{ "id": 4022496, "name": "In re JARON Z. et al., Minors, Respondents-Appellees (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Lynette H.F., Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Lynette H.F.", "decision_date": "2004-05-07", "docket_number": "No. 1-03-0286", "first_page": "239", "last_page": "264", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "348 Ill. App. 3d 239" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "317 Ill. App. 3d 853", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1026009 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "862", "parenthetical": "reviewing court need only find sufficient basis in record on appeal" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/317/0853-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 Ill. App. 3d 935", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5798065 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "950-51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/221/0935-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 Ill. App. 3d 859", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 261354 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "865" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/308/0859-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 Ill. App. 3d 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1472391 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "25" }, { "page": "24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/329/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 Ill. App. 3d 607", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1026035 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "614" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/317/0607-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 Ill. App. 3d 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 25347 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/338/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 Ill. App. 3d 865", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 173585 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "868" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/307/0865-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 Ill. App. 3d 792", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2592875 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "797" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/201/0792-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 Ill. App. 3d 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 381803 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "246", "parenthetical": "court should examine parent's conduct in context of her circumstances, including her poverty, transportation options, whether visits were discouraged, and effect of personal problems" }, { "page": "246" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/268/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 Ill. App. 3d 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1352929 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "772", "parenthetical": "\"a finding of parental unfitness may be based on evidence sufficient to support any one statutory ground, even if the evidence is not sufficient to support other grounds alleged\" (emphasis in original)" }, { "page": "773" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/302/0770-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 Ill. App. 3d 720", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 415428 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "726" }, { "page": "726" }, { "page": "726-27" }, { "page": "727" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/311/0720-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 Ill. App. 3d 643", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3778262 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "653", "parenthetical": "party who fails to make offer of proof as to evidence it intended to introduce waives any challenge with respect to that evidence" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/344/0643-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 Ill. App. 3d 497", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2567223 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/205/0497-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 U.S. 745", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11307633 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/455/0745-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 Ill. 2d 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 783189 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "210-11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/161/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 Ill. 2d 291", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 725379 ], "weight": 10, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "296" }, { "page": "296" }, { "page": "296" }, { "page": "301" }, { "page": "301" }, { "page": "302" }, { "page": "302" }, { "page": "302", "parenthetical": "noting that no word used by legislature in subsection connoted any particular, or different, burden of proof" }, { "page": "298-300", "parenthetical": "noting that a vagueness challenge which does not involve first amendment concerns must be conducted based on an examination in light of the facts of that particular case" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/195/0291-01" ] }, { "cite": "332 Ill. App. 3d 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1034123 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121", "parenthetical": "parent waived contention -with respect to section 1(D) (m) by failing to object to the time period used by trial court" }, { "page": "117" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/332/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 Ill. App. 3d 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1281379 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "241-42", "parenthetical": "\"[wjhere a party fails to make an appropriate objection in the court below, he or she has failed to preserve the question for review and the issue is waived\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/326/0225-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 Ill. App. 3d 780", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 35352 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "786", "parenthetical": "any error by trial court in not holding hearing did not render subsequent orders affecting children void for lack of jurisdiction" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/294/0780-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 Ill. 2d 122", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3092064 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "129" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/91/0122-01" ] }, { "cite": "134 Ill. App. 3d 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3637765 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "369", "parenthetical": "trial court's jurisdiction over adjudicated children is \"necessarily of a continuing nature\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/134/0365-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 Ill. App. 3d 374", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8498771 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381" }, { "page": "380-81", "parenthetical": "trial court has jurisdiction to modify dispositional order at any time" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/218/0374-01" ] }, { "cite": "314 Ill. App. 3d 649", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 140331 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "654-55", "parenthetical": "dispositional order is final order from which appeal properly lies; parent's failure to file notice of appeal therefrom fails to perfect review of that order or of neglect proceedings" }, { "page": "654", "parenthetical": "failure by trial court to follow procedural dictates of Juvenile Court Act did not cause it to lose its jurisdiction over cause" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/314/0649-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1639, "char_count": 62924, "ocr_confidence": 0.743, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.6179787307035767e-07, "percentile": 0.8210422692597136 }, "sha256": "d418c3f5452bf680fbef75b9c073ab3c415bd9fe6010c319b4f728916a3310ad", "simhash": "1:caab204c080a57d4", "word_count": 10301 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:23:16.717830+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re JARON Z. et al., Minors, Respondents-Appellees (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Lynette H.F., Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE FITZGERALD SMITH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nRespondent Lynette H.F. (respondent) appeals from two companion orders finding her to be an unfit parent and terminating her parental rights to two of her minor children, Jaron Z. (Jaron) and Raven H. (Raven). On appeal, respondent makes several contentions asserting error by the trial court. The State and the children\u2019s public guardian have filed appellees\u2019 briefs. For the following reasons, we affirm.