{ "id": 4022929, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PRUDY CALGARO, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Calgaro", "decision_date": "2004-05-03", "docket_number": "No. 2-03-0397", "first_page": "297", "last_page": "303", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "348 Ill. App. 3d 297" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "208 Ill. 2d 118", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2462782 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "138" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/208/0118-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 Ill. App. 3d 113", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 35346 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "122" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/294/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 Ill. App. 3d 974", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5238746 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "982" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/226/0974-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 Ill. App. 3d 728", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3530301 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "730-31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/133/0728-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 Ill. App. 3d 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3314388 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476" }, { "page": "476" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/67/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 Ill. App. 3d 900", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3522217 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "902" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/122/0900-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 Ill. App. 3d 844", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2540477 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "876" }, { "page": "877" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/209/0844-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 Ill. App. 3d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3276773 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "5" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/75/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 Ill. App. 3d 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2183263 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "388" }, { "page": "389" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/328/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 Ill. App. 3d 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3187533 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "190" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/86/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 Ill. 2d 194", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 29957 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/198/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 Ill. 2d 144", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1131032 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "204" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/187/0144-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 660, "char_count": 13446, "ocr_confidence": 0.765, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.12613862815940236 }, "sha256": "cff6242c57ce7e64cc065187bcdcd689745722b36bd11bea0b1d9e3f986c2aad", "simhash": "1:9babbe442f484df4", "word_count": 2109 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:23:16.717830+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PRUDY CALGARO, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BOWMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe State appeals the trial court\u2019s order suppressing evidence against defendant, Prudy Calgaro, that was obtained through judicially authorized eavesdropping. The State contends that the trial court erred in holding that the application to use an eavesdropping device did not establish reasonable cause to believe that the recorded conversations would produce evidence that a felony was being committed. We reverse and remand.\nThe eavesdropping in question occurred as part of an ongoing investigation of alleged prostitution at the C\u2019est la Vie massage parlor. Members of the State Line Area Narcotics Team (SLANT) wanted to have an informant, identified as Tammy Strawberry, call the C\u2019est la Vie posing as a prospective employee. Inspector Robert Czech of SLANT obtained the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s approval and submitted to the trial court an application for a wiretap authorization.\nThe application stated that the parties whose conversations were to be recorded were Tammy Strawberry, defendant, \u201cand any other persons that may involve themselves in pandering violations.\u201d In an affidavit accompanying the application, Czech related interviews with witnesses who described acts of prostitution that occurred at the C\u2019est la Vie. Czech averred that Strawberry was the consenting party and that Strawberry and defendant were the parties whose conversations would be overheard. The final paragraph of the affidavit stated as follows:\n\u201cThe nature of this investigation is such that any authorization granted pursuant to this petition should not terminate automatically; it is anticipated that conversation with Tammy Strawberry and Prudy I. Calgaro will result in more than one conversation which will consist of negotiations for Tammy Strawberry\u2019s participation in and performance of acts of prostitution while being employed by Prudy I. Calgaro at Calgaro\u2019s place of business (The C\u2019est la Vie) and obtaining corroborative evidence of Calgaro\u2019s involvement in and association with others involved in violations of the Pandering statute.\u201d\nJudge Gerald F. Grubb issued an order authorizing the monitoring of conversations between Strawberry and defendant \u201cand possible unknown persons.