{
  "id": 4022218,
  "name": "In re DENISE C., Alleged to be a Person Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Denise C., Respondent-Appellant)",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Denise C.",
  "decision_date": "2004-05-28",
  "docket_number": "No. 1-02-1535",
  "first_page": "889",
  "last_page": "893",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "348 Ill. App. 3d 889"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "287 Ill. App. 3d 1088",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        521028
      ],
      "year": 1997,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "1095"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/287/1088-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "313 Ill. App. 3d 788",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        186491
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 2000,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "796"
        },
        {
          "page": "796"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/313/0788-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "229 Ill. App. 3d 737",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        5215452
      ],
      "year": 1992,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "738-39"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/229/0737-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "239 Ill. App. 3d 880",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        5147709
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1993,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "884-85"
        },
        {
          "page": "884-85"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/239/0880-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 444,
    "char_count": 8215,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.74,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 6.15741549407694e-08,
      "percentile": 0.38261033751388596
    },
    "sha256": "477a75db723b03592f598d3f5aeddc4f3cf0daccb04d21e39515826b7205ee59",
    "simhash": "1:994622de204efeec",
    "word_count": 1328
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:23:16.717830+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "In re DENISE C., Alleged to be a Person Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Denise C., Respondent-Appellant)."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE HARTIGAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter a hearing, respondent Denise C. was found to be a person subject to involuntary admission under the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) (405 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 100 et seq. (West 2002)) and the circuit court ordered that her hospitalization in the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities (Department) continue. Respondent contends that the order authorizing her continued involuntary admission should be reversed because the State did not comply with section 3 \u2014 601(b)(2) of the Code, which requires the provision of specified information in a petition for involuntary admission. 405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 601(b)(2) (West 2002).\nOn April 26, 2002, Department social worker Alice Moneypenny filed a petition for the involuntary admission of respondent. The petition alleged that respondent \u201ccontinues to be subject to involuntary admission\u201d and was \u201cin need of immediate hospitalization\u201d because she was mentally ill and due to that mental illness was reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon herself or another in the near future and was unable to provide for her basic physical needs so as to guard herself from serious harm. Specifically, Moneypenny alleged that respondent \u201cremains very easily agitated and at times paranoid\u201d and had engaged in \u201ckarate hand chops and kicks\u201d and \u201cthreatening behavior towards staff\u201d because \u201cher hostility is fueled by delusions [that] staff are sorcerers and have evil powers\u201d and because she \u201caccuses women here of wanting her \u2018husband\u2019 (abusive ex-boyfriend) and becomes irate.\u201d Where the petition form asked for \u201cthe names and addresses of the spouse, parent, guardian, close relative or, if none, a friend of the respondent,\u201d Moneypenny answered that respondent \u201chas never provided this information.\u201d The petition was supported by psychiatrist certificates by Dr. Phyu Marhla and Dr. Marlene Alejos, indicating examinations on April 26, 2002, the date of the petition.\nA hearing was held on the petition on May 7, 2002. Dr. Marhla, the sole witness, testified in part that respondent referred to a certain man as her husband, fianc\u00e9, and boyfriend. When Department staff telephoned the man identified by respondent, he cursed and hung up. Respondent referred to particular Department staff members as her brother or son, while in fact they were not related to respondent. No family member of respondent had visited or telephoned her while she was in the Department hospital. When asked by Department staff who could take care of her if she were released and could not go to her husband, respondent identified a community mental health agency. The court found that respondent was subject to involuntary admission and that hospitalization was the least restrictive treatment. Respondent did not object to the petition at the hearing or make a motion to strike or dismiss the petition.\nRespondent solely contends on appeal that the order authorizing her continued involuntary admission should be reversed because the State did not comply in its petition for involuntary admission with section 3 \u2014 601(b)(2) requiring that such a petition contain information regarding relatives, guardians, or friends. She does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at trial.