{ "id": 4021943, "name": "In re MARK W., a Person Asserted to Be Subject to Involuntary Treatment With Psychotropic Medications (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Mark W., Respondent-Appellant (The Department of Human Services, Intervenor-Appellee))", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Mark W.", "decision_date": "2004-06-08", "docket_number": "No. 5-02-0461", "first_page": "1065", "last_page": "1077", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "348 Ill. App. 3d 1065" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "775 N.E.2d 616", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "619", "parenthetical": "an appellate court will reverse a trial court's order to involuntarily administer psychotropic medications only if it is manifestly erroneous" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 Ill. App. 3d 427", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 487126 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430-31", "parenthetical": "an appellate court will reverse a trial court's order to involuntarily administer psychotropic medications only if it is manifestly erroneous" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/333/0427-01" ] }, { "cite": "806 N.E.2d 1233", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1242" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 Ill. App. 3d 1121", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3832570 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1132" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/346/1121-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 F. Supp. 2d 158", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9260334 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/305/0158-01" ] }, { "cite": "558 N.E.2d 1194", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3251477 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/137/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "549 N.E.2d 292", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "299" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Ill. 2d 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3260643 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "49" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/133/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "504 U.S. 127", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11728086 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "135" }, { "page": "489" }, { "page": "1815" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/504/0127-01" ] }, { "cite": "539 U.S. 166", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 8897706 ], "weight": 30, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "178-79" }, { "page": "211" }, { "page": "2183" }, { "page": "178-79" }, { "page": "211" }, { "page": "2183" }, { "page": "179-80" }, { "page": "211" }, { "page": "2184" }, { "page": "181-82" }, { "page": "213" }, { "page": "2185" }, { "page": "180-81" }, { "page": "211-12" }, { "page": "2184-85" }, { "page": "182" }, { "page": "213" }, { "page": "2185" }, { "page": "180-81" }, { "page": "211-12" }, { "page": "2184-85" }, { "page": "182" }, { "page": "213" }, { "page": "2185" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/539/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "494 U.S. 210", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5046 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "the United States Supreme Court held that a state prisoner has a liberty interest, under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, in refusing the administration of psychotropic medication" }, { "parenthetical": "the United States Supreme Court held that a state prisoner has a liberty interest, under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, in refusing the administration of psychotropic medication" }, { "parenthetical": "the United States Supreme Court held that a state prisoner has a liberty interest, under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, in refusing the administration of psychotropic medication" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/494/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "641 N.E.2d 345", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 9, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "351" }, { "page": "354" }, { "page": "354" }, { "page": "354" }, { "page": "354" }, { "page": "354" }, { "page": "355" }, { "page": "356" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 Ill. 2d 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 783189 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "214" }, { "page": "219" }, { "page": "219" }, { "page": "220" }, { "page": "220" }, { "page": "220" }, { "page": "221" }, { "page": "224" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/161/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "514 N.E.2d 977", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "980" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 Ill. 2d 140", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3188649 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "146" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/118/0140-01" ] }, { "cite": "727 N.E.2d 200", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "204" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "189 Ill. 2d 635", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1224793 