\nBACKGROUND\nJaron was born prematurely to respondent in August 1993, with several medical problems. At birth, Jaron required a tracheotomy tube and a breathing monitor. He was nonverbal until the age of four and has been diagnosed with mild cerebral palsy. He is currently labeled a \u201cspecial needs child,\u201d has behavioral problems including attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), and participates in several different therapy and special education programs. Raven was born to respondent drug-exposed in July 1995. Raven too has been labeled a \u201cspecial needs child\u201d: she has severe cerebral palsy, is nonverbal, is not toilet-trained and requires occupational, physical, speech and developmental therapies.\nRespondent\u2019s family was first brought to the attention of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) when Raven was born. At that time, both Raven and respondent tested positive for a controlled substance. DCFS allowed Jaron and Raven to remain with respondent, but put a family service plan in place requiring that respondent participate in an inpatient drug treatment program. Respondent refused to comply and later overdosed on a controlled substance and was hospitalized. Jaron (then 3V2 years old) and Raven (then 10 months old) were placed in foster care. In May 1996, the State filed petitions for adjudication of wardship and motions for temporary custody, based on Jaron and Raven\u2019s injurious environment and risk for physical injury. The trial court entered a temporary custody hearing order, finding probable cause that Jaron and Raven were neglected as well as the \u201curgent and immediate\u201d need to remove them from respondent\u2019s care. DCFS placed the children with relatives.\nThe trial court held a formal adjudicatory hearing on October 21, 1996, and entered an adjudication order with respect to both children. In that order, the court found that Raven had been born drug-exposed and that both children were neglected and living in an injurious environment while in respondent\u2019s custody. On January 6, 1997, the court entered a disposition order finding respondent unable to care for Jaron and Raven and her attempts at reunification to have been unsuccessful. The court declared the children wards of the court, terminated temporary custody and appointed DCFS as the children\u2019s guardian. Because Jaron and Raven\u2019s relatives could no longer care for them, the children were separated and moved into treatment foster homes to assist with their special needs.\nIn May 1997, respondent entered an 18-month intensive inpatient and outpatient drug treatment program, as originally recommended by DCFS. She was also entitled to weekly visits with Jaron and Raven, but did not attend these visits consistently for some time. In January 1998, the trial court entered a permanency order, with a goal of \u201creturn home\u201d of the children to respondent within 12 months, as she had made \u201csubstantial progress\u201d through treatment. In the following months, respondent obtained unsupervised and overnight visitation with the children; Raven was returned home in October 1999 and Jaron was returned home in December 1999, with the court finding respondent \u201cfit, able, and willing to care\u201d for them. However, the court instituted orders of protection with each return, requiring respondent to refrain from drug use, submit to random drug screens and attend counseling.\nAt this time, respondent\u2019s household was composed of three children (Jaron, Raven and her other minor daughter) and Byron Freeman (the father of the minor daughter). Respondent married Freeman in February 2000 and was the children\u2019s primary caretaker. In-home and out-of-home services were provided by several agencies to assist respondent. On March 15, 2000, respondent relapsed and violated the terms of Jaron and Raven\u2019s orders of protection by using cocaine. Respondent admitted her relapse to DCFS during a subsequent interview. The trial court found that respondent had violated the orders of protection, but determined that because Freeman was in the home, the children were not in imminent danger and, thus, should not be immediately removed. A plan was implemented requiring respondent to again remain drug free, submit to drug screens, and attend weekly Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) and Narcotics Anonymous (NA) meetings, as well as counseling and therapy.\nIn the following weeks, respondent failed to attend two drug screens and tested positive for cocaine during a third. On May 31, 2000, the trial court ordered another drug screen for respondent, which also tested positive. On this date, the trial court vacated the previous orders of protection for Jaron and Raven because respondent had violated them, found probable cause that these children were neglected, and determined that there was an immediate urgency and need to remove them from her care. Jaron and Raven were again placed in their nonrelative treatment foster homes, and eventually, on November 2, 2000, the court entered a modified disposition order finding respondent unable to care for them and her reunification attempts unsuccessful. The court terminated temporary custody and placed the children in DCFS guardianship. Respondent was ordered to participate in a psychological assessment, complete both intensive and multiweek inpatient and then outpatient drug treatment programs, attend NA/AA and therapy meetings, and submit to random drug screens.\nBetween June and October 2000, respondent split from her husband and became homeless. She did not have consistent contact with her caseworkers and did not participate in any of the ordered programs, except for the psychological assessment, which determined that she was in need of intensive inpatient drug treatment. In June 2000, she failed to attend two drug screens and tested positive for cocaine at a third. In July 2000, she again tested positive and entered a three-day detoxification program. After completing that program, she did not participate in her aftercare regimen and tested positive a few days later. She missed another drug screen in August 2000, entered a second detoxification program (lasting two days) in mid-September 2000, and tested positive again after completing it. She failed to participate in the program\u2019s aftercare. In October 2000, she tested positive. She entered a third detoxification program, which was to last seven days. Respondent missed two days, did not complete her aftercare, and again tested positive after being discharged. She also declined an opening with a different treatment program and admitted to being an \u201cactive\u201d drug abuser through October 2000.\nIn late October 2000, respondent left her neighborhood, obtained a seasonal job, and went to live at a women\u2019s shelter where she became a house manager. In January 2001, she enrolled in an intensive outpatient therapy program, which met five times a week. Respondent was scheduled to finish this program in March 2001. She failed to attend two days in January 2001, ten days in February 2001 and three of the first nine days in March 2001. Respondent was placed \u201con contract\u201d (i.e., supervision) and was told she would be dropped from the program if her absenteeism continued. At this point, respondent began attending meetings and completed the program in April 2001. As part of her aftercare, respondent was ordered to attend 90 NA/AA meetings in 90 days. Respondent failed to do so.\nIn June 2001, respondent moved back in with her husband and their minor daughter. The trial court entered a permanency order, finding that respondent had not made substantial progress toward the return home of Jaron and Raven, and had only started \u201cin earnest\u201d to comply with previously ordered requirements in March 2001. In October 2001, the State sought appointment of guardianship with consent to adoption, asking the trial court to find respondent unfit and to terminate her parental rights. The State premised its allegations under sections l(D)(b), (D)(k) and (D)(m) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/l(D)(b), (D)(k), (D)(m) (West 2002)), asserting that respondent failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to Jaron and Raven\u2019s welfare; failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis of their removal within nine months after the adjudicatory hearing or within any nine-month period thereafter; failed to make reasonable progress toward return of the children within nine months after the adjudicatory hearing or within any nine-month period thereafter; and had been addicted to drugs for at least one year immediately prior to commencement of these proceedings. Respondent filed a demand for particulars, asking that the State identify the \u201cexact dates\u201d for the alleged nine-month period in which she failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions or reasonable progress toward return home of the children. The State moved to strike the demand and the trial court agreed.