\u201d\nApparently such conversations did occur. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained during those conversations. The trial court, through Judge J. Todd Kennedy, granted the motion. Although the motion did not specifically raise this ground, the court held that the wiretap application documents did not link defendant to any pandering violations at the C\u2019est la Vie. The court observed that Czech\u2019s affidavit stated only that defendant was the registered agent of the business; it did not state that she played any role in the business\u2019s hiring or other day-to-day operations. The State filed a certificate of impairment and a timely notice of appeal.\nThe State contends that the trial court should not have suppressed the evidence, because a liberal reading of the application documents permits the inference that defendant was involved in the illicit activities at the C\u2019est la Vie. We agree with the State that the evidence should not have been suppressed, albeit for slightly different reasons.\nGenerally, when a motion to suppress evidence involves factual determinations, a reviewing court will not reverse a trial court\u2019s ruling unless it was manifestly erroneous. People v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144, 204 (1999). However, where the facts are not in dispute, our review is de novo. People v. Anthony, 198 Ill. 2d 194, 201 (2001). Here, no facts were disputed and the court\u2019s ruling turned solely on legal issues.\nDefendant contends, as the trial court held, that the application documents did not link her to the illegal activities at the C\u2019est la Vie. The expected conversations were to consist of Strawberry calling the business to ask about employment there, which would presumably involve a description of her job duties. However, the application listed defendant only as the registered agent, which does not necessarily support a conclusion that she was involved in the business\u2019s day-today operations or was responsible for its hiring. Thus, according to defendant, the application did not demonstrate that the eavesdropping was likely to record conversations about the described criminal activity.\nThe problem with this argument is that neither the application nor the authorization order specifically limited the recorded conversations to those involving defendant. The application requested permission to monitor conversations between Strawberry and \u201cPrudy I. Calgaro and any other persons that may involve themselves in pandering violations.\u201d The order similarly allowed recording conversations with \u201cPrudy I. Calgaro, and possible unknown persons.\u201d Moreover, a careful review of the statute governing judicially approved wiretapping reveals that this was permissible. The specific identity of the person whose conversations are to be recorded is not necessarily critical in obtaining judicial approval for eavesdropping.\nSection 108A \u2014 3(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (the Code) governs the process of applying for judicial approval of the use of an eavesdropping device where one party to the anticipated conversation consents to its use. 725 ILCS 5/108A \u2014 3(a) (West 2002). The statute requires a statement of facts to justify a reasonable belief that a felony has been, is being, or is about to be committed; a description of the type of communication to be monitored; the identity of the consenting party; and \u201cthe identity of the person, if known, whose conversations are to be overheard by the eavesdropping device.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/108A \u2014 3(a)(2) (West 2002).\nSection 108A \u2014 4 of the Code provides that a judge may authorize the use of an eavesdropping device if he or she finds that one party to the conversation has or will have consented to the use of the device; there is reasonable cause for believing that an individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a felony; and there is reasonable cause for believing that particular conversations concerning that felony will be obtained. 725 ILCS 5/108A \u2014 4 (West 2002).\nThe restrictions on the use of an eavesdropping device in such situations are purely statutory; the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. IV) is not implicated. People v. Sylvester, 86 Ill. App. 3d 186, 190 (1980). However, because Illinois citizens are entitled to be safeguarded from unnecessary governmental surveillance and other unreasonable intrusions into their privacy, the statutory restraints on eavesdropping must be strictly construed with respect to all requests and consents for the authority to use an eavesdropping device. People v. Bookman, 328 Ill. App. 3d 384, 388 (2002); People v. Monoson, 75 Ill. App. 3d 1, 5 (1979).\n\u201cReasonable cause\u201d as used in the eavesdropping statute is synonymous with \u201cprobable cause\u201d and is established when the totality of the circumstances is sufficient to warrant the belief by a reasonable person that an offense has been, is being, or will be committed. People v. White, 209 Ill. App. 3d 844, 876 (1991). An application to use an eavesdropping device should be viewed in a commonsense manner and the issuing judge\u2019s conclusions that reasonable cause exists should be given great deference when reviewed by subsequent judges. White, 209 Ill. App. 3d at 877. Nevertheless, an application must establish reasonable cause to believe that the eavesdropping will obtain particular conversations about the described felony. People v. Ellis, 122 Ill. App. 3d 900, 902 (1984). Although this requirement is found in section 108A \u2014 4, governing judicial authorizations, rather than in section 108A \u2014 3, it is properly considered a requirement to be included in an application. Bookman, 328 Ill. App. 3d at 389.