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "639" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/189/0635-01" ] }, { "cite": "786 N.E.2d 1019", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1027" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "203 Ill. 2d 352", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 799391 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "367" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/203/0352-01" ] }, { "cite": "792 N.E.2d 421", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "436" }, { "page": "436" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 Ill. App. 3d 238", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5574785 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "257" }, { "page": "258" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/341/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "788 N.E.2d 310", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "315" }, { "page": "315" }, { "page": "316-17" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 Ill. App. 3d 1096", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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Mark W., Respondent-Appellant (The Department of Human Services, Intervenor-Appellee))." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE DONOVAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nRespondent, Mark W, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Madison County granting the State\u2019s petition to involuntarily administer psychotropic medication to Mark W. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court\u2019s finding that section 2 \u2014 107.1 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Mental Health Code) (405 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 107.1 (West 2002)) is constitutional as applied to pretrial detainees generally and to respondent specifically, but we reverse the order granting the State\u2019s request to involuntarily administer psychotropic medication.\nBACKGROUND\nOn December 19, 1999, Mark W. was arrested in Peoria County and charged with the aggravated battery of two police officers. The record reveals that on the evening of December 19, 1999, the police were summoned to a bar where Mark W. was alleged to have been removing beer bottles from the garbage and drinking the remaining beer from the discarded bottles. The police found Mark W a short distance from the tavern. Mark W admitted going through the garbage and indicated that he was entitled to do so because he owned the property. He also told the police that he was their \u201ccommander\u201d and a \u201cpriest of the high order.\u201d In the process of Mark W.\u2019s arrest, he allegedly struggled with and struck the two arresting officers.\nOn December 28, 1999, Mark W. was indicted on two charges of having \u201cmade physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature\u201d with two police officers. On June 5, 2000, a judge of the Tenth Judicial Circuit in Peoria County found Mark W unfit to stand trial pursuant to section 104 \u2014 10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/104 \u2014 10 (West 2002)). Mark W was admitted to Alton Mental Health Center on June 19, 2000. While at Alton Mental Health Center, Mark W. received various antipsychotic drugs, including Zyprexa, which was replaced with Risperdal, which was ultimately replaced with Clozaril. On May 25, 2001, the Peoria County trial court found Mark W. fit to stand trial and he was released on bond.\nMark W stopped taking his medication after his release on bond. On February 8, 2002, Mark W. was again found unfit to stand trial by the trial court in Peoria County. On April 3, 2002, Mark W. was remanded to the custody of Department of Human Services (DHS) for inpatient treatment. On April 9, 2002, Mark W. was readmitted to Alton Mental Health Center.\nOn April 19, 2002, Dr. Kanwal Mahmood, Mark W.\u2019s treating psychiatrist, filed a petition for involuntary treatment, which is the subject of this appeal. The petition sought to force Mark W to receive antipsychotic medication, Clozaril, on a nonemergency basis. The petition indicated that Mark W was suffering from schizophrenia, was delusional, and had deteriorated in his ability to care for himself. The petition opined that the administration would make Mark W \u201cmore in touch with reality\u201d so that he could \u201cfunction in the community.\u201d The petition made no mention of his status as unfit to stand trial or a goal of making him fit for trial. The court ordered the petition set for a hearing on April 25, 2002. The case was continued on Mark W\u2019s motion to allow him to be examined by a mental health professional not employed by DHS.\nOn May 16, 2002, Mark W filed a motion to dismiss, contending, inter alia, that section 2 \u2014 107.1 of the Mental Health Code was unconstitutional as applied to pretrial detainees in general and to him specifically. Mark W. filed three affidavits, which incorporated pertinent documents and exhibits. One of these was a report of Dr. Bryce Sullivan, a licensed clinical psychologist, who examined Mark W on two occasions. His report provided a review of Mark W.