\nThe trial court held a fitness hearing in October 2002. Three witnesses testified for the State. Meg O\u2019Rourke testified that she was the social worker in charge of Jaron and Raven\u2019s case from June 1999 to June 2000, and then became the supervisor of the social worker assigned to the case from June 2000 to August 2001. She stated that after the children were first brought to the attention of social workers, respondent was ordered to participate in inpatient drug treatment but failed to do so for some 10 months, whereupon the children were removed from her care. The children were later returned, but after respondent admitted to relapsing through cocaine use, O\u2019Rourke began conducting weekly home visits and ordered drug screens, two of which respondent failed to attend and a third at which she tested positive. Respondent was then ordered to attend intensive inpatient and then outpatient treatment and NA/AA meetings. O\u2019Rourke testified that during this time, respondent did not stay in contact with her, did not complete the treatments and was not visiting Jaron or Raven \u201cconsistently.\u201d Respondent began some treatment in 1998, and the children were returned to her in late 1999 with social work services in place to help respondent with the children\u2019s special needs. O\u2019Rourke stated that the children were then removed at the end of May 2000 because respondent admitted to cocaine use again and tested positive during a drug screen. Respondent was then ordered to participate in various treatment programs, including outpatient treatment; she did not complete this treatment at that time, telling O\u2019Rourke that she felt she did not need it. While the service plan instituted by O\u2019Rourke had a goal of \u201creturn home,\u201d respondent had an overall rating of \u201cunsatisfactory\u201d due to her failure to maintain contact with her social worker, attend drug screens and NA/AA meetings and refrain from substance abuse. O\u2019Rourke further testified that respondent ultimately completed an outpatient program in April 2001, but has never completed an inpatient program. At the treatment program respondent did participate in, she was labeled \u201cmanipulative and not engaged.\u201d She only began consistent weekly visits with Jaron and Raven in February 2001.\nJennifer Bala, Jaron and Raven\u2019s social worker from June 2000 to October 2001, testified that respondent did not complete any of the required treatment programs outlined for her in the summer of 2000, after the children had been removed the second time. During that summer and fall, respondent either missed or tested positive at several drug screens, and her visits with the children were \u201cpretty inconsistent,\u201d amounting to only four visits in three months. Bala testified that she supervised the visits respondent had with the children. Respondent brought food and gifts, and the children sometimes stated that they wanted to visit her and go home with her. Bala also stated, however, that during the visits Raven would \u201cretreat\u201d into a \u201cbaby-like state\u201d and Jaron would be \u201cvery angry\u201d and disobedient toward respondent. With respect to the outpatient program respondent completed during early 2001, Bala noted that respondent missed several meetings and never participated in inpatient treatment as ordered. Although respondent began visiting her children regularly and participated in aftercare treatment, she did not begin attending the ordered NA/AA meetings until March 2001.\nTina Dorow, Jaron\u2019s therapist since March 2000, testified that respondent has an attachment with the children, loves them, and has helped them through therapy at some points. Dorow further testified that she offered respondent therapy in June, September, and November 2000 and January 2001, but respondent refused each time, telling Dorow \u201cshe knew how to stay clean.\u201d\nThe parties stipulated that respondent has not tested positive for drugs since January 2001. After the State rested but before respondent presented her case in chief, respondent moved for a directed finding with respect to the allegations based on sections 1(D) (k) (habitual drunkenness/drug addiction) and 1(D) (m) (failure to make reasonable efforts within a nine-month period). The court asked the State what nine-month period it was examining when dealing with respondent\u2019s progress toward \u201creasonable efforts,\u201d whether this was the nine months after the 1996 adjudication of neglect, and what effect if any the return of the children to her in 1999 had on this statutory period. The State told the court:\n\u201cThe nine month period is from March of 2000, until December of 2000. Treatment didn\u2019t start until January of 2001.\u201d\nThe court granted respondent\u2019s motion for directed finding with respect to section l(D)(k), but denied it with respect to section l(D)(m).\nRespondent then began her case in chief, presenting five witnesses and testifying on her own behalf. Tenishia Williamson, a counselor at the outpatient program respondent completed in April 2001, testified that respondent missed several days during the program, including two days in January 2001, ten days in February 2001 and three days in March 2001 whereupon she was placed on supervision. Respondent should have completed the program in March 2001, but did not finish until April 2001. Williamson stated that respondent missed these days due to her duties at the shelter where she was \u201chouse manager.\u201d\nDeidra Hearn, an employee of the shelter, testified that respondent was homeless when she arrived at the shelter and was eventually promoted to \u201chouse manager,\u201d a full-time position which entailed chores and the supervision of other residents. Hearn stated that respondent had been referred to counseling and other treatment in early 2001 and would have been excused from her chores to attend these programs by the shelter\u2019s supervisor if she had so requested. Gayle Campell, another employee of the shelter, testified that she has had contact with respondent since 1997 when she entered the 18-month drug program after the children were first removed from her home. Campell stated that respondent attended parenting classes, twice obtained seasonal employment at a department store, and acted appropriately with the children.\nFreeman, respondent\u2019s husband, testified that he worked nights, leaving respondent to be the primary caretaker of Jaron, Raven and their other minor daughter. While the home was \u201c[v]ery busy, very constant,\u201d Freeman stated that \u201cit was manageable.\u201d He had not seen respondent use drugs in December 1999 when Jaron and Raven had been returned. However, respondent began using again in March 2000. He notified social workers, split from respondent and took custody of their minor daughter. He also testified that he was present for most of the visits respondent had with Jaron and Raven, and that respondent acted appropriately and bonded with them. She never attended a visit under the influence of drugs or alcohol. He further testified that while he never saw respondent actually take drugs, he assumed that this was so due to changes he observed in her behavior.\nTiffany Harrison, respondent\u2019s adult daughter, testified that respondent took care of Jaron after he was born and visited him every day while he was in the hospital, and took Raven to therapy every day. Harrison stated that while the children were living in the relative foster home after first being removed, respondent would visit and do \u201cmotherly things\u201d such as change diapers and clean clothes. She denied ever seeing respondent \u201chigh\u201d or leaving the children unattended. She further testified that she visits Jaron and Raven once a month and respondent accompanies her, and that the children \u201cact like they were never separated from\u201d respondent, who brings them toys, clothes and food. Harrison testified that Raven plays with no one but respondent and cries when the visits are over, and that Jaron asked her if he could \u201ccome home\u201d to respondent.\nRespondent testified that she was a \u201crecovering drug addict,\u201d that she smoked crack cocaine regularly between July 2000 and October 2000, and that she last used cocaine in October 2000. She stated that Jaron and Raven were first removed to relative foster care in May 1996 when she was using cocaine, but that she saw them every day. She did not begin receiving treatment until a year later, whereupon she participated in an 18-month inpatient program. Jaron and Raven were returned in late 1999. Respondent testified that she relapsed in March 2000 while the children were in her care, using cocaine \u201cabout three times\u201d between March 2000 and May 31, 2000, when she tested positive and the children were removed again. She used cocaine because she felt \u201cfrustrated\u201d and because the social work agencies had \u201cset [her] up to fail.\u201d She was then homeless until September 2000, when she entered a shelter and eventually became house manager. Her psychological assessment recommended she attend an inpatient drug treatment program, but she entered multiple detoxification programs instead. Respondent admitted that she did not perform any ordered aftercare treatments from these programs. She then participated in another program in January 2001, but she was placed on supervision due to her absences, which respondent attributed to her duties as house manager at the shelter. Respondent was also ordered to attend 90 NA/AA meetings in 90 days, but did not do so.