\nSection 3 \u2014 601(b)(2) of the Code requires that a petition for involuntary admission contain:\n\u201cThe name and address of the spouse, parent, guardian, substitute decision maker, if any, and close relative, or if none, the name and address of any known friend of the respondent whom the petitioner has reason to believe may know or have any of the other names and addresses. If the petitioner is unable to supply any such names and addresses, the petitioner shall state that diligent inquiry was made to learn this information and specify the steps taken.\u201d 405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 601(b)(2) (West 2002).\nA petition that does not list relatives or friends or indicate that a diligent inquiry was made to locate them is fatally defective under the Code. In re Adams, 239 Ill. App. 3d 880, 884-85 (1993); In re Wiessing, 229 Ill. App. 3d 737, 738-39 (1992). Reversal is mandated because the error may prejudice the respondent, even where the respondent did not object in the trial court to the lack of familial information in the petition. Adams, 239 Ill. App. 3d at 884-85. However, a petition for involuntary commitment should be read in its entirety, and it is sufficient to provide information required by the Code somewhere in the petition. In re Bert W, 313 Ill. App. 3d 788, 796 (2000). Where a petition did not provide the required familial information but an attached report explained that the respondent refused to give a social history and had no known family or friends except for a named sister whom the respondent would not acknowledge and was thus not contacted, the petition as a whole indicated that a diligent effort had been made to find family and friends as required by the Code and that there was no prejudice to the respondent. In re Robinson, 287 Ill. App. 3d 1088, 1095 (1997).\nHere, while the petition did not list any family members or friends as required by the Code, the question was not simply left unanswered as in Adams and Wiessing. Instead, the petition stated that respondent had never provided the information and that respondent claimed to have a husband who was in fact an \u201cabusive ex-boyfriend,\u201d clearly not the responsible contact person contemplated by the Code. This case is analogous to Robinson, where a statement that respondent refused to give a social history and did not acknowledge her one known relative was a sufficient indication of the diligence required by the Code. Also, the hearing testimony indicates that Department personnel asked respondent questions and gathered information to determine whether she had any relatives or friends of the sort contemplated by the Code. In contrast to Robinson, where the respondent\u2019s sister was not contacted because the respondent did not acknowledge her, here the Department contacted respondent\u2019s one known acquaintance, the husband/fianc\u00e9/boyfriend, who expressed his refusal to cooperate. It is reasonable to conclude from the evidence that the Department made diligent efforts to find family and friends as contemplated by section 3 \u2014 601(b)(2), that willing or concerned family or friends could not be found, and thus that respondent suffered no prejudice.\nAs to respondent\u2019s argument that the form petition used here does not comply with section 3 \u2014 601(b)(2) because it does not solicit from petitioners the name and address of respondent\u2019s substitute decision maker, a reviewing court will not reverse a civil commitment for minor deviations in form which cause no prejudice to respondent. Bert W., 313 Ill. App. 3d at 796. A substitute decision maker is a person designated \u201cunder the Powers of Attorney for Health Care Law or under the Mental Health Treatment Preference Declaration Act.\u201d 405 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 110.5 (West 2002). Here, there is no indication that respondent designated a substitute decision maker and thus no showing of prejudice. Also, the phrase \u201csubstitute decision maker, if any,\u201d in section 3 \u2014 601(b)(2) clearly indicates that the legislature was aware of the prospect that a respondent may not have a substitute decision maker. 405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 601(b)(2) (West 2002). While it would be preferable for the State\u2019s petition form to refer to all the persons listed in section 3 \u2014 601(b)(2), we will not reverse the trial court\u2019s judgment on such a formal basis absent some showing of prejudice to respondent.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nCAMPBELL, P.J., and REID, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE HARTIGAN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Peter Maltese, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People.",
      "Amy J. Szczepaniak, William Conroy, and Jeff M. Plesko, all of Guardianship and Advocacy Commission, of Tinley Park, for appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "In re DENISE C., Alleged to be a Person Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Denise C., Respondent-Appellant).\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1\u201402\u20141535\nOpinion filed May 28, 2004.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Peter Maltese, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People.\nAmy J. Szczepaniak, William Conroy, and Jeff M. Plesko, all of Guardianship and Advocacy Commission, of Tinley Park, for appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0889-01",
  "first_page_order": 907,
  "last_page_order": 911
}