\u2019s mental health records as well as his opinions, within a reasonable degree of psychological certainty, regarding the potential effects of forcing non-emergency drugs upon Mark W\nDr. Sullivan noted that Mark W. had a history of psychiatric problems which dated back to at least 1990 and also had a history of noncompliance with treatment for psychiatric problems. Dr. Sullivan stated: \u201c[T]he risk of [Mark W] causing serious physical harm to himself or others, like all clinical predications of dangerousness, is difficult to ascertain. He clearly has the potential of behaving in a manner that could cause injury to others[,] as indicated by the police report of 12/19/99 in which [Mark W] was alleged to have caused injury to two police officers which required medical attention. However, the mere existence of prior episodes of aggressive behavior does not, by itself, predict future similar behaviors.\u201d Dr. Sullivan went on to state that Mark W. \u201cdoes have the capacity to inflict serious physical harm upon himself or another person\u201d and that a \u201cfacility with the authority to administer emergency psychotropic medication and physical restrains [sic] would, through their use, be able to protect [Mark W] and those with whom he has contact from physical harm if [Mark W] were ever at imminent risk of causing serious physical harm to himself or others.\u201d\nDr. Sullivan\u2019s report listed the numerous side effects of Clozaril, such as agranulocytosis (a blood disease that can lead to death that is characterized by a reduction in a certain type of white blood cells), seizures, adverse cardiovascular and respiratory effects, neuroleptic malignant syndrome, tardive dyskinesia, drowsiness, sedation, fatigue, dizziness, vertigo, headache, tremor, syncope, restlessness, agitation, rigidity, akathisia, confusion, fatigue, hyperkinesia, amnesia/memory loss, loss of speech, stuttering, and many others. Dr. Sullivan opined that if Mark W were administered Clozaril, these side effects could impact trial-related issues, such as making it mor\u00e9 difficult for Mark W to focus on the testimony of witnesses at his criminal trial and making it more difficult for Mark W. to communicate with his counsel and assist his counsel with his defense. Additionally, the side effects could negatively impact jurors\u2019 perceptions of his credibility and character and the content of his testimony at his criminal trial. Finally, Dr. Sullivan opined that if Mark W. were administered Clozaril and the effects of the medication resulted, he would appear more sane at his trial than if he did not receive the effects of the medication.\nOn July 3, 2002, the trial court heard and considered Mark W.\u2019s motion to declare section 2 \u2014 107.1 of the Mental Health Code unconstitutional as applied to pretrial detainees in general and Mark W specifically. The trial court found that the statute was constitutional, and the court denied the motion.\nThe court then proceeded to hear the State\u2019s motion for the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication. The parties chose not to present the testimony of any witnesses but simply presented a stipulation regarding what their testimony would be if called to testify. (The content of the stipulation will be provided and discussed later in this opinion.) The trial court then signed an order prepared by the State to involuntarily administer psychotropic medication to Mark W. The order for the administration of psychotropic medication was in effect for 90 days. Mark W appeals the July 3, 2002, order for the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication.\nSubsequent to the filing of the notice of appeal, on February 7, 2003, the trial court in Peoria County found that Mark W had been in the custody of DHS for one year and that Mark W remained unfit. A discharge hearing was set on May 9, 2003. On May 9, 2003, Mark W was found not guilty by reason of insanity on both counts.\nANALYSIS\nIn undertaking our review, we begin by finding that this case is moot. The duration of the order entered on July 3, 2002, was 90 days. Mark W. was found not guilty by reason of insanity on May 9, 2003. Because the order for the involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs has expired and Mark W is no longer a pretrial detainee, any relief we may provide is essentially an advisory opinion. Appellate courts generally lack jurisdiction to render advisory opinions. See In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill. 2d 393, 401, 781 N.E.2d 237, 242 (2002). However, we find that the constitutional issue raised in Mark W.\u2019s appeal falls within the public-interest exception to the mootness doctrine. The criteria for this exception are (1) the public nature of the issues presented, (2) the desirability of an authoritative determination for the purpose of guiding public officials, and (3) the likelihood that the question will recur. In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill. 2d at 402, 781 N.E.2d at 242-43; see also In re Evelyn S., 337 Ill. App. 3d 1096, 1101-02, 788 N.E.2d 310, 315 (2003). The procedures courts must follow to authorize the involuntary medication of mental health patients are a matter of \u201csubstantial public concern.