\nRespondent stated that she visited Jaron and Raven once a month during October 2000 and June 2001, but also stated that she was entitled to weekly visits during that time and participated in every visit. She then admitted missing visits and declining to participate in therapy sessions offered to her by therapist Dorow. She testified that she helps the children during the visits, teaching Raven sign language. Respondent admitted to missing several drug screens and that at least two were positive, even after she had completed detoxification programs. She blamed the positive results on cocaine being left in her \u201csystem.\u201d She denied missing or testing positive for other drops, and denied that social workers ordered an inpatient program or aftercare following her outpatient treatment. She considered herself \u201ccured\u201d of her addiction as of March 2001.\nRespondent rested her case. The court then continued the matter for argument, asking the State to address \u201cwhat nine month period or periods\u201d it was asking it to consider wherein respondent failed to make \u201creasonable efforts.\u201d When the State offered to make its argument at that time, the court declined and asked the parties to present it with any case law addressing whether a court could consider the time period when the children were home with respondent after their initial removal.\nThe court reconvened on January 28, 2003; none of the parties offered case law to the court with respect to whether it could consider the time between when the children were returned home in December 1999 and before respondent relapsed in March 2000 as part of the nine-month period, although the State argued that the court could consider it while respondent argued that it could not. The State told the court that a different nine-month period it could consider, without involving any consideration of the time during which the children lived with respondent, was between May 31, 2000 (when the children were removed for the second time), and February 2001.\nWith respect to the allegations under section l(D)(m) of the Adoption Act, the court noted that the adjudication of neglect in this cause was rendered on October 21, 1996, and thus, it could look to the first nine months after this date or any other nine-month period thereafter. The court commented that it had not received any evidence concerning the first nine months, so it would not consider this time. The court then stated that the period of time it would look to was from March 15, 2000 (when respondent relapsed), to December 15, 2000, to determine if respondent made \u201creasonable progress\u201d under section l(D)(m). While the court concluded that respondent was somewhat cooperative, she did not begin participating in intensive treatment as ordered until January 2001, \u201cwell beyond the 9 month period.\u201d Moreover, the court noted that even though respondent had \u201cformally\u201d enrolled in a treatment program at that time, \u201cshe missed meetings^ s]he missed appointmentsE,] *** she was about to be discharged from the *** program as of March.\u201d Thus, the court stated that respondent did not \u201cactually [make] the progress that was necessary\u201d until March 2001, when she had been placed on supervision and finally began attending the program consistently. This was \u201cwell beyond the December 15th cut-off date *** [and] a whole year after she first started using in March of 2000.\u201d The court also held that if it could not consider the time during which the children were home with respondent as part of the nine-month period, then even during the alternative nine-month period after their removal on May 31, 2000, to February 2001, respondent had still not made reasonable progress under section l(D)(m). This was because respondent admitted to using drugs until October 2000, and as noted earlier, she did not make the \u201cnecessary\u201d progress in her treatment until March 2001, again after the operative \u201ccut-off date.\u201d\nWith respect to section l(D)(b), the court stated that respondent visited her children often and showed concern and interest toward them when she did see them. The court concluded, however, that she \u201cfailed to show a reasonable degree of responsibility\u201d toward their welfare due to her continued use of cocaine while they lived with her and her \u201creluctance\u201d to enter and complete a treatment program, waiting until March 2001. Based on these findings, the court declared respondent unfit and began a best interests hearing.\nDuring the best interests hearing, therapist Dorow testified that she would recommend the termination of respondent\u2019s rights to Jaron and Raven for \u201cfour reasons.\u201d Dorow stated that although Jaron has commented that he wants to go home, his actions during play therapy show he feels \u201csomething bad\u201d will happen if he is returned and he is not engaged in his family. Dorow next noted that the children have lived little of their lives with respondent; Jaron, who was with respondent longer, lived only 27 months of his 9-year life with her. Third, Dorow testified that respondent cannot meet the children\u2019s special needs, \u201cshowing in visits *** that she has a hard time tolerating\u201d and accepting the children\u2019s moods and behaviors. Finally, Dorow noted that the children need permanency, which they have found with their foster parents. While Dorow anticipated that termination would be \u201cdifficult\u201d and even \u201cdevastating\u201d for the children, she testified that this was in their best interests.\nAndreas Buehler testified that he was the social worker assigned to the children\u2019s case in January 2003. Based on his observations, the foster homes where the children resided were \u201csafe and appropriate,\u201d and the children had \u201chealthy\u201d and \u201crespecting\u201d relationships with their foster parents, who were able to and had been meeting their special needs. While Jaron had stated to Buehler he wanted to live with respondent, he also stated that he wanted to live with his foster parent as well. The children were bonded with their foster families, both of which told Buehler they would seek adoption of Jaron and Raven if this was available. Buehler recommended that respondent\u2019s parental rights be terminated due to her history of substance abuse, her relapse while the children were in her care, and the length of time the children had been in foster care.\nDelivia Ware, Raven\u2019s foster mother, testified that Raven has lived with her for six years. In addition to Raven, Ware has one biological child, one adopted child and one foster child whom she is adopting. Two of these children have special needs, and like Raven, require several therapies. Ware testified that Raven has been with her all her life, that she can meet her needs, that she takes Raven on outings and to her appointments, and that Raven has a \u201creal bond\u201d with her family. Ware stated that she also has a good relationship with Jaron\u2019s foster mother and would maintain sibling visits between Raven and Jaron. Deborah Haynes, Jaron\u2019s foster mother, testified that Jaron had lived with her for three years and in that time, his grades have risen \u201ctenfold,\u201d he has learned to play musical instruments, he participates in Boy Scouts and he loves to travel.\nRespondent also testified at this hearing. She stated that she visits Jaron and Raven once a month and that Jaron told her several times that he wants to live with her. Respondent averred that she has participated in speech therapy for Jaron, has gone to group sessions with him, and that she knows how to care for both children. Respondent testified that she currently attends NA/AA meetings, participates in random drug screens and is not using drugs.\nWhile making its best interests determination, the court noted that it had participated in this cause since 1996 shortly after the children\u2019s births, and that the children had been in DCFS custody since that time with the exception of only a few months when they were at home with respondent. The court commented that respondent\u2019s relapse was \u201cnot just a minor slip but a regress into the lifestyle that caused these children to come into care to begin with,\u201d since she did not stop using drugs until well after the children were removed a second time, \u201cviolat[ing] [the] trust\u201d that was allowed her when the children were not immediately removed. The court also looked to the special needs of the children as well as the difficulty termination may have on them, but stated that, in view of the entirety of the case, it \u201cwould not want to risk[,] given the present circumstances,\u201d returning these children to respondent. Thus, the court entered an order finding respondent unfit pursuant to sections 1(D) (b) for her failure \u201cto maintain a reasonable degree of responsibility, interest or concern as to the child[ren]\u2019s welfare,\u201d and l(D)(m) for her failure \u201cto make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions which were the basis for removal within any 9 months after adjudication,\u201d declaring it in the best interests of the children to terminate respondent\u2019s parental rights, and appointing a guardian with the right to consent to the children\u2019s adoptions.