\nHaving set out in some detail the statutory requirements for an application to use an eavesdropping device, it is important to note what the statute does not require. It does not require that the nonconsenting party be suspected of committing the felony or even that the nonconsenting party be specifically identified. The statute requires only the \u201cidentity of the person, if known,\u201d whose conversations are to be monitored. 725 ILCS 5/108A \u2014 3(a)(2) (West 2002).\nAlthough the cases addressing this issue are not numerous, they suggest that these omissions from the statutory requirements were intentional. The legislature intended the statute to cover situations, like this one, where it is clear that felonies are being committed at a particular business but the identity of the particular people responsible for them is unclear. In People v. Childs, 67 Ill. App. 3d 473, 476 (1979), the court observed that, by its very nature, a \u201cstorefront\u201d operation is uncertain. There, the application stated that several people were using a business to sell stolen property, but the officers could not determine beforehand with whom they would speak on a given occasion. However, this uncertainty did not invalidate the eavesdropping order so as to require suppression of the resulting evidence. Childs, 67 Ill. App. 3d at 476.\nLikewise, in People v. Moss, 133 Ill. App. 3d 728 (1985), the court refused to suppress wiretap evidence even though the defendant was not specifically named in the application. Apparently, the defendant\u2019s brother was the target of the investigation and the defendant was only fortuitously in his brother\u2019s company when the recorded incident took place. Moss, 133 Ill. App. 3d at 730-31.\nMost recently, in People v. O\u2019Toole, 226 Ill. App. 3d 974 (1992), John O\u2019Toole and his girlfriend, Brenda Haney, were looking for a hit man to murder her ex-husband. O\u2019Toole contacted an acquaintance, Ron Johnson, who notified police. Johnson agreed to meet with O\u2019Toole and have the conversation recorded. The application named O\u2019Toole as a party to the expected conversation, but did not name Haney, who also participated. Haney then sought to suppress the evidence on the ground that she was not named in the application. The appellate court found it insignificant that the application did not list all of the expected parties to the conversation and refused to disturb the trial court\u2019s order allowing the evidence. O\u2019Toole, 226 Ill. App. 3d at 982.\nHere, although the application could have been more artfully drafted, viewing it in a commonsense fashion, it is clear that Strawberry was going to phone the C\u2019est la Vie to inquire about working there. Thus, she presumably would have been directed at some point to the person in charge of hiring. The police expected that this would have been defendant, but it could have been someone else. The authorization allowed the recording of Strawberry\u2019s conversations with any such \u201cunknown persons.\u201d As a result, the application did demonstrate reasonable cause to believe that Strawberry\u2019s conversations would concern the ongoing pandering violations. As in the fencing operation in Childs, it was not critical that the police be able to identify the specific individual responsible for the pandering violations.\nIn light of this conclusion, it is clear that the application complied with the statute. It identified an ongoing felony, pandering, being committed at the C\u2019est la Vie. Defendant complains that the application showed only that prostitution, a misdemeanor, was being committed, while the wiretapping statute applies only to felonies. However, we agree with the State that a reasonable inference from the repeated and quite organized nature of the prostitution inside the business was that someone was responsible for \u201carranging] a situation in which a person may practice prostitution,\u201d which is the definition of pandering. See 720 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 16(a)(2) (West 2002). Pandering is a Class 4 felony. 720 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 16(b) (West 2002).\nThe application met the rest of the statutory requirements. It listed the type of conversations to be recorded and the identity of the consenting party. Defendant does not challenge the application or authorization order on any other grounds. She argued in the trial court that the order was invalid because the name of the consenting party was an alias. See People v. Manuel, 294 Ill. App. 3d 113, 122 (1997). However, she does not renew this argument on appeal.\nFinally, because of our resolution of the primary issue, we need not consider the State\u2019s alternative request to decide whether the informant could testify to the content of the conversations even if the recordings were suppressed. We note, however, that the supreme court recently decided that when reviewing an order suppressing evidence, the appellate court has no jurisdiction to consider the propriety of evidence that was not suppressed. People v. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d 118, 138 (2003).\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Boone County is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nHUTCHINSON and GILLERAN JOHNSON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BOWMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Roger T. Russell, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belvidere (Lawrence M. Bauer and Gary F. Gnidovec, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "Jack P. Rimland, of Law Office of Jack P. Rimland, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PRUDY CALGARO, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201403\u20140397\nOpinion filed May 3, 2004.\nRoger T. Russell, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belvidere (Lawrence M. Bauer and Gary F. Gnidovec, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nJack P. Rimland, of Law Office of Jack P. Rimland, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0297-01", "first_page_order": 315, "last_page_order": 321 }