\u201d In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill. 2d at 402, 781 N.E.2d at 243. Because of the short duration of orders authorizing involuntary treatment, it is likely that the circumstances present in the case at bar will recur without the opportunity to be litigated before the case is rendered moot by the expiration of the order. In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill. 2d at 402-03, 781 N.E.2d at 243. For those reasons, we deny the State\u2019s motion to dismiss, and we will address the constitutional issue raised by Mark W\nInitially, we note that in In re Evelyn S., 337 Ill. App. 3d 1096, 788 N.E.2d 310 (2003), we found that the Mental Health Code governs the administration of psychotropic medication to pretrial detainees found unfit to stand trial. In re Evelyn S., 337 Ill. App. 3d at 1102, 788 N.E.2d at 315; see also In re Robert S., 341 Ill. App. 3d 238, 792 N.E.2d 421 (2003). The Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 includes procedures for the involuntary commitment of defendants found unfit to stand trial, but it does not contain provisions for determining whether the treatment of a pretrial detainee found unfit to stand trial may include the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication. In re Evelyn S., 337 Ill. App. 3d at 1103-04, 788 N.E.2d at 316-17. In the absence of the procedural safeguards provided by the Mental Health Code, there would be no procedural safeguards at all. In re Robert S., 341 Ill. App. 3d at 257, 792 N.E.2d at 436.\nNext, the statute we are analyzing, section 2 \u2014 107.1, allows for the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication on a non-emergency basis if certain criteria are established by clear and convincing evidence. At the time of the events herein, the statute provided as follows:\n\u201c(A) That the recipient has a serious mental illness or developmental disability.\n(B) That because of said mental illness or developmental disability, the recipient exhibits any one of the following: (i) deterioration of his or her ability to function, (ii) suffering, or (iii) threatening behavior.\n(C) That the illness or disability has existed for a period marked by the continuing presence of the symptoms set forth in item (B) of this subdivision (4) or the repeated episodic occurrence of these symptoms.\n(D) That the benefits of the treatment outweigh the harm.\n(E) That the recipient lacks the capacity to make a reasoned decision about the treatment.\n(F) That other less restrictive services have been explored and found inappropriate.\n(G) If the petition seeks authorization for testing and other procedures, that such testing and procedures are essential for the safe and effective administration of the treatment.\u201d 405 ILCS 5/2\u2014 107.1(a \u2014 5)(4) (West 2002).\nOur review of the merits of Mark W.\u2019s unconstitutionality claim is guided by the following principles. \u201cLegislative enactments carry a strong presumption of constitutionality, and a party challenging the constitutionality of a statute has the burden of clearly establishing its invalidity.\u201d People v. Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d 352, 367, 786 N.E.2d 1019, 1027 (2003); see also People v. Falbe, 189 Ill. 2d 635, 727 N.E.2d 200 (2000); People v. Inghram, 118 Ill. 2d 140, 514 N.E.2d 977 (1987). It is our duty to affirm a statute\u2019s constitutionality if reasonably possible, and any doubts must be resolved in favor of the validity of the challenged enactment. Falbe, 189 Ill. 2d at 639, 727 N.E.2d at 204; Inghram, 118 Ill. 2d at 146, 514 N.E.2d at 980.\nThe Illinois Supreme Court has previously determined that the provisions of the Mental Health Code authorizing the forced administration of psychotropic medication to a mental patient did not violate the patient\u2019s substantive due process rights and that the provision authorizing the forced administration of drugs to patients exhibiting disruptive or threatening behavior was not unconstitutionally vague. In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d 200, 641 N.E.2d 345 (1994). In re C.E. involved an adult male whom the circuit court found subject to involuntary admission to a hospital for treatment and evaluation. C.E.\u2019s guardian filed a petition for declaratory relief and requested that the trial court declare section 2 \u2014 107.1 unconstitutional. The trial court held that section 2 \u2014 107.1 was facially unconstitutional and therefore held the section null and void. Upon review, the Illinois Supreme Court stated, \u201c[Pjersons who are mentally ill or developmentally disabled have a Federal constitutionally protected liberty interest to refuse the administration of psychotropic drugs.\u201d In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d at 214, 641 N.E.2d at 351; see Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 108 L. Ed. 2d 178, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990) (the United States Supreme Court held that a state prisoner has a liberty interest, under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, in refusing the administration of psychotropic medication). After a detailed analysis of how section 2 \u2014 107.1 addresses the State\u2019s concern for the well-being of those who are not able to make a rational choice regarding the administration of psychtropic medication, the court concluded, \u201c[Sjection 2 \u2014 107.1 does not, on its face, impermissibly burden the Federal constitutional liberty interests of C.E.\u201d In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d at 219, 641 N.E.2d at 354. As a result, the court found that section 2 \u2014 107.1 was constitutional as applied to C.E. and similarly situated individuals.