\nANALYSIS\nOn appeal, respondent asserts several different allegations of error on the part of the trial court when disposing of this cause. These include: (1) that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to terminate her parental rights since it erred in not conducting a second adjudicatory hearing after the children were removed from her care the second time; (2) that the trial court erred in adjudicating respondent unfit under sections l(D)(m)(i) and (D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act; (3) that section l(D)(m)(iii) of the Adoption Act is unconstitutional; (4) that even if section l(D)(m)(iii) is constitutional, the court\u2019s finding that she was unfit pursuant to this section was against the manifest weight of the evidence; (5) that the court\u2019s finding that respondent violated section l(D)(b) was against the manifest weight of the evidence; and (6) that the court\u2019s finding that termination of her rights was in the best interest of the children must be reversed because the court ignored statutory factors and this finding was against the manifest, weight of the evidence. We now address each of respondent\u2019s arguments.\nI. Second Adjudication\nRespondent\u2019s first contention on appeal is that the trial court in the instant cause lacked jurisdiction to terminate her parental rights. She asserts that the court omitted \u201ca crucial step\u201d in the termination process when it failed to adjudicate Jaron and Raven \u201cneglected\u201d again, after they were removed from her care for the second time. She claims that this rendered all subsequent proceedings \u201cinfirm,\u201d divested the court of jurisdiction and precluded the State from seeking a determination of unfitness under the Adoption Act. She also insists that because the children were returned to her custody, any subsequent neglect proceeding necessarily had to be commenced anew, as any reliance on the original neglect adjudication date would have been \u201cfundamentally unfair\u201d because it was rendered so long ago. We disagree.\nAs a threshold matter, we note that respondent has waived this argument for our review. Respondent concedes as much in her reply brief on appeal. She notes that she never raised this claim at any point during the proceedings below. The dispositional order definitively removing the children and finding her unable to care for them was entered by the trial court on November 2, 2000. Respondent had 30 days from which to appeal this final order; her failure to do so resulted in waiver. See In re M.J., 314 Ill. App. 3d 649, 654-55 (2000) (dispositional order is final order from which appeal properly lies; parent\u2019s failure to file notice of appeal therefrom fails to perfect review of that order or of neglect proceedings).\nDespite her forfeiture of this issue, respondent urges us to review its merits. Even were we to do so, it is clear that her arguments fail.\nPursuant to the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act), a trial court has jurisdiction over children who are \u201cabused, neglected or dependent.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 1 (West 2002). Once the trial court adjudicates a child neglected, it maintains jurisdiction over the case and conducts a dispositional hearing to determine if he should be made a ward of the court and how his needs should be handled. See 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 21, 2 \u2014 22 (West 2002); see, e.g., In re Shawn B., 218 Ill. App. 3d 374, 381 (1991). During the dispositional hearing, the court examines whether the parent is fit, willing and able to care for the child; if so, the court may choose to issue a dispositional order returning the child to the parent\u2019s care. However, the law is clear that the court may modify a dispositional order at any time, since proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act do not terminate unless the child \u201cages out\u201d of the juvenile system or the trial court issues an order expressly stating that the case is closed and all proceedings are discharged. See 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 31, 2 \u2014 21, 2 \u2014 23 (West 2002) (jurisdiction of trial court over child and to modify related orders continues until child reaches majority or is adopted); see also Shawn B., 218 Ill. App. 3d at 380-81 (trial court has jurisdiction to modify dispositional order at any time); In re Johnson, 134 Ill. App. 3d 365, 369 (1985) (trial court\u2019s jurisdiction over adjudicated children is \u201cnecessarily of a continuing nature\u201d). In fact, it has been held that a child need not be explicitly adjudicated a ward of the court in order to confer jurisdiction upon the court to enter a dispositional order; rather, adjudication of wardship may be implied from the circumstances of a particular case. See 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 23 (West 2002); see, e.g., In re J.N., 91 Ill. 2d 122, 129 (1982).\nIn the instant case, Jaron and Raven were adjudicated neglected on October 21, 1996. While it is true that they were returned to respondent in December 1999 upon a finding that she was fit and able to care for them, the trial court imposed orders of protection governing their return. When respondent violated these orders by failing to meet any of their requirements and returning to drug use, the court removed the children on May 31, 2000, and entered a modified dispositional order finding her unable to care for them. That the court \u201cskipped directly to\u201d a dispositional hearing rather than conducting a second adjudicatory hearing, as respondent states, is of no consequence in this particular case. It was clearly implied that Jaron and Raven were still under the court\u2019s jurisdiction as of May 31, 2000. Between their return and their second removal, the trial court never issued an order expressly closing their case or discharging the proceedings, nor did the children \u201cage out\u201d of the system. Instead, the court had imposed ongoing orders of protection, respondent\u2019s violation of which caused it to modify its previous disposition of return home to a new disposition of removal. Accordingly, contrary to respondent\u2019s contention, the children\u2019s return home did not \u201creset\u201d the procedural process of this cause or somehow erase the court\u2019s original October 1996 adjudication of neglect. That the adjudication occurred years earlier is of no moment, as the trial court possessed a continuing jurisdiction over the children and to modify orders affecting the disposition of their cause.\nUltimately, even if the trial court\u2019s failure to conduct a second adjudicatory hearing before the children\u2019s second removal was in error, that error did not divest it of jurisdiction to rule upon this cause. See M.J., 314 Ill. App. 3d at 654 (failure by trial court to follow procedural dictates of Juvenile Court Act did not cause it to lose its jurisdiction over cause); In re C.S., 294 Ill. App. 3d 780, 786 (1998) (any error by trial court in not holding hearing did not render subsequent orders affecting children void for lack of jurisdiction). Therefore, respondent\u2019s contention fails.\nII. Sections 1(D) (m)(i) and (D)(m)(ii) The following is not publishable under Supreme Court Rule 23.\nIII. Constitutionality of Section l(D)(m)(iii)\nRespondent\u2019s third contention on appeal is that section l(D)(m)(iii) of the Adoption Act is unconstitutional on its face. Respondent claims that this section violates due process because \u201cit circumvents the requirement that the State prove unfitness by clear and convincing evidence.\u201d After discussing the fundamental importance of the right to parent one\u2019s own child, respondent asserts that the State\u2019s ability to choose any nine-month time period after the initial nine months following an adjudication of neglect in which to examine a parent\u2019s fitness, as allowed under subsection (iii), affords no notice to the parent regarding which nine-month period she will be evaluated on and, accordingly, reduces the State\u2019s burden of proof in demonstrating the parent\u2019s unfitness. Respondent\u2019s argument is clearly misplaced.\nAs a threshold matter, we note that respondent has forfeited this argument on review. As she concedes in her reply brief on appeal, respondent did not object or raise any issue at trial with respect to subsection (iii) or to the State or court\u2019s declarations that she was being evaluated under the nine-month time period from March 15, 2000, to December 15, 2000, or alternatively, from May 31, 2000, to February 2001. Respondent never challenged the State\u2019s presentation of the evidence outlined above or the court\u2019s ruling as to the periods of time on which it was concentrating. Accordingly, respondent\u2019s argument is waived. See In re April C., 326 Ill. App. 3d 225, 241-42 (2001) (\u201c[wjhere a party fails to make an appropriate objection in the court below, he or she has failed to preserve the question for review and the issue is waived\u201d); accord In re D.F., 332 Ill. App. 3d 112, 121 (2002) (parent waived contention -with respect to section 1(D) (m) by failing to object to the time period used by trial court).