituted reasonable progress. As the supreme court wrote in C.N., the benchmark for measuring a parent\u2019s reasonable progress includes viewing the parent\u2019s compliance with service plans and the court\u2019s directives in light of conditions that became known after the children\u2019s removal. C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 216-17, 752 N.E.2d at 1050.\nMoreover, evidence showed that during the relevant nine-month period, Lora (1) cancelled unsupervised visits, (2) was late picking up or returning the children on numerous occasions, and (3) cancelled or was late for numerous counseling sessions. No evidence suggested that Lora had established the stability required to resume caring for the children. Nor did the evidence show that Lora had complied with DCFS directives such that the children could be returned to her in the near future. Evidence showed instead that although Lora knew that her children\u2019s return depended on her participation in counseling, she found any excuse to cancel her counseling sessions. After reviewing all of the evidence in accordance with the applicable standard of review, we conclude that the trial court\u2019s unfitness finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\n2. October 2002 Permanency Goal\nLora also argues that the trial court erred by changing the October 2002 permanency goal. We reject this argument for the reasons stated in our discussion of Edward\u2019s appeal.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nAffirmed.\nKNECHT, EJ., and McCULLOUGH, J, concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel B. Kennedy, of Champaign, for appellant.", "John B. Hensley, of Hensley Law Office, of Champaign, for appellant.", "John C. Piland, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Norhert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Linda Susan McClain, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re JORDAN V., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Edward Velez, Respondent-Appellant).\u2014In re DUSTIN B. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Lora Velez, Respondent-Appellant).\nFourth District\nNos. 4\u201403\u20140828, 4\u201403\u20140829 cons.\nOpinion filed April 22, 2004.\nDaniel B. Kennedy, of Champaign, for appellant.\nJohn B. Hensley, of Hensley Law Office, of Champaign, for appellant.\nJohn C. Piland, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Norhert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Linda Susan McClain, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1057-01", "first_page_order": 1075, "last_page_order": 1087 }