\nIn this case, Mark W. contends that when applied to him and other pretrial detainees, section 2 \u2014 107.1 neither requires nor allows any inquiry whatsoever into whether its application would force a respondent to take medication that would, in effect, involuntarily sacrifice his right to a fair trial. Mark W contends that the side effects from the medication may make it difficult, if not impossible, for him to focus on the testimony of witnesses or to communicate and assist his counsel, the medication would negatively impact jurors\u2019 perceptions of his credibility and character, and finally, the medication could rob him of the opportunity to present an effective insanity defense.\nAfter Mark W\u2019s argument was presented to this court, the United Supreme Court rendered its opinion in Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 156 L. Ed. 2d 197, 123 S. Ct. 2174 (2003), holding that the government may involuntarily administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant to render that defendant competent to stand trial under certain \u201crare\u201d circumstances. The Court in Sell recognized that it previously had held that a defendant has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in avoiding the involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs. Sell, 539 U.S. at 178-79, 156 L. Ed. 2d at 211, 123 S. Ct. at 2183, citing Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 118 L. Ed. 2d 479, 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992). The Court found that only an \u201c \u2018essential\u2019 \u201d or \u201c \u2018overriding\u2019 \u201d state interest could overcome this liberty interest. Sell, 539 U.S. at 178-79, 156 L. Ed. 2d at 211, 123 S. Ct. at 2183, quoting Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135, 118 L. Ed. 2d at 489, 112 S. Ct. at 1815. The Court stated:\n\u201c[T]he Constitution permits the Government involuntarily to administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing serious criminal charges in order to render that defendant competent to stand trial, but only if the treatment is medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial, and, taking account of less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly to further important governmental trial-related interests.\nThis standard will permit involuntary administration of drugs solely for trial competence purposes in certain instances.\u201d Sell, 539 U.S. at 179-80, 156 L. Ed. 2d at 211, 123 S. Ct. at 2184.\nThe Court in Sell went on to state:\n\u201c[T]he court applying these standards is seeking to determine whether involuntary administration of drugs is necessary significantly to further a particular governmental interest, namely, the interest in rendering the defendant competent to stand trial. A court need not consider whether to allow forced medication for that kind of purpose, if forced medication is warranted for a different purpose, such as the purposes set out in Harper related to the individual\u2019s dangerousnesst ] or purposes related to the individual\u2019s own interests where refusal to take drugs puts his health gravely at risk. [Citation.] There are often strong reasons for a court to determine whether forced administration of drugs can be justified on these alternative grounds before turning to the trial competence question.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Sell, 539 U.S. at 181-82, 156 L. Ed. 2d at 213, 123 S. Ct. at 2185.\nSee also In re Robert S., 341 Ill. App. 3d at 258, 792 N.E.2d at 436.\nWe can only assume that Mark W.\u2019s argument after Sell would be that section 2 \u2014 107.1 is unconstitutional because it does not \u201crequire or allow for\u201d the trial court to consider the protections provided for pretrial criminal defendants contained in Sell. The court in In re C.E. provides the necessary guidance to resolve this issue. The respondent in In re C.E. contended that section 2 \u2014 107.1 was unconstitutional because it did not specifically require the application of the \u201csubstituted judgment\u201d test. In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d at 219, 641 N.E.2d at 354. The \u201csubstituted judgment\u201d analysis was adopted in In re Estate of Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d 33, 549 N.E.2d 292 (1989), and In re Estate of Greenspan, 137 Ill. 2d 1, 558 N.E.2d 1194 (1990), in which the court found that in certain specifically limited circumstances, a guardian may lawfully exercise a ward\u2019s common law right to refuse the administration of life-sustaining medical treatment. In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d at 220, 641 N.E.2d at 354. Under the substituted judgment analysis, the \u201c \u2018surrogate decision-maker attempts to establish, with as much accuracy as possible, what decision the patient would make if he were competent to do so.\u2019 \u201d In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d at 220, 641 N.E.2d at 354, quoting In re Estate of Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d at 49, 549 N.E.2d at 299. In In re C.E. the court observed as follows:\n\u201cInitially, we note that section 2 \u2014 107.1 does not explicitly adopt the \u2018best interests\u2019 or the \u2018substituted judgment\u2019 test. Neither phrase appears explicitly or verbatim in the language of section 2 \u2014 107.1[.] We also find it noteworthy that section 2 \u2014 107.1, by its terms, does not foreclose the court\u2019s consideration of the wishes expressed by the mental health recipient while the recipient was competent. Section 2 \u2014 107.1 requires proof that the benefits of the psychotropic medication will outweigh its harms, and that other treatment alternatives have been considered and found ineffective. (405 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 107.1(d)(4), (d)(5) (West 1992).)