\nEven were we to review respondent\u2019s constitutional challenge, as she urges, we find that it has no merit. Foremost, we begin by citing established law, which holds that all statutes are presumed to be constitutional. See In re R.C., 195 Ill. 2d 291, 296 (2001). A party challenging the constitutionality of a statutory section on appeal bears the burden of rebutting this presumption and demonstrating a constitutional violation. See R.C., 195 Ill. 2d at 296. A party asserting a facial challenge to a statute is confronted with the most difficult of constitutional challenges, since in order to succeed she must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid. See In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d 200, 210-11 (1994). As a court of review, our duty is to construe statutes so as to affirm their constitutionality and validity whenever reasonable. See R.C., 195 Ill. 2d at 296.\nIn R.C., our state supreme court was confronted with a very similar facial challenge to another section of the Adoption Act. There, a parent contended that section l(D)(p), under which a parent may be declared unfit due to mental illness, violated due process because it altered the burden of proof for termination of parental rights to something less than clear and convincing evidence. Our supreme court disagreed. Reiterating the requirement that a decision to terminate parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing evidence, the R.C. court declared that there was nothing in section 1(D)(p) purporting to alter this requirement. See R.C., 195 Ill. 2d at 301 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982), which established the clear and convincing standard). The court noted that section 1 of the Adoption Act is merely a definitional section; section 1(D) defines an unfit person and enumerates in its subsections the possible grounds upon which a parent may be held unfit. See R.C., 195 Ill. 2d at 301. However, nothing in section 1(D) or in any of its subsections dictates the burden involved in proving unfitness. See R.C., 195 Ill. 2d at 301. The burden of proof for unfitness, noted the R.C. court, is not found in section 1 but, rather, is set forth in section 8 of the Adoption Act, which clearly establishes that a parent may be found unfit based on the grounds listed in section 1 only through \u201c \u2018clear and convincing evidence.\u2019 \" R.C., 195 Ill. 2d at 302, quoting 750 ILCS 50/8(a)(l) (West 1998). From this reasoning, the court concluded that there was no merit to the parent\u2019s argument of unconstitutionality: there was no evidence that the legislature intended to alter the established burden of proof in section 1(D) (p) with the words used therein. See R.C., 195 Ill. 2d at 302.\nThe same reasoning used by our supreme court in R.C. undeniably applies to the instant case. Subsection (iii) of section l(D)(m) of the Adoption Act, just like all the other subsections therein, simply provides another ground available to the State in proving a parent\u2019s unfitness. The burden of proof upon the State, however, never changes; as set forth in section 8 of the Adoption Act, it remains a \u201cclear and convincing evidence\u201d standard. 750 ILCS 50/1, 8 (West 2002). That the legislature has allowed the State under section l(D)(m)(iii) to challenge a parent\u2019s fitness based on any nine-month period after the end of the initial nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect does not change the quantum, of evidence required to be shown by the State in proving unfitness, but only the type of evidence upon which it may rely. See R.C., 195 Ill. 2d at 302 (noting that no word used by legislature in subsection connoted any particular, or different, burden of proof). This legislative directive does not connote any particular burden of proof, let alone one that \u201clessens\u201d the established burden of clear and convincing evidence, as respondent contends. Thus, we find no constitutional infirmities on the face of section l(D)(m)(iii).\nIn addition to the facial challenge she makes here, respondent discusses the instant case on a more specific level and tenuously asserts other claims of error. In briefly addressing these, we note that she seemingly makes a claim of vagueness as to section l(D)(m)(iii), alleging that even though she filed a \u201cbill of particulars\u201d at the outset of her fitness hearing, she was never told the exact nine-month period upon which she was being evaluated until the State\u2019s closing argument, at which point she could not present a meaningful \u201cdefense.\u201d However, the record belies her assertions. It is true that respondent filed a bill of particulars, asking the State to tell her the exact nine-month period on which it would be concentrating. The trial court denied the bill. Respondent did not appeal from this decision, nor has she included in the record a transcript of the court\u2019s ruling on this motion, as she was required to do to perfect our review. See 166 Ill. 2d R. 323; 155 Ill. 2d R. 366. Moreover, contrary to respondent\u2019s claims, the record is clear that she indeed knew which nine-month period was at issue well before the State\u2019s closing argument. This is because, immediately after the State rested its case in chief and before respondent began hers, the court asked the State on which nine-month period it was basing its allegations of unfitness. The State replied \u201cfrom March of 2000, until December of 2000.\u201d\nWhile respondent would be correct in noting that the State told the court during its closing argument that the court could also look to the nine months between May 31, 2000, and February 2001, respondent takes this statement out of context. The court had earlier asked the parties whether it could consider the time in which the children lived with respondent (from December 1999 until their second removal on May 31, 2000), but neither side presented any case law. The court believed that it could consider this time and thus declared that the nine-month period it would consider for allegations under section l(D)(m)(iii) would be, as the State had insisted before respondent presented her case, March 2000 to December 2000. It was only as an alternative to this period that the court reasoned the nine months between May 31, 2000, and February 2001 would also support its finding of unfitness. Thus, based on our review of the record, we find that respondent did know the nine-month period at issue (March 2000 to December 2000) within ample time to present her defense.\nMoreover, any assertion of \u201cvagueness\u201d respondent may make in relation to section l(D)(m)(iii) would fail. Looking to the facts of the case at hand, we find that the terms regarding the applicable statutory time period, as contained in this subsection, are in no way subject to a vagueness challenge. See R.C., 195 Ill. 2d at 298-300 (noting that a vagueness challenge which does not involve first amendment concerns must be conducted based on an examination in light of the facts of that particular case). In our view, the section is clear with respect to the applicable time: a parent\u2019s actions for a fitness determination may be examined in light of any nine-month increment of time beginning following the expiration of the first nine-month period after the adjudication of neglect. See 750 ILCS 50/l(D)(m)(iii) (West 2002). Furthermore, respondent failed before the trial court, and fails now on appeal, to state how she was prejudiced, if at all, by the application of section l(D)(m)(iii) to her cause. See generally In re L.M., 205 Ill. App. 3d 497 (1990). She made no offer of proof at trial, nor does she assert a basis before us, regarding what different evidence she would have presented or argument she would have made that would have changed the outcome here. See Edward Don Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 344 Ill. App. 3d 643, 653 (2003) (party who fails to make offer of proof as to evidence it intended to introduce waives any challenge with respect to that evidence). Rather, there was no material dispute as to the evidence that was presented or as to the time frames attributed to this evidence by the parties.\nTherefore, we find no validity with respect to respondent\u2019s facial challenge to the constitutionality of section l(D)(m)(iii).\nIV Trial Court\u2019s Findings Under Section l(D)(m)(iii) The following is not publishable under Supreme Court Rule 23.\nV Trial Court\u2019s Findings Under Section 1(D)(b)\nRespondent\u2019s next contention on appeal is that the trial court\u2019s finding of unfitness based on section l(D)(b) of the Adoption Act was against the manifest weight of the evidence. She asserts that the evidence clearly demonstrated that she showed a reasonable degree of interest, concern and responsibility toward Jaron and Raven while they were in foster care: she overcame her drug addiction; completed drug treatment programs; took cardiopulmonary resuscitation, parenting and sign language classes; and attended therapy appointments and scheduled visits with the children. Respondent further asserts that even after her relapse, the evidence manifestly supports her claim: she entered detoxification, became a house manager at a shelter, participated in outpatient and aftercare programs, and has remained drug-free. Respondent claims that, in light of her \u201cremarkable efforts,\u201d even the trial court commented she showed interest and concern toward Jaron and Raven, and she insists that any missed visits or lack of immediate progress does not weigh in favor of the termination of her parental rights. Based on the record, we disagree.\nThe grounds for finding parental unfitness under section 1(D) of the Adoption Act stand independently of each other. See In re E.O., 311 Ill. App. 3d 720, 726 (2000). Thus, even were we to ignore our determination above that the evidence was sufficient to support the allegations under subsection (m)(iii), we may affirm the trial court\u2019s finding of unfitness under its conclusions with respect to subsection (b). See E.O., 311 Ill. App. 3d at 726; accord In re C.L.T., 302 Ill. App. 3d 770, 772 (1999) (\u201ca finding of parental unfitness may be based on evidence sufficient to support any one statutory ground, even if the evidence is not sufficient to support other grounds alleged\u201d (emphasis in original)).\nSubsection (b) provides that a parent\u2019s \u201cfailure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the child\u2019s welfare\u201d is a ground for finding the parent unfit. 750 ILCS 50/l(D)(b) (West 2002). Since this language is in the disjunctive, any of these three elements may be considered on its own as a basis for unfitness: the failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest or concern or responsibility as to the child\u2019s welfare. See C.L.T., 302 Ill. App. 3d at 773. We recognize, as respondent points out, that in examining allegations under subsection (b), a trial court must focus on a parent\u2019s reasonable efforts and not her success, and must consider any circumstances that may have made it difficult for her to visit, communicate with or otherwise show interest in her child. See E.O., 311 Ill. App. 3d at 726-27; see also In re T.D., 268 Ill. App. 3d 239, 246 (1994) (court should examine parent\u2019s conduct in context of her circumstances, including her poverty, transportation options, whether visits were discouraged, and effect of personal problems). However, our courts have repeatedly concluded that a parent is not fit merely because she has demonstrated some interest or affection toward her child; rather, her interest, concern and responsibility must be reasonable. See E.O., 311 Ill. App. 3d at 727. Noncompliance with an imposed service plan, a continued addiction to drugs, a repeated failure to obtain treatment for an addiction, and infrequent or irregular visitation with the child have all been held to be sufficient evidence warranting a finding of unfitness under subsection (b). See T.D., 268 Ill. App. 3d at 246; In re M.C., 201 Ill. App. 3d 792, 797 (1990). Ultimately, as noted above, we accord great deference to a trial court\u2019s finding of unfitness and will not reverse that finding unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. See In re Grant M., 307 Ill. App. 3d 865, 868 (1999).\nIn the instant case, the trial court commented that respondent \u201chas always showed concern towards that children when she has seen them and also shown interest towards the children when she has seen them.\u201d However, the court found that the issue regarding the allegations under section 1(D) (b) was whether respondent maintained a reasonable degree of responsibility toward the children\u2019s welfare as well. Citing respondent\u2019s drug use while the children were in her custody, as well as her \u201cinability or reluctance\u201d to participate in a treatment program and waiting until March 2001 to \u201cactually comply with the dictates of a program,\u201d \u201cclearly and convincingly\u201d proved that she failed to show such responsibility.\nGiven the multitude of facts in this case, we cannot find that the trial court\u2019s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. With Raven\u2019s drug-exposed birth in July 1995, a service plan was imposed and respondent was ordered to participate in a drug treatment program. She did not comply with this plan and Jaron and Raven were removed in May 1996. Respondent did not enter such a program until a year after that, in May 1997. It took her 3V2 years to have the children returned to her custody, which did not occur until December 1999. Then, after just three months, respondent began smoking crack cocaine again, doing so three or four times while the children were in her care. She admitted to her relapse in March 2000, and DCFS allowed the children to stay with her and ordered her to again seek treatment. She did not and appeared at a hearing on May 31, 2000, testing positive for cocaine, whereupon the children were removed. Respondent continued to use drugs on a regular basis from June 2000 until October 2000, and became homeless. Yet, she consistently refused to enter an inpatient program as ordered, stating that she \u201cknew how to stay clean.\u201d Although she participated in three outpatient detoxification programs, she did not attend every session of these short programs nor did she participate in the aftercare as required. Significantly, she tasted positive for drugs each time she \u201ccompleted\u201d these programs. And, while respondent finally entered an intensive outpatient program in January 2001, she did not take her treatment seriously, as her absenteeism placed her on supervision and caused a month\u2019s delay in her completion of the program. Her excuse that her duties as house manager of the shelter caused her absences was directly contradicted by shelter employees, who testified that respondent would have been able to attend the program if she had simply asked. What is more, she again refused to complete aftercare following this outpatient program and has yet to ever enter an inpatient program as ordered.\nDuring this time, the record also reveals several periods when respondent was not in contact with social workers, missed several scheduled visits with Jaron and Raven, and refused to partake in therapy offered to her by therapist Dorow. There is documentation that respondent did visit the children and brought them toys and food. However, these visits were very few in comparison to the months over which they spanned, and respondent admitted that she was not availing herself of scheduled weekly visits. There is also documentation indicating that respondent acted appropriately with the children while visiting them and that Jaron expressed a desire to live with her. However, there is overwhelming evidence on the record demonstrating that more has been occurring during these visits: Raven regresses to an infant-like state, and Jaron has more often than not expressed confusion, anger, disobedience and worry directly against respondent regarding her drug use and the state of his custody.\nEven within the context of respondent\u2019s personal circumstances, her lack of interaction with social workers, the children\u2019s special needs, her continued refusal to participate in even the most minor aspects of drug treatment and the imposed service plans, and her repeated failure to maintain frequent and regular visitation more than sufficiently demonstrate that she has not maintained a reasonable degree of responsibility toward the welfare of Jaron and Raven. Therefore, we find that the trial court\u2019s determination that she was unfit under section l(D)(b) was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nVI. Best Interests\nRespondent\u2019s final contention on appeal is that the trial court\u2019s finding that termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of her children was erroneous because the court failed to consider the \u201cbest interest factors\u201d as statutorily required and because the court\u2019s finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nOnce a trial court finds a parent unfit under one of the grounds of section 1(D) of the Adoption Act, the next step in an involuntary termination proceeding requires the court to consider whether it is in the best interests of the child to terminate parental rights, pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 3 (West 2002)). See D.F., 332 Ill. App. 3d at 117. The burden of proof is upon the State, which must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the child\u2019s best interests. See In re D.T., 338 Ill. App. 3d 133, 154 (2003). The court\u2019s determination in this respect lies within its sound discretion, especially when it considers the credibility of testimony presented at the best interests hearing; that determination will not be reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence or the trial court has abused its discretion. See In re B.C., 317 Ill. App. 3d 607, 614 (2000); In re G.L., 329 Ill. App. 3d 18, 25 (2002).