\u201d In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d at 220, 641 N.E.2d at 354.\nThe court went on to find as follows:\n\u201cSection 2 \u2014 107.1 requires a showing, by clear and convincing proof, that the involuntary administration of the medication will outweigh the harms that may be caused by the medication. (405 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 107.1(d)(4) (West 1992).) The recipient\u2019s subjective perceptions may well be an integral part of this proof. Thus, the factors specified in the statute may often require that the trial court take into account the subjective attitudes of the recipient while the recipient was competent.\nConsequently, we conclude that section 2 \u2014 107.1 permits the court\u2019s consideration of the \u2018substituted judgment\u2019 of the mental health recipient, and that the court respect the wishes expressed by the mental health patient when the patient was capable of making rational treatment decisions in his own behalf.\u201d In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d at 221, 641 N.E.2d at 355.\nAs a result, the court found no error, \u201cunder Federal constitutional law, in the legislature\u2019s failure to expressly include the \u2018substituted judgment\u2019 test in section 2 \u2014 107.1.\u201d In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d at 224, 641 N.E.2d at 356.\nConsistent with the reasoning in In re C.E., we find that section 2 \u2014 107.1 is constitutional. Section 2 \u2014 107.1(a\u20145)(4)(D) (405 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 107.1(a\u20145)(4)(D) (West 2002)) (which requires a showing, by clear and convincing proof, that the involuntary administration of the medication will outweigh the harms that may be caused by the medication) allows the trial court to consider the factors identified in Sell when deciding whether to order the involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs to a pretrial defendant. As Mark W. correctly contends, one of the harms that may be caused by the medication is the involuntary sacrifice of his right to a fair trial.\nIn compliance with Sell, when considering whether to involuntarily administer psychotropic drugs to a mentally ill and unfit person with pending criminal charges, the trial judge must consider the following factors: (1) that important governmental interests are at stake, (2) that involuntary medication will significantly further those concomitant state interests, (3) that involuntary medication is necessary to further those state interests, and (4) that the administration of the drugs is medically appropriate, i.e., in the patient\u2019s best medical interest in light of his medical condition. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180-81, 156 L. Ed. 2d at 211-12, 123 S. Ct. at 2184-85; see also United States v. Gomes, 305 F. Supp. 2d 158 (D. Conn. 2004). Alternatively, the United States Supreme Court has directed trial courts to determine whether forced medication may be warranted for a purpose other than returning a defendant to competence to stand trial, such as \u201cpurposes *** related to the individual\u2019s dangerousness[ ] or purposes related to the individual\u2019s own interests where refusal to take drugs puts his health gravely at risk.\u201d Sell, 539 U.S. at 182, 156 L. Ed. 2d at 213, 123 S. Ct. at 2185; see also Gomes, 305 F. Supp. 2d 158. The court\u2019s findings must be determined on the basis of current circumstances, because the defendant\u2019s medical condition may have changed over time. Sell, 539 U.S. 166, 156 L. Ed. 2d 197, 123 S. Ct. 2174. Given our interpretation of section 2 \u2014 107.1(a\u20145)(4)(D), we find that the trial judge was correct in finding that section 2 \u2014 107.1 is constitutional as applied to pretrial criminal defendants and Mark W. specifically.\nAfter the constitutional issue was decided by the trial judge, the court proceeded to the hearing on the petition to involuntarily administer psychotropic drugs to Mark W Rather than call witnesses before the court, the parties chose to present evidence in the form of a stipulation regarding what the witnesses would testify to if called. The stipulation was presented to the court as follows:\n\u201c[Defense Attorney:] I\u2019ve discussed the situation with [Mark W] several times, and based on his interest in not wanting to be called to testify and not wanting to have to testify, he\u2019s going to follow my advice and not testify in this proceeding. Based on that, we\u2019ll have no evidence to dispute the [S]tate\u2019s witnesses, so we\u2019re willing to stipulate that the State would offer evidence that Mark has a serious mental illness, that because of his illness he suffers by suffering from pervasive delusions, [that] his symptoms have persisted for a marked period of time, that they believe that the benefits of the treatment would outweigh the harm, that he lacks the capacity to make a reasoned decision about his treatment, and that less restrictive services are inappropriate.