\nSection 1 \u2014 3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act requires a trial court to consider a number of factors for termination within \u201cthe context of the child\u2019s age and developmental needs.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/ 1 \u2014 3(4.05) (West 2002); see also G.L., 329 Ill. App. 3d at 24. These include:\n\u201c(a) the physical safety and welfare of the child, including food, shelter, health, and clothing;\n(b) the development of the child\u2019s identity;\n(c) the child\u2019s background and ties, including familial, cultural, and religious;\n(d) the child\u2019s sense of attachments, including:\n(i) where the child actually feels love, attachment, and a sense of being valued ***;\n(ii) the child\u2019s sense of security;\n(iii) the child\u2019s sense of familiarity;\n(iv) continuity of affection for the child;\n(v) the least disruptive placement alternative for the child;\n(e) the child\u2019s wishes and long-term goals;\n(f) the child\u2019s community ties, including church, school, and friends;\n(g) the child\u2019s need for permanence which includes the child\u2019s need for stability and continuity of relationships with parent figures and with siblings and other relatives;\n(h) the uniqueness of every family and child;\n(i) the risks attendant to entering and being in substitute care; and\n(j) the preferences of the persons available to care for the child.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 3(4.05) (West 2002).\nAdditionally, a court may consider the nature and length of the child\u2019s relationship with his present caretaker and the effect that a change in placement would have upon his emotional and psychological well-being. See In re J.L., 308 Ill. App. 3d 859, 865 (1999).\nWe disagree with respondent\u2019s first assertion, i.e., that the trial court erred because it did not \u201cdiscuss\u201d any of the statutory factors in finding that termination of her rights was in the best interest of Jaron and Raven. Respondent claims that the court used merely one \u201cbuzzword\u201d (the term \u201cpermanence\u201d) in its colloquy, and accordingly, it did not consider any of the other factors. However, respondent presents no legal precedent to establish that a trial court is required to explicitly mention, word-for-word, the factors listed in section 1 \u2014 3(4.05) while rendering its decision. To the contrary, our law is clear that a trial court need not articulate any specific rationale for its decision, and a reviewing court need not rely on any basis used by a trial court below in affirming its decision. See McMahon v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 221 Ill. App. 3d 935, 950-51 (1991); In re Marriage of Lehr, 317 Ill. App. 3d 853, 862 (2000) (reviewing court need only find sufficient basis in record on appeal). Moreover, our review of the record evidence in relation to the statutory factors, which will be discussed more fully below, indicates to us that the trial court touched upon all of the factors in one form or another throughout the duration of the best interests hearing. The court explicitly stated that it had personally presided over Jaron and Raven\u2019s case for some three years.\nEven if the trial court\u2019s colloquy did not consider every factor, our independent review of the record attests to overwhelming evidence that the statutory factors support the conclusion that Jaron and Raven\u2019s best interests lie in the termination of respondent\u2019s parental rights. Of Jaron\u2019s 9 years of life, he has spent only 27 months in respondent\u2019s care. He has been living with his current foster mother Deborah Haynes for over three years, during which time his grades in school have risen greatly, he has learned to play musical instruments, he has become a Boy Scout and he participates in cultural activities. Haynes maintains consistent visitation for Jaron with Raven and his other siblings. Haynes has ensured that Jaron attends his therapy sessions to cope with his custody status and his cerebral palsy, and has expressed a desire to adopt him. Dorow, Jaron\u2019s therapist, testified that although respondent visited him and taught him about his heritage and familial identity, Jaron was often either not engaged during her visits or expressed anger and disobedience toward her due to her drug use, and respondent had a hard time tolerating his behavior. Although Jaron has said on occasion he wished to return home to respondent, Jaron also consistently expressed that he wanted to five with Haynes. Dorow noted that when Jaron was scared or wanted affection, he turned to Haynes rather than respondent. Although Buehler had only been assigned to Jaron\u2019s case for a month before the best interests hearing, he corroborated much of Dorow\u2019s testimony, noting the healthy and respectful relationship Jaron has with Haynes.\nRaven was removed from respondent\u2019s care a few months after her drug-exposed birth and has lived six of her seven years with the same foster parents, the Wares, who have other adopted and foster children with the same special needs. Delivia Ware testified as to Raven\u2019s therapies, the bond she has developed with the family, her marked improvement and the activities she has come to enjoy. Raven also participates in regular visits with Jaron and her other siblings, and Ware testified that these visits will continue once she and her husband are allowed to adopt Raven. Buehler noted that Raven\u2019s foster home was safe and appropriate and was conducive to her special needs.\nRespondent presented little evidence during the best interests hearing that the statutory factors lie in her favor. She produced no professional or expert testimony to rebut that of the therapists and caseworkers, all of whom, though noting it may be difficult on the children, strongly recommended termination. She testified only that she has attended some of Jaron\u2019s speech therapies, has taught Raven some sign language, and otherwise knows how to care for their special needs.\nBased on this record, we find no error with the trial court\u2019s determination that the termination of respondent\u2019s parental rights was in the best interests of Jaron and Raven.\nCONCLUSION\nAccordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.\nAffirmed.\nO\u2019MARA FROSSARD, EJ, and GALLAGHER, J, concur.\nRespondent has five children: in addition to Jaron and Raven, she has an adult daughter, a minor daughter who is without special needs and is not at issue in this appeal, and an infant son who died while in the custody of the Department of Children and Family Services several years ago. Raven has been referred to throughout these proceedings as both Raven H. and Raven G. Although the caption of this cause uses \u201cRaven H.,\u201d respondent alerts us in her reply brief that the proper reference should be \u201cRaven G.\u201d Also, we note that Jaron and Raven have the same biological father, Sedale Z. His parental rights were involuntarily terminated; he has not appealed that decision and is not a party to the instant appeal.\nRespondent\u2019s relapse was brought to the attention of DCFS by her husband, Byron Freeman.\nThe testimony provided by all the witnesses who took the stand in this matter is lengthy and repetitive of much of the history with respect to Jaron and Raven\u2019s case as already outlined here. Accordingly, we recount this testimony in brief, highlighting only pertinent or additional information relevant to our disposition on appeal.\nIn addition to an alleged error under both these sections of the statute, respondent devotes a portion of her brief to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence presented against her with respect to section l(D)(m)(i). Because this second portion in essence mimics the first portion with respect to both sections 1(D) (m)(i) and (D)(m)(ii), we treat them as one argument.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE FITZGERALD SMITH" } ], "attorneys": [ "James A. Rolfes, Tracy A. Gregar, and Myra A. Marcaurelle, all of Sachnoff & Weaver, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Nancy Kisicki, and Nancy Faulls, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.", "Patrick T. Murphy, Public Guardian, of Chicago (Charles P Golbert and Elizabeth A. Di Cola, of counsel), guardian ad litem." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re JARON Z. et al., Minors, Respondents-Appellees (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Lynette H.F., Respondent-Appellant).\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201403\u20140286\nOpinion filed May 7, 2004.\nJames A. Rolfes, Tracy A. Gregar, and Myra A. Marcaurelle, all of Sachnoff & Weaver, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Nancy Kisicki, and Nancy Faulls, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nPatrick T. Murphy, Public Guardian, of Chicago (Charles P Golbert and Elizabeth A. Di Cola, of counsel), guardian ad litem." }, "file_name": "0239-01", "first_page_order": 257, "last_page_order": 282 }