\nWe don\u2019t necessarily agree with all of that evidence, but we stipulate that it will be presented, and we have nothing to controvert it.\nTHE COURT: You\u2019re not going to rebut it?\n[Defense Attorney:] So based on that, even though I reserve the argument that [section] 2 \u2014 107.1 should not apply, under [section] 2 \u2014 107.1 an order certainly could and should be entered.\nTHE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Rothert. Is that accurate, Mr. Barberis?\n[Assistant State\u2019s Attorney:] The State would accept his stipulation, and based upon the order that we presented, we believe that if called to testify, the State [sic] would be able to call the treating physician, Dr. Mahmood, and that we would be able to establish that the requested psychotropic medications are needed, and that the Court would concur and enter the order.\ns}{\nTHE COURT: All right. Under the circumstances, the Court will find that [Mark W] is a person who is subject to the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication, that being [C]lozaril up to a maximum of 900 milligrams per day, and that the [Cjlozaril laboratory examinations are also authorized.\u201d\nInitially, we observe that although stipulations are to be encouraged, clarity and precision of thought should be encouraged as well. \u201cThese goals can be obtained by ensuring that the stipulation to which the parties agree is both accurate and complete.\u201d People v. Durgan, 346 Ill. App. 3d 1121, 1132, 806 N.E.2d 1233, 1242 (2004). The stipulation does not include the report of Dr. Sullivan and is extremely general regarding Dr. Mahmood\u2019s testimony. Of course, the parties and the court did not have the benefit of the Sell decision when this stipulation was agreed to by the parties and accepted by the court. The stipulation fails to adequately address the factors identified in Sell \u2014 (1) that important governmental interests are at stake, (2) that involuntary medication will significantly further those concomitant state interests, (3) that involuntary medication is necessary to further those state interests, and (4) that the administration of the drugs is medically appropriate, i.e., in the patient\u2019s best medical interest in light of his medical condition (Sell, 539 U.S. at 180-81, 156 L. Ed. 2d at 211-12, 123 S. Ct. at 2184-85) \u2014 which are to be considered when a court decides whether an individual charged with a crime is, prior to trial, subject to the involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs. In addition, as we now know, forced medication may also be warranted for a purpose other than returning a defendant to competence to stand trial, such as \u201cpurposes *** related to the individual\u2019s dangerousness[ ] or purposes related to the individual\u2019s own interests where refusal to take drugs puts his health gravely at risk.\u201d Sell, 539 U.S. at 182,. 156 L. Ed. 2d at 213, 123 S. Ct. at 2185. The stipulation also fails to address this alternate ground for granting the State\u2019s petition. As a result, we find that it was manifestly erroneous for the trial court to grant the State\u2019s petition to involuntarily administer psychotropic medication to Mark W, considering that, at the time, he was charged with a criminal offense and he was awaiting trial. See In re Jennifer H., 333 Ill. App. 3d 427, 430-31, 775 N.E.2d 616, 619 (2002) (an appellate court will reverse a trial court\u2019s order to involuntarily administer psychotropic medications only if it is manifestly erroneous).\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we deny the motion to dismiss this appeal as moot, we affirm the trial court\u2019s finding that section 2 \u2014 107.1 of the Mental Health Code is constitutional as applied to pretrial detainees generally and to Mark W. specifically, but we reverse the order granting the State\u2019s request to involuntarily administer psychotropic medication to Mark W Because of Mark W\u2019s current status and the duration of the order, there is no need to remand this matter.\nAffirmed in part and reversed in part.\nCHAPMAN, P.J., and KUEHN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE DONOVAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Jeff M. Plesko and Anthony E. Rothert, both of Guardianship and Advocacy Commission, of Alton, for appellant.", "Bill Mudge, State\u2019s Attorney, of Edwardsville (Norbert J. Goetten, Stephen E. Norris, and Kevin D. Sweeney, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Jan E. Hughes, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellee Department of Human Services." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re MARK W., a Person Asserted to Be Subject to Involuntary Treatment With Psychotropic Medications (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Mark W., Respondent-Appellant (The Department of Human Services, Intervenor-Appellee)).\nFifth District\nNo. 5\u201402\u20140461\nOpinion filed June 8, 2004.\nJeff M. Plesko and Anthony E. Rothert, both of Guardianship and Advocacy Commission, of Alton, for appellant.\nBill Mudge, State\u2019s Attorney, of Edwardsville (Norbert J. Goetten, Stephen E. Norris, and Kevin D. Sweeney, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Jan E. Hughes, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellee Department of Human Services." }, "file_name": "1065-01", "first_page_order": 1083, "last_page_order": 1095 }